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1INTRODUCTION
a) Research Goals
On 8 September 1994, in a pompous ceremony figuring Helmut Kohl, François Mitterand, 
John Major, and Warren Christopher, one of the last remnants of the Cold War was officially 
declared history: American, British, and French troops left Berlin. Similar ceremonies were 
held throughout Germany after 1989 as former allied troops, including the Russian forces, left 
the bases they had occupied for almost fifty years. The farewell speeches held on these 
occasions emphasized the bravery of the troops, the unparalleled success they had in fulfilling 
their mission of safeguarding the freedom of Germany, and the magnanimity of the sending 
countries (on the occasions of Russian troops leaving, tones were more muffled).1
The large-scale deployment of conventional troops of the hostile power-blocs at the Cold War 
frontline, both in West and East Germany, remains a remarkable and outstanding feature of 
European postwar history. On a diminished scale, despite the ceremonies referred to above, 
NATO troops are still present in many places in Germany. This continuity indicates that the 
troop's significance stretched well beyond the allocation of military security against the East 
Allied troop stationing in the Federal Republic cannot be seen as in isolation from basic 
political and economic phenomena.
This study deals with the political impact and important economic consequences o f American 
and British troop-maintenance in the Federal Republic of Germany from 1955 to 1967. It will 
concentrate particularly on the linkage between economic and security issues associated with 
Anglo-American troop maintenance. This linkage manifested itself in many ways during the 
endless conflicts about the foreign exchange expenditure o f the troops. The research period 
has not been chosen randomly. 1955 was the date of West German sovereignty and the status 
of the troops on its soil changed from occupation forces to allies. 1967 marked the end of the 
most serious crisis concerning the continuation of allied troop maintenance under increasingly 
difficult financial conditions - and also the limit of availability of a sufficient archival base.
For the speeches held during the Berlin ceremonies see: EA 19/1994, D550-570.i
2However, many of the conflicts described in this thesis have shown a marked continuity and 
have still not yet been resolved.
Allied troop maintenance in Germany has not been the subject of extensive historical research 
despite it being one of the most conspicuous manifestations of the postwar military-political 
settlement in Europe. A large body of scholarly work exists which interprets allied troop- 
maintenance in Germany entirely within the framework of general strategic and political 
questions. Only the most recent of this literature is based on archival evidence.
The influence of strategic factors, above all nuclear strategy, on the conventional posture in 
the Alliance has been dealt with by whole school of historians.2 A certain consensus has been 
reached in this respect which explains the long-term presence o f the troops in Europe as a 
necessary complement of nuclear weapons and its value as depending on nuclear strategy. 
Their ’tripwire* function - they provide time to consider a nuclear response to an attack - 
figures as their most important role. However, it is evident that strategic factors explain only 
a small part of the continuity of allied troop-maintenance in Germany and that political factors 
played a far more important role.
The political foundations of allied troop stationing have also been extensively researched. The 
concept of ’double containment’3, that is the containment o f both the Soviet-Union and 
Germany, provides a useful framework. The troops tied the United States and Britain to the 
defence of Western Europe, deterred local Soviet aggressions, and controlled the integration 
o f Germany into the military and economic framework of the West.4
2 The most influential work is presumably Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment, 1982. Other examples are 
Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas, 1982; Cioc, Pax Atomica. The Nuclear Defense Debate in Germany, 1988; 
Stromseth, The Origins o f Flexible Response, 1988 and numerous articles in journals like DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 
An assessment of the strategic debate in the Alliance is M.Trachtenberg’s History & Strategy, 1991. For details of 
location, their structure, and changes over the years, see: Duke(ed), US M ilitary Forces and Installations in Europe, 
1988; Duke/Krieger(eds), US Military Forces in Europe, 1993; Lee Gordon, "The Half-Forgotten Army. A Survey 
of British Forces in Germany*, in: THE ECONOMIST 28.11.1970; Mahnkefed), Amerikaner in Deutschland, 1991: 
Nelson, A History o f US M ilitary Forces in Germany, 1987.
3 It is outlined in a very lucid way in Hanrieders, Germany, America, Europe, 1989.
The literature on German rearmament covers all these aspects. See for a comprehensive treatment the three 
volumes of the MGFA(ed), Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956, 1982-1993 with exhaustive 
bibliography. For the political foundations of British and American troop maintenance in Germany, see ch.I and ch.VI.
3Remarkably less research has been done on the major practical problem this troop- 
maintenance has posed for the sending countries and Germany: the problem of the cost and 
the impact o f the financial problem on political-strategic questions as well as on the economic 
relations of the countries involved. At issue in particular was the foreign exchange need of 
the troops which was seen as causing a considerable drain on the reserves of the sending 
countries. This troop cost problem therefore did not only have a military and financial 
component, but it also became a major factor of the monetary relations of the affected 
countries. Historical research on this problem is rare, especially research based on archival 
sources.5 This is surprising given that the history of allied troop maintenance is marked by 
an uninterrupted series of conflicts that arose on this issue. Disagreements about financial 
questions were much more frequent in the Western Alliance than strategic or political 
divergences. When the latter arose, they were often closely linked with the cost issue. It 
therefore seems rather arbitrary to simply separate strategic and political questions from their 
often complicated economic-monetary background. A comprehensive history of allied troop 
maintenance in Germany has to take this into account before it is possible to understand the 
particular role these troops played in postwar German and European history.
As a matter of fact, it is rather surprising that such an expensive kind of deterrence as large- 
scale conventional troop stationing was maintained during all these years, even though the 
main contributing countries -the United States, the United Kingdom and France- constantly
1 In the Anglo-German context only one specific article exists: Kaiser, ’Money, Money, Money’, in: Schmidtfed), 
Zwischen Bündnissicherung und privilegierter Partnerschaft, 1995, which provides an account with many facts but 
does not place the issue in a larger context. A few paragraphs, based on archival evidence, can be found in Schmidt 
G., Großbritannien und Europa, 1989; Mager, Die Stationierung der britischen Rheinarmee, 1990; Thoß, in: 
MGFA(ed), Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik III: Die NATO Option, 1994, p. 198-210.
The history of German-American Offset has been early on the object of some works of political scientists. The meat 
comprehensive are: Thiel, Dollar-Dominanz, Lastenteilung und Amerikanische Truppenpräsenz in Europa, 1979, 
discusses the economic background extensively, suffers, however, strongly from the complete absence of archival 
material; Mendershausen, Troop-Stationing in Germany. Value and Cost (RAND), 1968 provides a brief but well- 
informed analysis; Treverton, The Dotlar-Drain and American Forces in Germany, 1978, based on interviews with 
participants in the events and on privileged access to government documents, is particularly strong on the 1966/67 
crisis. Research based on archives is rare. The exceptions are: Wightman, 'Money and Security. Financing American 
Troops in Germany and the Trilateral Negotiations 1966/67', in: Rivista dt Storia Economica 1/1988, p.26-77, with 
a similar approach to the one adopted in this thesis; Donfried, The Political Economy o f Alliance: Issue Linkage in 
the West-German American Relationship, Ph.D.thesis, 1991, which deals mainly with the Anderson-Dillon episode; 
and Haftendom, Kernwaffen und die Glaubwürdigkeit der Allianz, 1994 which places the issue in the larger context 
of the strategic discussion in NATO during the mid-1960s.
4regarded it as only a temporary solution. Changes in strategic doctrines, the nuclearization of 
the Alliance, the build-up of a large conventional army, the Bundeswehrt and all the related 
economic problems did not decisively alter troop-levels. For an explanation of this continuity 
it is necessary to bridge the wide gap that often exists between disciplines in research on 
contemporary history. The analysis has to be extended beyond the narrow scope of a history 
of the troops and take into account fundamental political and economic aspects of the 
relations between the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany.6
. r*\
As previously mentioned, this research originated from taking a closer look at a problem 
which plagued Bonn’s relations to the countries maintaining troops on German soil: the 
problem of the foreign exchange cost of allied troops in Germany. The United States and the 
United Kingdom tried, during the so-called offset- or support cost negotiations7, to recover 
by various means the huge foreign-exchange losses caused by troop maintenance abroad. The 
potential o f conflict in these negotiations was immense. The Germans regarded them as a 
discriminatory practice and as an outright symbol of their inferior status in the Alliance. In 
contrast, the United States and Great Britain saw them as an important means of ensuring 
German resources for the defence of the West and as a justified contribution to common 
defence. What lifted the conflict to an even higher plane was that both the US and the UK 
came to regard the troop’s foreign exchange cost as a cause for fundamental monetary 
imbalances in the Western World. This interpretation was refuted by the Federal Republic. 
The diverging views led to numerous crises in mutual relations during the period 1955-1967.
Three basic approaches will be adopted in order to guide the analysis:
1) to write a history of the Support Cost- and Offset-negotiations and to link them to related 
phenomena in the economic and political relations of the United States, Great Britain and
* The impact of the troops on German society from a sociological and "micro-historic" point of view has to be 
left aside, although it would be very interesting to look at it in more detail. Many German cities housed large foreign 
garrisons over decades. The troops played not only an important economic role in the region, but presumably also 
fostered a considerable exchange of values and attitudes. See: Signe S., D ie GIs. Amerikanische Soldaten in 
Deutschland, 1985; Nelson D., Defenders or Intruders? The Dilemmas o f U S.Forces in Germany, 1987.
1 Support Crists were direct, budgetary payments by the German government towards the cost of allied troops 
on its territory. Offset are measures short of direct payments which should offset the foreign exchange loss of the 
stationing countries, for example by placing weapon orders in those countries or by investing in their money markets. 
Occupation costs were German contributions to cover the expenses of the occupation forces in 1946-55.
5Germany.
2) to show how economic, and in particular monetary, factors influenced security issues in 
relations between Germany, Europe and the United States.
3) to highlight changes in West Germany's relations with America and Britain in the period 
from 1955 until the Kiesinger/Brandt government's ascendancy to power in 1967, particularly 
regarding the role of economic diplomacy as reflected in the debate about the troops and their 
cost. Special attention will be given to tensions arising from the simultaneous integration of 
Germany in European institutions, in the Atlantic Alliance, and in the international monetary 
system. The objective of the following paragraphs is to clarify and narrow these three 
approaches.
b) The History of the Negotiations on Troop Costs
To write a history of the Support Cost- and Offset-negotiations is a self-evident purpose, 
given (i) the prominence and continuity of this problem during the first twenty years of West 
Germany's membership in NATO and (ii) the absence of related literature and the gaps in the 
few existing works. Reconstructing the events was therefore a first necessary step. However, 
I have not concentrated on the tiring technicalities and day-to-day work of the negotiations. 
It has also was not been my intention to calculate how a fair offset or a fair sharing of the 
defence burden might have looked. Estimating the value of the troops is an essentially 
political assessment. Moreover, their overall cost is almost impossible to quantify* The 
crucial task will be to attempt placing the negotiations in the context of numerous related 
issues such as the debates about troop levels, international monetary relations, armaments 
trade, military strategy, European questions, domestic political and economic factors, etc. The 
negotiations were forums in which such questions were dealt with and therefore provide an 
ideal starting point to take a fresh look at many issues. Generally the negotiations dragged 
on for many months and kept various departments of the respective governments busy, 
thereby producing abundant archival material. This provides a broad fundament to historical
1 See ch.I. In times of crises, like the Berlin crisis 19S8-1961 the troops were naturally regarded as more 
'valuable* than in times of detente. These fluctuations render it not astonishing that NATO never found a formula 
to institutionalize the distribution of the costs. Attempts by political scientists to calculate a fair burden-sharing miss 
this point completely. See for example: Olson/Zeckhauser, ’An Economic Theory of Alliances', in: REVIEW OF 
ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 48/1966, p.266-79; Oneal/Elrod, 'NATO Burden-Sharing and the Forces of 
Change', in: INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 33/1990, p.435-56; van Ypersele de Strihou, 'Sharing the 
Defense Burden among Western Allies’, in: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, 49.4/1967, p.527-536.
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analysis.
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Offset or support costs payments had a direct connection with the level of allied 
troop-maintenance. Reductions were often justified by the insufficiency of German payments. 
The consistent emphasis of German governments on a stable troop level made the threat of 
redeployment an obvious means of pressure. Allied policies concerning troop levels are a 
focus of my research. The British reductions of 1958/59 and the American reductions in 
1966/67 were intensely debated issues. Their connection with the negotiations and their 
economic, political and strategic reasons will be analysed in depth.
c) The Link between Monetary and Security Policy
During a Congressional Hearing on the future of US troop maintenance in Europe, Martin 
Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary o f State for European Affairs, remarked that the US troop 
deployment had been conducive to a *climate o f receptivity toward American economic 
activity in Europe. /  don *t like to imply that our troops in effect are hostage to European 
good behaviour in the economic area, but obviously it would be foolish to deny at a 
psychological level that there is a certain relationship here. * Such statements which suggest 
a close link between economics and security in transatlantic relations have, in particular in 
connection with monetary affairs, found their way into a great number o f very diverse 
scientific works on basic economic and political relations between the European countries, 
especially the FRG, and the United States.9 10 The connection between political-military and 
economic-monetary factors has sparked increasing interest by many political scientists dealing 
with International Relations (IR) or International Political Economy (IPE) since the 1970s.11 
It is certainly no great novelty that security and economical issues were closely linked in
9 US Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services: Special Subcommittee on NATO Commitments, 92nd 
cong., 2nd sess., October 1971-March 1972, p.12574.
10 For example: Calleo/Rowland, America and the World Political Economy: Atlantic Dreams and National 
Realities, 1974; Strange, International Economic Relations o f the Western W orld 1959-71, 1976, p.270-75; Thiel 
(1979); Hanrieder (1989), p.292; Costigliola and Borden, in: Paterson (ed), Kennedy’s Quest For Victory. American 
Foreign Policy 1961-63, 1989, p.24-85.
11 See for example: Bergs ten/Keohane/Nye, * International Economics and International Politics: a framework for 
analysis’, in: Bergsten/Krause(eds), World Politics and International Economics, Washington 1975. For a recent 
attempt: Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade, 1995.
7international relations during the Cold War. However, empirical studies which thoroughly and 
systematically analyse these linkages are rare, particularly those which include a historical
perspective.12
How did political-military factors in German-American and German-British relations influence 
their monetary relations and vice-versa? What exactly was the connection between the 
developments in the international monetary system and allied troop-maintenance in Germany? 
Those are basic themes of this research.
The most fundamental problem in the international monetary system from the 1950s to the 
1970s was the increasing pressure on the currencies of the United Kingdom and, from 1958 
on, of the United States. These problems moved inexorably to the forefront of political 
concerns and exerted an increasing impact on the politics in the Western Alliance. A major 
recipient of the huge Sterling and Dollar outflows was the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Monetary problems therefore assumed an increasingly important role in British-German 
relations since the early 1950’s and in American-German relations from 1959 onwards. 
Germany's monetary policy was, despite the strength of its currency, in many ways restrained 
by the consequences of its commitment to the Western Alliance. The reality of the foreign 
troop maintenance in Germany turned out to be an important factor in this respect.
For the United States and Britain the situation was the reverse. Sterling and Dollar as 
suppliers of international liquidity created a strong burden on the balance-of-payments of both 
countries.13 Washington and London were not willing to abandon the central role their 
currencies played in the world economy, for a variety o f reasons. A stable balance of 
payments was a necessary precondition for these policies. Military expenditure abroad, of 
which troop stationing abroad was a major component, was in either case a conspicuous 
negative factor. Evidently, troop maintenance was not the only, nor even the main cause of 
the disequilibrium of the late 1950’s and 1960's, but they were an easy and popular target for
Strange, 'Political Economy and International Relations', in: Booth/Smith(eds), International Relations Theory 
Today, 1995, p.154-74. One of the few exceptions is: Donfried (1991).
see e.g. Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis, I960; Strange, International Economic Relations o f the Western 
World, 1976, p.45-47.
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demonstrating action on this problem. The USA and Britain saw themselves confronted with 
the dilemma of either assigning more relative value to the strengthening of the balance-of- 
payments or to harmonious relations with the Federal Republic which insisted on stable troop 
levels. This particular situation allows to address anew a whole range of issues which have 
been seen previously only in their purely political-military or monetary context.
8
Research on this theme will proceed alongside the following questions: 1. What was the 
influence o f allied troop-maintenance on the monetary situation o f Germany, the US and 
Britain? 2. How did monetary circumstances affect the attitude o f these countries towards the 
conventional posture? 3. How were these influences converted to different policies towards 
the troop-levels? 4. How were monetary policies affected by political-military considerations? 
Finally, how did the troop cost issue spill over into other areas of mutual relations?
The significance of these problems for German postwar history remains to be evaluated. The 
concentration- of historical research on either security policy or foreign economic policy 
prevents a balanced interpretation of these questions.* 134
d) Offset and German Postwar Foreign Policy
The ’German Question*, understood as the problem of how a re-emerging, powerful Germany 
fits into the European structure of power, is a fundamental problem which underlies most 
research on German postwar foreign policy. Its long history stretches back centuries. Since 
the German reunification it is once more at the center of debate. The problem of Germany 
laid at the heart o f many political issues in postwar Europe, and also formed an essential 
background of troop level and balance o f payments debates.
The ’German Question’ has to bear an exuberant amount of literature.15 Research on it has
Döring-Manteuffel, ’Deutsche Zeitgeschichte nach 1945’, in: VFZ Vol.41, 1/1993, p.1-30.
13 For a critical reviews over much of the German literature see: Michalka(ed), Die deutsche Frage in der
WeltpoUtik (Neue Politische Literatur, Beiheft 3), 1986.
9been traditionally marked by a certain ambiguity in the use of the term.'6 In the postwar 
period the problem of reunification was subsumed under the slogan and was much more 
accentuated than the continuity of the question of Germany's position in Europe.17 It was 
assumed that only when reunification actually should take place, the problem of a German 
hegemonic position in Central Europe would arise anew.18 In reality, the problem of German 
power in Europe never ceased to occupy the minds of West-European and American 
politicians after the war.19
How does this research figure in this context? First, as already mentioned, the significance 
o f the Anglo-American troop stationing was twofold: control of the Soviet Union and control 
o f Germany, 'double containment*. This control function was tacitly but widely acknowledged 
and substantial changes in troop-levels inevitably affected the credibility of this function.20
A second, and for this research even more important, aspect of the problem is the extent to 
which it became an economic one after 1955, when Germany was politically and militarily 
tightly connected to the Western camp. Twice in the twentieth century Germany had been 
able to transform an impressive economic resurgence in assertive, ultimately militarily 
aggressive, foreign policies. The most significant development in the Federal Republic, during 
and after the process of its inclusion into the Western alliance system, was the unprecedented 
economic success in the 1950'$ and 1960's, evoking apprehensions that the Federal Republic 
might use its sheer economic weight to pursue irresponsible policies. In the relationship 
towards its Western Allies the German problem expressed itself increasingly in an economic 
context. This historical process can be traced right up to today when the looming economic
'* Verheyen, The German Question, 1991, p.2-3, discerns four principal dimensions of the German Question: 
1. the question of German identity, 2. the reunification issue, 3. the problem of Germany's place in the international 
environment, 4. the problem of German political and economic power in a narrower regional context.
tT An example for this ambiguous treatment is provided by the articles in Schröderfed), Die Deutsche Frage ab  
internationales Problem , 1990.
18 Heß, Westdeutsche Suche nach nationaler Identität, in: Michalka (1986), p.28.
19 Loth, Der Historiker und die Deutsche Frage, in: Historbches Jahrbuch 11211992, p.366-382.
20 See for example Wiggershaus, *The Other "German Question". The Foundation of the AUantic Pact and the 
Problem of Security against Germany*, in: Di Nolfo(ed), The Atlantic Pact 40 Years Later. A H btorical Appraisal, 
1991,111-126.
hegemony of Germany is a major question of European policy.21
Rising economic power and lasting security dependence gave the foreign policy of the Federal 
Republic a very particular shape in the ’post-sovereignty* period from 1955 onwards. The 
institutionalized constraints on Germany’s sovereignty in the Paris Accords of 1955, and 
possibly even more the self-restraint Germany exerted on its foreign policy as a consequence 
of recent history, contrasted sharply with the spectacular economic rise of the Federal 
Republic. Surprisingly, the role of economic diplomacy has only recently attracted increasing 
attention in accounts of postwar German foreign policy.22 The traditional concentration on 
'classical* attributes of foreign policy (military and alliance politics) has led to a rather 
striking neglect of the more subtle instruments of foreign economic policy in furthering 
Germany's interests.23 This is particularly conspicuous in the field of monetary policy. 
During the 1950s, the German mark became one of the strongest currencies in the world. It 
would be indeed curious if this spectacular development had not had a deep influence on 
foreign policy issues.
How did the allies cope with the new fact of the overwhelming German economic success? 
Was the control-function of the troops used as lever in economic conflicts with the Federal 
Republic? Did Germany’s need for security provided by NATO (and this security was for the 
Germans as a consequence of the crude logic of the nuclear age guaranteed by the presence 
of allied conventional troops on German soil), influence the way it managed its foreign 
economic policy? Did Germany use its economic weight to further its goals during the Cold 
War period?
The comprehensive questions posed in the last paragraph can, of course, not be answered fully 
with the results of this thesis. The objective is to add new angles to this fundamental debate. 
Many of the arguments dealt with in the thesis reappear in one form or another in the
10
11 Schwarz, ’Germany's National and European Interests', in: Baring(ed), Germany's New Position in Europe: 
problems and perspectives, 1994, p.107-30.
22 A good example is Hanrieder (1989).
23 Schröder H.-J., 'Wirtschaftliche Aspekte deutscher Aussenpoiitik in der Adenauer-Ära’, in: Knipping/MQlIer 
(eds), Aus der Ohnmacht zur Bündnismacht: das Machtproblem in der Bundesrepublik, 1945-60, Paderborn 1995.
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contemporary discussion about DM hegemony and similar - real or unreal - consequences of 
Germany’s economic power.
The thesis will proceed chronologically, divided into two parts. The first part will deal with 
the problem of British-German support costs and its implications during the years 1955-60. 
The troop cost issue had no special importance for German-American relations during this 
period. The second part, 1960-67, analyses German-American offset problems. Every chapter 
in both parts will attempt to place the troop cost issue in one or several larger contexts which 
are outlined at the outset of the chapters.
e) Sources and Literature
The coverage of the research period (1955 - 1967) by both published primary sources and 
archival material is extensive. However, biographies, journals, and newspapers were a 
necessary complement. 1 attempted to avoid the parochial view of some archive-based 
research in-which the authors were visibly infatuated by the 'importance* o f key documents 
they had dug up whereas the material often repeats only the temporary position of a small 
part of the concerned government. Particularly, in order to understand the crucial domestic 
context of many issues, secondary sources were essential.
Even so, primary sources are the foundation on which this research rests. Some o f them are 
available in edited form. For US policy, the FRUS edition and the microfiche collection of 
newly declassified documents, the Declassified Documents Reference System, are very useful. 
These editions provide a good documentation of major issues, but unavoidably lack detailed 
material related to the subject. American archives were therefore crucial for this study. 
Extensive research has been carried out in the presidential libraries (JFK Library/Boston, LBJ 
Library in Austin) and in the National Archives (Washington). All of them contain an 
enormous amount of documentation on relevant issues. I consulted also important smaller 
collections like the McGhee Papers (Georgetown University) and the National Security 
Archives (George Washington University, Washington DC).
Extensive published documentation is lacking in the case o f Britain. The Public Record 
Office, however, provides an immense amount of most compelling and comprehensive
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material for all questions related to offset and monetary policy. Material from the Prime 
Ministers Office (PREM), the Cabinet (CAB), the Foreign Office (FO), the Treasury (T) and 
Ministry of Defence (DEFE) files has been consulted. The files are open until 1965 and have 
been thoroughly evaluated. Unfortunately, documentation on British policy in 1966/67 is not 
yet available and the analysis of the British position during these years must remain very 
preliminary.
Published sources for the German side are limited.24 Only recently, the publication of 
German diplomatic documents has begun which covers, however, only the years 1963-65. 
Archives which contain relevant material are spread all over Germany. The Politisches Archiv 
- Auswärtiges Amt/Bonn provides material on the details of the negotiations, though many 
o f the high-level documents are still closed to research. The sources in the 
Bundesarchiv/Koblenz close most of the gaps. Highly rewarding are the papers of various 
involved politicians (Blankenhom, v.Brentano, Etzel, Schaffer, von Guttenberg). The files o f 
the Chancellory (B l36) have proved extremely useful. The central files of the Finance and 
Economics Ministry (B126/B107) also contain further extensive material.
Regarding the monetary side of the question some documentation in the Bundesbankarchiv 
(Frankfurt) was available and very helpful. Smaller collections such as the Defence Ministry 
sources which have been declassified for the Nuclear History Project (Prof.Krieger/Marburg), 
the Ludwig-Erhard Stiftung (Bonn) and the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (München) have been 
consulted. Significantly important, particularly for the crucial year 1966, is the Military Diary 
by former Defence Minister von Hassel. The files of the Defence Ministry in the 
Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv in Freiburg, however, are almost useless for the period o f this 
research due to the lamentable state of declassification.
For the period 1964-67, the archival base is somewhat unbalanced because of the thirty years 
rule. The American side is comprehensively documented, the German sufficiently (although 
crucial documentation can not yet be quoted), and the British only very sketchily. This
14 O f limited value are Adenauers Teegespräche (1950-1963% ed. Schwarz/Morsey, 1984-1992; editions of 
correspondence (like "Sehr Geehrter Herr Bundeskanzler, Von Brentano Briefwechsel mit Adenauer, ed. Baring, 1974; 
HeusslAdenauer 1948-1963, edMensing, 1989), the Protokolle o f the CDU Bundesvorstand 1953-1959, ed. Buchstab, 
1990, and the various memoirs.
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affected particularly the last chapter.
Specific difficulties were presented by the statistical material. Official statistics for many of 
the questions posed in this thesis are hardly available and often unreliable. The influence of 
the troop maintenance on the balance of payments is a question that depends very much on 
interpretation. Balance of payments statistics are subject to numerous revisions by 
governments and the accounting method varies from country to country. Additionally, they 
were often manipulated for the sake of political reasons. Reservations regarding the reliability 
of the statistical material quoted in the thesis are mentioned where necessary.
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CHAPTER I
AMERICAN AND BRITISH TROOPS IN GERMANY 
AND THE FIRST SUPPORT COST AGREEMENT
a) German Rearmament and Allied Troop Maintenance in Germany 
When in May 1955 the Paris Accords came into effect, the great dispute about German 
rearmament which had dragged on for over five years finally came to an end. The result was 
spectacular, encompassing the establishment of West Germany’s sovereignty and its inclusion 
among NATO only ten years after World War n . Hiese events were accompanied by the 
continuation of large scale NATO troop stationing on German soil. American, British, French, 
Canadian, Dutch, Belgian, and Danish troops changed their status from occupiers to 
protectors. The diplomatic process leading up to the Paris Accords as well as the political and 
military causes and implications have been researched in much detail.1 There are, however, 
still many gaps as to the economic foundations of these events -crucial for understanding the 
results- and as to how the plans, embattled for such a long time, were implemented in 
practice.2 3The following paragraphs briefly review the origins of allied troop maintenance in 
Germany and of West German rearmament, emphasizing the link between these two 
developments, within the perspective of economic burden-sharing.
In a way, the events leading up to the Paris Accords can be interpreted as an enormous 
undertaking of multinational burden-sharing initiated by the United States o f America. Very 
soon after World War n , the Americans felt the need to find a way of using German 
resources in the increasingly costly pursuit of the Cold War. However, only the outbreak of 
the Korean War in 1950, and the lessons drawn from it, created the necessary political
1 The three volumes of the MGFA (ed), Anfänge Westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, (München 1982, 1990,1993) 
provide a meticulous account with references to the vast literature about the issue. Recent collective volumes 
containing many excellent articles on German rearmament and related issues are: Heller/Gillingham(eds), NATO: The 
Founding o f the Alliance and the Integration o f Europe, 1992; Wiggershaus/Maiei^eds), Das Nordatlantische Bündnis,
1993; Diefcndorf/Frohn/Rupieper, American Policy and the Reconstruction o f W est Germany, 1945-55, 1993. See 
further. Schwartz, Am erica's Germany. John JM cCloy and the Federal Republic o f Germany, 1991; Rupieper, Der 
besetzte Verbündete. Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1949-55, 1991; May, The American Commitment to 
Germany, 1949-55, in: DH 13/1989, p.431*60. The foUowing pangraphs are based on this literature.
3 The publication o f the fourth volume o f the MGFA's Anfänge Westdeutscher SicherheitspoUtik by 
W Abelshauser will close a huge gap regarding the financial conditions of German rearmament.
16
preconditions. One of the consequences was that the United States themselves undertook a 
significant expansion of their commitment to Europe. The American government came to see 
the various economic aid schemes, like the Marshall Plan, as incapable to achieve a 
stabilization of the critical situation in Europe. Economic aid was replaced by military aid on 
a large scale.3 Even this was seen as insufficient. The presence of a large conventional force 
in Europe seemed imperative from a military point of view in order to deter another 
Communist aggression. As long as the economic and political situation of the European 
democracies remained fundamentally unstable and the Soviet threat imminent, the only rapid 
way to achieve this objective was the stationing of American forces in Europe. Precisely that 
was also urgently requested by the Europeans.
The massive reinforcement of the small remaining US force in Europe was approved by 
Congress only in 1951, after bitter controversies.4 The acrimonious debate showed that an 
extended US troop engagement was perceived as a major shift in US foreign policy. For the 
first time, American forces were deployed during peacetime in Europe. Nobody at that time, 
however, thought that the American troop presence in Europe would outlast even the 
existence of the Soviet Union. In all probability, the commitment had been approved by 
Congress only because the administration gave credible assurances that the measure would 
be of a temporary nature and the financial burden on the US would last only during a certain 
transitional period: namely until the Europeans had rebuilt their own forces. Undoubtedly, the 
government itself believed in this prospect, as Eisenhower later recalled: 'After a ll  when we 
deployed our six  divisions to NATO. the deployment was never intended to be permanent and  
we informed congress that this was a temporary measure, particularly related to the build-up 
o f  W est German forces\ 5 The decision for an American troop commitment gave a strong 
impetus to the idea o f German rearmament which had been considered by military planners 
already for some time.
* Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins o f the Cold War, 1945-50, 1985, p.241.
4 On the 'Great Debate’ about a prolonged massive US military presence in Europe see: Williams, 77ie Senate 
and US Troops in Europe, 1985; Carpenter, ’US Nato Policy at Crossroads. The 'Great Debate* o f 1950-51’, im 
International H istory Review  8/1986, p J 89-414; Thoss, 'The Presence of American Troops in Germany, 1949-56', 
in: Diefendoi&Rohn/Rupiepeifeds), 1993, p.411-32.
s FRUS 1958-60, VII, Memo of Discussion at the 390th NSC meeting, 11 December 1958, p.367.
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The Americans were not at all eager to shoulder the burden of Europe’s conventional defence 
alone. In 1949/50, the cost of economic aid and military commitments made themselves 
increasingly felt in the American budget - without any reasonable prospect of an imminent 
decline, quite the contrary.6 The fear that the US would have to settle the bill alone was not 
unjustified. Britain and France were increasingly engaged in the defence of their shaken 
colonial empires, and other NATO countries lacked the necessary resources. The only country 
which had the potential to relieve the US significantly of their burden by means of 
conventional troops and financial support was the still occupied West Germany. The idea of 
rearming Germany was therefore in many ways linked to the US troop commitment and it 
was this ‘Burden-Sharing’ component which was a decisive element driving the debate.
In late 1949, the US Secretary of State, Acheson, confronted the NATO partners with the 
American intention to permit and pursue the partial reconstruction of Germany’s military 
potential in order to use these resources for the defence of the West. His first proposal was 
a 'package deal', explicitly linking US troop commitments to West German rearmament.7 
However, European opposition, due to their still fresh wartime memories, proved to be even 
stronger than anticipated. The reconstruction of a German military and the inherent restoration 
of German sovereignty were difficult to swallow so shortly after the war. French resistance, 
in particular, was almost insurmountable. Only the danger of American disengagement or a 
stop of its military and financial support overcame this opposition. In an attempt to contain 
the German military potential, whose reemergence was obviously unavoidable, with a control 
scheme as narrow as possible, France in 1950 launched the Pleven Plan for an integrated 
European army. Four years of intensive, protracted negotiations and diplomatic arm-twisting 
on the subject of the proposed EDC (European Defence Community) followed.6 Finally, in 
August 1954, the French parliament voted the project down. The plans for Germany's 
integration into Western defence organizations were void. The Federal Republic which had 
hoped to gain sovereignty, once it accepted to contribute to the European army and continued *
* Leffler, A Preponderance o f Power, 1992, p 304-11; Pollard (1985), p .222-42.
1 Acheson, Present a t die Creation, 1970, p.437-440.
1 On the EDC, apart from the MG FA-volumes cited above, see for example: Gersdorff, Adenauer's Aussenpolitik 
gegenüber den Siegermächten 1954, 1994; Fursdon, The EDC. A History, 1980; Volkmann/Schwengler (eds). Die 
Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschafi. Stand und Probleme der Forschung, 1985.
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close control by the Western Alliance, saw its foreign policy in shambles.
Despite the negative vote, the USA and Britain continued with vigorous efforts to find a new 
scheme which made German rearmament acceptable to France. Finally, France agreed to West 
Germany’s accession to NATO and to the revived Western European Union (WEU), founded 
in 1948 by Britain, France and the Benelux countries. Numerous control mechanisms were 
included in the treaties to prevent autonomous military action by Germany. The politically 
most important controlling steps, however, were the American and British pledges to remain 
with their forces in Germany.9 This was, in a way, an ironic result: the political framework 
of German rearmament required, instead of relieving the US and the UK of military burdens, 
a costly commitment, even if this was intended to last only for a short period.
The Paris Accords of 1954 which codified these events also meant the end of occupation for 
West Germany. It regained most of its sovereignty. The foundations for a German 
contribution to Western defence were in place, and American and British objectives seemed 
fulfilled. Their sighs o f relief proved premature. The first years of Germany in NATO were 
overshadowed by various frictions between the new partner and its allies about the size and 
form of the German contribution to common defence. Apart from the twelve divisions the 
Germans promised to provide for conventional defence, few o f  the earlier plans for 
rearmament were still valid in 1955. This was a result of the turmoil following the defeat of 
the EDC. The absence of precise commitments and various political and economic obstacles 
prevented a rapid build-up of German forces. The quarrel between West Germany and its 
NATO partners about the exact form of the German contribution began. How much of the 
burden of common defence would the Federal Republic have to shoulder? This lasting 
controversy over burden-sharing became one o f the most important issues of NATO policy.
To sum up: The fervour and the urgency with which the US and the UK had pushed forward 
the debate about a German defence contribution from 1950*1954 resulted not only from the 
need to tie Germany to the Western camp or from military exigencies, as the otherwise useful
* The American, British, and Canadian assurances to continue maintaining their troops in Europe are printed in: 
FRUS 1952-54, V/2, p.1351.
. concept of 'double containment* implies.10 The pressing burden of defence expenditure and 
the obligation to pay large conventional armies abroad made the utilisation of German 
resources indispensable, if there was to be any hope o f ever reducing this burden and 
maintaining simultaneously a credible defence posture in Europe.11 The political 
circumstances o f German rearmament, on the other side, required the prolonged presence of 
American and British forces as controlling factor against a re-awakening of dangerous 
German policies. These, in a way, contradicting objectives form an essential background to 
the conflicts analysed in this thesis.
19
b) The End of the Occupation Regime and the Financing of Allied Troops 
The burden of conventional defence in Europe during these Cold War years was enormous, 
especially for the three powers which bore the major part of the cost -the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Germany. In 1955, the United States maintained an army of 261.000 
men in Germany, about 10% of total US military personnel.12 13The United Kingdom, in the 
WEU-Treaty, committed itself to keeping four divisions and the 2nd tactical Air-Force in 
Germany, altogether 105.000 men. Those were about 15% of all British troops under arms. 
For both countries the cost of these commitments was only part o f the resources which went 
into the defence of Europe.
It is very important to distinguish between the actual cost falling on the budget and the share 
o f this budgetary cost arising in foreign currencies. The budgetary cost, according to NATO 
rules, was to be assumed by the country which maintained the forces, wherever they were 
stationed. Precise figures as to the budgetary cost of the American and British European 
commitments are difficult to find because usually they were not specified in the military 
budgets, contrary to the foreign exchange c o s t In November 1959, the US Budget Director
10 This formula which interprets US policy towards Germany as an attempt to  combine the containment o f Soviet 
pow er with the containment o f any resurgence of agressive German policies has been coined in one of the most 
thoughtful analyses of German*American postwar relations: Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe, 1989.
11 See also: Peter, Britain, the Cold War, and the Economics o f German Rearmament, 1949-51, in: DeighLon(ed),
Britain and the First Cold War, 1990, p.273-90.
13 Mendershausen, Troop Stationing in  Germany. Value and Cost, 1968, p.52. For allied troop levels 1955-67, 
see table 3, Appendix L
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estimated the cost of the American NATO commitment, including back-up, aid, etc. at $4 
billion, of which $1.2 billion were converted in local currencies.13 An 1970 estimate put the 
cost of US forces in Europe at between $7-9.5bn of which $1.9bn went across the 
exchanges.14 The British published estimates on the budgetary cost only in the 1960s. In 
1966, the budgetary cost was estimated at $437.2m of which $249,2m was DM- 
expenditure.15
Germany was under the obligation to contribute twelve divisions, to be built up until 1959. 
Cost estimates for the build-up of the army went up to between DM 50-80bn with a projected 
yearly allocation of DM9bn (see ch.II)* that is about 309b of German budgets in the late 
1950s. Initially, the funds for rearmament were expected to equal the occupation costs 
Germany had to pay after the war toward the expenses of the occupation forces. Those were 
formidable sums. In the early fifties, occupation costs and related expenditures absorbed about 
15% of Germany’s net social product and in some years 35% of all expenses in the Federal 
budget!16
The end of the occupation period added a particular factor of urgency to the debate about 
burden sharing in the Alliance. It implied the termination of these occupation costs.17 They 
had covered the DM expenditure of allied troops on German soil almost completely (and a  
big part of the budgetary cost) and were the major contribution o f Germany to the Cold W ar 
prior to joining NATO. The end of the occupation regime made the continuation of allied 
troop maintenance in Germany an expensive venture in financial terms and implied heavy
FRUS 1958-60, VH, 424th NSC Meeting, 1111.1959, p.512.
14 Roughly one third o f the cost was spent on operations (personnel pay, supply, transport, maintenance) and the 
rest for equipment, constructions, administration, and training. See: fried . T h e Financial Cost o f A lliance', in: 
Newbouse(ed), UJSJroops in Europe, 1971, p .106-07,129-30.
15 KCA 1966, p.21266.
14 KfiUner, 'D ie Entwicldung bundesdeutscher MilitSrausgaben in Vergangenheit und Zukunft', in: APUZG 22/84, 
2 June 1984, p.29; Abelsbauser, *The Causes and Consequences o f the German Rearmament Crisis*, in: 
Heller/GiUingham(eds), (1992), pJ14 ; KfiUner/Volkmann, 'Finan&vissenschaftliche, finanzwirtschafttiche und  
jinanzpoUtische Aspekte ernes deutschen Beitrags zur £V G \ in: M GFAII (1990), p.748; Hardach, Der M arshallplan, 
1994, p.238.
17 This refers only to occupation payments in the W estern zones. Berlin remained occupied territory until the 
1990s and the Federal Republic paid the expenses o f allied troops stationed in the city.
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additional burdens to budgets and external balances of the sending countries.
Table 1:
Approximate Allocation of Occupation-Costs paid by the Federal Republic. 1948-56 
(in Smillion)
paid to: American Forces British Forces others0 Sum
1948/49 476.2 571.4 142.8 1190.4
1949/50 404.8 404.8 166.7 9763
1950/51 547.6 404.8 285.7 1238.1
1951/52 547.6 309.5 2893 1166.6
1952/53 7623 434.3 517.7 17143
1953/54 7623 4343 517.7 17143
1954/55 1623 4343 517.7 17143
1955/56 3502 1993 212.1 761.9
1948/56 4612 3115 2574 10301
9 French. Belgium, Dutch, Danish, Canadian Forces; includes also from 1952 on Germany’s contribution towards 
NATO infrastructure costs
Sources: until 1955: FRO, T 225/424, Treasury note on allocation of occupation costs, 5.8.1955 
1955/56: Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.13783.
note: This table offers approximate figures o f the funds as paid by Germany, not as spent by the occupation forces. 
Exact figures about the amounts differ considerably from source to source. Firstly, this is due to a confusion on how 
much had been paid and how much bad been actually spent (from the early 1950s on, the occupation powers were 
not able to spend all the money). Statistics on bow much had been spent show often surprisingly huge variations from 
year to year. (See, for example, the figures on US receipts in: US Senate, 91.cong, sess.l. Subcommittee on US 
Security arrangements and Commitments abroad: US Forces in Europe, p tlO , 1970, p.2245). Secondly, the methods 
o f calculation are obscure. German official estimates add all kind of different costs caused by the occupation troops. 
They cite an amount of about $11048m as actual occupation costs in the mentioned period. (See: Leistungen der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland fflr die auslindiscben Streitkrifte, in: BPI 24/1961, 3 February 1961» p.221-24).
As has been already remarked, both the US and Britain had planned for only a temporary 
presence of their troops after signing the Paris Accords. These hopes were quickly shattered. 
The most important reason -in a long-term perspective- was that the troops acquired an 
eminent political importance which by far overshadowed their military significance. Their role 
in assuring the ratification of the Paris Accords is one example. The maintenance of American 
troops became a crucial element of postwar European policy. They guaranteed the control of 
German rearmament and economic reconstruction by the United States. This was of central 
importance to all European countries which had been at war with Germany. For Germany, 
on the other hand, the US troops were an essential piece of NATO’s security guarantee. When
2 2
the US in 1956 gave first hints of considering redeployment the reaction made one thing 
definitively clear US hopes for a short stay in Europe were too optimistic (For this episode, 
and a more extensive discussion of the political and strategic importance of the US troops, 
see ch.VI).
The lack of a firm British intention to provide troops for a European army had been a major 
factor in the defeat of EDC. Even after this disaster, when it became increasingly clear that 
some form of British commitment would be necessary to accomplish German rearmament as 
fast as possible and to save the Western defence cooperation, a vehement discussion split the 
British government and public.18 Britain's hesitation over a formal commitment of troops 
was due more to financial considerations than to an unwillingness to commit forces to 
continental defence. Foreign Secretary Eden stated in a 1954 telegram to his American 
counterpart, Dulles: *Once the EDC is in force and the Germans are bearing their fu ll share 
o f defence expenditure we must face the certainty that after what m ay not be a very long 
period we shall cease to receive any German contribution towards the costs o f maintaining 
our forces in Germany . . .  At present levels this would mean that we should have to finance 
an extra 80 million pounds in foreign exchange. This would present us with very great 
difficulties,*,19 During the EDC debate, apprehensions that the Federal Republic would spend 
all its defence funds for its own forces, leaving the UK to foot the bill for its troops on the 
continent, were a major preoccupation of the British cabinet30 The tenor of the discussion 
was that the UK could not take on any additional burden on its balance of payments. Whether 
this could be avoided by reductions, US aid, further German payments, or administrative 
savings remained an open question as long as the EDC debate went on. When it became 
obvious that a British troop commitment was essential for the European security structure, the 
problem was still not resolved. In the internal discussion during 1954 about the commitment,
11 The most recent monographs on this subject are: Doc krill, Britain* Policy fo r  West German Rearmament, 
1991; Jansen, Großbritannien. das Scheitern der EVG , und der NATO Beitritt der BRD, 1992; Mager, D ie  
Stationierung der britischen Rheinarmee, 1990.
'* PRO, T312/53, Tel.874: Eden to Dulles, 6 March 1954.
80 See for example the following Cabinet Memoranda: FRO, CAB 129/ C (52)36,13.2.1952; C(52)106,4.4.1952; 
C(52)141, 3.5.1952; C(52)162, 14.5.1952; C(52)185, 9.6.1952; C(53)112,233.1953.
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arguments over cost therefore played a central role.21
These arguments were, however, overruled (as was the still strong opposition to participation 
in an organization like WEU where Britain had to delegate some sovereignty in defence 
matters). The political benefits of a British commitment seemed to outweigh the financial 
cost. Firstly, the troops were necessary to overcome the impasse in the German rearmament 
question because France, in particular, insisted on such a pledge. Secondly, they kept the US 
troops in Europe. This was a major objective of British foreign policy, particularly after 
Dulles* ‘agonizing reappraisal* threat during the final stage of the EDC process. The 
Americans certainly also made their interest in a British commitment quite clear to HMG. 
Lastly, the troops could be useful in influencing continental politics given the abstinence of 
Britain from the new supra-national institutions in Europe, like the ECSC. This last point was 
the most ambiguous one because Britain never managed to achieve a clear idea of the role 
its troops should play on the continent, as we will see later on.
Rather grudgingly, Britain finally accepted the formal commitment of troops to continental 
European defence which was embodied in the WEU Treaty: * ...Britain...will continue to 
maintain on the mainland o f Europe, including Germany,., fo u r divisions and the Second 
Tactical Air Force...She undertakes not to withdraw these forces against the majority o f the 
High Contracting Parties...This undertaking shall not, however, bind her in the event o f an 
acute overseas emergency. I f  the maintenance o f die UK forces on the mainland o f Europe 
throws at any time too great a strain on the external finances o f the United Kingdom, she 
w ilL.invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions on which the UK 
forces are maintained*.22 When this declaration was made, it was hailed as a great success 
for British diplomacy. The inconvenience this pledge would cause for Britain in the years to 
come probably contributed greatly to her later reluctance to participate in other supranational 
institutions in Europe.
The longterm political implications of the American and British commitments were only
See Mager (1990), pp.121-145.
22 Protocol N oJI on F aces of WEU, A it VI, 23.10.1954, in: HMSO, Cmnd.9498, Treaty Series, 1955.
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vaguely grasped in 1955/56. The immediate problem which seemed to prevent the United 
States and Britain from withdrawing their troops at an early point was another one. Both 
countries had expected that the Europeans would themselves shoulder the burden of 
conventional defence for their territories, especially when the German army was ready. But 
during late 1955 and 1956 it became clear that the build-up would proceed slower than 
expected and a reduction of the Anglo-American contingents appeared to be an unacceptable 
political and military risk as long as a direct threat from the Soviet Union was perceived. In 
this situation the extension of German financial contributions towards the cost of their troops 
in Germany seemed a justified request to the stationing countries. They were all faced with 
fierce domestic criticism about the high cost of their military commitments. In the case of the 
troops in Germany, the difficulty was less the sheer budgetary cost. The major problem for 
the sending countries was the huge loss of foreign exchange caused by conversion of dollars, 
pounds, etc. into DM to pay for services called upon by the troops. To justify the necessary 
extension of the troop maintenance this financial burden had to be kept within certain limits, 
or better, completely neutralized.
Certain delays in German rearmament had been foreseen by the stationing countries. As they 
were unwilling to assume all of a sudden the whole cost of their NATO commitment, they 
had insisted upon including a clause in the NATO Finance Convention, signed in Paris, which 
guaranteed an extension of occupation payments for one year (until mid-1956) to cover the 
period until West German rearmament gained momentum. This extended scheme obliged 
Germany to pay altogether $762m in monthly allocations on a sliding scale.23 The NATO 
Finance Convention reserved the right for the allies to negotiate a  further extension. The 
Germans, however, understood May 1956 to be the end of this kind o f payments. Wrongly, 
as it turned o u t The stationing countries argued that if a German army was not forthcoming 
fast enough, the Federal Republic should continue to pay rather than have a free ride on the 
Western defence machinery.
However, one of Germany’s major objectives during the EDC debate had been to get rid o f
33 FRUS 1952-54, V /2, NATO Finance Convention (amended), p.1342-43. A  widely overlooked, but very 
relevant consequence of this agreement was that these payments and all the following offset payments remained part 
of the budget o f the Ministry of Defence. Consequently all of these costs were seen as part of the German defence 
effort.
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the occupation costs. Numerous quarrels between Bonn and the occupying powers had 
originated from this issue.24 The termination of occupation and the coming into effect of the 
Paris Accords made further voluntary payments - in whatever form - unacceptable to any 
German government. Widespread public protest against the dismantling of German industries 
and the confiscation of goods and facilities by the victorious powers after World War n  were 
still a political issue. Reminiscences of the humiliating reparations scheme in the Versailles 
Treaty after the First World War added to the negative symbolic value of occupation costs 
in German public opinion. This background provides an adequate understanding of the dogged 
German resistance to payments after 1955. To the Germans it seemed as if the proposed 
equality in the Alliance existed only in theory because other NATO members with foreign 
troops on their soil did pay no such contributions. Thus the cost of American and British 
troop maintenance very soon became one of the most serious problems in Germany’s relations 
with these countries affecting political relations, national budgets as well as financial markets.
The following paragraphs outline the first conflict arising on the question, as well as the 
background behind the positions. As the by far most serious repercussions were on British- 
German relations, the analysis will concentrate on this issue. The fundamental economic and 
political issues behind the British position will be scrutinized. Then, I will attempt an 
assessment of the troop's influence on the German balance of payments, to be followed by 
an account of the first support cost negotiations 1955/56.
c) The Impact of Troop Stationing in Europe on the British Balance of Payments 
In December 1955, participating for the first time officially at the annual NATO Council 
meeting, the German delegation was up to an unpleasant surprise. Arguing with the slow pace 
of German rearmament and the heavy burden on their balance of payments, Britain, France, 
and the US demanded the continuation o f payments for foreign troop maintenance in the
*  The issue is largely neglected by historical research. Far some hints, see: Schwartz (1991), 270*273; Henzler, 
Fritz Schaffer, 1945-67. Eine biographische Studie, 1994.
Federal Republic for the period after May 1956.25 The German ministers were shocked. The 
British minutes recorded that the German Finance Minister * Dr.Schaffer (who was beginning 
to get heated) had to say that such a request was quite unacceptable to the Federal Republic. 
There was no legal basis for it, and it was open discrimination.*26 Later, Schaffer 
embarrassed the allies with public announcements that the demands were not in accordance 
with the NATO-Treaty and that he would strictly oppose any further payments. He stirred up 
a considerable press campaign and the fust open row on the troop cost issue started.27 It 
became largely a British-German affair. The British arrived at the conclusion that their 
military commitment in Europe was a danger to their economy, and in particular to their 
balance of payments. The Americans, though faced with a numerically much higher cost, still 
profited from the overwhelming strength of their trade and regarded the dollar losses caused 
by their troops with relative equanimity, as long as the overall balance of payments was under 
control.
The completely negative attitude of Schaffer touched on a core point of British postwar 
economic policy. All through the postwar decades, Britain went to great effort to safeguard 
and strengthen the traditional role of sterling as an international reserve currency. This became 
a primary, if not the most important, objective o f British foreign economic policy after the 
war.
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Many, many volumes have been written on the wisdom and folly o f this policy, centring on 
the question whether Sterling policy was a decisive factor in Britain’s relative economic 
decline2*, and thoughout the thesis there will be numerous references to this debate. A  *31
39 FRUS 1955-57, IV, p.44-49; BA, B 126/51520, Record o f a Trvwmg SchJffer/Blank-Allied Defence M inisters, 
16 December 1956.
36 FRO, CAB 134/1048, MAC(GX55): Record of M inisters Meeting in  Paris, 16.12.1955.
71 FAZ 7.2.1956; THE ECONOMIST, 11.2.1956; SPIEGEL 223.1956.
31 The following list is necessarily selective. Additional works on the subject w ill be referred to throughout the 
text: Alford, British Economic Performance, 1945-75, 1988; Cairncross/Hcbengreen(eds) Sterling in Decline: The 
Devaluations o f 1931, 1949 and 1967, 1983; Caimcross, The British Economy since 1945, 1992; Dow, The 
Management o f the British Economy, 1945-60,1970; M ilward, The European Rescue o f  the Nation Suite, 1992, p 3 4 7 - 
95; Pollard, The Wasting o f  British Economy: British Economic Policy 1945 to the Present, 1982; Strange, Sterling  
and British Policy, 1971.
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comprehensive analysis of British monetary policy during the 1950s and 1960s is, however, 
well beyond the scope of this study. Previous research will be summed up and a closer look 
will be given to the link between British security and sterling policies. The following section 
attempts to assess the influence of Britain's military commitment in continental Europe on 
its balance of payments, placing it in the larger context of British monetary policy.
A review of British foreign policy, prepared in 1956 on the highest levels, stated after listing 
up Britain’s fundamental foreign policy objectives: ’There are many areas or aspects o f 
policy in which a fa ilure could make it more difficult fo r  us to attain these aims. But there 
is one, success in which is a matter o f life or death to us as country. This is the maintenance 
o f the international value o f sterling ... Success in this is the greatest single contribution we 
can make to the maintenance o f our position in world affairs and to the success o f  the 
policies which the free  world is seeking to p u r s u e The document shows the curious mix 
o f sentimental commitment, political motivations, and economic reasoning which was 
characteristic o f British postwar monetary policy. During the heyday of the British empire, 
the international role of sterling had been one of the mainstays of British influence in the 
world and a valuable source of income for the city of London. Until the mid-1950s about 
50% of all international transactions were still conducted in sterling and Britain managed the 
reserves of numerous countries which formed the so-called Sterling Area.30
The financial consequences of World W ar n, however, had seriously undermined this 
position. From the conference of Bretton Woods on, British monetary policy was directed 
towards regaining for its currency the traditional position. The expected co-management of 
international monetary relations together with the Americans, however, proved to be beyond 
the strength of Britain's economy. A first disastrous attempt in 1947 to establish free 
convertibility with the dollar had ended in a rush out of sterling and had shown that the task *
*  T he Future of the UK in World Affairs’, CAB 134/1315, FR (56)3,1 Jum  1956; in: Goldsworthy<ed), The 
Conservative Government and the End o f Empire, 1951-57, pLl, 1994, p.62-63.
10 James, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods, 1996, p.90. To the Sterling Area belonged 
the countries o f the Colonial Empire and many former colonies, like Australia, South Africa, India, Ireland, New 
Zealand, etc. See: Tew, International Monetary Cooperation 1945-70, >o1970, p. 180. On British Sterling policy see 
also: Schmidt, 'Großbritannien, die Gründung der EWG und die Sicherheit des Westens: T h e  American 
Connection'", in: Salewski M (ed), Nationale Identität und Europäische Einigung, 1991,169-231.
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would be extremely difficult to accomplish. Even the 1949 devaluation against the dollar did 
not reestablish confidence in the British currency. The move towards free convertibility in 
dollars, envisaged in Bretton Woods, had to be postponed for an indefinite period. In the 
meantime, the chronically weak British currency was shielded against trouble by American 
help and by the European Payments Union.31 Britain’s financial policies in the 1950s were 
designed to escape from this dependence on other nations, and to accomplish a safe move 
towards free convertibility.
These objectives were undermined by recurring balance of payments problems and frequent 
waves of currency speculation against the pound, impeding the buildup of a sufficient level 
of reserves. Devaluation as a way out of this situation was ruled out. A complex mix o f 
considerations related both to foreign policy and domestic economic objectives led to the 
rejection of a flexible exchange rate for the pound in the early fifties.32 In the mid-1950s, 
the British government gradually became strongly committed to the rate of $2.80/pound. It 
was to defend this rate until 1967 despite the increasingly higher cost of doing so.33 The 
commitment to Sterling's fixed exchange rate compelled the government to a series of 
restrictive economic measures in the domestic economy and to constant efforts of trimming 
its external commitments in order to restore confidence in the currency. None of these policies 
was a decisive success. Sterling remained fundamentally weak.34
"  The EPU was an intra-European financial clearing mechanism designed to  facilitate trade in Europe by 
multilateralizing the settlement o f payments imbalances. Every month, bilateral balances between the member 
countries were set off against each other so as to  establish an overall position of each country towards EPU. W hen 
a country's position was negative, it had to settle it by a m ixture of debts and hard currency payments. This was very 
advantageous for a country which tended to have a huge deficit with the EPU-countries, like Britain. In  the absence 
o f EPU, the deficits would have had to be settled entirely by dollars or gold. Recently, the EPU as research subject 
has seen a surge o f interest: Kaplan/Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, 1989; Eichen green. Reconstructing 
Europe's Trade and Payments: The EPU, 1993; Dickhaus, Die Bundesbank bn Westeuropäischen Wiede raujbau 1948- 
58, 1996.
M Milward, T he Origins o f the Fixed-Rate Dollar System ’, in: Reis (ed). International Monetary Systems in 
H istorical Perspective, 1995, p.135-151.
55 A comprehensive answer as to the reasons for this position must await an archive-based study of B ritish 
monetary history after 1955. Some continuing lines in the arguments against devaluation were, however, political 
considerations with regard to the US and the Sterling Area countries, which were both against devaluation; fear o f 
adverse economic effects at home; prestige reasons; fear o f political damage for the ruling party; and the influence 
o f the City.
u  HMSO, UK Balance o f Payments 1946-1954, C m nd.9430,1955, p32-33. For a recent overview over B ritish 
economic policy after the war, see: Caimcross (1992).
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In the British government there was no lack of explanations for this situation. One factor, 
however, took on a specific importance in government discussions after 1955: military 
commitments abroad, and specifically in Europe. Losses attributed to British troop 
maintenance elsewhere, mostly in countries belonging to the Sterling-area, involved no foreign 
exchange component because payments were made in sterling. The European commitment 
constituted a drain on British reserves because of the need for huge conversions to pay for 
local services, German civilian employees, allowances for the soldiers, etc. The British 
government estimated the average annual foreign exchange cost caused by troop-maintenance 
on the European continent at about SlSOm.35
Already in 1952, the Chancellor of Exchequer had stated categorically that he could take on 
at most a burden of $84m arising from the commitment in Germany.36 In 1955, the situation 
was, if anything, even tighter. The WEU pledge had greatly enhanced Britain’s prestige on 
the continent Unfortunately, it seemed to endanger a central goal of British policy: the 
accomplishment of a sound and stable monetary position for the pound. British politicians like 
Macmillan came to assign to the troop cost problem a central role in their policy towards 
Europe, especially when Germany’s payments seemed to stop after 1956. They regarded 
German support cost payments as a just means to get back the foreign exchange Britain lost 
through the provision o f security for Europe. The Federal Republic appeared to benefit greatly 
from allied troop-maintenance, boasting an impressive balance o f payments surplus and an 
ever stronger currency. Hence the dogged British insistence in this matter. The question was 
reduced to a simple choice: a stable currency or troops in Europe, or -formulated differently- 
the choice between the political merits of troop maintenance in Europe and the interest in 
sterling stability. Ultimately, the choice was decided for sterling stability. The British 
government would rather incur the odium of prolonged and acrimonious negotiations with the 
Germans than take on the cost for the sake of vague political benefits. A tough policy seemed 
justified as Germany’s economy was booming while Britain's was dragging on, thus putting 
further pressure on the pound. In the following paragraphs I will try to analyse whether the
ss See Appendix I, table 4.
16 CAB 129/55, C(52)320, Defence and Economic Policy. Cabinet memo by M r Butler, 3 October 1952, in: 
Goldsworthy(ed), (1994), p 3 5 .
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diagnosis of British politicians -troops in Europe or Sterling stability- corresponded to reality.
Prior to 1955, the UK was able to cover the foreign exchange need o f its troops by drawing
on the DM accumulated in the account for German occupation costs. Those funds also 
covered most of the budgetary cost. Contrary to the foreign exchange expenditure, this cost 
would have been the same if the troops would have been stationed in Britain. It might have 
been even less due to various allowances granted to allied forces in Germany in the Status 
of Forces agreements37 and to the lower cost o f living in Germany at that time.38 The only 
way to get rid of this burden, therefore, was to disband the troops altogether which would 
have involved even more political explosive then ’simply* redeploying them. To get help for 
its budget was therefore for the UK government only a side issue in the support cost 
negotiations.
The real issue was the foreign exchange cost. It was this cost in the first place which caused 
most of the apprehensions in the British government regarding the termination of German 
payments. For the first period after the cessation o f occupation payments Britain was still able 
to draw on accumulated, unspent funds in the occupation cost account However, these funds 
would be used up quickly and from then on the Bank of England would have to purchase DM 
on the London exchange market for use of its Rhine Army.39 According to the British 
government this factor influenced the British balance with European countries negatively, 
impeded the UK to earn reserves, and forced the British to equal the balance by payments in
37 Those agreements regulated the conditions for the stay of foreign troops in the Federal Republic and accorded 
to the troops allowances like free use of buildings and territory, reduced telecommunication tariffs, tax exemptions, 
duty free petrol, and German assumption of damages caused by the troops. See: BA, B 126/34103, BFM, Abe HE: 
Truppenvertragskonferenz, 7 December 1959. For a summary o f the treaties: KCA 1952, p .12226-7; KCA I960, 
p.17849 (a full version is in: Vertráge der BRD, Serie A, vol.7(1957), nr.64, p.42-171; n r.65, p.172-221; nr.67, p 366- 
75; Supplementary Agreement in: ibid., vol.20(1965), nr.228, p.142-467).
M Fried, in: Newhouse (1971), p.125.
M The British and french acquired the marks needed for their troops on the free m arket The Americans 
presented each month dollar cheques at the Bundesbank to  acquire DM at an agreed upon rate of DM 4.20. W hen 
the dollar in the late 1950s came under pressure, the Bundesbank protested against the continuation o f this m ethod 
(in case the market price of dollars was only one Pfennig lower than this official price -m ost of the tim e it was even 
less- then the Bundesbank lost $150.000 a month due to the discrepancy between the two prices). In the context o f 
the offset negotiations in 1961, the Bundesbank managed to  get a compromise which meant that the price for troop 
dollars was fixed anew at the beginning of each month. For documentation on these issues, see: NA, RG 59, D F 
1960-63, 862a.l3.
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the framework of the EPU. The EPU deficits illustrated in the table below had to be covered 
mainly by gold and dollars. This caused a direct drain on scarce British currency reserves. 
Thus went the prevailing interpretation in the British government40
How far did this British analysis conform to reality? What was the troops' real impact on the 
British balance of payments? The following table compares the foreign exchange cost of the 
troops with the yearly British EPU position, where balance of payments movements with 
Europe were reflected. German support cost payments have been added.
Table 2:
Local foreign-exchange cost of British troops in Germany as compared to contributions received from Germany and 
to  the BriLish EPU position ($ million)
local foreign 
exchange cost of 
British troops (1)
contribution received 
from Germany(2)
net UK annual EPU 
position(3)
1954-55 216 431 +136
1955-56 193 196 -327
1956-57 179 95 -225
1957-58 176 140 -317
1958-59 160 34 -267
1954-59 924 896 -1000
sources:
(1) see Appendix I, table 4. These data have been selected from British primary source material. The documents offer, 
however, a wide range of estimates. The data chosen are those cited most frequently in the sources. They can, 
however, be regarded only as approximations. The foreign-exchange cost o f troop-stationing in Germany depends very 
much on the method of calculation.
(2) Keesings Contemporary Archives, various editions; BGBL n , 17, 21.4.1959; B G B LII, 22,30.5.1959.
(3) The column shows deficits or surpluses for every year, not the accumulated position. EPU, Final R epot 1951- 
1958, OEEC, Paris 1959, p3 6 .
The table seems to underline the necessity of a continuation of German payments if British 
apprehensions outlined above were not to come true. However, for the period 1956-59 it is 
obvious that even if the troop commitment had been terminated and this would have had a 
corresponding impact on the British balance with Europe, the British EPU position would
40 See for ex.: FRO, CAB 134/1209, Committee on Services* Cost in Germany, CG (56)4, Memo by the 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 25 May 1956.
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have remained strongly negative. There also seems no direct relation between the decline of 
German payments and the negative British EPU position. It is necessary to emphasize at this 
point that a straightforward comparison of one factor in the account with an overall payments 
measure (for example military expenditure abroad to overall deficits) is, in any case, a rather 
ambiguous indicator.
How much foreign exchange would Britain have saved if it had redeployed its troops? On this 
point unanimity was never achieved in the British government and the range of estimates is 
not astonishing, given the many variables which would have to be taken into account.41 A 
redeployment o f over large parts or the whole o f the Rhine Army including equipment would 
have effected other subaccounts of the mutual payments statistics. A  contraction of domestic 
demand in Germany might have set resources free for exports, and the opposite effect might 
have happened in Britain. In addition, Britain had itself substantial foreign-exchange earnings 
from foreign toops on its soil, namely American and Canadian troops. Their expense 
amounted to an annual average of about $200m, which easily matched the British cost in 
Germany.42 A British redeployment from the continent was likely to provoke a movement 
of these troops as a reinforcement of allied troops in Germany.
One further problem was the sheer cost of redeployment It has been already noted that it is 
doubtful whether stationing its troops in Britain would have saved the government money. 
Allied troops in Germany benefited from a series of allowances and German wages for 
civilian employees were lower. The cost of redeployment would have put a heavy one-time 
burden on the British balance of payments. Furthermore, German payments would have 
stopped which would have caused an additional drain on the British budget if the redeployed 
troops were kept active. This was very probable as the troops were assigned to NATO and 
their dissolution needed the consent of NATO authorities. Finally, after the first reduction o f 
8000 men in 1957 Britain already had serious difficulties in housing the men, and this was 
one of the main reasons for not going on with redeployment in 1959. Hence, even if
41 For an example of the difficulties of such an estimate see FRO, CAB 129/91, Report by Officials: Local 
Defence Costs in Germany, 8 January 1958.
41 Balance o f Payments 1946-1956, Cnmd.9871, HMSO, October 1956, p.44.
Balance o f Payments 1956-1959, Cmnd.861, HMSO, October 1959» p.18.
redeployment would have saved foreign exchange* it also was likely to cause heavy additional 
burdens on the British government budget (the Americans were to have similar problems in 
the 1960s). Imponderabilities such as those cited above make it impossible to arrive at an 
exact quantification of the foreign exchange impact of troop stationing abroad.
However* in the last analysis the real extent o f the burden the troops placed on Britain’s 
external balances can be assessed only if its placed in the larger context of British monetary 
problems. Strikingly enough* the official British balance o f payments looked rather positive 
until the mid-1960s. This did not prevent frequent rushes of speculation against the pound. 
These attacks which hampered all efforts by the British government to stabilize the currency 
denoted a fundamental lack of confidence in sterling on the markets. One major reason for 
the uncertainty about the position of sterling was the calamitous gap between British reserves 
and liabilities* the latter being always four times the size o f the former.
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Table 3: UK Current Balance, Reserves and Liabilities (in $m)
UK current balance UK reserves (gold + 
foreign exchange)
UK total liabilities liabilities to 
the Sterling Area
1953 +526 2518 11211 7834
1954 +638 2762 11701 8187
1955 -221 2120 11326 8061
1956 +652 2133 11463 8008
1957 +678 2273 10970 7302
1958 +977 3069 11133 7053
Sources: UK Balance of Payments 1946-1956(2), Cmnd.122, HMSO* April 1957.
UK Balance of Payments 1956-1959, Cnmd.861, HMSO, October 1959.
(UK Balance of payments statistics were subject to  numerous* considerable revisions. Since the argument 
is about the contemporary perception, I choose corresponding statistics.)
This huge amount of liabilities is linked with the role of sterling as a  reserve currency for the 
Sterling-Area. Most of the claims against Britain were resulted from the war and were held 
by Sterling Area Countries* as the table shows. The commitment towards the Sterling Area 
countries or the almost identical Commonwealth was directly linked to the commitment to 
preserving the value of Sterling. Devaluation would have been a blow for most Sterling Area 
countries and their reserves. It would have been a disaster not only for British prestige, but
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probably also for its trade as a larger share of British trade was still directed to the 
Commonwealth than to Europe.43
Assigning to sterling policy highest importance also underlined the importance of relations 
with the United States, because of Britain’s ultimate dependence on American monetary 
support. All through the postwar period, Britain had to earn substantive sums to pay back 
loans from the United States or international organizations, like IMF, EXIM Bank, or EPU. 
Those amounted to about $168m a year in the mid-1950s, growing precipitously after the 
Suez crisis and its disastrous effect on Britain’s external balance.44 Since the famous 1946 
loan Britain had not been able to rid itself o f its dependence on American money; this 
dependence was partly necessity but expressed also a political choice.
Because of this close identity of British Sterling policy with the pursuit of harmonious 
relations with the Commonwealth and the United States it was very likely that in the case that 
British monetary policy necessitated choices which touched upon the interests o f foreign 
countries Britain would rather accept conflicts with the Europe of the Six than with the USA 
or the Commonwealth. The conflicts regarding troop costs offer many instances for this 
observation.
Numerous explanations have been put forward to account for the chronical weakness of 
sterling, such as the backwardness of the British economy and its organisations, the stop-and- 
go cycles to cope with payment deficits, expansive government policies at home and abroad, 
speculation, etc.45 There is still much more empirical work necessary to clarify the mutual 
influences o f British monetary policy towards its general economic conditions and vice versa. 
Crucial for this study is the impact of Britain’s policy of priority for sterling on its relations 
with Europe, and in particular Germany. The quarrel about troop costs assumed its great 
importance because the British government and parts of the public assigned to the
41 ’The Future o f the UK in W orld Affairs', CAB 134/1315, FR(56)3, 1 June 1956; in: Goldsworthy(ed), The 
Conservative Government and the End o f Empire, 1951-57, pL l, 1994.
44 Peden, 'Economic Aspects of British Perceptions of Power’, in: Di Nolfo(ed), Power in Europe II, 1992, 
p.150-51.
43 For an assessment of this debate: Alford (1988), p.74-88.
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neutralization of the foreign exchange cost of the BAOR an important role in correcting the 
monetary predicament
However, from the analysis above and almost all accounts of British postwar monetary 
policy46 it emerges clearly that the cost of the troops in Europe was not a major cause for 
British monetary difficulties, as the British govement continuously claimed. Its absence would 
not have altered the basic components of the British monetary position and its monetary 
policy. As it will emerge more clearly in the following chapters, the problem was of a 
fundamentally political nature. The 1955 commitment had been made in a unique situation 
conferring a series of political advantages to the United Kingdom. Thereafter, however, 
British politicians did not have a consistent strategy with which to capitalize on this 
commitment Instead, it was resented as liability. This sentiment increased and decreased in 
parallel to the Sterling situation. Britain continued initiating quarrels with its European 
partners on this problem instead of solving the deeper roots of its balance o f payments 
problem. Tlroop reductions in Europe or support cost demands were a popular subject, they 
seemed to demonstrate activity but they were in the last analysis just window-dressing. The 
reason for creating the conflicts over support costs and troop reductions was not only the need 
to acquire foreign exchange and to relieve the British budget The fundamental cause was a 
deep ambiguity towards the political role of the troops in Europe which is derived from an 
indecisiveness in Britain’s whole approach towards Europe, as will be shown in the following 
chapters. Support cost and troop level questions became issues o f highly symbolic and 
political value and were an expression of basic lines of British policy in this period.
The monetary problems o f Britain can not explain the tense climate and the serious discords 
that were to prevail throughout all the support cost negotiations. One has to also take into 
account the psychological situation of the United Kingdom as a  winner of the war, now 
having to beg financial assistance from their former enemies, whom the British forces 
moreover provided with military protection. This gave the support cost question a particularly 
hostile twist which should not be underestimated. A perusal of the extensive documentation 
on the support cost negotiations makes it impossible to ignore this sentiment It formed the
46
A n  e x c e p tio n  is ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  C h a lm e rs , Paying for Defence,  1 9 8 5 .
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background of British frustration on the issue and expressed itself in acid statements against 
Germany’s resistance to pay for its protection. ‘The British people, who after all won the war, 
cannot accept that the Germans are treating the UK like dirt, while they have things their 
own way. They will not agree to keeping British soldiers in Germany, i f  the Germans do not 
play the game,* Macmillan said to Dulles, and added somewhat prophetically: *It may take 
a little longer fo r  the US, but ultimately the US may feel that way, too!*A1
d) Foreign Troops and the German Balance o f Payments
The British sentiment on the monetary consequences of their troop presence in Germany has 
been shown to be more politically motivated then to be underpinned by sound economic 
reasoning. A further claim, by all former occupation powers, was that the Federal Republic 
massively benefitted from the presence of foreign troops on its territory. This is the assertion 
that has to be tackled now.
From 1954 on, the German balance of payments showed a continuing surplus. This was 
especially due to a large surplus in Germany's trade balance. An almost equally important 
factor, however, has been mostly ignored by research: the increasing foreign-exchange 
receipts from foreign troops, notably the Americans. These receipts had a huge influence on 
the German balance of goods and services, particularly after the termination of occupation 
payments. At the end of 1959, when the increasing deficit of the American balance of 
payments focussed attention on the reasons for the German surplus, the Bundesbank prepared
a report which investigated the influence of the foreign troops on the German balance of
*
payments.4*
Between 1950-1959, Germany acquired an amount of almost 16.5 billion marks ($3926m) in 
foreign exchange from foreign troops on German soil, despite the occupation- and support 47*
47 FRUS 1955-57, IV, Memo of coQvemtioo. 11 December 1956, p.127.
41 Bundesbankarchiv, B330/Bd. 10161: Vermerk: Die Bedeutung der Deviseneinnahmen von fremden Truppen 
für die Entwicklung der Zahlungsbilanz und der W ährungsreserven, 4  December 1959.
l iU U l
costs paid to the stationing countries during this period.49 60% of these receipts accrued in
1957-59. Dollar-exchanges by American troops alone formed 87% of the amount The British 
Army of Rhine (BAOR) exchanged Sterling to the tune of 1.3 billion marks ($309m). 
Compared with the accumulated trade surplus of Germany over the period ($5095m), the 
importance of these receipts for the German external financial position becomes very obvious.
37
Table 4:
Development of German Balance of Services and receipts from foreign troops (S million)
Balance of Services receipts from foreign 
troops
balance of services, 
excluding troop receipts
trade balance
1950 +123 +50 +73 -714
1951 +218 +87 +130 -24
1952 +388 +202 +185 +167
1953 +384 +271 +113 +595
1954 +306 +243 +62 +643
1955 +405 +292 +114 +286
1956 +619 +418 +201 +690
1957 +816 +633 +183 +976
1958 +705 +923 -218 +1190
1959 +401 +805 -404 +1286
1950-59 +4365 +3926 +439 +5095 1
Source: see fh.48. Table 5 . Appendix I is from a similar, later document with slightly lower figures for receipts. 
For the trade balance: Bundesbank(ed). 40 Jahre DM. Monetäre Statistiken 1948-87, 1988, p5 .
The German balance of payments 1950*1959 had an overall surplus of about DM 40billion 
($9524m). Theoretically this amount would have been almost halved were it not for the 
presence of foreign troops in ^Germany. The receipts were booked in the German balance of 
services, which saw a surplus of about 18.3 billion marks ($4365m) in this period. The 
Bundesbank also compared these foreign exchange receipts with the reserves in gold and 
foreign exchange the Federal Republic accumulated between 1950 and 1959 (DM21.8 bn;
49 American sources put the figure for dollar exchanges above German payments, steeply rising after 1956, at 
DM 15392.7m (S3665m) between 1945 and 1960; this corresponds roughly with the Bundesbank figure. See: 
Browder, The G Ï and the Wirtschaftswunder, in: Journal of European Economic History 22, 3/1993, p.610.
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$5190m). The Bundesbank concludes that *a considerable part o f the augmentation o f  
German monetary reserves can be attributed to the stationing o f foreign troops in the Federal 
Republic.**0 These figures are related only to the troops* impact on the German reserve 
position. Research on the overall economic consequences of foreign troop stationing in 
Germany is at a very preliminary stage. It is clear, however, that the impact was considerable, 
on the micro- as well as on the macro-level. For example, US forces counted among 
Germany's largest employers during the 1950s.* 51 For many cities and regions, foreign 
garrisons remain an outstanding economic factor until today.
As in the case of comparing British troop costs to overall balance of payments statistics, 
certain reservations also have to be made in the case of German receipts before establishing 
too straightforward an interpretation o f the monetary impact It is impossible to calculate the 
exact extent of the commitment of German economic resources for services to foreign 
troops.52 How did these claims impede the German ability to employ these resources 
elsewhere, for example in export-oriented industries? Many costs are not reflected in foreign 
exchange calculations, for example the use of huge areas for military training purposes, 
housing and facilities. Where would the German workforce, whose services made up the 
biggest part of the troop's foreign exchange cost33, have been employed? In this context one 
might recall that during the 1950s and 1960s serious labour shortages existed in Germany. 
Immigrant foreign workers solved the problem; however, money transfers to their home 
countries became a negative factor in the German balance o f payments. Complicated side 
effects like these prevented any agreement between stationing and host country on the exact 
extent of the foreign exchange cost (for such an attempt, see ch JO ). Usually, however, the 
Federal Republic accepted the figure presented by its allies.
Despite these reservations, it is undeniable that allied troop maintenance played a considerable
90 BBA, B33CV10161, V e r m e il , 4 December 1959.
51 Browder (1993), pj601-612.
32 Mendershausen, Troop Stationing in Germany. Value and Cost, 1968, p.85; Pried, in: Newbouse(ed), 1971, 
p.127-9.
*  About half o f the foreign-exchange cost was caused by civilian labour. Other services and exchange by soldiers 
amounted for the rest. See: FRO, CAB 1341209, Committee on Services Coat in Germany, C.G.(56), 6.6.1956.
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role in the accumulation o f German balance-of-payments surpluses. It provided Germany, 
which had suffered from a critical dollar shortage until the early 1950’s, with sufficient 
liquidity for debt repayments and vital imports, particularly from the dollar zone, without 
impeding domestic investment. This clear monetary gain would, however, rapidly become a 
political liability.
e) The Support Cost Negotiations 1955/56**
During 1955, the BAOR made provisions against the cessation of occupation costs. 
Considerable savings were achieved, faciliated by the fact that during the occupation regime, 
due to abundant German payments, British troops had lived on a 'somewhat more generous 
scale than elsewhere'.33 34*Nonetheless, and despite warnings by the Foreign Office as to the 
potential of political conflict in the question, a majority in the British government pressed for 
German payments to continue. All through 1955, sterling had been under great pressure and 
the year-end balance showed a considerable deficit.36 The prospect o f having to assume from 
May 1956 on, when German payments ceased, an additional foreign exchange burden of 
perhaps up to $200m seemed intolerable. A further inconvenience was the hardening of the 
EPU, effected in August 1955, which meant that debtors had to repay now 75% of their debt 
in gold or hard currency as opposed to the previous 50%. As troop costs were reflected in the 
EPU accounts this meant that any drain would have to be met mostly by hard currency.57
When the German reply to the ‘NATO*questionnaire’ 1955 on Germany’s military build-up 
proved unsatisfactory, the time was deemed ready by the British government It urged the 
United States to join in a common action asking for an extension o f support payments by
34 Those end the following negotiations received a first treatment by W JCaiser, 'M oney, Money, M oney', in: 
Schmidt G ., Zwischen Bundnissicherung undprivilegitrter Partnerschaft, 1995,p.???. H is ace*»«* is useful regarding 
the details of the negotiating process.
55 PRO, T225/424, Treasury Memorandum, 25 July 1955; CAB 134/1209, on Services Cost in
Germany, memorandum. May 1956; for the extent of the savings, see table 2.
34 Dow (1970), pp.89-90,255.
51 PRO. T225/424, Treasury Memorandum. 25.7.1955.
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Germany.58 This proved to be more difficult than expected. The Americans adopted a very 
hesitant attitude based on a clear perception of the political difficulties new requests would 
cause for the German government A certain unease at the prospect that the United States 
would have to settle the bill in the end by further aid to Germany also may have played a 
role.59 However, the growing impression that the Federal Republic was not doing enough 
for rearmament finally led to an acquiescence of the United States to British demands. The 
NATO-meeting in December 1955 seemed a convenient moment but, as we have seen, the 
action proved abortive. The Germans, represented by their hard-nosed Finance Minister 
Schaffer, refused to concede any legal right for further support costs to the allies.
After the inconclusive meeting between Schaffer and the allied delegations, official requests 
were formulated by the Three Powers despite Germany’s openly voiced opposition to 
negotiations. The British Aide-Memoire flatly rejected Schaffer’s argument that Article IV/4 
of NATO Finance Convention excluded any further cash payments.60 It warned of rising 
domestic pressure in Britain towards reductions in the BAOR should Germany continue to 
resist payments; and it hinted explicitly at the low level o f the German defence effort A rapid 
start to negotiations on support costs was demanded.61 The Aide-Memoire did nothing to 
alter the Federal Republic’s opposition. H ie  Germans rejected the contention that they spent 
less on defence than all the others and pointed to the fact that nobody requested payments 
from other countries with NATO troops on their soil.62 This they felt to be utter 
discrimination.
M An extensive account of die support-cost negotiations o f 1955/56 and the events leading up to  them is included 
in FRO, CAB 134/129, An Account of the Negotiations leading up to the Agreements...on Support for the Forces in 
the Year 195&57 (Hoyar Millar to Lloyd), 3.8.1956. The debate about the German response to the NATO- 
Questionnaire of 1955 already showed the difficulties German ministries had in  projecting a reasonable plan for the 
military build-up. See: Greiner, in: MGFA XU, pp.642-656.
*  Kaiser (1995), p.4-6.
® PA-AA, MB 301, vol.62, Aide-Memoire UK to  German Government, 26.1.56. Art. IV/4 o f NATO Finance 
Convention contained a declaration of intent by Germany that, after the end o f the occupation period, it would be 
ready to talk about further support ’(e-g*  goods and services)' with the stationing countries.
°  BA, B126/34100, Finance Ministry Memo on Stationing Costs, 21.6.1956.
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Mutual irritation mounted considerably during the first months of 1956 as both sides used the 
press to put pressure to back their arguments. The matter became an issue of wide public 
debate in Britain and Germany.63 The United States increasingly feared over the prospect 
of a serious deterioration in British attitudes towards Germany which might have damaging 
effects on other policy areas: ‘When their reserves decline, they become very sensitive about 
various policies. Their financial difficulties affect all o f their policies and contribute to their 
position on such matters as Common Market*6* The Americans decided to take a tougher 
stance and agreed on a common presentation of the three allied ambassadors at the 
Auswärtiges Amt, with their ambassador, Conant, taking the lead. He accused the Germans 
of leaving it to others to pay for its defence.65 All three ambassadors demanded ’real’ offers 
by Germany which until then had suggested only to permit a more liberal use of the 
occupation cost account and to increase its weapon purchases abroad (on the economic 
reasoning behind this offer, see ch.II).
Still the German position, represented by Schaffer, did not change. Dulles, Mollet, and Eden 
wrote to Adenauer expressing their concern about the Federal Republic’s stance.66 At this 
point, it became obvious to Adenauer that the issue might do lasting harm to British-German 
relations. Schaffer came under increasing attack from his colleagues for his stubbomess67 *
Adenauer ordered him to stop any further public comment on the issue.69 He and Foreign 
Minister von Brentano came to the conclusion that a serious offer was unavoidable in this
63 BA NL Blankenhom, 60, Letter Blanksnhom to Adenauer on conversation with Steel, 20.256; 
ibid., 61/1, Letter Kirkpatrick to Adenauer, 13.4.56; FAZ, 7.2.1956.
64 FRUS 1955-57, XXVI, Telegram from the North Atlantic Council Meeting, 17.1255, p.62.
65 FRO CAB 134/129, An A ccount.., 3.8.1956; BA, B126/34100, finance Ministry oo Representation made by 
Allied Ambassadors, 23.1956.
66 BA, B136/3131, M ollet to Adenauer, 26.4.1956; Dulles to Adenauer,26.4.1956; Kurzprotokoll Kabinettsitzung, 
25.4.1956.
07 7  believe that the Finance M inistry's proposal about further US foreign aid was misplaced and therefore !  
have not been astonished by the reaction. Furthermore, the handling o f the support cost question was, /  think, not
very skillfulT, von Brentano to Adenauer, March 1956, in: Baring(ed), Sehr verehrter Herr Bundeskanzler, 1974, 
p.188; see also: LES, Erhard-Adenauer correspondence, Erhard to Adenauer, 29.21956.
B A  B 136/3131, Adenauer to  Schfiffer, 23.1956.
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situation.69 Consequently, the Finance Ministry was relieved of its responsibility for the 
question and the Foreign Ministry took over. This did not, however, impede the Finance 
Minister from continuing with the strongest resistance. His position was motivated by 
electoral concerns and by the realistic expectation that in the run-up to the 1957 Federal 
elections, the reserves he had accumulated would be mercilessly plundered by domestic as 
well as foreign demands.70
At the end of April, von Bientano went to London for consultations. The support cost issue 
turned out to be the central point of discussion.71 The Germans were now prepared to offer 
Britain $83m cash and an advance payment of $107m for arms purchases. They intimated that 
they prefered to continue the talks bilaterally so as to avoid another staging of the three allied 
ambassadors at the AA.72 The British, exasperated by the slow progress of the talks which 
had been going on since February, agreed to bilateral talks. They rejected the cash offer and 
insisted upon $143m. Forcefully, they made the Germans aware of the political importance 
of the subject The AA minutes noted: * Warning by the Chancellor o f the Exchequer that we 
are heading towards a catastrophe -break-up o f NATO, pullback o f British troops- i f  solution 
is not found very rapidly. Very heavy strains in German-British relations due to this problem  
... if the support cost question were solved, we could count upon a real intensification o f 
economic and political relations between both countries\ 73
However, it soon became clear to the British that a sum larger than the year before was not 
attainable because o f the results of Germany's parallel negotiations with the United States,
"  BA, NL 239 v.Breniano, 156/5. v.Bientano to  Adenauer, 13.4.1956; ibid., 156/6, vJlrentano to  Adenauer, 
20.4.1956. The attacks from  abroad also centered increasingly on Schiffen 'H e [Duties] knows how difficult these 
things were, particularly when a government had such a good finance m inister*; Conversation Adenauer - Dulles 
12.6.56, in: FRUS 1955-57, XXVI, p .l 14. Schaffer even threatened to  resign, but in  the decisive cabinet meeting be 
and StrauB were overruled on the support cost question, see: BA, B 102/51520, Schaffer to Herwaith, 9.2.1956; BA, 
B102/51521, note on cabinet meeting, 8.6.1956.
10 Henzler (1994), p.513-23.
71 FRO, PREM 11/1366, WG 1051/1146: Record of Conversations M acmillan - vJtootano, 30.4.1956;
BA, NL Hallstein, 128, notes of conversations in London, April 1956.
73 FRO, T234/30, Adenauer to Macmillan, 26.4.1956; PA AA, R efJ01/95, memorandum, 25.5.1956.
73 PA-AA, R ef200, Chancellor/Foreign M inister V isits, vol.4: memo on v.Breniano Trip to London, 5.6.1956.
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France and other countries. The Americans, with their much larger force, had accepted an 
amount of only $155m.7* Even this had been approved by the German cabinet only after 
very strong pressure by the US government and against the continued resistance of Schaffer 
who spoke of an ’etemalization of the occupation statute*.* 75 Finally, Britain settled for $95m 
(£34m) cash payments and a secret declaration of intent by the German government to buy 
arms to the amount of $524m in the year ahead.76 Altogether Germany paid a total o f $357m 
(DMl.Sbn) to the stationing countries. Their requests had been $571 m. Payments in the 
previous year had amounted to $762m.
The agreement was criticized in both parliaments. British parliamentarians decried that the 
payments fell far short both of previous payments and the actual cost of the troops. Several 
speakers demanded a withdrawal of the BAOR.77 In the Bundestag, von Brentano met the 
attacks of the opposition arguing that it had been a test case of Germany's international 
reliability. He stated that he had left the allies in no doubt that these would be the last 
payments.78
The monetary consequences were minor. The balance of payments problems remained. The 
troop cost problem, however, had entered the stage o f British-German relations as an 
increasingly disturbing factor. The poisoning of mutual relations was therefore the most 
important consequence of the whole affair, *wkich bid fa ir  to do more damage to Anglo-
PRO CAB 128/30, cm 45(56), 21.6.56. The US talks were concluded quickly to spare Adenauer at his US visit 
in June a discussion on this problem. For the results of these talks see Aide-Memoire US-Embassy to  AA, 6.6.56, 
PA-AA Ref301/95; Ranee received $66m after having to admit that 30.000 o f its troops destined for NATO were 
engaged in Algeria: see PA AA, R ef301/95,2 8 3 3 6 . This relatively generous treatment was criticised in  the British 
press and parliament. Belgium received $29m and Denmark, the Netherlands and also secured small amounts.
For details, see Appendix: Support Cost- and Offset Agreements.
75 BA, B126/51521, Memorandum Finance Ministry, 8 June 1956; B 126/34100, Excerpt of the 137th Cabinet 
Meeting, 6 June 1956.
76 PA-AA, Ref301/95, Aide-Memoire UK to  Federal Government, 293.1956; PRO, FO 371/124616, v.Brentano 
to British Embassy Bonn, 29.6.1956.
77 Hansard, House of Commons, 5th series, vol355, p366-70. The press echoed this criticism. The TIMES called 
the agreement 'deeply disappointing’ (303.1956) and the ECONOMIST spoke of a 'sad effort'(7.7.1956, p.13-14).
71 Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestags 2. Wahlperiode 1953-57; 155. Sitzung, p. 8416 B.
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German relations than any single issue fo r  a long tim e/19 It would have been tolerable i f  
the problem had now ceased to ex ist But it persisted* and the proposed weapon purchases 
proved to be a vain promise. The delay in German rearmament increased allied discontent 
with the agreement
The Germans* on the other hand* felt that the agreements had done little to secure a stab le  
troop presence, and rumours of renewed requests were reported during summer. When these  
proved to be true, the FRG had even more difficulties to resist than the year before. Germ any 
felt obliged to continue payments which closely resembled occupation costs and as such w ere 
highly criticised by the public. The fact that the German government on the whole had been  
defeated over the issue* permits the highlighting of another characteristic of postwar policy 
for which the support cost negotiations are an excellent indicator. They became a continuing 
reminder of Germany’s status of ‘semi-sovereignty* after 1955. It was not only the restrictions 
of the Paris Accords but also the fact that Germany had voluntarily accepted dependence o n  
a continued allied troop presence* which was to foster a strong compliance of Germany to the  
allies in other fields. Until the formulation of ’Ostpolitik* in the late 1960s* Germany was to  
cope with the dilemma that* compared with its Cold War rhetorics* its actual contribution to  
defence remained relatively low* provoking financial requests from the countries which 
guaranteed its security.
79 PRO CAB 134/129* An Account* 3.8.1956.
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CHAPTER n
THE GERM AN REARMAMENT CRISIS 1956
The support cost problem had been hardly solved, and in a manner that was unsatisfactory 
to all participants, when West Germany was put in the dock again: this time it was the delay 
in its rearmament program. It had to admit openly that its ambitious plans were unrealistic 
and that the build-up of a German army would proceed much slower than promised during 
the EDC negotiations. This failure became the basic argument for a continuation o f German 
payments to support allied troops. This is an essential background to the burden-sharing 
discussion during the mid-1950s. What were the reasons for a development which surprised 
most observers? Which consequences followed for the sharing of the defence burden? In 
answering these questions I will concentrate less on the details of the rearmament process and 
the protracted practical problems which accompanied it;1 indeed, my main intention is to 
outline the broader political and economic reasons for the delay and how they influenced the 
support cost debate. The chapter also points out some fundamental political and economic 
factors underlying West Germany’s remilitarisation in the 1950s.
Initial rearmament plans had foreseen the build-up of a 500.000 man army within the period 
1955-58. Despite deep doubts in the Finance and Defence Ministries as to the practical 
feasibility of this endeavour, Adenauer personally promised the Americans to keep to the 
schedule as agreed.3 Already by the end of 1955 it had become quite clear to the German 
government that this was a very optimistic commitment. In public, however, it incessantly 
reaffirmed its intention to create the promised forces within three years.
Yet, there was never a coherent overall plan for the financing of the rearmament effort The 
German government clung to the planned allocation of DM 9bn($2143m) a year which had 
been previously fixed during the early 1950s, despite great uncertainty about whether this sum *
1 On these issues see the three volumes 'Anfangc Westdeutschcr Sicherheilspolitik? (etLMGFA). The fourth 
volume by Abelshanser/Scbwengler unfortunately appeared after completion of this thesis.
* BA, B 136/2163, SchSffer to Adenauer, 31.8.1955; Conversation Schflffer-TuthiU, 23.7.55; Adenauer to Cooant, 
5.9.55.
46
was adequate. As regards the rest of the bill generous help by the Americans was hoped for. 
How big this 'rest* was remained secret to all participants. In any case, German hopes that 
US aid would cover much of the cost were wiped out by a sharp US Aide-Memoire in early 
1956. It stipulated the end of grant aid to the Federal Republic on the grounds that the 
Germans were not doing enough for rearmament.3
Not surpirisingly, the financial plans were revised continually during 1955/56. The projected 
cost shrank, for example, from January to June 1956 from DM 45bn ($10.7bn) to DM 32bn 
($7.6bn).4 Earlier, some estimates had predicted figures of DM60-80bn and more.5 These 
downward revisions reflected the pessimistic view of the Finance Ministry about the available 
funds and the time schedule of the enterprise. At no time the allies were able to obtain a clear 
picture o f German financial planning. No wonder; inside the German government itself 
nobody apparently had a real idea o f how much rearmament would cost. It just became ever 
more obvious that there would be a certain delay.
This was not due to a lack of money. In 1954 the following funds were earmarked for the 
successive four years: the amount in the so-called Juliusturm  ($1.2bn)6, the US Nash-list 
grants($0.95bn), and the budgetary provision ($8.57bn).7 *O f the $4286m set aside for 
rearmament in 1955 and 1956, however, only $194m were spent before the end o f 1956. 
$ 1267m were used for occupation costs and offset payments (see table 5). The rest was 
simply added to the Juliusturm . The German argument that the continuation o f support cost 
payments would endanger rearmament o r that rearmament would seriously damage the 
economic progress o f Germany seemed, in view of these figures, quite exaggerated.
5 BA, NL Blankenhom, 61h/l, US Aide-Memoire to  Germany, 153.56.
4 BA, B 126/51520, BMF Memo on Defence Planning. 25.1.1956; BA, B126/51521, Memo BMP. 
Verteidi gungsfinanzienmg, 28.6.1956.
5 Abelshauser, T he causes and consequences»*, in: HeUer/Gillingbam(ed$), 1992, p317-18.
4 The 'Juliusturm* was a large amount of unspent Binds accumulated by the Federal government due to
unexpectedly high tax revenues and the delay in rearmament. It was named after the tower in Berlin where the 
German Reich deposited French reparation payments after the 1870/71 war.
1 Abelshauser, in: Hellet/GiliinghamCeds), 1992, p316; Greiner, D ie militiirische EingUedenmg der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die WEU und in  die NATO , 1954-57, in: MGFA HI (1993), p.641-658.
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Table 5:
Allocation o f German Defence Fonds 1955 « 1956 (in million $ )'
Defence
budget
allocation
Occupation 
and Support- 
costs
Research,
damages
Purposes not 
related to 
defence
Balance 
(Budget minus 
expenditure)
Amount 
spent for 
rearmament
1955 2143 867 * 42 857 381 24
1956 2143 400 12 429 1286 170*
1957 2143 il l . n.a. a a . ILL a a .
* occupation costs until May 1955: SI52m; support costs until 31 March 1956: $714m. 
0 until 31 October 1956.
When the German government realized that it would soon have to admit the awkward truth 
about the delay, Adenauer looked for a scapegoat in the form of a political sacrifice. In the 
summer of 1956, the Minister of Defence, Blank, had promised NATO in writing that all 
force goals could be kept to. At the end of October, however, the Federal Government had 
to put its cards on the table. To ’spare’ Blank embarrassment, a new defence minister was 
installed shortly before the Annual Review meeting of NATO. This was Franz-Josef Strauss 
who had been coveting the job for years.9
Finally, in autumn 1956, Germany’s NATO partners were confronted openly with what they 
had already suspected. The first announcement was that the German conscription period 
would be reduced from 18 to 12 months. Publicly, the government justified this with allied 
troop reduction plans.10 Internally, Adenauer stated his own purpose: he was well aware of 
the unpopularity of long military service in West Germany and undertook the move with a 
view to the next elections.11 *In his secret speech at the NATO Annual Review meeting in 
October, Strauss cited the difficult psychological situation of a demilitarised and defeated
I BA NL Blankenhotn 70/3/145-146, Memorandum of finance ministry on Defence expenditure, 7 .12^6.
* BA NL Blankenhoro 67/1/34, Letter Blankenhorn to Adenauer, 9.10.1956; Strsufi, Erinnenmgen, 1989, p.268- 
284; Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Staatsmann ¡953*67, 1990, p.270-274; Greiner, in: MGFA HI (1993), p.764-65.
10 BA NL Blankenhorn 63/85, Federal government press-release, 27.9.56.
II Buchstab(ed), Adenauer: Wtr haben wirklich etwas geschaffcn. D ie ProtokolU dee CDU-Bundesvorstands
1953-57,1990, 20.9.1956, p.1031.
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country which rendered military service unpopular.12 The step, publicly announced without 
consulting Bonn's NATO allies, met with strong criticism from the Americans and British.13
Furthermore, Strauß informed his colleagues, procurement planning for the German forces 
would be stretched to take into account the requirements created by new strategic 
developments and the latest technological advances.14 The most sensitive announcement was 
the admission that the build-up of the promised conventional array would be delayed; this 
delay would occur despite the well-known huge stockpile o f unspent money Schäffer had 
accumulated. The Federal Government had informed the United States already before the 
NATO meeting that manpower targets were to be reduced to ’80.000 instead o f96.000 by the 
end o f 1956 and to between 175,000 and 200.000 by the end o f  7957’.15 Strauß, in his 
speech, gave an even smaller figure. The following table summarizes the numerous revisions 
of force goals in internal German estimates and compares them with the actual progress made.
Tabic 6: Revision of Force Goals For German Forces, 1955-56
Projected 
Force goals 
on:
Plan of 
October*55
December
1955
January
1956
March
1956
November
1956
Actual
build-up
31.1236 97.000 96.000 87.000 96.000 75.000 67.971
31.1237 271.000 270.000 220.000 270.000 135.000 120.000
31.1238 606.100 480.000 417.000 488.000 165.000 184.000 |
31.1239 - 605.000 583.000 - 343.000(3/61) 248.000 |
Sources: Greiner, in: MGFA M, p.650.656.752*54,771,787; NHP, Defence M inistry note, January 1963.
13 BA NL Blankenhom 68/2/107, Draft of Speech at NATO Council, 22.1036.
13 ibid. 67/1/33, Letter Blankenhom to Adenauer, 9.10.56; FRUS 1955-57, IV , Memo of Discussion at the 284th 
NSC Meeting, 10 May 1956, p.80. The Americans had tried in vain to warn the Germans of the consequences of a 
shorter military service; FRUS XXVI, 1955-57, p.93-98, conversation v.Brentano-DuIles, 43.1956 and conversation 
Strau&Elbrick, 143.1956.
14 as fn.12. StrauB meant the discussion about the 'N ew  Look* in the Eisenhower administration and the massive 
equipment of US forces in Europe with tactical nuclear weapons.
°  FRUS 55-57. XXVI. A me mb Bonn to DOS, 16 October 1956, p.168.
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As to the reasons for these revisions, Strauß put particular emphasis on problems of 
accommodation as a result of the stream of refugees to Germany and on the generally 
antimilitaristic mood in the country.16 17 The German,-defence minister reaffirmed his 
government’s determination to attain the planned strength of its army; unfortunately, there 
would be an unspecified delay.
The rearmament crisis placed Germany in an awkward position. After all, rearmament had 
been the prize for the Federal Republic’s sovereignty. It appeared that Germany, having 
achieved its political objectives, was now shirking its commitments. NATO-ambassador 
Blankenhom wrote: * A t all events, we should avoid the impression that the delay in the build- 
up, which we cannot deny, is taking place only because we don*t want to impede the 
extraordinary economic progress o f the Federal Republic. It w ill be difficult, in any case, to 
counter the argument that in this and the next year we will make much less o f a sacrifice fo r  
defence than other nations and that therefore the support cost question should be dealt with 
again*}1
Blankenhom was righ t West Germany's NATO partners were very irritated. The official 
German arguments did not convince them, particularly after they had fought so long to make 
rearmament politically possible. They saw German rearmament not only as a gain for Western 
security and as a  step towards integrating the Federal Republic in the Western Alliance, but 
also as an essential step in sharing the Cold War burden (see ch.I). Supplementing their own 
conventional troops partly with German forces had been a major aspect of the EDC debate. 
This prospect was, at least temporarily, delayed to a future date. Acheson’s idea of utilizing 
the German economic potential seemed, once more, far from being fully implemented. 
Frustration understandably ran high, fueled by the very satisfying performance of the German 
economy while other NATO partners struggled with the defence burden.
An additional source o f irritation was the delayed business for the armaments industries in
16 BA, NL Blankenborn. 68/2, Draft of Strauss Speech at NATO M eeting, 22.10.56.
17 BA NL Blankenhom, 67/1, Letter Blankenhom to Adenauer, 9.10.1956.
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the US, France and Britain. Satisfying the presumed need for military equipment for th e  
twelve planned German divisions had been a silent hope of all three governments. With th e  
allocation of nine billion marks a year from 1955 onwards for the purpose of rearmament in  
the Federal budget a wave of orders for military equipment was expected to materialize so o n  
(see ch.V). The most important aspect o f this affluence was, however, that a fast build-up o f  
the army was obviously not impeded by lack of money. Whereas the United States and G reat 
Britain seemed more and more stuck with their troops in Europe, Germany appeared to b e  
mainly concerned with accumulating foreign exchange reserves instead of creating a strong 
conventional army. It comes as no surprise that this situation had a decisive impact on th e  
support cost debate.
What were the real reasons for the rearmament crisis? H ie causes for the failure were m ore 
complex than the official announcements suggested. One important factor was the delay in  
making a decision about the whole political organisation of the defence effort, caused by th e  
defeat of the EDC project As a result previous plans for the organisation of rearmament 
became obsolete.1* Blueprints for the form of the German military contribution w ere 
extremely sketchy in 1955. Necessary legislative action by the Federal government had to b e  
rushed through parliamentary procedures. This was not easily done. The whole rearmament 
process was strongly criticized by the Social Democrats, supported by a strong popular 
movement against rearmament19
A second pan of the problem was a 'practical* one. Although abundant funds were available 
for the years 1955-58, it was not easy to spend them in a  reasonable way. Delays in building 
barracks, difficulties in acquiring land for them, the slow taking in of recruits, - all these w ere 
problems stated by the Germans as reasons for the unspent money.20 Allied troops occupied 
much o f what remained of prewar barracks and training areas. There was certainly also  *30
11 Abdshauser, in: Heller/ Gillingham. 1992, p312 .
"  On domestic opposition to German rearmament: VoUcmann, 'D ie innenpolitiscbc Dimension A denaucncber 
Sicberheitspolitik in der EVG Phase, in: MGFA n , 1990, p335-604; Ehlert, 'Innenpolitische Auseinandersetzungen 
um die W ehrveitrige 1954-56’, in: MGFA m , 1993, p.235-560.
30 BA NL Blankenhorn, 68/2, Speech of Strauss at the NATO-Meeting, 22.1036; see also: Greiner, in: MGFA 
m , 674-675.
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considerable disorganisation within the German defence ministry and in the cooperation 
between the ministries. All these bottle-necks contributed to the delay; yet, in the end, they 
were not decisive. The major causes for the rearmament crisis were fundamental doubts about 
the economic and military conditions o f a conventional buildup.
On closer view, it comes as no surprise that conventional rearmament was suddenly no longer 
a first-range priority for West Germany. Germany was now integrated into and protected by 
the Alliance. Thus, it had achieved its basic foreign policy goal. Conventional rearmament 
was neither popular with the people, nor did it fit into the general strategic trend of the 
Alliance which was stressing nuclear deterrence more and more. The German government 
adopted its own *New Look* version, symbolized by the succession of Blank by Strauß.21 2
Strauß, now in the position where he considered himself the ideal man, immediately set 'new 
priorities*. His plans to equip the Bundeswehr with nuclear delivery systems, and possibly 
also nuclear weapons32, incited violent public debate in Germany. 'Quality instead of 
quantity* became his often cited slogan, not only with respect to his nuclear plans but also 
regarding the conventional buildup.23 He was unwilling to finance the application of outdated 
strategic concepts when, at the same time, Germany’s allies put increasing emphasis on 
nuclear warfare on the battlefield, rocket technology, and sophisticated airpower.
The money saved because of the delay in rearmament was partly spent in politically more 
opportune ways, such as social expenditure.24 A costly reform of the pension system was 
undertaken. Refugees, veterans and victims of the Nazi-regime received financial help. After 
all, 1957 was an election year. The rest was stockpiled to cover future burdens, as Finance 
Minister Schaffer tirelessly insisted on.25 Blank, during his tenure, was not able to prevent
21 Greiner, in: MGFA m , p.733-737.
22 The exact extent o f Strauß* intentions is still hotly debated. For an assessment: Ahonen, 'R anz Josef Strauss 
and the German Nuclear Question, 1956-62'. in: JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 18/1995. p.25-41.
22 ibid., p.822-25; Krieger, Franz Josef Strauß, 1996, p.34-42.
24 Emminger, D-Mark, Dollar, Währungskrisen, 1987, p.78. On the expansion of welfare benefits: Hockerts, 
Sozialpolitische Entscheidungen in  Nachkriegsdeutschland, 1980.
25 Buchstab (ed), 1990, 117.1957, p.944; Köllner/VoUanann, in: MGFA 0 ,1 9 9 0 , p.789-791.
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funds not used for rearmament being diverted to these purposes» despite his protests against 
Schäffer’s tight-fisted attitude.36 The Finance Minister supplied the economic rationale 
behind the rearmament crisis. Schaffer felt that remilitarization could easily interfere with the 
phenomenal economic progress of the Federal Republic. He feared above all the inflationary 
impact of huge defence spending. To release the billions of the Juliusturm  would foster this 
»for both German financial experts and public, equally distressing prospect.26 7 *Hie danger o f  
inflation was aggravated by the fact that industrial production in Germany had almost no free 
capacity. That was one motivation behind Schaffer’s promotion of arms purchases abroad.38 
Support cost payments were no substitute because was a waste of funds and he already 
foresaw a huge gap in the financial plans for the following years.29 Arms purchases abroad, 
however, unburdened the booming economy and transferred surplus foreign exchange abroad 
(for a more detailed treatment of this question, see ch.V).
Industrial leaders and politicians agreed on these economic matters.30 Domestic priorities 
rated higher than regard for alliance affairs. This applies also to the shortening of the 
conscription period. Labour shortages made this a reasonable step and, of course, this was a 
major aspect of the decision.31 Thus, Schaffer and Strauß tried to extend rearmament over 
a longer period, although this meant major conflicts with the partners in the Alliance.
26 See for example the controversy in: BA, B 126/34100, Blank to  Chancellor*« Office re Stationing Costs 1956. 
13 July 1956; Schiffer to  Chancellor's Office, 18 July 1956.
31 The President of the Federal Bank, Vocke, supported Schiffer’* arguments: 'Fact is that an acceleration o f  
defence expenditures in combination with the release o f billions fo r  new Federal programs plus tax reductions, and 
all that in connection with continuing demands fo r  higher wages...is enough to damage the strength o f the currency*; 
see: BA, B 136/3320, Vocke to Adenauer, 20.4.1956.
38 BA, B 126/51520, Finance Ministry memo on defence planning, 25.1.1956.
39 BA, B 126/51521, note Finance m inister on cabinet meeting, 8.6.1956.
30 BA, B 102/57514, BD1 memo, 16.1.1956; ibicL, note on meeting Erhard, Strauß, BDI, 22.1.1957. It might also 
have been detrimental to  the willingness o f the industry to produce weapons that they were clearly told that arms 
production would rem ain under the tight control o f politicians.
31 Biitle, Rearming the Phenix, US M ilitary Assistance to the FRG, 1950-60.1991, p.323-325.
Economic progress was the political priority for the Federal Republic after 1955.”  It was 
the ’Wirtschaftswunder’, and not ’Westintegration’, which became the major factor of 
identification and rehabilitation in the eyes of the German public. This indicates a shift in 
basic policy aims from a search for security in the Western Alliance to an overriding 
emphasis on economic progress. The necessary security framework had been put in place. 
Now the policy o f economic growth took priority, conflicting with the economic exigencies 
of rearmament.
The shift in policy priorities from the search for security in the Alliance to a promotion of 
economic growth in the European framework became a source of potential conflict with the 
British; whilst the search for security had tended to worry, above all, France. This was one 
background to the Anglo-German problems and to French-German harmony during the 
successive years. The delay in German rearmament was criticised mainly by Washington and 
London. Both exerted increasing pressure on Strauss and the German government. They 
succeeded in putting new steam into the stuttering effort
When Strauß, under strong pressure from his NATO colleagues, tried to get more money 
released for rearmament he m et like Blank, with the resistance of Schaffer. The Finance 
Minister was not willing to commit funds from the Juliusturm  prematurely and fought 
stubbornly for his reserve.33 Strauß identified him consequently as responsible for the slow 
progress of the Bundeswehr build-up.34 He was not the only one to criticise the tight 
financial policy of Schaffer. Adenauer and von Brentano had already blamed his resistance 
in the question of support costs for strained relations with England.33 Schaffer's insistence 
on restricted public spending and on holding reserves for future problems made his stance *14
53
n  For German economic policy in the Fifties see e.g. Ambrosius, Europäische Integration und wirtschaftliche 
Entwicklung der BRD in den 50er Jahren, in: Berding(ed), Wirtschaftliche und politische Integration in Europa im 
19. und 20. Jahrhundert, 1984, p.271-294; BQhrer/Schröder, Germany*s Economic revival in the 1950‘s: The Foreign 
Policy Perspective, in: Di Nolfo(ed), Power in Europe ü , 1992,172-196.
”  BA NL Schiffer, 34, memorandum by Schiffer, 18 September 1957.
14 BA, NL Schiffer, 37, Schiffer memorandum on formation of the cabinet 1957, October 1957.
“  Buchsub(ed), 1990. p.944; FAZ 15.6.1956; 17.6.1956.
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within the cabinet increasingly unpopular and finally cost him his job in October 1957.36 
Although the most pronounced ’anti-spending’ minister had disappeared it still took some 
time and much trouble before the Bundeswehr build-up gained momentum. The delay was 
overcome only at the end of the 1950s, probably not until after the Berlin Wall crisis in 
August 1961, and the strength o f the German army remained for a long time below the level 
of allied expectations.
Not unexpectedly, the delay in German rearmament was seen as the incentive to pose new 
support cost demands towards the Federal Republic. Support costs were a palliative to justify 
continued troop maintenance by the US and the UK. Both felt trapped there by the immobility 
of the political situation and the foundering of their hopes that a  German army could provide 
alternative conventional manpower. In this sense, support costs paralleled the discussion about 
the nuclearization o f the alliance which started during these years. It was also sparked by a 
will to economize in military budgets and to alleviate the burden of Europe's defence on the 
British and American economy. If the Germans would not provide the necessary conventional 
forces, they had to pay for allied troops and to accept the defence of their territory by nuclear 
weapons over the use of which they had little control
36 BA, NL Scbâffer, 39, note on a cabinet meeting on 19.6.1937,30 June 1936; Schwarz, Adenauer, 1990, p354.
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CHAPTER m
TH E SUPPORT COST NEGOTIATIONS OF 1957 
AND THE BRITISH ’NEW LOOK*
a) The Origins of the British Defence Review
During late summer 1956, indications o f renewed British support cost demands multiplied. 
In addition, rumours circulated widely that the British government planned reductions in the 
forces it maintained in Europe. Overshadowed as those reports were by the Radford Plan 
debate, by German rearmament problems, and later by the Suez and Hungarian crises, they 
did not receive much attention. At the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in 
December 1956, however, the UK started a new round of support cost negotiations. They 
were burdened with an explicit threat of British troop-reductions in Europe. Macmillan, then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, personally attended the meeting and gave a candid exposé of 
Britain's problems. He emphasized the foreign exchange problem the British were faced with, 
the enormous resources it employed for defence worldwide, and compared this with German 
deficiencies in their military effort Macmillan urged NATO to undertake a strategic 
reappraisal which might lead to less reliance on conventional troops and to a stronger 
emphasis on nuclear weapons. He left no doubt as to the seriousness of his statements: \ .  J  
must...make it quite clear that unless our overseas costs can be met, the future o f our 
overseas contribution to NATO forces w ill be jeopardised\l
This chapter will discuss the support cost negotiations 1956/57 against the backdrop of the 
British defence review initiated in 1956. The military and economic motives behind the 
review will be outlined. The defence review and the support cost negotiations showed the 
ambiguity of the British government about the continental commitment it had just taken on. 
London saw itself confronted with difficult choices regarding its relations with the rest of 
Europe if it wanted to bring its economic resources in a line with its security commitments. 
The decisions on these choices were to have a deep impact on British-European relations.
1 For the verbal text o f Macmillan’* statement see: BA, NL Blankenhorn, 71/1, Record o f NATO Council 
Meeting (C-VR(56)74), 13 December 1936. A telegram-style version is in FRUS 1933-37, IV, p.131-35.
— ^
Nobody, least of all the US government, was really taken by surprise by the Macmillan 
statement In July 1956, at the same time as the American government discussed similar 
proposals (for the so-called Radford plan and its background, see ch.VI), Eden had written 
to Eisenhower proposing a reform in NATO strategy which might enable the UK to cut its 
troop deployments on the continent2 Using the argument of the increasing importance of 
nuclear weapons in modem warfare and citing the difficult balance of payments position of 
Britain, he urged a reappraisal of NATO’s military policy, suggesting to supplement costly 
conventional forces with cheaper nuclear weapons. The United States, however, after a  debate 
very much along the same lines, was impressed by the strong negative reaction within the 
alliance to US plans to reduce troops in Europe. They concluded that the political 
consequences of a military policy that relied solely on nuclear weapons would be dangerous.3 
Still, the American debate had left the British with the impression that the US was ambiguous 
over this issue and would not totally oppose a revision of the British defence posture. Even 
when the Americans became more outspoken against their blueprints for NATO reform, the 
British decided to continue with their initiative - particularly when the Suez Crisis turned out 
to be a major setback for English foreign policy.
In late 1956, Britain and France were forced by common superpower intervention to retreat 
from the Canal zone they had militarily occupied after Nasser had nationalized it. Not only 
Britain's military but also its economic vulnerability was clearly displayed during the crisis. 
The US had underlined its arguments against a continuation of the adventure with a temporary 
refusal to support the British currency.4 Apart from the blow to British prestige, Suez had 
provoked a serious run on the pound and a tremendous loss o f  foreign-exchange. In the 
months of November and December, Britain had lost $41 Om of its reserves, an enormous
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1 ibid.. Memo Dulles to  Eisenhower US position on review of NATO strategy and force levels, 1 October 1956, 
p.96-98.
4 W ashington's use o f financial pressure during the Suez Crisis is analysed in: Dobson, The Politics o f the Anglo- 
American Special Relationship, 1988, p.166-73; Johnman, 'Defending the Pound: the economics o f the Suez Crisis, 
1956', in: Garst/Johmnan/Lucas, Postwar Britain, 1945-64,1989, p. 166-181; Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy o f the 
Suez Crisis, 1991.
drain on the pre-Suez reserves of about $2250m.3 To stop the run the British government had 
to borrow $ 1300m from the IMF and had to take up a loan of $700m from the EXIM bank. 
Those loans had been approved by the Americans only after Britain had agreed to a cease-fire 
in the canal zone. The repayment of the debts incurred weighed heavily on Britain's external 
balance in the following years.
The monetary predicament was, already before it took these alarming proportions, one major 
cause for the British initiative. During 1955/56, apprehension had mounted in the British 
government that principal foreign policy objectives -to sustain Britain's role as third power 
in the world and to preserve sterling’s role as reserve currency- were seriously prejudiced by 
the pressing burden of military expenditure. In March 1956, Macmillan and Defence Minister 
Monckton urged upon Bden *a reappraisal at the highest level o f the whole basis on which 
our defence policy should rest'?  This reappraisal was to bring British resources and its 
defence posture in line. A 'Report on the Future of the United Kingdom in World Affairs', 
dated 1 June 1956 and prepared by Treasury, Foreign Office and Defence officials was the 
result.5 *7 *The officials stated that the United Kingdom had an overloaded defence structure and 
this had placed the economy under constant strain. A concentration on essential political goals 
of defence policy was indispensable to avoid further damage. From these essentials -keeping 
the Americans in Europe, developing closer cooperation with North America, and maintaining 
the cohesion of the Commonwealth- Continental Europe was conspicuously absent*
A reform of the traditional economic foundations of British military policy would have to take 
into account in particular the exigencies of the currency situation. Savings were to be 
achieved in places where foreign-exchange losses were high in proportion to political and 
military gains. The foreign exchange cost of the forces assigned to NATO was estimated now
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5 The December losses were obscured in official announcements by adding the first tranche o f the IMF loan to 
Britain’s reserves; KCA 1956, p.15239; KCA 1957, p .15307.
* Defence Policy: memo by Macmillan and Monckton to Eden. 203.1956, in: Goldsworthyfed), 1994, p.60.
7 ibid., p.61-81.
* ibid., p.67.
to be $ 190.4m a year for the BAOR and the 2nd TAF.9 10According to British government 
opinion as expressed in the report cited this was too high a price for the political gains o f 
troop stationing in Europe. Accordingly reductions in defence expenditure 'must be found  
largely in our expenditure on our defence in Europe, I t is there that the greatest scope exists 
fo r reducing demands on our engineering industry, our m ilitary manpower, our technical and  
scientific resources and our foreign exchange, in the interests o f reestablishing our economic 
strength.*'0
The problem was how to achieve such a  reform and the corresponding reduction without 
embarrassing the US or damaging British relations to third countries too heavily.11 If  NATO 
adopted a new strategic concept based mainly on nuclear weapons and requiring just a 
’tripwire' force of conventional troops on the Cold War border the task would be much easier. 
This was the background of Eden’s letter to Eisenhower. It soon became clear that the 
Americans were less than enthusiastic about the British proposals.12 They argued that a 
strategic discussion in the alliance at this moment would endanger Congress legislation on 
foreign aid as well as the legislative procedures concerning rearmament in the German 
parliament13 They therefore urged London to delay presenting their plans for review in 
NATO committees. The tense international climate, marked by Suez and the Hungarian 
uprising, made a fast British move difficult anyway. A final consideration was that the British 
feared that premature announcements would seriously impair the further payment o f support 
costs by Germany. There was no hope that reductions could be started before late 1957, and 
the previous agreement ended in May 1957. A follow-up agreement seemed therefore 
necessary in any case. These considerations suggested a slow pace for the British initiative.
Prior to the NATO meeting in December 1956 the British discussed their problem with the 
US delegation headed by Dulles. Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd stated that they * could not
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* CAB 129/84, CP(56)269, Memo by M inister o f Defence: UK Forces in Germany, 28 November 1956.
10 ibid., p.69.
11 CAB 134/1315, Cabinet Policy Review Committee minutes, 9 June 1956, in: Goldsworthy(ed) (1994), p.86.
11 PRO, CAB 128/30, Cabinet Meeting M inutes, 19.6.1956.
”  ibid.; FRUS 1955-57, IV, Memorandum US to UK, 29 June 1956, p.87-88.
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keep troops in Germany unless a way was found to reimburse the British fo r  this expense\ 
After Dulles asked: * Unless the Germans pay for it? \ Lloyd replied: ’ Unless someone pays 
fo r  i t! \u Ignoring this broad hint, Dulles acknowledged the gravity of the situation and 
agreed on the allegations that Germany was not doing enough for defence. However* he 
warned of the effect o f reductions on the German electorate. He also declared himself against 
a reliance on the British version of the tripwire strategy which in US opinion was placing too 
much emphasis on nuclear deterrence.14 5 This did not impress the British at all and they 
threatened openly to break the WEU-treaty* hinting that US help with respect to their nuclear 
capacity might be a solution.16
This plea was a further consequence of the defence review. If the UK, despite the envisaged 
cuts, was to retain a military capability compatible with its self-perception as third power in 
the world, recourse to increasing its nuclear potential seemed the only way.17 However, US 
financial and technical help was necessary. Particularly, regarding rocket technology, the 
United Kingdom had fallen far behind. Mischievous jokes suggested that the next British 
rocket should be constructed in such a way as to allow highly trained athletes to carry it into 
enemy territory.1® The US delegation was hesitant regarding help on this problem. However, 
soon afterwards the Americans started to expand nuclear cooperation with the British.19 It 
is unlikely that this was coupled at that time to a British promise to limit their defence cuts 
in Europe. The quid-pro-quo were base rights for the Americans in Britain and the important 
objective was to repair Anglo-American relations after Suez. However, soon the troop 
connection would play an increasing role. At the end o f the above mentioned meeting, both 
sides agreed that it would be better to wait first for the German reaction to the new support
14 FRUS 1955-57, IV , Anglo-American meeting, 11 December 1956, p.123, fn.2.
”  ibid., p.127.
16 ibid., p.130-31; see also: FRO, PREM 11/1270, American-British talks, 11 December 1956.
17 Excellent on this subject: Clark. Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship, 1994.
'* Quoted from: Porter, 'Downhill all the Way: 13 Tory Years', in: Coopcy/Tintsoa/Fieldmg(eds), The Wilson 
Governments, 1964-70, 1993, pJ21.
'* An Anglo-American agreement on the proliferation of medium range m issiles was signed in July 1958. See: 
Botti, The long  Wait. The Forging o f the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance 1945-1958,1987, p.234; B artlett, The 
Special Relationship, 1992, p.88; Clark (1994).
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cost demands before the British committed themselves to a fixed position on reductions in 
Europe.20
b) The Support Cost Negotiations 1956/57
The British position on approaching the Germans was clear the reform of their defence 
structure was not negotiable, but the willingness to compromise on particular points would 
be influenced by the German willingness to contribute to the foreign exchange cost. 
'Decisions concerning withdrawal o f our troops were therefore not primarily dependent on 
the outcome o f the negotiations concerning stationing costs, although these negotiations would 
influence the extent to which we should wish to withdraw our troops.’21 Under these 
circumstances a favourable agreement seemed not very likely. Indeed, strong political 
arguments against a new round of negotiations had been raised in the Foreign Office after the 
embarrassing experience one year previously. But when the full extent of the delay in German 
rearmament became known in late 1956, those inhibitions were discarded.22 The Germans 
were not surprised by the new request. Conscientious of their shortcomings in the military 
field and aware o f the disastrous repercussions of the negotiations in 1955/56, they 
immediately accepted the initiation of a new round of negotiations.23 Moreover, support cost 
payments were seen now explicitly as a means in the fight against suspected British troop 
reduction plans.24
Prior to Macmillan’s speech at the NATO council meeting, the Germans met with the British 
on the subject of support costs.23 Von Brentano and Schaffer already had come to an 
understanding with respect to the German position in the forthcoming negotiations. They
*  FRUS 1955-57, IV , p.134.
21 FRO, CAB 134/2223, MAC(GX57), services cost in Germany, 1st m eeting, 4.1.1957,
22 An account o f the 1957 negotiations is in FRO, CAB 134/2223, A Note on the Negotiations leading to the 
Local Defense Cost Agreement with the FRG, 1957. Memorandum by Gore-Booth (M 101/234), 1540.1957.
32 BA, B126/34103, Excerpt of Cabinet M eeting, 8.12.57; BA, NL Blankenbom 71/2, note, 174256.
34 PA-AA Ref301/96, von Brentano to Adenauer, 642 5 6 ; von Brentano to  Chancellor's Office, 444957.
33 PA-AA Ref301/96, Meeting of UK-FRG delegations, 12 December 1956.
agreed on $286m as an upper limit for all support cost requests - the rest of the stationing 
countries were expected to follow soon - and to a preferential treatment for Britain because 
of its special currency problems. One precondition in the negotiations would be that the allies 
would agree this time to terminate their demands once and for all.26 The Federal Republic 
also, for the first time, proposed monetary measures during discussions in the English-German 
Economic Committee which was set up as the forum for the negotiations.* 37 *These comprised 
a premature repayment of postwar debts, investment in UK Treasury papers, and an 
enlargement of the hardly used account at the Bank of England destined for arms purchases 
(from £20 to £30m).28 These offers were an expression of the increasingly strong reserve 
position of the Federal Republic which Bonn slowly began to use for political aims.
As direct support cost payments the German delegation offered $120m. The British, however, 
demanded $182m. The talks were complicated by requests which dribbled in from the rest of 
the stationing countries. Those requests were answered with a German offer of half the 
amount agreed upon in the previous year. France was excluded from this harsh treatment, but 
it was nevertheless offered considerably less on the argument that French forces in Germany 
were seriously under strength due to the Algerian war. Naturally, the affected nations 
protested, unsuccessfully, against the cuts.39 The fast progress hoped-for in the British- 
German case proved illusive.
By far the greatest complication became the public announcement of British troop reduction 
intentions in February 1957, when the talks were almost concluded. Widespread speculation 
on the subject had affected the negotiations all the time.30 The Germans were particularly 
disturbed by the British plans at a time when their own buildup had hardly started. This they
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saw as a grave military weakening o f NATO front-lines. Furthermore, Bonn feared a  
combined move towards a nuclearisation of Western defence with Germany providing th e  
Toot-soldiers* as it had renounced the posession of own nuclear arms.31
The Germans added to their bargaining position in the support cost negotiations that * G erm an  
concessions [will] be made dependent on guarantees about the maintenance o f previous fo r c e  
levels and combat capabilities\ 32 3They decided to request that a clause be inserted in th e  
prospective agreement which coupled the result and any payments to a British guarantee fo r  
stable troop levels. This was exactly what the British wanted to prevent. They thought ’th a t 
nothing should be written in the agreement, which prevents us from  making the reductions 
we have in m i n d The negotiations arrived at a deadlock. Macmillan, Prime Minister in 
January 1957, wrote an annoyed letter to Adenauer. \„Your negotiators appear to be trying  
to bring financial pressure upon us to delay giving effect to reductions, which we regard a s  
essential to our economy by leaving in doubt what contribution we could count on in 1957- 
5S*.34 This was a  foreboding o f Macmillan’s growing preoccupation with the issue. T he 
support cost question was to acquire an important place in determining his attitude towards 
the Federal Republic. Adenauer, in his answer, expressed his contempt of the troop reduction 
plans.35 Finally, a somewhat diluted version of the clause was accepted by the Germans. T he 
negotiations were concluded in March. Germany agreed to pay $140m cash, deposited £75m 
at the Bank of England as prepayment on postwar debts, and enlarged the account for military 
purchases to fSOm.36
The final signature was once more delayed by the arrival of an official US support cost
31 For a German assessment o f tbe British plans: BA, NL Blankenborn, 7 5 b /l, BMVg Memo: MÜitiriscbe
Beurteilung des britischen W eissbuchs, 25 April 1957.
33 BA, B 126/34103, von Brentano to  Adenauer. 223.1957.
33 PRO, PREM 11/1842, Macnnilan to  Lloyd, 8 February 1957.
34 PA-AA R ef301, vo l.97 ,22.237; also in: PRO, PREM 11/1842.
33 Und., letter Adenauer to  Macmillan, 2 3 3 5 7 .
36 BGBL 1959II, Notenwechsel zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik und der Regierung des Vereinigten 
Königreichs von Grossbritannien und Nordirland Ober gegenseitige H ilfe (Artikel 3 NATO Vertrag), p.414-417.
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request for a sum much larger than expected. Arguing with the necessity of a preferential 
treatment for Britain and the need of the funds for its own rearmament effort, the Federal 
Republic, after some discussion, managed to get US acceptance of $77.5m, half the amount 
of the year before. It had to accept a clause which granted the US the right to reopen the case 
within six months if the German rearmament effort still was behind schedule at that time.37 *
After concluding with the USA, the British-German agreement finally was signed. Thus, the 
support cost problem was solved and discussions centred on the British troop reduction plans.
c) The British White Paper, April 1957
The new Prime Minister Macmillan and his Minister of Defence, Duncan Sandys, were deeply 
impressed by the constraints the financial position put on British foreign policy. One 
consequence of the Suez crisis, which had clearly exposed Britain's financial and military 
limits, was that it hardened the determination of the British government to continue with its 
controversial defence review, including the plans to trim the BAOR. This proved a thorny 
endeavour, given the obligations of the WEU treaty and the foreseeable resistance o f the 
WEU member countries. Britain could not claim any overseas emergency as the first escape 
clause from the troop commitment. It had to base its plea on financial reasons. This required 
the consent of the WEU members.
The conflict would not remain an isolated issue, as the British realized beforehand. Defence 
Minister Anthony Head wrote to his colleagues when the December meeting of NATO was 
approaching: 'The problem facing us can, l  think, be summarized as follows: How large a 
reduction should we propose to our A llies in the interests o f our economic position, bearing 
in mind that i f  we go too fa r we may provoke a general reduction in military contributions 
to NATO, and indeed endanger the very stability o f the alliance as well as damaging the 
prospects o f the closer relationship with Europe which we have in mind in other fields’ *
”  For the US-German discussion see: BA, B 12634104, US Aide-Memoire to Germany, 25.2.1956; DDRS 
1987/149, Wilson to  Eisenhower, 223.57; FRUS 55-57, XXVI, Adenauer to  Eisenhower, 2 3 3 3 7 ; Krekeler 
Conversation with Dulles, 27337; Dulles Memo to Eisenhower, 27337 ; Memo of Conference with the President, 
2.437; Eisenhower to  Adenauer, 12.437, p.220-229. For the agreement an  7 June 1957: BG BLII, 1959, p.410-11.
51 PRO CAB 129/84, CP (56), 269, Memorandum of Defence Ministry, 28.1136.
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During the NATO meeting it already became obvious that the other WEU members would 
not be pleased. When, in February 1957, the British officially presented their plans for a troop 
reduction in Europe at the WEU Council Meeting the dilemma became only worse, although 
meanwhile, the US had resigned itself to limited British reductions (for the ensuing debate, 
see ch.IV). The full extent of the British plans was finally made known in the famous 
Defence White Paper of April 1957, provoking further apprehensions on part of Britain’s 
military allies.
The major changes the White Paper proposed were general reductions in manpower, the 
proposed end of national service in 1962, cuts in arms research and development and an 
increased emphasis on international cooperation in the development of new armament 
systems. These ideas were not entirely new, and the W hite Paper only summarized a 
discussion which had been going on throughout the 1950’s.39 The ultimate trigger for the 
implementation of these ideas may have been, as already said, the Suez Crisis at the end of 
1956. The White Paper was no radical change in policies but an attempt to devise strategies 
limiting the obvious erosion of British prestige and freedom to act as a world power. It was 
a new strategy to pursue an old policy design.40
The causes and consequences of the 1957 White Paper have received much attention in the 
scientific literature.41 The motives for initiating the defence review have already been shortly 
touched upon. The basic cause was the economic strain the military posture put on the British 
economy. This was summarized in the opening section o f the White Paper 'Britain's 
influence in the world depends fir s t and forem ost on the health o f her internal economy and 
the success o f her export trade. Without these, military pow er cannot in the long run he 
supported . . .  Over the last five  years, defence on average absorbed 10 per cent o f  Britain's 
gross national product. Some 7 per cent o f the working population are either in the Services
*  Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning. 1955-1958.1991, p.134.
40 Doc krill. The D efence o f the Realm: Britain in  the Nuclear Age, in: G ourvish/0'Day(eds), Britain since 1945, 
1991. p.144.
41 The most recent account is Navias. (1991). Furthermore: Bartlett. The Long Retreat, 1972; Darby, British 
Defence Policy East o f  Suez 1947-1968,1973; Rees, The 19S7 Sandys White Paper, in: Journal o f Strategic Studies 
6(1989), p.215-29.
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or supporting them. One-eigth o f the output o f the metal-using industries, upon which the 
export trade so largely depends, is devoted to defence. An undue proportion o f qualified 
scientists and engineers are engaged on military work. In addition, the retention o f such large 
forces abroad gives rise to heavy charges which place a severe strain upon the balance o f 
payments.**2 The section establishes a clear causal > link between Britain's military 
expenditure and its overall economic problems. That this reasoning was the main driving force 
behind the defence review also is the tenor of the literature on the subject (see fh.39). It is 
useful to shortly recapitulate the main issues of the debate on military expenditure and British 
economic problems in which the issue of the foreign exchange losses of British troops in 
Europe was embedded.
The assertion of the White Paper that military spending was to a good part responsible for 
British economic problems was prevalent in the British government of that time and widely 
shared by contemporary commentators.42 3 The argumentation is still influential and is 
sustained by critics of British policy in the 1950's such as Chalmers or Aaronovich.44 It 
gained renewed force with the opening of archives since contemporary historians often tend 
to repeat the analyses in the papers of government officials. The argument usually goes that 
the high concentration of investment and labour force in defence industries diverted resources 
away from fast-growing industries such as consumer goods, which were the linchpin of the 
postwar boom in Europe, and such damaged British exports. Together with military 
expenditure abroad, this is seen as a central factor for British balance of payments problems. 
The fact that the crisis of British postwar recovery 1951 coincided with the 'Korea- 
rearmament* seems to underline the a rgum ent'Britain*s incalculated act o f sacrifice during 
the crisis at the start o f the Korean War in embarking on a defence program which used up 
all the resources in sight and more, continued to exercise an unfavourable influence on 
economic development long after the event.*45
42 HMSO, Cmnd.124, Defence: Outline o f Future Policy, 1957, p .l.
4  For a vigorous critic o f British defence spending see: Shonficld, British Economic Policy since the War, 1958. 
See also: Bartlett (1972), p.105-06; The Economist, 5.1.1957.
44 Chalmers, Paying fo r  Defence. Military Spending and British Decline, 1985; Aartnovich(ed), The Political 
Economy o f British Capitalism, 1981; for further references sec: Geiger, in: Gorst/Johnmann/Lucas, 1991, p.96.
4  Shonfield (1958), p.56.
6 6
It has, however, already been observed in the previous chapters that such a straightforward 
interpretation might be too simple. The foreign exchange cost of the troops has been put into 
perspective (see c h i, where the financial consequences of troop maintenance were discussed). 
Chapter V will show that the failure of British arms export to Europe was mainly due to the 
fact that it was not consistent with the basic lines of British foreign policy. This argument can 
be extended to the whole sector o f British exports. Complaints about the giving up of markets 
to the Europeans in the rearmament period often disregard the fact that Britain at that time 
was not necessarily willing to direct its trade towards Europe but rather towards the US and 
the Commonwealth.46 The crucial interest in earning dollars and the unfavourable trade 
balance with the dollar area rendered exports there a priority. The second priority, 
Commonwealth trade, is not so obvious.47 *Although British trade with the Commonwealth 
was of a much higher value than with Europe, its level was stagnant compared to the 
breathtaking rise of inter European trade growth rates. The clinging to these imperial links 
can only be explained by political, or rather ideological, reasons. It would have been almost 
impossible to explain to the British public such a brusque revision of traditional foreign 
policy. The giving up or non-entering o f European markets was a necessary consequence of 
these policies, not of the claims on resources by defence needs.
The military burden is only one o f the many arguments in the great debate about British 
postwar ’decline*.4* It is not surprising that the prevailing view on the effects of British 
defence costs on the economy was soon challenged, apart from the reservations already made. 
Snyder points out that 'the rearmament program  strengthened (emph. in original) Britain’s  
ability to earn reserves in the years thereafter'!*  He cites the receipts of US foreign aid 
(1952-1956: $1 billion), the foreign exchange expense o f US and Canadian troops in Britain 
(about $182m a year in the 1950*s), and military exports ($577m until 1959). One might add 
US support for the pound which was not only motivated by economic motives but also intent
46 Burnham, The Political Economy o f Postwar Reconstruction, 1990, p.150-176.
41 For statistics about British trade in  the 1950’s see: BN, Statistical Office, Yearbook of International Trade 
Statistics. 1952. p.363; ibid.. 1955, p.689; ibitL, 1957. p.243, 589.
m Catterall, The state o f literature on British postwar history*, in: Gont/Johmnan/Lucas(eds), (1989), p.221-41; 
Kirby, The Decline o f British Economic Power since 1 8 7 0 ,1981, p .l 19-125.
Snyder (1964), p214 .
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on enabling Britain to keep its military commitments. On the other hand, Snyder 
acknowledges the commonly presented bottlenecks of the rearmament program: the pressure 
on metal using industries, the concentration of research on defence, and the outlays for troops 
abroad.50 Abelshauser, however, twists the traditional argument and maintains that the 
economic weakness was not produced by the effects of high defence costs, but, on the 
contrary, because of economic weaknesses deriving from other factors, Britain was no longer 
able to bear the expense.51 *A detailed analysis by Burnham confirms that the impact of 
rearmament was confined to a temporal check on exports whereas the commonly cited 
economic problems allegedly resulting from rearmament were already in place.32
This problem will hardly be solved until a detailed analysis for the British case is made. The 
difficult question whether military spending is a gain or a bottleneck for an economy has to 
be solved rather by comparably tedious sectoral studies than by sweeping statements.33 
Whatever the final result of this debate, it is clear that the straightforward assertion of the 
White Paper was too simplistic. This short review demonstrated that the monocausal linkage 
of high defence costs and economic decline is not as clear as the public discussion in Britain 
during the 1950's and parts of the literature suggest. Economic considerations in defence 
matters, as they were pushed forcefully in the support cost question and in the defence review 
1957, were also shaped by underlying political choices with economic reasoning often 
following them. H ie remainder o f this chapter will be concerned with these choices.
This chapter outlined the consequences of the British government's thinking that its economy 
and its military posture were no longer compatible. The political and economic shock of the 
Suez Crisis was the last straw and the Defence White Paper o f 1957 the foremost expression 
of this thinking. The basic goals of British foreign policy remained the same. However, in 
order to continue with this policy Britain had to devise strategies which limited the constraints
*  ibid., p.215.
51 Abelshauser, ‘Rüstung, W irtschaft, Rüstungswirtschaft', im Maier/Wiggershaus(eds). Das Nordatlantische 
Bündnis, 1993, p.103.
a  Bumham (1990), p. 176.
9  One example is: Bumham, ‘Rearming for the Korean W ar The Impact o f Government Policy on Leyland 
Motors and the British Car Industry*, in: Contemporary Record voL9l2,1995, p343*367.
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imposed by the economic situation. Choices had to be made and these choices are significant 
within the scope of this research.
The emphasis Britain put on its nuclear potential as the most simple and least expensive way 
to sustain what remained of the beleaguered British power in the world was in many ways 
beyond its economic and technological resources.34 A first choice was therefore necessary 
because the sustenance of a useful nuclear potential was not possible without cooperation 
from other countries. While the French, with similar problems, turned halfheartedly to Europe 
in the form of the FIG Agreement (see ch.V), the British accepted an increased reliance on 
the United States and valued the 'Special Relationship* higher than the European connection. 
In a paper of January 1957, entitled *The Grand Design*. Lloyd had proposed to his 
colleagues a pooling of the British nuclear program with European resources in the framework 
o f WEU.54 5 56The paper was an attempt to escape a too pronounced dependence on the US as 
it became evident during the Suez Crisis. However, when it was discussed in the cabinet, a 
majority was against Lloyd's idea, citing in particular the importance o f Anglo-American 
cooperation.36 This result robbed Britain of the principal carrot it could have extended to the 
Europeans in exchange for cooperation in other policy fields. When Macmillan, in March 
1957, went to meet the President on the Bermudas, his overriding concern was a broad 
intensification o f Anglo-American cooperation.57 Cooperation with the Europeans on nuclear 
arms matters was -for the time being- ruled out during Cabinet discussions on the White 
Paper.5* This choice, subsequently reaffirmed on many occasions, would seriously impede 
the British realignment towards Europe.
The second choice, made in 1956, was very much in line with the f ir s t  It meant going ahead 
with a substantial reduction of forces in Europe. The exact figure, to which the army was to
54 The changes in  British nuclear strategy are described in  detail by Navias (1991).
55 T he Grand Design’(Co-operation with W estern Europe). Cabinet memorandum CAB 129/84,5 January 1957, 
in: Goldsworthy(ed), 1994, p.102-07.
56 ibid., p. 107-110.
97 For documentation on the meeting see: FRUS 1955-57, XXVII, p.704-67.
54 FRO, CAB 128/31, Cabinet Meeting minutes, 22^.1957.
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be reduced, was 165.000 (from previously about 400.000 men). This figure was kept secret. 
The 77.000 men in the BAOR were targeted particularly. The result of the support cost 
negotiations seemed to make heavy cuts with regard to the sterling situation unavoidable. 
However, even a more acceptable result would not have deterred the British. The political 
risks of troop reductions were emphasized mainly in the Foreign Office. Apart from the 
foreseeable reaction o f the allies, it was the shacking of confidence in Sterling, the inherent 
loss of British prestige, and the enlargement of Germany's role on the continent, which were 
the critical points59. Furthermore, the appearance of a reversal o f policy so shortly after the 
WEU pledge was awkward. But these political risks were not regarded as high enough to 
justify the perceived economic strain. The British announcement at WEU in February 1957 
to reduce the BAOR to 40.000 and to halve the 2nd.TAF until the end of 1958 triggered a 
long argument It resulted in a two-year diplomatic battle, in which Britain was constandy on 
the defensive and which cast a long shadow over Britain's attempt to adjust itself to the 
evolving European integration process. The main problem was that the British government 
was not able to offer a politically acceptable alternative for troop maintenance or another kind 
of credible commitment to the Europeans.
Either one of the above mentioned choices alone might not have been interpreted as 
negatively in Europe. Both together, however, and the manner in which they were pushed 
through, exerted a blow with serious consequences on Britain’s European policy. This will 
be the subject of chapter IV.
”  FRO, FO 371/124622, Brief for Committee on Service Costs in Germany, 14.5.1956; ibid., FO note
on troop reductions.
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CHAPTER IV
ADENAUER AND ’PERFIDIOUS ALBION’1 *:
TROOP REDUCTIONS, SUPPORT COSTS, AND THE INTEGRATION OF
EUROPE, 1957-59
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a) Anglo-German Discords
In May 1959 the British Ambassador at NATO, Frank Roberts, reported an Adenauer quip 
he had picked up from his German colleague Blankcnhora. Allegedly, Adenauer had remarked 
that he now had two main enemies: England and his own Foreign Minister.3 Whatever the 
authenticity of this quote, it was typical of the state of affairs between Britain and West 
Germany in 1959. It seemed as if the conflicts of the previous years and all the hardly 
concealed fundamental differences in basic policy views suddenly converged, culminating in 
a tense meeting between Macmillan and Adenauer at the end of year.3 Numerous discords, 
whether they were about East-West relations, disarmament, the Free Trade Area (FTA) or 
support costs were inextricably linked and reinforced each other to produce a postwar low in 
British-German relations.
In retrospect, however, this seems quite surprising. The relationship between the United 
Kingdom and the Federal Republic after the war seemed to be under much better auspices 
than French-German relations. However, it should never attain the degree of close 
collaboration between Bonn and Paris which proved to be particularly harmful for Britain's 
attempts between 1957-63 to establish a form of European integration consistent with her 
basic foreign policy objectives. These attempts became indirectly dependent on German 
support If Bonn had opposed as strongly as the Netherlands the French policy of excluding 
Britain, France at that time probably would not have taken the risk of antagonizing Germany 
with an uncompromising policy and thus driving it into the Anglo-American camp. It has to 
be kept in mind that the famous *axe Franco-Allemand' emerged only slowly in the late
1 FRO, FO 371/145780, Bailee to P.Tcnnant on an Adenauer-Retniric. 29.10.1959.
1 PRO, FO 371/145775, Roberts to Steel, 27.5.1959.
5 For the continuous series of mutual recriminations during 1959 see tbe documents in PRO, FO 371/145777.
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1950s. To assume tacitly that its formation was natural distorts reality and the fact that the 
situation was open, be it towards a looser or closer form of European integration, towards a 
’Gaullist’ or an ’Atlanticism Europe. Insofar these few years have been decisive for the later 
shape of Europe.
The following chapter attempts to add some new viewpoints which make the critical choices 
of these years clearer. It will be argued that much of Germany’s tacit support for French 
European policy originated from the German disappointment with Britain in the security field. 
Without the incessant arguments over support cost and troop-level questions from 1955 to 
1959, Erhard and his strong partisanship in all parts of the German elites would have had a 
much stronger hand in the German debate with their more ’atlanticism position. In the 
previous chapters I cited various instances which showed the conflicts dealt with in this thesis 
as closely linked to the European issue. This chapter aims at investigating the link between 
security questions (and their financial dimension) and the question o f Britain’s position in 
Europe. I will try to elaborate these links with particular attention to the support cost 
negotiations 1957/58 and to British troop reductions between 1957-1959. '
A simple confrontation of dates suggests the supposed interrelation o f  British security policy 
and European integration. The Six had, soon after the EDC disaster, ’relaunched’ Europe at 
the Messina conference in June 1955. At this time the feeling prevailed in Britain that the 
WEU pledge to maintain troops on the continent and a loose cooperation with other European 
institutions was enough involvement in Europe for the time being.4 However, it rapidly 
became clear that troops could not substitute a  consistent European policy. The fast progress 
towards the Rome Treaties surprised the British. Contrary to their expectations, the Spaak 
committee which worked out the Messina proposals for the Common Market overcame all 
the huge obstacles which laid in the way. Britain had withdrawn its representative already in
4 For Britain’s European Poücy as it evolved tip Lo tbe ill-fated application in 1961-63, M. Camps*, Britain and  
the EC, 1955-1963, 1964, b  still indispensable. More recent works include: Young, Britain and the European 
Community, 1945-92, 1993; Greenwood, Britain and European Cooperation since 1945, 1992; Schmidt, 
Großbritannien und Europa, 1989; S.Ward, Britain, France and the EC, 1958-1963, (postgraduale ihesis) 1992; 
Kaiser, 'Selbstisoliening in Europa: Die britische Regierung und die Gründung der EW G’, in: W unn(ed), Wege nach 
Europa, 1992, p.125-133; Schmidt, ’Großbritannien, die Gründung der EW G, und die Sicherheit des Westens’, im 
Salewslri M-(ed), Nationale Identität und Europäische Einigung, 1991, p .169-231. For the FTA negotialions and 
EFTA see Camps (1964), and Griffiths(ed) EFTA (fortheoming).
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November 1955 from the negotiations and saw itself completely excluded afterwards.3 When 
the success of the Six became clear, Britain reacted and formulated its own alternative to the 
Common Market, the design of a wider Free Trade Area (FTA). The plan was presented to 
the OEEC on 13 February 1957. Only one day later, the British troop reduction plans were 
made public at the WEU Ministers Council.6 This resulted in a long series of heated 
discussions between Britain and its WEU partners, which will be described in some detail 
below. The FTA plans o f the British received less immediate scrutiny. Serious negotiations 
took place only when the Six finally had signed the Rome Treaties at the end of March 
1957.7 A new round of support cost negotiations began in mid-1957. It ended not until early
1958, accompanied by further British reductions, and placed the usual strains on German- 
British relations. The discussion about British troop levels lasted even longer, until well into
1959. The FTA negotiations had continued all along in the so-called Maudling Committee in 
a worsening climate, although differences on specific issues seemed to slowly converge. 
W hen suddenly the French declared in November 1958 that further talks on FTA were 
pointless, no decisive voice of opposition was heard from Germany. The subsequent 
foundation of EFTA only deepened the rift between the UK and Europe.
Throughout these events Britain followed a parallel policy of trying to achieve largest possible 
reductions of their Europe-based troops whilst on the other hand attempting to convince the 
Six of the benefits of their economic proposals. The outright denial or deliberate disregard 
for the awkward fact that both policies were inseparably linked, remained one of the most 
fundamental flaws in British policy until its unfortunate applications for EEC membership in 
the 1960s. Temporal coincidences are of course not enough to prove whether security 
conflicts spilled over to the process of European integration. H ie assumption is frequently 
made in the literature; but is hardly scrutinized in depth.1 A closer look at the troop-reduction
5 Young, The Parting o f the Way*’?, in: Dockrill/Young(eds), British Foreign Policy, 1945-56,1989, p.197-224; 
G riffiths, The Creation o f EFTA (forthcoming); Mil ward. The European Rescue o f the Nation State, 1992, p.426-27.
* Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.15723.
7 On this condition France and Germany insisted; see FRUS 1955-57, XXVI, conversation Dulles-Adenauer, 
Bonn, 4J.1957, p.240.
1 Only Schmidt (1989) cites sources to this effect putting them in a larger context. Young (1993) and Greenwood 
(1992) almost completely blend out security and monetary considerations hehinri London’s policy towards Europe.
Tdebate, at the support cost negotiations in 1957-58, the failure o f the FTA plan, and the 
British-German crisis of 1959 might provide some answers.
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b) The Negotiations about British Troop Reductions 1957
When the British in February 1957 anounced at the WEU meeting that they would reduce the 
BAOR from 77.000 to 50.000 men and halve the 2nd TAF (consisting of 466 aircraft and 
15.000 men), they provoked a storm of criticism from their WEU partners.9 The underlying 
motives for the British defence review have already been discussed. The White Paper of 1957 
indicated a political choice for relations to the US and the Commonwealth as highest priorities 
to the detriment of British positions in Europe. That is exactly how the troop reductions and 
the White Paper were perceived. The Europeans, and partly also the US, refused to see the 
British problem merely as a financial issue. They strongly emphasized the political 
background and this shattered all British hopes that their goals would be accomplished 
without serious political irritations.
The French turned out to be particularly critical. British-French relations had suffered much 
because of the Suez Crisis and the British decision to intensify nuclear cooperation with the 
United States despite timid declarations to pool knowledge and resources with France. The 
WEU announcement was a further affront. France, which had accepted German rearmament 
only on condition of the British troop maintenance pledge, was shocked by the rapid erosion 
o f this promise. When discussing the reductions with the British on 9 March 1957, French 
annoyance (and British intractability) 'led rapidly to a dramatic turn in a very friendly 
discussion'}0 Mollet denounced the breach o f the WEU pledge which might lead to a 
recurrence o f the situation in 1938. Macmillan pointed to his financial problems and to the 
fact that the French had long since moved big parts of their forces in Germany to Algeria 
without consulting anybody. The conversation ended on a depressing note: 'No agreement was 
reached, no compromise envisaged Subsequently, it was indicated to the English ministers 
that, i f  they insisted on reaching a decision this week, it would be impossible to avoid *
* Grcwc, RuckbUnden 1976-51,1979, p.279-80. 
10 DDF. 1957,1, p.429.
rinitialising at WEU an action contrary to their intentions.*11 This sharp reaction was very 
inconvenient and surprising for the British. They had tended to neglect the impact their 
defence review would have on European political opinion and concentrated instead on getting 
approval by the US and NATO authorities.
Only very late the Americans had realized the real extent of the British plans, Le. in early 
1957. ' Sandys wanted to make it quite clear that HMG was not prepared to spend any foreign  
exchange on the maintenance o f troops in Germany next year and therefore put us clearly on 
notice that the issue o f whether any British forces would be maintained in Europe would arise 
in acute form in a years time,*12 The new British defence minister also provided the 
Americans with exact figures regarding the reduction plans which should be put into effect 
at the earliest time. Such precipitate action had been unacceptable above all for SACEUR 
Norstad who complained that these reductions made any forward strategy in Europe illusory. 
Washington shared this interpretation and made clear that though it understood the financial 
situation of the British it would oppose any rapid reduction. In this case, the Americans 
threatened, a US disengagement from Europe could not be mled out.13 Unison, Norstad and 
the US government demanded a phasing-out of the British plans. The British, which deemed 
US support crucial, had accepted this compromise to obtain American acquiescence to their 
plans. They agreed to start only at the end of 1957 with their first 13.500 men reduction of 
the BAOR (from 77.000 to 63.500) and to continue with a second tranche down to 50.000 
in 1958/59.14
The eclat with the French endangered this compromise anew. A French-sponsored resolution 
against the British proposals was imminent, probably leading to a major diplomatic row. If 
the WEU members refused to approve the British case, an open breach of the WEU treaty 
would have been necessary in order to effect the cuts. The danger of antagonizing France and 
the others completely was obvious, particularly at that tim e.'Moreover, the Paris Agreements
7 4
ibid., p.430.
w FRUS 1955-57, XXVII, Conversation US See .of Defense Wilson-Sandys, 29.1.1957. p.684.
u  ibid, p.685.
14 BA, NL Blankenhom, Letter to Adenauer, 113.1957; Mager (1990), p.180.
Tand the current plans fo r  the closer association o f this country with Europe in a Free Trade 
Area had given great encouragement to our friends throughout Europe, and a faulty 
presentation o f the withdrawal o f British forces m ight do serious damage to our relations with 
European countries generally. We should therefore spare no effort to avoid a vote against us 
in WEU, which would leave us no alternative to breaking the WEU treaty....'15 This quote 
from the Cabinet minutes illustrates that even if  it came to a resolution the British government 
would not refrain from reductions on the continent. The serious considerations against such 
a confrontation, however, led the British to offer another minor concession: to wait with the 
discussion about the second tranche o f reductions until October.16
Surprisingly, this proved to be enough. The French relented and refrained from a direct 
confrontation. This conciliatory mood might, however, not have been due to a reversal of their 
position but to relative weak support by the other Europeans, especially the Germans. The 
astonishing fact has its solution in a gentleman’s agreement between the UK and the Federal 
Republic behind the scenes. After the Radford episode Germany had undertaken strenuous 
efforts to formulate a review of NATO which should promote closer consultation of the 
smaller nations by the Americans.17 Looking for allies in this matter, the Germans had 
approached the UK. *MrMloyd said that the Germans attach great importance to their 
proposal fo r a review in NATO, and, although the British were unenthusiastic about it, they 
would support the Germans because the Germans had been so helpful to them in the WEU 
meeting.*1* Apart from that, the German government was convinced anyway of the 
inevitability of British reductions. It also was acquainted with the US position which had 
resigned itself to a certain number o f reductions in view o f Britain's economic problems.19
7 5
CAB 128/31,17th meeting (5), 123.1957.
17 Fclken, Duties und Deutschland. 1993, p350-53.
11 FRUS 1955-57, XXVII, memo of conversation Dulles-Lloyd, Bermuda, 223.1957, p.723. In the final result, 
the German efforts for more cooperation were not very successful. The US made clear that they reserved themselves 
the right to act without consultation if the situation demanded it. See: FRUS 1955-57, TV, Letter Adenauer to  Dulles, 
19.11.1957, p.187-190; conversations von Brenlano - D ulles, 21.-24.11.1957, p.190-217.
19 FRUS 1955-57, XXVI, memo on conversation v.Brenlano-Dulles, W ashington, 53.1957, p.216-217; 
ibid., IV, Letter Dulles to Adenauer, 173.1957,165-166.
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Thus, the initial resistance of the WEU members had been overcome. On 18 March, the WEU 
council approved a reduction of the BAOR by 13.500 men and of the 2nd TAF by 50% of 
its aircraft and 25% of its personnel.20
However, for the UK this was only a first step. The central aim o f the British reduction 
efforts in the following years was the manpower ceiling of 165.000 for the army, to be 
reached in 1962, in consistence with the abolishment of national service in this year. This 
long term perspective was known only to the US, SACEUR and Spaak as General Secretary 
o f NATO.21 It was evident that with such a manpower target further reductions in Germany 
were unavoidable, even below the figure of 50.000 which had been made known to the WEU 
partners.22 The publication of the British White Paper on defence in April removed any 
doubts about British plans for the future of its forces in Europe. The basic purposes which 
were announced and the exclusive focus on nuclear weapons evoked mistrust and 
apprehension. The Germans in particular felt deceived because this kind of surprise was 
exactly what they had wanted to prevent with their reform proposals.23 When Macmillan 
visited Bonn in May 1957 he was lectured about the German view of Western defence 
strategy, i.e. the importance of conventional forward defence.24 The pronounced criticism 
compelled the UK to reassuring declarations about their intention to remain with troops in 
Europe. The British government thought it wise to wait until the financial situation at the end 
o f 1957 as well as the outcome of new support cost negotiations were known, before starting 
the deliberations on a second tranche of reductions in WEU and NATO.23
*  Text of resolution in: Keesings Contemporary Archives 1957, 15724-725.
21 PRO, T 225/1128, R eport Local Defense Cost Negotiations with Germany 1957-1958; prepared by Treasury, 
16.10.1958.
a  In January 1958 the British plans provided for a strength of 44900 men in the BAOR by 1963 (and o f 8500 
in  the 2nd TAF by 1961), see: PRO CAB 129/91, Local Defence Costs in  Germany. Report by Officials, 8.1.1958.
33 BA, NL Blanlccnborn, 75b/1, AA memo about British politics towards NATO, 29.4.1957; 751V3, Diary Entry, 
24.4.1957; NHP, Meeting with Chancellor Adenauer, 27.4.1957.
24 BA, NL Blankenhom 84/4, Summary Record on Adenauer-Macmillan conversations, 7.5.1957.
*  Mager (1990), p.181-183.
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c) A New Support Cost Row and Further Reductions
Although the Foreign Office raised objections against a new round of support cost 
negotiations, it became inevitable after heavy pressure was exerted by the Prime Minister and 
Treasury after a new balance of payments crisis.36 Between July and September 1957, British 
reserves fell by £189m ($529m) from a level of about £2400m.27 Simultaneously, the 
repayment of the debts incurred during and prior to the Suez Crisis made the achievement of 
a positive balance of payments very difficult. H ie commitments of Britain included £80m a 
year repayments on US and Canadian loans, the repayment of the IMF drawing of £200m and 
o f the EXIM bank loan of £180m.28 The annual EPU deficits were an additional burden. To 
a certain extent, the 1957 payments crisis was a late legacy o f the financial crisis 
accompanying the Suez adventure. The lasting debts incurred and, even more important, the 
profound shaking of confidence in the value of sterling would prove to be long lasting 
problems.
Markets got out of control in mid-1957. Suggested by the extreme surplus position of the 
Federal Republic and by the devaluation of the Franc in August, talk about a possible DM 
revaluation began and speculative money moved in huge amounts to Germany.39 At the 
OEEC meeting in June, German and British interpretations of the imbalance had openly 
clashed. The British delegate called the German surplus Very disturbing and depressing* and 
accused the Germans o f following an irresponsible monetary policy which took no account 
o f the external situation.30 According to the British, Germany had drained the system of 
reserves, accumulating them instead of re-investing them, as had been the enlightened practise
96 PRO, T225/1128, Report: Local Defense Cost Negotiation*..., 16.10.1958.
71 KCA 1957.15770.71.
a  PRO, CAB 134/2223, MAC(GX57)29, 27.11.1957, UK Memo involdng NATO resolution o f 26(h July.
9  Wippich, ’Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Krise des ¿-Sterling und des Sterling Gebiets, 
1956/57', in: Schmidt(ed), Zwischen Bündnissicherung und privilegierter Partnerschaft, 1995, pJ3-79.
30 BA, B106/25878, Record of Working Party 19 M eeting of the OEEC Council 17-18 June, 3.7.1957.
of the Americans and the English after the war.31 The Germans refuted this interpretation 
and saw the problem lying in different rates of inflation, thereby implying that the British 
should first fight against the sources of inflation in their own country.32 They suspected that 
'behind those...[British attacks]... obviously... was the intention to prepare new requests on 
Germany in the framework o f defence burden sharing (NATO)'.33 The differences between 
Anglo-American monetary policy, which accorded priority to the external account and to the 
stabilization of the currency on international markets, and the German policy which 
emphasized internal price stability34 became clearly visible. Speculation against sterling 
calmed down only when German and English delegates came together at the IMF Meeting 
in September, and decided to make concerted announcements emphasizing their determination 
in maintaining existing parities.35 They also decided to stop public accusations in these 
questions. However, the support cost question led to a fast termination of this uneasy truce. 
The monetary clash paralleled emerging conflicts in European and security matters.36 Fom 
now on, international currency matters would become ever more strongly linked to these 
problems, and this would show itself immediately in the support cost negotiations.
In connection with the currency crisis, Britain had succeeded in obtaining a NATO resolution 
which said that a country with intolerable currency problems incurred by troop maintenance 
abroad could have the possibility of invoking examination o f its problem by an independent 
team of NATO experts.37 The United Kingdom, however, was at first reluctant to initialise 
such a multilateral NATO procedure, fearing that a public discussion would only heat on
11 FRUS 1955-57, IV, Dulles-Macmillan conversation, 14 December 1957.
13 BA, B 102/25878, Preparatory Meeting o f German Officials on OEEC Conference, 3.6.57.
"  BA. B 102/25878, Excerpt o f 248th ZBR Meeting, 26 June 1957.
M Germany bad not to  worry about deficits undermining their currency. Rather the contrary, foreign money 
moving in greatly complicated the Bundesbank* ! efforts to keep price rises under control despite the booming 
economy. See: Emminger, ’D eu tsch e  G e ld - und WShnmgspoUtik 1948-75*, in: Deutsche Bundesbank(ed), WShnmg 
und Wirtschafi in Deutschland 1876-1975, 1976, p.485-55Z
u  BA, B102/25817, Aide-Memoire UK to Germany, 18.9.1957; B102/12660, Emminger Report on IMF Annual 
M eeting, 30.10.1957.
*  Unfortunately, a comparative study on the impact o f monetary policy on European integration during the 1950s 
and 1960s does not exist.
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Sterling speculation and that Britain's own receipts by American and Canadian troops would 
be taken into account.3* Therefore once more a bilateral approach to Germany was chosen 
and coupled with new discussions about troop levels which were to start in October 1957. 
'The main point to make is that our decision as to whether any concession can be made over 
the 13J500 men will depend on what can be done to relieve us o f the DM costs o f troops in 
Germany. The whole question o f what forces we can maintain and in particular whether we 
can make any concession to meet the point o f  view o f our Allies depends on finance,*39 Any 
concessions, however, would at most apply to 5000 of the 13.500 men who were to be 
removed. Oddly enough, the British nevertheless expected a conciliatory mood from the 
Germans. This was based on incorrect reports from the embassy in Bonn: * [There is now a] 
much better German understanding o f our position and no inclination to have another knock­
down drag-out row,*40
Yet, German resistance to negotiations proved as strong as two years ago. The reaction to the 
British memorandum of 30 October was elusive.41 All the Germans offered was an 
augmentation in the arms account at the Bank o f England and in the £75m debt prepayment 
account, which had resulted from the last agreement These offers were to underline that the 
Federal Republic was not prepared to extend any budgetary help and would confine its efforts 
exclusively to the monetary aspects of the problem.41 Of course, the German proposals were 
unacceptable for the British as they would have only been a shortterm help for the balance 
of payments, but a longterm debt burden.
As the Germans refused to change their position, the British decided to invoke the NATO 
resolution of July, offering at the same time to limit their reductions to 8500 in the case of
”  PRO. T225/1I28, report™, 16.10.1958.
”  PRO, CAB 134/2223. MAC(G)(57)21. PO to UKdel Paris, 30.10.1957. See also: FRUS 1955-57, XXVn, 
memo of conversation Dulles-Lloyd. Bermuda, 22.3.1957, p.723.
*  PRO, PO 371/130728, Steel to PO, 1.10.1957.
41 PRO, T  225/1128, repo rt» , 16.10.1958.
41 BA, B12Ö/34103, Finance Ministry Memo: Mutual A id, A it3  NATO Treaty, 28 November 1957; PA-AA, 
R ef JIA7/769, von Brentano to  Adenauer, 12 February 1958.
a satisfactory financial solution.43 4NATO appointed a panel of three experts to investigate 
the influence of the troops on the monetary problems of Britain. The German government 
made its disapproval of this procedure known immediately: 'A balance o f payments problem  
resulting from troop maintenance in Germany does not exist..The British balance o f payments 
position has general monetary and politico-economic reasons. It is out o f place to link it with 
NATO defence questions*.** Only late did the British government learn of the reasons for this 
intractability. They were bluntly told that Germany expected the British to pull back anyway 
and saw no point in paying anymore.45 Furthermore» the Germans argued that their military 
build-up was in full steam now and that estimates for defence appropriations in the following 
years showed precipitous rises. Further support costs would only enlarge the gaps in future 
budgets.46 They refused to accept the NATO procedure even when the experts approved the 
British case in their report, presented in January 1958.47 With special regard to British efforts 
to strengthen their currency and to hold to this end their balance o f payments in continuing 
surplus, the experts judged the British request for financial help legitimate. However, the 
Germans persisted in their argument that the British problem justified only monetary help, not 
budgetary payments, and made this position public.4*
This led to a stalemate that even Spaak, who was at that time Secretary General of NATO 
and closely involved in the discussions, could not dissolve. His visit to Bonn proved as 
abortive as repeated personal messages of Macmillan to Adenauer.49 Concerted pressure by 
the Western NATO members was futile.50 *Spaak was stunned by the atmosphere o f suspicion
41 FRUS 1955-57, XVII. memcoo Dulles-LJoyd, 22 October 1957, p.804.
44 PA-AA, Ref3 0 1 ,9 8 , AA Brief for NATO Council meeting, January 1958.
45 FRO, FO 371/137374, Conversation Lloyd-vJtcrwarlh, 18.2.1958.
44 BA, NL Blankenhorn 80/2, Memo prepared by German embassy at NATO: Financial Planning far Defence
until March 1961,9 November 1957.
41 PRO, T 225/1128, R eport-, p.7-8.
44 KCA 1958, p.16239; PA-AA, Ref.301/98, AA memorandum for NATO-meeting, 17 January 1958.
41 FRO, T225/1128, note on Spaak visit, 31.1.1958; PR EM 11/2331, Record o f Macmillan-Adenauer conversation
in Paris, 15.12.1957; Adenauer to Macmillan, 4 January 1958; BA, NL Blankenhorn 85a/3, diary entry, 2^.1958.
*  BA, NL Blankenhorn 85V2, Record of a Secret M eeting o f NATO ambassadors, 21.1.1958; BA, B126/34103,
Summary o f NATO Council Meeting, 8 January Meeting.
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towards England he had encountered in Bonn.51 The FIG agreement (see ch.VI) had been 
signed in November 1957, and German willingness to co-operate with Britain was at its 
lowest52
In late January 1958, the WEU council approved a reduction of 8500 men in the BAOR. The 
decision was doubtlessly eased by German resistance to accept the report o f the NATO 
experts.53 This passed the buck back to the British. Their plans to withdraw a further 5000 
men, a strategic reserve of special importance, met concerted resistance.54 Especially 
SACEUR Norstad was under no circumstances ready to accept this further weakening of his 
lines. The USA urged Britain to stop the reductions and accept a compromise in the support 
cost question, offering simultaneously American aid to cover the burden which was not met 
by a German-Bridsh agreement55 The Americans offered a further carrot the intensification 
of Anglo-American cooperation in nuclear technology would proceed much smoother if the 
British were willing to maintain their military presence in Europe at roughly the same 
scale.56
The British government finally decided to take a step which was long overdue. It accepted 
a long-term solution for the problem, coupled with a new pledge for a minimum level of 
troops. Due to the increasing size of the German army, a continuation of support cost 
payments after the current year was doubtful.57 Sticking to an uncompromising stance could 
have grave political consequences: *(a) a weakening o f NATO; (b) the frustration o f our plans
81
51 PRO, PO 371/137374, Roberts to FO, 3.2.1958.
52 BA, B126/34102 contains a Finance ministry note reporting a striking re-orientation of German programs for 
military orders towards France and Italy, 18.2.1958.
°  French resistance was this time less rigid. France agreed to the new reductions, yet not without signaling *the 
very grave consequences which derive from the progressive weakening of the British presence on the continent, 
coming close to  put into question the foundations of common defense’;DDF 19581, Pineau a Chauvel.28.1.58, p.100- 
101.
54 PRO, T  236/5099, UKdel Paris to FO, 8.4.1958; ibid., Chancellor o f Treasury minuta on conversations in  
Paris, 28.4.1958; FRUS 1958-1960, VII, 1, Memo of Conversation Dulles-Norstad, 26.9.1958, p.358.
”  PRO, T  225/1128, background notes: strength o f BAOR, 30 October 1958.
56 Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship, 1957-62, 1994, p.222-24.
"  CAB 128/32, 16th cabinet meeting, 12.Z1958.
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under the heading o f ... consultation, e tc : (c) more European Six Power activity...; (d) serious 
prejudice to the prospects fo r obtaining the free trade area; (e) an increase. especially in 
Germany, in ife  desire to make some sort o f a settlement with Russia’?*  Additionally, 
further large scale reductions became increasingly difficult to handle because o f a lack of 
housing and facilities for the returning soldiers.39
The British transmitted their new proposals based on these considerations to Spaak. These 
contained a declaration o f intent to keep the BAOR at 45.000 men until 1962, if Germany 
covered one third of its foreign exchange cost during this period and supported sterling by 
prematurely repaying postwar debts as well as depositing a further advance amount for arms 
orders in the Bank of England.60 For the first time Britain officially linked the FTA problem 
to the support costs. One of the conditions was that * the organisation o f Europe in the 
economic fie ld  develops in a manner consistent with the political and military organisation 
o f NATO and enables the United Kingdom to participate with its Allies on equal terms.’61 
The British informed the Germans that if their proposal was not accepted they would not 
hesitate to withdraw all their troops; the Germans replied that this only showed the British 
lack of interest in Europe.62
When the proposal reached the German government, however, a struggle broke out between 
the supporters of an uncompromising stance and more conciliatory advisers who grew more 
and more uneasy about British-German relations.63 The lines of division were essentially the 
same as those later found between Gaullists and Atlanticists. The Germans even presented two 
different proposals at the same time. Soon after von Scherpenberg, Permanent Secretary of 
the Auswärtiges Amt and in charge o f the negotiations, had communicated a plan close to the 
British position, another official memorandum, influenced by Strauß, arrived in London which
*  FRO, CAB 129/91, Local defence Costs in Germany. Report by Officials, 8.1.1958.
*  CAB 128/32, CC 19(58), 27.2.1958.
40 FRO, T 225/1128, rep o rt-, 16.10.1958; CAB 128/32, Cabinet Conclusions 19(58), 27.2.1958.
*  ibid.
0  FRO, PREM 11/2331, Lloyd-von Brentano discussion, 6 March 1958.
0  BA, NL Blankenborn, 85a/3, diary entry, 2 February 1958.
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entirely rejected the British proposals.64 It explicitly negated a connection between the 
organisation of Europe and monetary problems arising from the maintenance of British troop» 
in Germany. An Adenauer visit to London, planned for April, however, gave new urgency. 
The Chancellor did not want to be bothered by the problem. Finally, the Germans gave up 
their resistance to cash payments. They wanted to secure the presence of a British force of 
at least some value, declaring that *45.000 British soldiers were better than 50.000 French 
grandmothers
The UK, by agreeing to the Scheipenberg proposals, finally managed to achieve a solution 
after discussions lasting more than six months. The Germans paid $33.6m (£12m) a year until 
March 1961, they maintained an interest free account for arms order at the Bank of England 
($140m), and they pxtid the 1962-1964 rates of the London debt agreement prematurely 
(£7.5m annually). The British government declared that it would keep its troops at 55.000 (i.e. 
including the strategic reserve) until the end o f 1958 and at 45.000 until March 1961.45.000 
men was the highest number acceptable for Britain to remain in Germany under the 
manpower ceiling o f 165.000 for the army, the figure which had been decided in the defence 
review. However, SACEUR and the US urged the British to postpone any further reductions 
to the latter figure.66 TTiis interest was used by the British to opt for additional dollar-aid.67 
Against an aid of $25m destined for mutual weapon development, the British government 
agreed to keep the troop level stable in 1959.6* This link was kept secret to spare the US 
government embarrassing questions in Congress. It displayed clearly the concern of the United 
States about the never-ending quarrel between its allies. The Americans also renounced once 
more to request support costs for themselves. The British told them in unequivocal terms that 
if the US persisted in demanding a share thereby limiting the funds available for them, their
44 This memorandum is in PA-AA, 301/98, Aide-Memoire, 27.3. 1958.
“  PRO, T  236/5099. Bonn tel.333 to PO. 12.4.58.
66 For this and the following PRO, T225/1128. Background Notes: Strength o f B AOR, 30.10.1958; UK Em bassy 
Washington to  Ministry o f Defense on Sandys’taflcs in  Washington, 27.9.1958.
47 FRUS 1958-60, VI1/2, conversation Dulles-Lloyd, 4.5.1958, p.327-328.
*  FRUS 1958-60, V II/1, p348, ftU .
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troops would leave Europe.6* As compensation, the Americans agreed with the Germans on 
a pre-mature repayment of postwar debts to aid the weakening American balance of 
payments.10
The British-German agreement calmed down the support cost-front of British-German 
relations for three years. It did not prevent, however, the hidden tensions which made the 
problem such a hot issue from 1955 to 1958 from erupting in 1959 on the highest level.
d) The Organisation of Europe and the German-British Crisis 1959 
In the previous chapters the deterioration of British-German relations due to fundamental 
political differences in monetary and security issues from 1955 on has been outlined. The 
British government was content with the status quo in Europe, judged the situation as 
essentially stable, and for this reason it saw no need to continue undermining one of the most 
fundamental objectives of its policy, the strengthening of sterling, by what it saw as a major 
reason for sterling's weakness, its troop maintenance in Europe. The Germans, on the other 
hand, still felt the need for direct protection and forward defence. They also expected Britain 
to express support for the long-term goal of German reunification. That they should pay for 
this with support for the British currency policy, which they saw as flawed due to domestic 
mismanagement, caused deep resentment. Problems such as support costs tended to expose 
these differences in full light and thus came to acquire a disproportionate potential for 
conflict These conflicts had serious repercussions on other fields of British-German relations 
in general and on mutual policies towards the question of Britain's place in Europe in 
particular.
The British FT A proposal was an attempt to create an economic and political environment 
which would prevent the prolongation of the continual crisis that plagued Britain after World
*  'The Foreign Secretary {Uoyd} said the question is simply this: Does the United States want to see Britain 
keep troops in Germany? They wilt not stay there unless their local costs are paid  and a U.S. demand now fo r  
additional money would diminish this possibility'; FRUS 1955-57, XXVII, memcon Dulles-Lloyd, 25 October 1957.
19 see: Table 7, Appendix 1: also: BA, B 136/3132, von Brentano to Chancellor’s Office. 1 0 J5 9 ; PA-AA. 
Ref.HA7/1201, AA memorandum on US support costs, 10 September 1958.
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War n . After the Rome Treaty with its relatively strong integrative clauses and the common 
external tariff had been ratified, it was obvious that Britain would need strong support from 
within the Community in order to reconcile its proposal with the already existing 
arrangements. The success of the British proposals depended much on the German attitude, 
especially when the French position appeared more and more intransigent71 The prospects 
for a functioning German-British collaboration in this field did not seem bad.
In his famous Brussels speech in September 1956, Adenauer publicly emphasized his support 
for a close British alignment to the continent72 In 1957, he made plain his support for the 
FTA to Macmillan.73 It was well known that the German Minister of Economics, Ludwig 
Erhard, was a fervent supporter of a larger economic cooperation than the limited Common 
M arket He was supported by the majority o f industrial leaders and by the public opinion.74 
Additionally, the arrival of de Gaulle in power evoked deep apprehensions and mistrust in 
Germany, not least in Adenauer.73 One of the first actions of de Gaulle, his proposal fo r a  
'world directorate' composed of the US, Britain and France, infuriated the Germans and gave 
the British an opportunity to make easy points.76 Equally irritating for Germany was the 
brusque revision of the FIG agreement by de Gaulle(see ch.VI). The British government had
FRO. BO 371/137387, Briefing Paper on Adenauer V isit, April 1938. Home. MacmilUm, VolJI, p p 3 4 ,110-11; 
Young, Towards A New View of British Policy and Europe', in: Ahmann/Birke/Howard(eds), 77ie Quest F or 
Stability, 1993. p.459.
”  Schwaxz(ed), Adenauer. Reden 1917-1967,1975, p.327-332. Adenauer. Erinnerungen ¡955-59,1967, p.255- 
265; Adenauer: "„.um den Frieden tu  gewinnen". Die Protokolle des CDU Bundesvorstands 1957-61,1994, p .l 16.
73 Macmillan Diary, 83.1957; quoted in: Home (1989), p.33.
74 The last years have seen a rapid growth o f archive-based research on German policy towards Europe after the 
Rome Treaties. See for example: Bienke, ’Europakonzeptionen im  W iderstreit. Die Preihandelszonenverfaandlungea 
1956-58', in: VFZ 4/1994, p395-634; Scbaad, Anglo-German Relations during the Formative Years o f the EC, 1955- 
61, PhD thesis, Oxford 1995; Kfirfer, Kam pf ums Kanzleramt, 1987; Kfistets, 'D ie Europapolitik der BRD im  
Spannungsfeld von EWG- und EFTA-Gründung 1956-58', in: Hudemann/KJÜble/Schwabe(eds), Europa im B lick d er  
Historiker, 1995, p.203-240.
79 BA, NL Blankenborn, 193.1958, conference Adenauer, v.Brentano, Blankenborn; ibid., Blankenborn to  
Adenauer, 233.1958.
76 Forde GauUe’s proposal sec: FRUS 1958-60, V W 2, p.81-83; PRO, PO 371/137378, Record of A denauer- 
Macmillan conversations, 8.-9.10.1958; BA, NL Blankenborn, note on German-Engtish talks, 8.10.1958. The friendly 
but firm rejection o f de G aulle's memorandum by all NATO members marked the beginning of the long in
France’s relations to NATO, and the ’Anglosaxons* in particular, during de Gaulle’s term . See: FRUS 1958-60, V H/2, 
Eisenhower to  de Gaulle, 20.10.1958, p.108-109.
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every reason to hope that their supporters within the German government might overcome the 
advocates of a narrow European solution.77 How was this possibility lost?
The neglect of the relations with Germany in the preceding years turned out to be a heavy 
burden. A decisive part of the German political establishment had come to regard British 
policy with deep mistrust. The failure to join the EDC, the subsequent military policy, the 
distance towards the Common Market and the hostile attitude of the British press were 
transmitted by Adenauer’s aide von Eckardt to the British ambassador as German complaints. 
As for FTA, it was seen as a mere attempt by the British not to be excluded from the 
economic benefits of the EEC.7* When the FTA was mentioned to Adenauer by the 
Australian Prime Minister Menzies, he elaborated on the British unreliability in the security 
field.79 The feeling of suspicion peaked in early 1959 when Macmillan announced a trip to 
Moscow without consulting Adenauer.10 The Chancellor feared that the British worked 
towards allied disengagement from Europe and deeply resented their disarmament plans.11 
The British embassy in Bonn stated woefully that the ’Chancellors suspicions o f us are not 
only still alive but more rampant than they have ever been...[He] is convinced that we are 
preparing to sell Germany down the river'?2 During the year 1959 the attitude of the British 
and German leaders towards each other went from bad to worse.*3 When the British warned 
the Germans of the dangers of a narrow European solution and urged them to use their 
influence against France, they mostly resorted to the threat of a British disengagement from 
Europe which, as it turned out, was a somewhat counter-productive move.*4
77 Greenwood, Britain and European Cooperation since 1945,1992, p.61-72.
n  FRO, FO 371/137375, Steel to Lloyd: Minute on UK German relations, 10.4.1958.
77 For example: BA. N L Brentano, 179. Scherpenberg to  von Bienlano on a conversation Adenauer-Memies, 
19.6.1959.
"  FRO. FO 371/145773, Steel to FO, 3-2.1959; Adenauer. Erinnemngen 1955-1959.1967. p.468-471.
11 FRO, FO 371/145773, 32.1959. Steel to Foreign Office. See also: Siebenmorgen, Gezeitenwecfuei. 1990. 
p 2 6 1 . The attraction of disarmament for Britain at that time stemmed, o f course, also from the prospect o f tom e 
defence economies. See: DDF 19581, Chauvel to Pineau on conversation Moch-Uoyd, 32.1958, p257.
”  PRO, FO 371/145774, Bonn to Foreign Office, 312.1959.
°  Home. Macmillan, VoU l. 1989. p.133-136.
14 See for example: BA, NL BUnkenhorn 87/5, Record o f Adenauer-Macmillan conversation, 18.4.1958.
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Even at that time, Adenauer's suspicious attitude was not shared unanimously in the German 
government. Repeatedly, Erhard had encouraged the British to pursue their FT A plans.*5 
Prior to Adenauer’s visit to England in November 1959 one of his own ministers, the M inister 
of Atomic Matters, Balke, had urged the British *not to be so polite that he [AdenauerJ com es 
back still believing that Britain is a negligible quantity*. Balke criticised the Rome Treaty 
with astonishing frankness as *a Catholic Alliance reviving the Carolingian empire in the  
form  o f a third force.*96 The same message was transmitted by the Bundesbank. Its 
representative at the BIS meeting in Basel, Blessing, had counselled the British to be tough 
with Adenauer in order to convince him o f the dangers o f an economic division of Europe.*7
However, the British had not much in hand to be tough. Nuclear cooperation had been ru led  
out, a whole-hearted commitment to German reunification was very unpopular in England, 
and in the economic field both were more competitors than collaborators. The British capacity 
to influence German politics was therefore quite limited. At this point the function o f th e  
British troops in Germany as the guarantors o f its security seemed the only means of pressure 
left Internally, Macmillan had repeatedly made this link.** He even employed the troops to  
impress de Gaulle. *lf this negotiation [ i.e. on the F T  A ; H Zƒ does not succeed, a very  
dangerous situation would restdt...J recall to your mind that we have made a big effort fo r  
Europe. For this reason we have fo u r divisions in Germany. I f  however, the issue o f the [free  
tradeJ area does not progress in a satisfactory way. we would have to look fo r  n ew  
friends.*90 Presumably de Gaulle was not very impressed by this intimidation. To h im , 
Britain had already choosen its friends: they sat in Washington.
”  Erhard understood the Rome Treaties only as a first step towards a much larger economic framework. He d id  
not share the predominantly political attitude o f Adenauer towards the European institutions and supported therefore 
vehemently the British FTA proposals. See FRO, FO 371,137388, Record of British-German 16.-19.4.1958-
See also: LappenkOpper, * "Ich bin wiridich ein guter Europier". LErhards Europapolitik 1949-1966', in: FRANCIA  
18/3 (1991), p.85-100.
M FRO, FO 371/145780, Confidential Letter o f P.Tennant (Overseas Director o f the Federation of British 
Industries) to  Maudtting, Macmillan, and Lloyd, 29.10.1959. A remark on the letter says that the Prime M inister w as 
'impressed* by it.
” PRO, FO 371/145781, RJHakins to Foreign O ffice, 12.11.1959.
n PRO, PREM 11/2315, 24.6.1958, note M acmillan to Foreign M inister and Treasury, 24.6.1958. See *1«^- 
Griffiths, T he failure o f the wider free trade area’, in: EFTA Bulletin 3/4(1991), p.15-20.
”  DDF 1958 L Cotnpte Rendu des Entretiens Franco-BriUmniques, 29.-30.6.1958, p.870.
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The Americans, who adopted a very hesitant attitude towards British demands to help them 
in the European question, were admonished with the same argument Lloyd explained to them 
that 'the continued economic and political division o f Europe would, fo r  example, make it 
difficult fo r the U.K. to keep its troops in W est Germany .90 Nevertheless, the US indicated 
clearly to the Germans that they preferred the Common Market to a wider, possibly 
discriminating, free trade area.91 This did not prevent Macmillan from repeating his threats 
even more explicitly in Washington: * I f  exports fa ll, there will be a pressure on sterling o f 
a sort which inexorably demands countering measures such as deliberalization and other 
backward steps. The British people would not be prepared under these circumstances to 
continue to spend across the exchanges. year after year, 50 or 60 million pounds to keep 
troops in Germany, as they would fee l their economic distress was caused by German 
discrimination and would see no justification fo r  continuing to help defend Germany*91
Directly and frequently the threat of disengagement was used with increasing intensity against 
the Germans93 In November 1959, it became an open means of pressure against Adenauer 
to induce West Germany to a more cooperative European policy. The relevant passage of the 
Adenauer - Macmillan talk is worth quoting at length for it makes the use of the troops for 
politico-economic aims extremly clear. After Adenauer had expressed his deep concerns over 
a British disarmament proposal for a denuclearized zone in Europe, Macmillan retorted 
harshly by putting into question the British WEU commitment: *Franklyr had the British 
government o f that day thought o f the Six Powers o f the European Economic Community 
form ing an economic grouping from  which Britain would be excluded, they would not have 
accepted such a commitment. Nor could it be expected that any British parliament would 
continue those obligations under such changed conditions. In this matter economics and  
politics run together. H e hoped that Dr. Adenauer would realise that fo r  an island people like 
the British, maintaining troops abroad fo r a long period was unprecedented and would be *
*° FRUS 1958-1960, V II/1. convm ation Lloyd-Dillon, 8.12.1959, p.176.
"  ibid., conversation Dillon - Adenauer, Erhard, eLal., 11.12.1959, p.196.
”  ibid.. Memo of Conversation Macmillan - Herter, 28 1960, p.273.
”  FRO, PREM 11/2707, Conversation Ettel-U oyd, 17.6.1959.
** A puzzling interpretation of British 19th and 20th century involvement abroad.
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very difficult to continue i f  there were two economic groups in Europe engaged in a sort o f  
economic war. The proposals fo r  a common tariff fo r  the Six meant a perm anent 
discrimination against the UK. It would be alm ost impossible to honour the West European 
Union commitments while simultaneously conducting a ta riff war. Therefore it was essential 
either to bring down discrimination to negligible proportions or to negotiate some other 
arrangements.*95 The meeting, which had started with mutual recriminations96, brought both 
sides nowhere closer to those 'other arrangements'.
What is especially striking in retrospect is the fact that the British did not realise that the 
worth of their security guarantee had been devalued by their own actions over previous years. 
The British troop commitment had been presented as a liability which Britain had no intention 
of carrying further if the cost was not offset Whenever British politicians cited the danger 
of an economic division in Europe, they were confronted with the effects of their defence 
policy and whoever wanted to attack the British FTA plans was free to cite the defence policy 
as an evidence of Britain’s shaky reliability. It was an additional irony that the reduction 
threat in 1959 was a mere bluff as the UK had quietly decided to stop the reductions.
Several circumstances worked together to induce the government to this step which stabilized 
the troop-level in Germany at about 55.000 men. Firstly, in November 1958, Khrushchev’s 
Berlin ultimatum had greatly heated the climate of the Cold War. Secondly, the British w ere 
forced by a long-drawn guerilla war in Cyprus to give the country its independence and to 
reduce their garrison there by 20.000 men to a  mere 5.000 men.97 Upon their return, these 
troops and those coming from Europe encountered a serious lack o f housing, training areas, 
and other facilities. This posed difficult administrative problems to the government and forced 
it to stop the reductions in Europe.98 The arguments of the Foreign Office against reductions *91
91 FRO, FO 371/145780, Record of Conversation Adenauer - M acmillan, 19.11.1959.
** ibid.. Record o f a conversation Adenauer-M acmillan, 18.11.1959.
91 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, p .16833.
** ’Informed opinion in the Ministry of Defense is that in view of the Berlin Crisis and the rundown in C yprus 
it is likely that this lie . the stop] is the line which w ill be recommended', FRO, T  225/1129, note, 29.4.1959. See 
also: FRO, FR EM 11/2704, Record of a Meeting Strauss-M acmillan, 11.5.1959; T 225/1391, Treasury Brief for E tzel 
Visit, 10.6.1959; ibid. Prim e Minister to Chancellor o f Exchequer, 9.7.1959.
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also gained new weight 'Nothing would suit DrAdenauer and Herr Strauss better than to 
see our troops in Germany reduced while theirs are being augmented. They want a larger 
share o f the NATO commands...[and would be]...able to say...that we were o f less use as 
allies and that there was less need to meet us over the FTA because we were pulling out o f  
Europe anyway'™  Finally, the Americans would have been certainly distressed by further 
reductions. To use the stabilization of the troop level now as a demonstration of European 
mindedness was therefore slightly anachronistic. Whatever the remaining value of this stick, 
it beat a donkey which was already on the wrong path.
Summing up all evidence, a powerful influence of security questions on Germany's attitude 
towards British European policy is visible in many ways.* 100 This influence showed less on 
the level of the actual discussion of the British FTA proposals. Discussed were mostly 
economic problems. Britain’s will to exclude agricultural products from the FTA, to sustain 
a preferential treatment for Commonwealth, and to resist a common external tariff was 
difficult for the Europeans to accept. They would have altered the character of the Rome 
Treaties. Recent research, however, has shown that these economic divergences might have 
been overcome or mitigated by certain compromise agreements.101 Germany, for example, 
would have benefited economically more from the FTA than from the Common Market. 
These compromise formulas might have been achieved by concerted pressure from the other 
Five on France. When, however, the moment was approaching for strong intervention to brush 
aside the obstacles, nothing occurred and the German government exerted very little if any 
pressure on France.
This unwillingness to search for a compromise or to support Britain more forcefully had much 
to do with the conflicts in the security and the monetary field. It was a clear misjudgement 
by the British government to employ their security guarantee in economic and monetary 
conflicts with Europe while simultaneously depriving this guarantee of much of its credibility; 
particularly, as Britain had not much else on offer for Europe. What spoiled the FTA for the
** PRO, T 225/1391, Lloyd to Prime M inister, 8.7.1959.
100 See also Schmidt (1989).
101 Griffiths, The Creation o f EFT A (forthcoming).
Germans was the lack of a political commitment. The proposal seemed more destined to 
contain than to cooperate with Germany. The support cost and troop level problem lent this 
impression much o f its credibility. For long periods, support cost negotiations poisoned 
mutual relations and reduced them to a question of financial bargaining. Seen as a whole, 
these conflicts and British proposals for Europe did not fit together. Thus, British policy was 
seen as contradictory and confused at best, and as deliberately destructive at worst
91
92
CHAPTER V
CENTURION AND OTHER GADGETS:
THE FAILURE O F BRITISH WEAPONS EXPORT TO 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, German arms purchases were seen by both the US and the 
UK as a principal way of balancing the foreign exchange cost of their troops in Germany. 
Therefore, they were a recurrent theme in all support cost- and -later- offset negotiations. The 
conspicuous failure of British efforts to conquer a large segment of the weapon market in the 
rearming Federal Republic had a significant impact on these negotiations as well as on many 
other bilateral issues. In order to trace these connections I will outline in the following chapter 
the causes and consequences of the British failure to sell a sizeable quantity of military 
hardware to Germany.
A considerable amount of time passed before German rearmament after 1955 would be able 
to relieve the NATO partners of some of their defence burden in Europe (ch.II). Neither did 
the build-up of the German army move as fast as desired nor the vast military orders which 
were expected to materialize. Impatience on the part of the British and the Americans rose 
fast. When the Germans somewhat impertinently asked the United States in early 1956 for 
more financial assistance to rearmament they received a blunt response. The Americans 
accused them of spending far less than the average of other NATO-countries on defence 
matters despite the excellent state of their economy. Therefore, any additional aid would be 
precluded.1 Washington urged Bonn particularly to complete defence procurement plans and 
demanded that much higher orders be placed in European countries. This was a distinct hint 
on the support cost negotiations between Britain and Germany.
American grant aid to Germany was seen as increasingly anachronistic by the Eisenhower 
administration, given the economic situation in the Federal Republic. The last big item was 
the so-called Nash-list from 1953. It was worth about $900m and it consisted mainly of loans 1
1 For the German memorandum: BA, B 126/51520, 10.1.1956; the answ er BA NL Blankenhom 61b,1, 
Memorandum US to FRG, 153-56.
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of military material* military training and exchange programs.2 It was the only aid 
commitment o f the United States to continue after the 1956 memorandum. This and earlier 
American military aid programs, however, had one important lasting consequence, because 
they provided the German forces with their basic equipment, for example tanks. T h e  
Bundeswehr developed in many respects a structural dependence on American material. T h is  
dependence tended to perpetuate itself because newly bought US arms were more com patib le 
with existing stocks than material from any other source.
The Germans, in the period in which the US memorandum arrived, fully agreed w ith  th e  
request to buy the Bundeswehr equipment abroad. Firstly, they lacked their own arm am en ts  
industry; advanced military material was only available abroad. Furthermore, as a lre ad y  
outlined in chapter 11, there were apprehensions of a macro-economic nature, brought fo rw a rd  
by Finance Minister Schaffer and by Strauss. There was the danger of domestic inflation in 
case o f too much government investment, the possible curtailment of German e x p o r t  
capabilities3, and the disturbingly high balance of payments surplus. Straufi resumed: A p a r t  
from the advantage that arms and equipment from allied NATO countries originate fr o m  
current production and have therefore -partly- considerable price advantages, o rd e r in g  
weapons abroad also effects trade policy. B y buying abroad we correct payments im b a la n ces  
caused by the German export surpluses in deficit countries. In  particular, we are a b le  to  
reduce our surplus in the EPU\* Most German industrial leaders shared the feelings o f  th e  
government and argued that for the moment their total capacity was being em ployed.3 T o  
produce the equipment for the planned 12 divisions in such a short time was re g a rd e d  
impossible, damaging to export prospects, leading to tax rises and incalculable co n v e rs io n  
costs. Furthermore, German industrialists still remembered vividly the demontation p e r io d  *1
1 For US aid to  Germany see: Birtle, Rearming the Pkenix, 1991.
1 FAZ, 6 March 19S6. Precisely this was a hope of parts of the British government and industry.
4 StrauB, in: BPt, 27.2.1958, p.330-331.
s Thus even industrial leaders at that time were in favour of arms purchases abroad, though th is  a ttitu d e  
diminished considerably later on. See: Brandt, Rustung und Wirtschaft in der Bundesrepubtik, 1966, p .1 4 8 -1 5 1 . S e* 
also: Abelshauser, in: Heller/Gillingham, 1992, p .313 ,327; Leaman, The Political Economy o f West G erm any, 1 9 8 8 , 
p.85; THE ECONOMIST, 11.2.1956, p.49.
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after the war and the strong attacks on them for producing weapons for the Nazis.6 Certainly, 
the competitive advantage by weapons industries in other countries also played a role in the 
initial reluctance of the German industry to fight for a share of the cake.7 *The industry’s 
restraint in producing weapons was to change relatively quickly.
In 1955/56, however, German and allied objectives appeared in accordance. There was still 
the question from which sources Germany would get the equipment for its military forces. 
Would it cooperate mainly with the United States or with Western Europe? How strong was 
domestic production going to be? What role would the United Kingdom play? These decisions 
had not only economic consequences. They also were to be of considerable political 
importance.
Early on, France, the UK and the United States started to compete for German orders. During 
the EDC debate, a future European armaments cooperation along with the European army had 
been foreseen.* Such plans vanished together with the EDC. After Germany’s accession to 
NATO, the three major Western weapon producing countries rushed to get their foot in a 
market with enormous potential. The US in October 1956 concluded an agreement stipulating 
the framework of defence procurement by Germany.9 The US government would act as an 
agent for military sales and payments were to be transferred to a specific account maintained 
by the US Treasury. The French proposed shortly after the demise of EDC a European arms 
pool to the Federal Republic.10 Despite these activities the Germans felt no urgent need to 
choose between the competitors. The rearmament crisis made the final form of the German 
army difficult to foresee. Therefore, procurement plans were at a rather preliminary stage. The 
strategic debate in the Alliance, undermining the importance of conventional weapons, added 
another factor of insecurity.
6 Brandi, 1966, p.86-87.
1 ibid., p.175-78.
* Abelshauser, ’Rüstung, Wirtschaft, Rüstungswirtschaft', in: Maier/Wiggershau$(eds), Das Nordatlantische 
Bündnis, 1993, p.97-98.
9 TI AS 3660, Exchange of notes: Mutual Defence Assistance, 8  October 1956, p.2787-2802.
10 Abelshauser, "Integration a la carte". The Primacy of Politics and the Economic Integration o f Western Europe 
in the 1950s, in: Martin S.(cd), The Construction o f Europe, 1994, p.13-15.
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Political pressure from abroad, however, mounted, particularly in the context of the support 
cost negotiations. Soon after the US memorandum cited above had arrived, Blankenhom, the 
German ambassador at NATO, was informed that the previously earmarked sum of $619m 
for military purchases in Europe over the whole rearmament period would have to be 
increased as a consequence of the support cost negotiations to $1430-1670m.M However, the 
authors of the memorandum added, that military experts did not expect orders of this size to 
be feasible. This was a sound judgement. When finally the first orders were placed their 
volume was disappointingly low. In the ’Questionnaire*, the Federal Republic had to submit 
to the Annual Review Meeting of NATO in October 1956, the announced target figures fo r 
orders in Europe turned out to be considerably less than expected by the allies. Initially, 
Germany had planned to order weapons to the tune of about S595m from European sources 
and $2143m from the United States in the period 1957-1959. Defence Minister Strauss, 
however, explained that in the following two years, 1957-1958, $286m could be expected fo r 
Europe and $548m for the US, adding that even these figures were possibly too high.1 2 *
Actual orders of $238m in EPU-countries and $286m in the United States had been placed 
until the end of 1956 by the Federal Republic.11 This seemed to indicate a balance between 
European and American sources at this point.
The American lead, however, was to increase progressively. Various French efforts to ge t 
Germany to agree with their proposals o f  a bilateral arms cooperation scheme failed, m ost 
spectacularly in the famous Franco-Italian-German Trilateral agreement. Almost immediately 
after the EDO had been outvoted by the French parliament, the French had proposed a 
bilateral armaments organisation to Bonn which would work separately from the W EU  
armaments committee. For this reason, the Germans had initially stalled.14 In late 1956, after 
the Radford plan crisis, Adenauer suddenly came out as a supporter of the French plans.11
11 BA, NL Blankenhom, 61a/l/42-44, note W irtschaftsministerium, 7 April 1956.
12 ibifL, 68/1, NATO Review Meeting: Questionnaire on German military build-up, 29 October 1956.
u ibid.
14 DDF 1956, II, Doc.188, Faure-Adenauer, von Brentano conversation, 17.9.1956, p.392-96.
12 DDF 1956 III, Doc.104: Couve de M urville a Pineau, 3.11.1956, p .164-65; Doc, 123: Notes pour visite du  
Chancellier: Cooperation franco-allemande, 3 November 1956; Abelshauser, in: Martin(ed), 1994, p.12-16; for som e 
further details in a rather poor article on the issue: Bo&suat, 'Les Armements dans les Relations Franco-Allemandes
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Strauß, who was the major German driving source behind the idea o f a European armaments 
cooperation, was also well disposed towards the French ideas. In 1957, the French extended 
their proposals even to the nuclear sphere.* 146 A protocol was signed which stipulated French- 
German cooperation in the whole field of military production, including nuclear weapons.17 
Shortly afterwards Italy joined the agreement. France, however, in the last consequence was 
not ready to share its nuclear secrets and feared a violent Russian reaction if Germany was 
to acquire nuclear weapons. De Gaulle, on becoming head of state, cancelled the ominous 
third part of the agreement, concerning nuclear cooperation.18
Soon afterwards, the Germans decided to buy the American Lockheed Starfighter for their air 
force instead of the French Mirage, despite intense lobbying by the French.19 The German 
decision rested upon many motives: Strauß’ annoyance about the cancellation of FIG, the co­
production component in the Starfighter programme which gave Germany access to high-tech 
know-how, the technical superiority and advanced stage of the US fighter, and high-pressure 
US lobbying combined with cautious hints about future help in upgrading the Starfighter to 
nuclear capability.20 The French were furious. They considered the German decision a heavy 
blow to any future effort of European arms cooperation.21 In fact, French-German 
cooperation in the field of armaments was to trail behind German-American cooperation for 
a long time.
Where did all this leave the British? As it turned out, they were left with the role of the odd
(1945-63), in: Revue d’Allemagne 25/4, 1993, p.601-15..
14 BA, NL Blankenborn, 81b, conversation Faure-Adenauer, 16.11.1957; conversation Strauß - Chaban-Delmas, 
20.11.1957.
17 DDF 1957/11, Pincau to Bonn and Rome embassies, 20.1157, p.717-718; protocol, 25.1157, p.762-3.
'* BA NL Blankenhom, 92b/2, conversation Wormser/Laloy • Strauß, 19.11.1958; the episode is now quite well
researched. For example: Fischer, 'Das Projekt einer tri lateralen NukJearkooperation. Französisch-deutsch-italienische
Geheimverhandlungen 1957/58’, in: Historisches Jahrbuch 112/1992, p. 143-56; Barbier, Nuti, and Conze, in: Revue 
ä ‘ histoire diplomatique 104(1990), p.77-158.
19 Kelleher, Germany and the Politics o f Nuclear Weapons, 1975, p.103.
20 BA, NL Blankenhom, 92b/2, conversation W oimser/Laloy-Strauß, 19 November 1958; ibid., 94/1, AA memo: 
German-French military cooperation, 26 November 1958; Kelleher (1975), p.103.
21 DDF 58/11, Seydoux a Couve de Murville: Adenauer-Joxe Conversation, 28.10.1958.
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man out, although they had to offer substantial know-how and a vast selection of military 
hardware. From the beginning, armaments trade as a means to reduce the imbalance in the 
bilateral payments account had been an issue in British-German support cost-negotiations. T he  
British government, however, regarded arms trade as a rather ambiguous business. A big share 
of arms in exports was considered a mixed blessing. The Bank of England had noted th is 
already in 1950. Dealing with the conversion of large parts o f the British industry to arm s 
production in the wake of the Korean War, it stated 'that i f  we concentrated wholly o n  
armaments and made up the resulting shortages both at home and in the Sterling Area b y  
buying civilian equipment from Germany, Germany at the end o f the rearmament p erio d  
would fin d  herself with a firm  foo t in the markets which we had given up to her, and w ithout 
the reconversion problem with which we ourselves would be faced*22. This argument becam e 
common place in the British government.
Despite many reservations, Britain embarked during 1950-1952 on an ambitious rearmament 
program triggered by the Korean War and greatly expanded its arms production capacity.23 
The British metal producing industry, which accounted for about 40% of the country’s  
exports, was especially affected.24 *26Treasury observed in 1955 that the *concentration o f  
defence claims on the metal using industries has led to a direct conflict with exports a n d  
investments.,25 By this time the rearmament boom had long been over. Unlike the Federal 
Republic, however, Britain still had large parts of its capacity bound up in armament 
industries. Apparently, the foreboding of Bank of England had come true. 'The absence o f a n y  
defence expenditure making claims on the economy, which compete with the claims of exports  
and investment, has been o f great benefit to Germany during the period o f reconstruction 
since the war and has given German economy a relative advantage over that o f the U K , 
particularly in the export fie ld .,26 This, as discussed briefly in chapter III, is a statem ent 
which is difficult to prove empirically. The major negative factor of the rearmament drive f o r
22 PRO, T 234/30, Letter Bank of England to Treasury, 25.9.1950.
21 Burnham, 'Rearm ing for the Korean War’, in: Contemporary Record 9/1995, p.343-67.
14 Caimcross, The British Economy since 1945, 1992, p.100.
15 PRO, T 234/24, Brief for a Meeting with German Ministers at NATO, December 1955.
26 PRO, T  234/24, Treasury Memorandum, 13 December 1955.
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Britain might have been the giving up of markets in Europe to Germany at a time when the 
latter’s industry was still relatively weak. It should not, however, be disregarded that this was 
consistent with an overall trend of British policy, the concentration o f economic policy on the 
Commonwealth and the United States.27 In any case, in the mid-1950s the United Kingdom 
still had huge capacities bound in arms production. Its defence expenditure was falling. 
Therefore, the British either had to sell abroad or accelerate a costly reconversion of these 
industries.
When during the NATO meeting in 1955, Schaffer offered German arms orders to offset the 
foreign exchange drain resulting from British troop maintenance in Germany, his proposal was 
received with some indignation, particularly in the Treasury Department ’We shall be tying 
up our manpower and industrial capacity on defence to the advantage o f our strongest export 
competitor. The Germans do not conceal that they have no intention o f disrupting their 
civilian industry and export potential Dr Schaffer indeed offered that i f  it was the balance-of- 
paym ents that particularly worried us Germany would be prepared to buy arms from us. We 
shall have to consider in any case what advantages we can derive from the German policy 
o f  buying arms abroad. We shall however sell arms to Germany anyway. We have no spare 
m ateriab or idle capacity to produce additional tank and aircraft whose export would be a 
pure gain to our balance o f payments, offsetting our DM expenditure.*2* Great Britain 
concentrated its diplomatic efforts therefore on obtaining direct payments.
However, the Treasury's ambiguous stance on arms trade was not shared by other 
departments, notably the Foreign Office29, the Ministry of Supply30, and the embassy in 
Bonn which ’... had long considered that German purchases o f British arms were the only 
long-term palliative to  the balance-of-payments problems with which we are faced; not only
27 Milward, The European Rescue o f the Nation State, 1992, p396-408.
*  PRO, T  234/25, Treasury note, 2.1.1956.
29 The FO, however, also cautioned 'that it is not necessarily in our interest to encourage the Germans to buy 
rather than to make arms, and thus encourage them knocking us for six in the export markets’; see: PRO, 
F0371/124613, Warner to Bonn Embassy, 12 April 1956.
20 PRO, T234/28, Rowan to Steel, 13 March 1956.
99
in 1956, but fo r some years to come. ’31 This view was reinforced by the disappointing result 
of the first support cost negotiations. Apparently there was no alternative to arms trade. The 
ambiguity with which the government regarded this business would, however, prove to be o f 
considerable disadvantage to its sales promotion efforts.
Estimates in the Ministry of Supply for German arms orders ran from £80m ($224m) to 
£250m ($700m) a year.32 These hopes were confirmed by a letter o f intent from the Federal 
government in June 1956 in the context of the support cost agreement, in which von Brentano 
promised German orders to the tune of $524m in 1956/57.33 However, no major new orders 
were received during that year. The German account in the Bank of England which was made 
up of prepayments for arms, as agreed in the support cost negotiations, remained almost 
untouched. Of the $157m of arms orders, which were registered in March 1957, $120.5m 
were for Hispano-Suiza armoured track vehicles, an order of dubious value, as it turned out 
later.34 The British government grew more and more uneasy about the situation.
A particular blow for British expectations was the case of the Centurion tanks. The British 
government had high hopes of furnishing the German army with its model. The value of the 
prospective order was estimated at £50m ($140m) which would have theoretically disposed 
of more than one tenth of Britain’s accumulated EPU deficit.35 Eden wrote twice to  
Eisenhower to obtain support for the British model against American competition.36 T he 
particular urgency in this case was caused by the highly critical economic situation of the 
Royal Ordnance Factories in Dalmuir where these tanks were produced. Of the four factories.
11 PRO, FO 371/124612, FO note to Treasury, 24.2.1956.
31 PRO, CAB 134/1291, MAC(G)56, Memo M inistry of Supply, 10.1.1956; PRO, FO 371/124615, Bonn to  FO ,
Tel.415, 30.5.1956; Bonn to FO, Tel.477, 13.8.1956.
33 PRO, FO 371/124616, von Brentano to UK Embassy Bonn, 29 June 1956.
34 PRO, FO 371/130727, FO Brief for Prime M inister, May 1957; see also PA-AA, Ref.301,96, Emminger to
Auswärtiges Amt, 10.11.56: English government is....embittered that none o f these promisses has been realised'.
35 EPU, Final Report 1959, p36; PRO, CAB 134/1291, Ministry of Supply Memo, 26 January 1956.
34 PRO, PREM 11/3344, Eden to Eisenhower, 18.2.1956; DDRS 94/1319, Memo McElroy for President: Tanks, 
April 1957.
three were kept working in the hope of German orders.37 *The German decision, however, 
was delayed more and more, and in September 1956 the case already seemed lost. Especially 
embarrassing for the British was that the Americans had given the German army 1000 M47 
tanks free as part of the Nash-list. The new defence minister StrauB evoked renewed hopes 
that the rest could possibly be supplied by Britain. In May 1957 Macmillan, making a last 
desperate pitch, wrote once more to Eisenhower. 'Both fo r  the sake o f European cooperation, 
and in order to lessen the need fo r dollar enddtem, it is most desirable that some o f these 
requirements should be supplied by B r i t a i n ,But although Eisenhower promised support, 
the decision was taken in favour of the new American M4S tank. A final protest by 
Macmillan to Adenauer achieved nothing.39 40
This was a considerable fiasco. The Embassy in Bonn and the Foreign Office had wasted 
almost two years of strenuous efforts on the issue and now blamed the Americans. 7/ is 
virtually useless fo r us to try to sell the Germans anything where we are in competition with 
the Americans, The reason is, o f coursef that the Americans have in the shape o f MAAG some 
200 American business men dressed up in uniform who have a great deal o f time and money 
to be spent in nobbling the Germans who count. . .  We have nothing comparable to offer. 140 
The Pentagon had, in fact, contrary to Eisenhower’s wishes, not hesitated to offer its good 
services in selling the M48 - particularly, as it was about to develop a successor model for 
which German funds were a welcome financial help.41 Two other reasons were, however, 
decisive for the Germans. The first was the higher compatibility of the US tank with the 
already existing M 47 tanks, as Strauss emphasized later.42 *Moreover, the M48 appeared to 
be the newest model, whereas the British were about to replace the Centurion with a newer
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,7 PRO, FO 371/124612, Arms Working Party Meeting, 2 8 .il9 5 6 ; CAB 128/30, CM 49(56), 12.7.56.
*  PRO, PREM 11/3344, Macmillan to Eisenhower, 17.5.1957.
”  PRO, PREM 11/3344, Adenauer to Macmillan, 29.6.1957; FO 371/130794, Macmillan to Adenauer, 28.7.1957.
40 PRO. FO 371/130775, FO minute, 1.11.1957.
41 FRUS 1955-57, XXVI, Memo of Conference with the President, 2 April 1957, p.227; ibid., XVII, Eisenhower
to Macmillan, 26 August 1957, p.782-83; DDRS 1994/1319, Memo McElroy to President, April 1957.
41 PRO, PREM 11/2704, Record of a Meeting Macmillan - Strauß, 115.1959.
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model not on offer.43 The Germans were always ready to suspect, not without some 
| justification, that they were being used to get rid of outdated material at a high price.44
ij Soon after the failure of the Centurion business a similar case happened with the British
j aircraft P 177. Again Britain kept facilities open only in the hope of selling the aircraft to
Germany.45 In the following up to the 1957 defence review, the RAF had been no longer 
interested in this expensive tool. Again the deal with Germany did not materialise due toj
French and American competition. Production had to be stopped at the end of 1957 when the|
| German ’No* became known. This caused fierce protests from employees and management
of the Saunders-Roe Company who had been dependent on this order and, moreover, was 
located in a region with a particularly weak economic structure.46 As these examples show, 
balance of payments concerns and structural economic policy at home went hand in hand in
the British government's promotion of arms sales.
I
|
Most damaging to the reputation of British weapons was the case of the Hispano-Suiza 
armoured track vehicles. The contract for the order, worth about $120m, had been concluded 
under Strauss’ predecessor Blank. The main partner, the dubious Swiss firm Hispano Suiza, 
had subcontracted the largest part of it to British Leyland without any involvement o f the 
British government.47 Unfortunately the vehicle proved to be of a dreadfully poor quality 
and, moreover, there had been cases o f bribery in the Federal Defence ministry when the 
| order was made.48 *When Strauss realised this, he cancelled 1800 of the 2800 ordered
vehicles, thereby reducing Britain’s far biggest arms export success in Germany to a third o f
41 PRO, FO 371/124632, Embassy Bonn to FO, tel.49, 26.1.1956.
44 PRO, FO 371/130727, FO Brief for Prime Ministers Visit to Germany, May 1957; PRO, FO 371/137471, 
Core-Booth to FO, 29.1.1958.
43 ’HMG hove continued to finance development only in order to give the Germans time to make up their m inds 
PRO, FO 371/130773, Brief on Arms Sales for Adenauers Visit to London, 17.12.1957; FO 371/130727, FO B rief 
for Prime Ministers V isit to Germany, 5/1957.
46 PRO, FO 371/137471, FO Brief for M r.Harvey's visit to Bonn, 15.1.1958; PA-AA Ref-301, vol.37, Embassy 
London to Auswärtiges Amt, 24.12.57; KCA 1957, p.16020.
47 PRO, FO 371/137476, Embassy Bonn to FO, 29.8.1958.
44 A series of articles with essentially correct information on the affair can be found in; FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU, 6.-16.12.1958.
its original size /9 Although the British government was aware of the shady circumstances 
o f the deal, the loss of such a tremendous amount of foreign exchange (about $84m) was a 
considerable shock.50 The UK therefore urged the German defence ministry to review its 
decision. Eventually, the Germans were willing to reinstate parts o f the order because of their 
disillusionment with the Franco-Italian-German agreement and because of the need to use the 
arms account at the Bank of England.51 However, the affair left a very bad impression.
The series of failures caused considerable annoyance in the British government. 'The Germans 
m ust realize that these disappointments and the way in which they have come about are 
having an adverse political effect in the United Kingdom and are seriously disturbing Anglo- 
German relations. In particular they strengthen the hands o f those . . .  who do not wish the 
United Kingdom to cooperate with Germany or, indeed, with Europe; . . .  the view is gaining 
ground in some quarters that the Germans have been leading us up the garden path.*52 
Compared to the estimates of 1955, the result of the British efforts was miserable. In July 
1957 the preliminary level of orders was $168m, March 1958 $213m and in 1961, after the 
Hispano-Suiza deal had been slashed, it was as low as $138m.53
Frustrated, British civil servants contemplated the reasons for these failures. They produced 
a tremendous variety of explanations: the anti-British attitude o f StrauB; the possibility that 
British weapons were outdated and too expensive; the Franco-Italian-German Tripartite 
Agreement; Britain's reluctance to cooperate in arms production and its independent strategic 
policy; the secretiveness and absence of cooperation from British services; the reluctance of 
Britain to make government-government deals and, of course, US competition.54 Although
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09 PA-AA, 11A7/1202, BMV to AA, 6 November 1958; Interministerial Meeting, 6 November 1958.
50 PRO CAB 129/86, C (58)236,15.11.58, FO 371/137476, Steel to Ministry of Supply, 28.8.1958.
91 PRO, F0371/137477, Embassy Bonn to M inistry of Supply on McFarlane-Hopf conversation, 19 April 1958. 
52 PRO, FO 371/137471, FO Tel.144 to Bonn, 21.1.1958.
51 Data derived from: FO 371/130774,15.7.1957; PREM 11/3344,313.1958; B A  NL Etzel, note Referat Fp2, 
183.1961.
54 PRO, PREM 11/3344, Ministry of Supply to Prime Minister on Export of Arms, 123.1958; FO 371/124613, 
Bonn to FO, 17.4.1956; FO 371/137374, conversation Lloyd-v.Herwarth, 18.2.1958; FO 371/145946, McFariane 
(Bonn) to Ministry of Supply, 29.1.1959; FO 371/124616, Anglo-German Economic Committee: Arms Supply to
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the last reason was grave, the political explanations are more important. All evidence points 
to British hesitation in becoming involved in a cooperative arms development scheme on the 
continent.”  When it seemed to go ahead without Britain as in the case o f FIG, there was 
great indignation. As long as British policy, however, seemed to be that of maintaining 
political, economic and military56 distance from the continent, it was not surprising that the 
Germans felt it to be more convenient politically to cooperate with the United States and 
France. A business such as armaments trade made more political sense when pursued with 
these countries. British arms export policy to Germany was not consistent with the overall 
tendency of British foreign policy. This was the main bottleneck. The consequence was that 
the level o f British sales remained disappointing throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
Although a more cooperative attitude came up in the British government after 1958, American 
competition would become the decisive factor for high-tech weapons in the 1960’s. Regarding 
less sophisticated types of armaments, German industry caught up rapidly and expanded its 
share greatly. Failures like the Hispano-Suiza contributed to this trend.57 The change o f 
British policy came too late. The UK continued to trail far behind American and French sales, 
reaching about the level of Italian sales to the Bundeswehr.58 In the 1960s, arms sales 
became again an integral part of German-British offset agreements. Even this did not change 
much. The continuing distance between Germany and the UK, underlined by quarrels about 
support costs, monetary policy, and troop-levels, impeded closer military cooperation between 
the two countries. In a way, European integration in the economic Field without Great Britain 
was paralleled by a similarly exclusive continental cooperation in strategic-military matters.
Germany, 22.11.1956.
91 For example: from the start of their rearmament the Germans had expressed their priority for govemment- 
govemment deals instead of negotiating directly w ith the foreign firm in which case they suspected to be charged a 
higher prize. W hereas the US had immediately agreed to  such a scheme, the UK government, mainly because o f the 
industry's and the services’resistance, steadily refused. See: Fro, FO 371/137474, Brief on Adenauer visit, 29 A pril 
1958; FO Brief for Defence Minister’s visit to Germany, 20 March 1958. 96
96 The German m ilitary thought until the late 1960s that British weapons were not suitable for warfare on the 
continent; Interview o f the author with former German defence minister, von Hassel, 17 August 1994.
57 BA, B136/3105, Summary of Strauß* remarks at Meeting of Budget Committee, 27 February 1959.
91 BA NL Etzel, vol.17, BMF memo, March 1961; Snyder (1964), p.223; Appendix, table 6.
P A R T II
TROOPS AND DOLLARS 
IN GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 
1955-67
Ti .
i
1 0 5
CHAPTER VI 
THE RADFORD PLAN:
AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS ITS TROOPS IN GERMANY, 1955-58
The American GI's in Germany were« in sharp contrast to the controversies surrounding the 
British troop commitment from 1955 onward, no source of serious conflict between sending 
and host country - apart from one significant episode which is the subject of this chapter. The 
American military presence became an integral feature of the European postwar settlement 
within a few years. Divergences on their military and political role were mainly played out 
in strategic debates which affected the troop level insignificantly. This relative calm and 
stability, however, should not lead one to conclude that preoccupations, similar to the British 
ones, did not exist in US government circles. On the contrary, the principle of a seemingly 
unlimited presence of their troops in Europe was never accepted by the American government 
as a whole nor by Congress and the public. In the absence of powerful financial counter­
arguments (balance of payments problems), however, the political arguments for a stable troop 
level carried the day by and large. This changed only in 1959/1960 when the American dollar 
came under pressure similar to that affecting the English pound. In the following chapter I 
will retrace US government discussions regarding the rationales for troop stationing in Europe, 
concentrating on the Radford plan episode. This will be preceded by a short discussion of the 
strategic debate in whose terms the troop level question was couched during the 1950s. The 
motivations behind the German insistence on a stable troop level will be outlined in more 
detail as in chapter 1.
Allied force levels in Europe were influenced by changes in strategic thinking and revised war 
plans. However, this influence was felt mainly at the planning level. When the plans were to 
be implemented, financial and political considerations proved to be stronger than strategic 
doctrines. To understand the debate about force reductions, it is nevertheless necessary to 
recapitulate briefly the basic lines of the strategic discussion within the Alliance during the 
1950*s. The debate about force levels in Europe was couched in strategic terms and those 
arguments were among the principal ones brought forward to justify a lower or higher 
American force level.
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The strategic debate in the Western Alliance was mainly about the most appropriate balance 
between conventional and nuclear weapons.1 The basic lines of NATO’s military strategy 
were set by the United States which also retained, due to its exclusive possession of a huge 
nuclear potential, the ultimate decision about the nuclearisation o f an eventual war. However, 
the established concepts of deterrence were challenged consistently, not only by the 
Europeans, but also from within the US administration and from many semi-official strategic 
thinkers. Technological progress, political considerations, revised estimates of Soviet military 
power and, above all, economic limitations led to frequent doubts about the wisdom of the 
strategic doctrine of the day.
A stable factor in strategic thinking after the war was the feeling that NATO’s troops were 
conventionally inferior to the Warsaw Pact forces. In the first years of the Cold War it was 
therefore tacitly accepted by American and British military planners that in case of a full-scale 
attack, the Soviet Union would conquer large parts of continental Europe.2 With the help of 
airpower and nuclear strikes the occupied territory was then, following closely allied strategy 
in World War II, to be liberated. However, the experience of the Korean War 1950-51 clearly 
showed the uselessness of atomic weapons in liberating occupied territory.3 In addition, the 
prospect of Soviet occupation was completely unacceptable for the Europeans. The 
implementation of a forward strategy became politically imperative. Its expression was the 
huge conventional build-up program which was decided at the NATO Council M eeting in 
Lisbon, February 1952. It provided for 96 divisions as force goals, and it was clear that 
without German resources and manpower these goals were impossible to achieve.4 To close 
the gap until the new forces were available was one o f the reasons for the United States to
1 For an excellent review of the American strategic debate see: Trachtenberg. History & Strategy, 1991.
1 Krieger, ‘Die Ursprünge der langfristigen Stationierung amerikanischer Streitkrane in Europa*, in: H erbst/ 
BQhrer/Sowade(ed), Vom Marshall-Plan zur EWG, 1990. p.373-399; Greiner. ‘Zur Rolle Kontinentaleuropas in den 
alliierten strategischen Planungen*, in: Maier/W iggershaus(ed). Das Nordatlantische Bündnis 1949-56,1993 ,147-50 .
5 Freedman, The Evolution o f Nuclear Strategy, 1981, p .71-72; Greiner, in: Maier/W iggershaus(eds), 1993. p.150- 
152.
4 SteinhoffTPömmerin, Strategiewechsel, 1993, p.13-15; W ampler, ‘Conventional Goals and Nuclear Promises: 
The Truman Administration and the Roots of the NATO New Look*, in; Heller/Gillingham (1992), p.53-58.
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formally approve the stationing of a large number of American troops in Europe.3
However, even given the existence of a German army it was soon realized that the Lisbon 
plans were utopian, especially from a financial point of view. A way out of this dilemma was 
provided by the development of tactical nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield. The 
Eisenhower-administration adopted a corresponding military policy from 1953 onwards, 
termed ’New Look', which was based on an almost complete reliance on nuclear deterrence 
to decisively reduce the cost of defence. With tactical nuclear weapons and by keeping the 
advantage of the US in nuclear technology it seemed possible to entrust deterrence mainly to 
nuclear weapons, avoiding the expensive maintenance of large conventional forces. 
Consequently the nuclear stockpile was increased to gigantic dimensions (from 50 nuclear 
warheads in 1948 to 18500 in 1960) and tactical nuclear weapons were stationed in Europe/ 
During the 1953 NATO Council meeting the allies were informed of the new strategy.* 7 They 
were assured by the US that an attack on them would be answered immediately by atomic 
weapons. This was made credible by the presence of American troops on the front line which 
would force the Americans from the first day to take part in any hostilities.
The military value of conventional troops themselves, however, was put into question when 
seen in those strictly strategic terms. The so-called sword (strategic ballistic weapons) and 
shield (conventional troops supported by tactical nuclear weapons) strategy, which was the 
result of the New Look and was approved by NATO with document MC 48. assigned the 
troops the role of a tripwire/ How strong this tripwire should be. however, was never 
established and was subject to heated debates. Consistent pressure increased during the 1950’s 
to save as much as possible on military budgets in various countries, notably the US and 
Britain. The Eisenhower-administration and the Macmillan government in Britain never 
abandoned the hope of soon being able to reduce their commitment decisively. The
1 See cb.l; see also Treverton, America, Germany, and the Future o f Europe, 1992. p.64-91.
4 Rosenberg. ‘The Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1960’, in: International Security 7(1983). p.3*71.
7 Maier, Amerikanische Nuklearstrategie unter Truman und Eisenhower, in: Maier/Wiggenhaus(ed), (1993), 
p.234-240.
G oc, Pax Atomica, 1988. p.7.s
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Europeans, however, saw these commitments as essential in political and military terms for 
the postwar European security architecture. After all, a real forward strategy was established 
by NATO only in the early 1960s.
Thus, the political implications of conventional troops turned out to be essential obstacles to 
reductions. Even when reliance on nuclear deterrence was paramount, troop reductions (or 
reduced force goals) became highly contested issues. It became clear that whatever strategical 
thinking was predominant at the time, its practical implementation would be mainly dependent 
on political and economic circumstances. This is demonstrated by the first German-American 
dispute on troop levels in 1956/57, which created diplomatic discords to a considerable extent 
German and American strategic and political concepts of the troops were diverging 
increasingly and these differences were intensified by economic considerations. The crisis 
concerning the so-called Radford plan made this abundantly clear.
On 13 July 1956, the New York Times published an article reporting that the Chairman of 
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford, planned a reduction of American conventional 
manpower by 800.000 men, almost one-third of the total strength of the US army.9 Evidently 
the European theatre would be affected by reductions of this size. Adenauer was highly 
alarmed by the report and he initiated a major diplomatic effort to counter what he considered 
as a dangerous development with disastrous consequences. The German ambassadors in 
Washington, London, Paris and at NATO were called in to the Bundeskanzleramt for 
consultations, emissaries went to Washington, to NATO and WEU, and Adenauer himself 
wrote a pathetic letter to his "dear friend" John Foster Dulles.10 In this letter he painted an 
apocalyptic picture of the future world situation should the American disengagement plans 
prove true. Apparently the report came as a real shock to him. The strong reaction of the 
German government raises many questions. What reasons lay behind this extraordinary 
reaction to an unconfirmed report? What was the real background of the article? And what 
were the consequences of the affair on mutual relations? Above all: what were the roots of
* NYT. 13.7.1956.
10 Interview de M aiziere in the European Historical Archives, Florence: IFZ, NL Krekeler 39, Adenauer to 
Dulles. 22.7.1956; lbid.,47. Hallstein to Krekeler. 20.7.1956; FRUS 55-57, XXVI, Conversation Mrnphy-Ambassador 
Krekeler, 17.7.1956, p.131-133.
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one of the most consistent policy positions of the Federal Republic during the Fifties and 
Sixties, i.e. the insistence on a stable level of US troops in Germany?
A denauer's reaction clearly underlined the importance he attached to the US troops in 
Germany. For him these troops were the fundamental symbol of the American commitment 
to Europe. They were not only the principal condition under which the other Europeans 
accepted German sovereignty, they also guaranteed protection against a Soviet Union which 
a t that time most Germans held to be extremely expansionist The principal deterrent the 
American nuclear umbrella, was effective and credible for Germany only in combination with 
the strong conventional troop presence of the NATO members. Without this 'hostage 
function' of a force that could pursue forward defence, Germany would have been confronted 
w ith  two very inconvenient situations in the event of war; either occupation or nuclear war 
on German soil. Thus, a strong and credible conventional force-level was essential. This was 
one o f the main reasons for the German government to accept the establishment of a large 
conventional army so shortly after the war, in opposition to a large part of the West German 
population. As Adenauer well understood, the presence of US troops represented US control 
w hich made this buildup acceptable to the rest of Europe.
A part from these strategic and political reasons, domestic reasons were responsible for 
A denauer's (and his successors') uncompromising stance towards stable troop levels. Any sign 
o f  American disengagement might have revived the bitter debate about rearmament and 
W estintegration which had dominated German politics in the early Fifties." The opposition 
movement had ardently criticized Adenauer's policy which aimed at achieving sovereignty 
w ithin the Western framework by rearming Germany and silently delaying the prospects of 
reunification in the future.12 If the Federal Republic was to be rearmed, any chance of an 
understanding with the Soviet Union over Germany as a whole seemed impossible. Another 
argument of the antimilitaristic movement, led by the SPD, was the fear that German soldiers 
would, in the case of war, serve only as cannon fodder, having to fight the battle on the 
ground. The implementation of the 'New Look* strategy in the United States with its reliance 1
11 Adenauer, Erinnentngen 1955-59,1967, p.197-214; Pottering, Adenauers Sicherheitspolitik 1955-1963,1975, 
p.62-90.
12 See cb.II, fa. 19.
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on nuclear weapons, also for tactical purposes on the battlefield, gave this interpretation some 
plausibility. Redeployment or reduction of American troops therefore touched upon 
Adenauer’s worst fears, possibly driving the Germans towards neutralism by undermining the 
credibility of ’Westintegration.*13 He had placed all his credit on this policy. His ’Grand 
Design’ was threatened by the possibility o f an American disengagemenL The Chancellor 
complained that the Radford plan 'would destroy my whole policy \ 14 15*An additional galling 
detail of the whole affair was that it came just after the Chancellor had returned from a visit 
to Washington without having been informed of the American plans.
The US government was well aware of these circumstances; and even if one assumed that it 
did not know until the NYT story, it knew perfectly well afterwards thanks to Adenauers 
tireless efforts to communicate his disapproval. What lay behind the NYT report?
That Eisenhower basically supported the view that the American commitment of manpower 
in Europe was only o f a temporary nature is well-known and he mentioned this conviction 
frequently.13 Indeed, a reduction of expensive conventional manpower would have been an 
essential point in putting the economizing aspects of the ’New Look* strategy into force. Out 
of fear of negative repercussions on the EDC debate, Eisenhower and Dulles never seriously 
planned such a risky move during the first half of the 1950s.14 On the contrary, the Paris 
Accords were supplemented by a solemn declaration by the President that US troops would 
remain in Europe as long as needed.17 Soon, however, the economic consequences of this 
commitment became an issue in the Eisenhower administration, particularly after German
11 These arguments are all summarized in a speech Foreign Minister von Brentano gave to the hastily invoked 
WEU-Council at IS September 1956; see BA NL Blankenhom 67/3.
14 ibid. 63/3/194, Adenauer conversation with Q uarles, 10.9.1956.
15 'The President sa id  he had always insisted that the Europeans should develop groundforces to replace ours~.; 
FRUS 1955-57, IV, Memorandum of Conference with the President, 2.10.1956, p.100. See also; Trachtenberg, T h e  
Nuclearization o f NATO*, in: Trachtenberg (1991), p.163-68.
14 Thoss, ’The Presence o f American Troops in Germany, 1949-56’, in: DiefendorffFrohn/Rupieperfeds), 1993, 
p.417-420.
17 The pledge stated the US goveroment’s intention to ’continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such 
units o f its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fa ir  share c f the forces needed fo r  
the jo in t defense o f the North Atlantic area while the threat to that area exists, and w ill continue to deploy such forces 
in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy fo r  the defense o f this area V FRUS 1952*54, V.2, p.1345.
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contributions petered o u t
The US Treasury warned frequently of the foreign exchange loss implicit in long-term troop 
maintenance abroad.18 However, prior to 1958 these .warnings did not have the force to 
overcome the political counter-arguments by the State Department The focus of the 
administration's efforts to reduce the cost was therefore on budgetary savings. Cost saving 
studies were a common exercise for US military services in these years. It seems that the 
Radford plan was part of such a cost-saving study which had leaked o u t19 These studies 
were also an expression of the deep dissatisfaction large parts of the administration felt by 
the slow progress the allies were making towards achieving more self reliance in defence 
matters, thus failing to relieve the United States of the heavy burden of its expensive 
worldwide commitments. While apparently proposals in the size of the Radford plan survived 
only the lower levels of the government, a lively discussion was nevertheless going on in the 
higher ranks about the possibility of 'streamlining* the forces, fed by the need to economize 
and suggested by new strategic priorities. These discussions were reinforced by British 
intentions to reduce the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) in Germany. There were also 
considerable internal struggles going on between different branches of the US forces over the 
question of the most appropriate strategy in employing conventional and atomic weapons. The 
Radford plan indicated a certain prevalence of the Air Force opinion to the detriment of the 
position of the army, whose influence shrank with the diminishing importance of the large 
troop contingents in Europe. It is well possible that army officials were responsible for the 
leak to the NYT.20
During August and September 1956, the American government discussed different approaches 
to the problem.21 There was an overall agrément on the desirability of cuts in troop 
deployments abroad. *It should be our purpose to seek to establish a situation that would
“  FRUS 1955-57, XIX. Memo of Discussion at the 280th NSC Meeting. 22.356, p.272-73.
19 FRUS 1955-57, XDt. 249th NSC Meeting, 17 August 1956. p.349.
30 Rosenberg, in: International Security 7(1983), p.42-43; Felken, Duties und Deutschland. D ie amerikanische 
Deutschlandpolitik 1953-1959, 1993, p.366.
n  FRUS 55-57, IV, Memorandum of Conversation, p.93.
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permit the withdrawal o f a considerable amount o f U.S. ground forces from Europe as soon 
as this can be done without undue risk. The creation o f the German divisions and die 
imaginative use o f military manpower may afford that opportunity. The sole question 
presented is whether circumstances at this time permit us either to withdraw forces, or even 
publicly to disclose a trend in that direction.,n  According to the State Department, such a 
political situation did not yet exist German pressure apparently worked. The prospect of a 
SPD victory in the German elections alarmed the Americans more than necessary. For the 
time being the principal goal was 'to avoid undercutting Adenauer\ * 23 Eisenhower agreed 
to that He fe lt very definitely that we cannot take divisions out o f Europe at this time. The 
effect on Adenauer would be unacceptably damaging*?4 *
Moreover, the German position was supported by France. The French Premier Mollet 
informed Dulles that France still insisted on the absolute necessity of American troop- 
presence: *Mr.Mollet explained to Mr.Dulles that the French understanding o f the European 
defence problem is founded on three principles: 1. Necessity o f  an American presence in 
Europe . . .  It is indispensable . . . that [die US] should be represented physically: the 
problem o f  the force levels arises from  that. 2. Impossibility to rely solely on atomic weapons 
. . .  3. Necessity that nuclear weapons are k e p t . . .  a t the place . . . where defence is  
o r g a n iz e d Considerations regarding the effects of reductions on German rearmament also 
weighed heavily on the decision to pursue them, if at all, veiy quietly.26 *US-Senator George 
was sent on a goodwill-tour to Europe to calm emotions. He assured Adenauer that there 
would be no withdrawal or reduction as long as the US presence was welcome to the 
allies.17 This firm position would also deter the United Kingdom from bringing forward 
proposals for a reduction of their forces in Europe during the forthcoming NATO-council
a  NSA, NHP, Wampler OH sources. Box 5, Elbrick/MacArthur n  to Dulles, 27 September 1956.
u  FRUS 55-57, XIX, 249th NSC Meeting, 17 August 1956, p349.
M ibid Memo of Conference with the President, 2 October 1956, p.99.
v  DDF 1957, D, Entretien Dulles Mollet, 6.5.1957, p.740.
M NA, RG 59,711.5,9-1657, Paris POLTO 600: Parkins to Secretary of State, 16 September 1957.
v  FRUS 55-57, XXVI, Conversation George - Adenauer, 28.9.56, p.161-63.
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meeting in December 1956.28 The convenient moment for large-scale US troop-reductions 
was expected to lie somewhere in the near future -an assumption that proved to be wrong. ’A 
job  o f changing the German psychology from  the present feeling that i f  we did make any 
reduction whatever, we are abandoning them*, would have to be sustained, as Dulles put i t 29
The Americans tried a more subtle method to reduce the troops which was suggested by the 
President 'The President asked why we cannot streamline divisions and cut down backup 
troops without public announcement It could be done on a worldwide basis, avoiding the 
connotation o f pulling out o f Europe *.30 So it happened. The available data shows that 
manpower in Germany fell from 262.000 in 1956 to 235.000 in 1958.31 *3The departing troops 
were mostly airforce units whose functions were made obsolete by tactical nuclear weapons 
arriving in Europe.”  Large-scale reductions were ruled out for the time being. During 
discussions on the military budget the subject was regularly brought up,”  but only at times 
of a sharply deteriorating balance of payments, 1958-60 did serious debate start anew.
However, these events were enough to influence Adenauer’s policy to a considerable extent. 
He was by no means reassured. In every conversation with American politicians in late 1956 
he returned to the subject and complained about US policy, demanding incessantly more 
consultation.34 35 When Germany’s failure in its own rearmament became clear these 
continuing complaints naturally caused a great deal of annoyance in Washington.”  The US 
suspected that the turmoil was used by Adenauer to counteract American criticism regarding
** The UK had already informed ihe US of its imemion to review its defense policy with the Intention to lower 
their troop level in Europe: see ch.m.
”  ibid., p.94, fn .l.
30 FRUS 1955-57, XXVI, Memo of Conference with the President, 2.4.1957, p.226.
31 see Appendix l  table 3.
33 FRUS 1955-57. IV. Memcon President - Norstad, 28 October 1957. p.184-85; DDRS 1992, NSC Memo: US 
Security Effort Overseas. 19 December 1957.
33 For example: FRUS 1955-57, XIX. Memo Cutler for the President, 1 July 1957, p.533-35; 332d NSC meeting, 
25 July 1957, p.556-65; 345th NSC meeting, 14 November 1957, p.681.
34 BA NL Blankenhom 63/3, Adenauer conversation with Quarles, 10.9.56; FRUS 1955-57, XXVI,
Message from SACEUR (Gmeniher) to Goodpaster, 19.11.1956, p.174-175; Schwarz, Adenauer, 1990, p320.
35 BA NL Blankenhorn 73/5. Conversation Adenauer with Globke and Blankenhom, 17.1.1957.
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the planned reduction of the German conscription period from 18 to 12 months.36 This 
motive cannot be ruled out completely, considering Adenauer’s style of policy-making. But 
his grievances had a very real background, as we have seen. That the cuts undermined 
seriously the fighting ability of the troops was presumably not even Adenauer's opinion. 
However, German mistrust about the US commitment to Europe remained. Adenauer saw it 
from now on as a high probability that the United States would redeploy their troops in due 
course and he wanted to be prepared for this situation.37 Frequently in the following years 
he cited the Radford plan as evidence of the unreliability of the United States presence. Any 
new sign of shrinking US troop levels would revive this m istrust
The Radford plan also had immediate repercussions on German foreign policy. In a speech 
in Brussels in September 1956 Adenauer emphasized as strongly as ever before the 
importance of the European integration process.38 *Implicitly criticizing the United States, he 
gave strong approval to the relance of European Integration, initiated by the Conference of 
Venice in May 1956. It is quite evident that the Radford plan played a prominent role in 
making Adenauer an outspoken European at this time.34 Frankly, he spoke to the French 
about his misgivings. *At present, the Chancellor regards the American policy with strong 
reservations and this also applies to statesm en and diplomats o f the United States . . .  To 
counteract he considers it absolutely necessary that the European countries are united. From 
there derives his will to revive European policy in a situation which he thinks is the last 
opportunity \ 40 During a famous meeting with Moilet at the height of the Suez Crisis (Mollet 
and Pineau left the room twice during the conversation to call London) he appeared to be 
almost hysterical about the danger o f a Soviet-American co-dominium over the world.41
It is also highly probable that the Radford plan led Adenauer and parts of the German
N FRUS 1955-57, XXVI, Telegram from Embassy Bonn to Sec. of State, 16.10.1956. p.167.
31 See Buchstab (ed.), Protokolle, (1990). p.1028-30; Schwarz (1990). p.302.
"  Adenauer, Reden 1917-1967, (ed. Schwarz), 1975, p.329.
1989) EEC-Treaty*. in Serrated.). It Relancio dell' Europa e i Trattati di Roma, (Brussels
40 DDF 1956, III, 1990. Cbuve de Murville to Pineau. 10.10.56. Doc.261, p.553.
DDF 1956, III, 1990, Compte Rendu des Conversations Adenauer/Mollet a Paris, 6.11.56, Doc.138, p.237.41
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political establishment to question the abstinence of Germany in the nuclear field. 'On 
military side, I gather, he (Adenauer] has the impression that while risking his reputation in 
pressing fo r  rearmament, those who dispose o f nuclear power will alone make decision lsic} 
affecting his countrys fa te and that he will playing with marbles \ 42 Defence Minister Strauss 
got a free hand for talks about nuclear cooperation with France and Italy.43 The Radford plan 
thus had a considerable impact in forcing West Germany to see the limitations and problems 
of too strong a reliance on the United States. It made abundantly clear that the US presence 
and its role of a pacifier was not to be taken for granted. It was, however, only a foretaste 
of the debate during the 1960s. 41
41 FRUS 1955-57, XXVI, Memo of Acting Director of CIA, Cabell, to Sec. of Slate. 28.8.1956. p.148; see also: 
Greiner, ’Die militärische Eingliederung der BRD in die WEU und die NATO 1954-571, in: MGFA CH, p.731-736.
o See ch.V .
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CHAPTER VII
THE AMERICAN BALANCE O F PAYMENTS AND TH E SECURITY 
COMM ITM ENT IN EUROPE: T H E  RESPONSE OF TH E EISENHOWER
ADMINISTRATION
a) A Turning Point in European-American Relations?
In November 1960, the US Secretary of Treasury, Anderson, and the Undersecretary of State, 
Dillon, paid a visit to Bonn which has been termed 'a striking symbol* for the changing 
nature of European-American relations.1 Whereas in the first postwar decade European 
delegations used to cross the Atlantic in order to negotiate economic help with their American 
counterparts, the mission of Anderson and Dillon aimed at rallying the Europeans to the 
defence of the American currency which had been under pressure since 1958. Germany was 
the main target and the negotiator's agenda included a request for a direct contribution 
towards the cost of maintaining US troops in Germany. Press commentators on both sides 
rushed at the event. The German press commented on the visit with particular malice. 
Anderson and Dillon were portrayed as begging for money and, to underline this 
characterisation, DER SPIEGEL printed a photo showing the stout German minister of 
economics, Erhard, lecturing the skinny Anderson.1 2
The visit appeared to signal a new framework in which European-American relations were 
to evolve: the limits o f American economic power and the success of the European recovery 
made themselves felt, particularly in the monetary field. This had vast political consequences. 
Monetary problems were to affect American-German relations (and American-European 
relations in general) during the 1960s deeply. A closer look into the causes and consequences 
of the visit may give us an understanding of the nature of the changes going on. Throughout 
the rest of the thesis, these fundamental changes will be evaluated through an analysis of the 
troop cost question.
1 Solomon, The International Monetary System, 1945-81, 1982, p J3 .
2 SPIEGEL 49/1960, p.27-29.
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First, I will briefly portray the developments in the international monetary system prior to 
1960, in particular the emergence of large American balance of payments deficits. These were 
widely seen as the most conspicuous sign o f a fundamental change in US-European relations. 
Later on, commentators usually referred to the decline of the dollar when speaking of a 
supposed ’decline o f US hegemony*.3 1 will then concentrate on the specific question of how 
the US security effort in Europe was linked with the dollar problem. The Anderson-Dillon 
mission as one important response to the balance of payments deficit will serve to underline - 
as in other examples in this thesis- the interrelation of security and monetary problems in 
German-American relations. An analysis o f the issues at stake during the negotiations and of 
the German response will provide the necessary empirical base to address those questions. *1
3 This, in my opinion problematic, notion dominates the writings by political scientists on the events in the 
international monetary system. Yet, there is agreement neither on whether US hegemony was actually declining or 
not, nor on whether this hegemony was benign or repressive. This ambiguity illustrates the problem of using the 
concept as a given analytical tool in historical research. Another drawback is that an emphasis on US hegemony 
I fosters a tendency to portray European policies as essentially reactive to American policies. Historians of US-
1 European relations during the 1950s have seriously questioned the extent of American influence in shaping European 
' \ affairs. See for example the debate on the Marshall plan. For a summary of the debate see Maier, ’Introduction', to: 
Maier/Bischof(eds), The M arshall Plan and Germany, 1991. The use of the concept of hegemony in analysing 
[, transatlantic relations is critically assessed by Gadzey, The Political Economy o f Power: Hegemony and Econom ic 
|! Liberalism, 1994.
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b) The International Monetary System until 1958 and the Causes of the Dollar Problem 
The Anderson-Dillon mission was an indirect consequence of the emergence of a huge deficit 
in the American balance of payments and of the parallel shrinking of the American gold 
reserves.
Table 7:
US Liquidity Deficit4 and Gold Reserve Position, 1952-1961 (in $ billion)
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
Liquidity
Balance
-1.21 -2.18 -1.54 -134 -0.92 0.62 -335 -3.65 -3.71 -2.43
Gold
Reserves
23.25 22.09 21.79 21.75 22.06 22.86 20.58 19.51 17.80 16.95
Sources: Liquidity Balance: Survey of Current Business, October 1972.
Gold Reserves: UN Statistical Yearbook 1962
From 1958 onward these figures moved increasingly to the centre of public and official 
attention. In order to understand why this development occurred and why it caused such 
enormous alarm in the United States and in financial circles all over the world, it is necessary 
to outline briefly the basic features of the international monetary system as it evolved during 
the postwar period.
Already during World War II, various blueprints for a postwar monetary system had been 
drawn up in Great Britain and the United States. The common ground in these plans was the 
conviction, especially strong on the American side, that the chaos in international financial 
markets during the 1930s had had a decisive influence on the catastrophic events that 
followed.3 The lesson drawn was that a stable exchange rate system of convertible currencies 4*9
4 Again, as in the British case, we encounter the difficulty of evaluating balance of payments statistics. How to 
measure the balance of payments concctly has always been a point of contention among economists. Every country 
has its own accounting method. Moreover,'governments have numerous possibilities to manipulate the statistics, by 
changing the method of accounting, etc. The present study has no intention to participate in this debate. The officially
announced figures, used in diplomatic dealings and in major financial statistics, are accepted as the base on which
decision makers founded their policy. The so-called liquidity balance, equalling liquid liabilities to foreign
governments and private holders as well as changes in official reserve assets, was regarded until 1966 by the US
government as the overall measure for the balance of payments position.
9 Bergsten, The Dilemmas o f the Dollar, 1975, p329; the classic study on the creation of the postwar monetary 
system is Gardner, Dollar-Sterling Diplomacy, new.rev.ed 1969. A recent assessment is: James, The IMF and the 
Creation of the Bretton Woods System’, in: Eichengreenfed), Europe*s Postwar Recovery, 1995, p.93-126.
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had to be established to curb disruptive tendencies in the world economy and to allow an 
undisturbed flow of multilateral trade. This reading was a fundamental driving force of US 
postwar economic policy towards Europe. The central role accorded to monetary policy in the 
stabilization o f postwar Europe and in creating an economically liberal Atlantic system, 
protected by an American dominated security system, provides an important rationale for 
understanding the US reluctance regarding changes in the system. The monetary system and 
the security system were two sides o f the same coin and changes in one sphere invariably 
affected the other, as we shall see later.
To avoid the unilateral currency devaluations and the massive trade restrictions which had 
characterized the ’beggar thy neighbour’ policies of so many interwar governments, American 
and British officials devised, at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, a system of fixed 
exchange rates for the major world currencies, based on the dollar as the center of the system. 
The value of these currencies was pegged to the dollar. Exchange rate changes were to be 
limited to the extreme circumstances o f a ’fundamental disequilibrium’. This turned out to be 
a very vague definition. The value o f the dollar was expressed by a fixed rate to gold 
($35/ounce). Dollar holders were guaranteed by the US government that they could exchange 
their dollars for gold at any time at this rate. The US gold stock thus provided the essential 
foundation stone of exchange rate stability in this system. The objective was to make all 
major currencies convertible with each other and with the dollar, thus guaranteeing an 
undisturbed flow of goods and capital in the world economy. In case a country experienced 
balance of payments difficulties, it would draw on the resources of a newly created body, the 
International Monetary Fond (IMF).
This system, negotiated between Britain and the United States, but perforce also accepted by 
the rest of the industrial countries (apart from the communist bloc), had another important 
consequence which made it different from prewar practices. The participating governments 
*formally committed themselves to the principle o f collective responsibility fo r the  
management o f the international monetary order.'6 In international organisations like IMF, 
OEEC, EPU, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), etc., monetary policy was discussed
Cohen, Organizing the World's Money, 1977, p.93.6
120
and common solutions were sought.
This was particularly important when the strict rules of the Bretton Woods system regarding 
monetary, policy.turned out.to.be out of tune.with the^evere. realities, of.the postwar^world 
and the rapidly changing economic circumstances. The major problem was the immense need 
for capital and goods to reconstruct the war-ravaged European economies. Only the US was 
able to provide such capital and essential commodities. Thus, they became by far the biggest 
supplier of goods on world markets, and the need for dollars to pay for these goods soon 
made the dollar a rare asset. The resources of the IMF were not large enough to provide 
enough liquidity. Most governments had to impose strong restrictions to prevent runs out of 
their currency into the dollar. The ill-fated attempt by the United Kingdom to return to 
convertibility in 1947, for example, resulted in such a run. It made it clear that a longer 
transitory period than expected would be necessary before full convertibility was to be 
achieved. Meanwhile, US economic programs and military aid fuelled the European
economies with_liqujdity in Jhe form of dollars. This provided governments with the
possibility to build up their reserves and kept the European market open for US business. 
What emerged was a dollar-gold standard differing in many aspects from the plans envisaged 
in Bretton Woods. However, the system proved to work very well for most of the 1950s.
How important the provision of dollars for the recovery o f Europe actually was is still an 
issue of debate among historians. It suffices here to say that at the end of 1958 most 
European countries had achieved the goal of closing the dollar gap and had built up 
respectable monetary reserves, mainly held in dollars. De-facto convertibility was introduced. 
However, the sudden emergence of huge US balance of payments deficits threw the system 
almost immediately into crisis.
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c) The Debate on the Balance of Payments Deficit
The debate on the causes and consequences of the American deficit produced innumerable 
pages by governments, journalists, and scientists.7 Not surprisingly, the debate was started 
by economists. The most influential contribution has been the early study by the Belgian* 
American economist R.Triffm, ’Gold and the Dollar Crisis*, published in 1960. In his book 
Triffin pointed to an inherent paradox in the dollar-gold system which later became known 
as the Triffin Dilemma. His analysis focused on the international monetary system 's 
dependence on dollars as main source of liquidity. This was a consequence of the liquidity 
gap after the war which had put countries in reconstruction on a de facto dollar standard. 
Dollars came to make up a huge part o f their reserves, and the American currency became 
the main transaction currency. The role o f the dollar as reserve currency and transaction unit 
implied, according to Triffin, that the United States necessarily had annual balance o f  
payments deficits caused by the outflow of dollars to the growingLworld economy. However, 
as the amounts o f dollars in the reserves of the major industrial countries and those 
accumulating in the system mounted, the US gold.reserves, which guaranteed the value o f  the 
dollar, were no longer.able to cover all thejdaim s on the US government. Consequently, 
confidence in the value of the dollar waned and dollar-holders exchanged the dollar for gold, 
causing a drain on the US gold stock. The necessary measure to restore confidence, would 
have been to restrict the outflow of dollars. This, however, would have resulted in a shortage 
of liquidity for world trade (gold as a rare raw material was not able to cover the expansion 
of world trade). Thus, the system was undermining itself. The solution Triffin devised for this
7 The contributors to the extensive literature on monetary problems in the 1960'$ can be roughly divided in four 
categories with many works crossing the borderlines: Economists, Political Scientists, Historians, and Participants in 
International Monetary Diplomacy. Examples for accounts by economists; Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis, 1961. 
Bordo/Eichengreen(eds), A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System , 1993; Horsefield(ed), The IMF 1945-65: 20  
Years o f International Monetary Cooperation, 1969; Yeager, International Monetary Relations: Theory, H istory and  
Policy, 1976. Political scientists tackled the problem mostly by scrutinizing the power structure behind international 
monetary relations. See for example: Block, The Origins o f International Economic Disorder, 1977; Bcrgsten (1975); 
Cohen B., Organizing the World’s Money: The Political Economy o f International Monetary Relations, 1977; Odell, 
US International M onetary Relations, 1982; Cohen, International M onetary Reform, 1964-1969, 1970; Strange, 
International Economic Relations o f the Western World 7959-77,1976. Historical accounts based on archival research 
are rare: Borden, in: Paterson(ed), Kennedy’s Q uest fo r Victory, 1989, p.57-85; Kunz, in: Kunz(ed), The Diplomacy 
o f the Crucial Decade, 1994, and, recently, James, International M onetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods, 1996. 
Policy-makers concerned with monetary problems also produced many volumes. Amongst the best known are: Gilbert, 
Quest For World M onetary Order, 1980; Solomon (1982); Roosa, The D ollar Problem and World Liquidity, 1967; 
Coombs, The Arena o f international Finance, 1976.
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problem was a kind of a world bank where the rich industrial countries were to pool their 
reserves and which would become the source of liquidity. However, like most of the 
ingenious mechanisms economists contrived, this proposal was out of tune with political 
realities. The surrender of sovereignty to such a body was hardly acceptable to any nation.
As usual, governments looked not for the possibly most rational solution to the monetary 
problems but for the~;poUticdIyZmbst' opportune.' Corrective actions in the monetary field 
entailed -as they do still- very unpopular measures. This was a strong incentive to continue 
the system by curing the symptoms and neglecting the causes. After all, the Triffin dilemma 
had been there since_the end o f  the_war, and the system had nevertheless worked to mutual 
advantage.8
The different elements of the American deficit were easily identifiable. Apart from temporary 
factors, four causes of a structural nature were mainly responsible:
1. US military expenditure abroad ( including foreign aid). The maintenance of military 
facilities on a worldwide base and the expansion of foreign aid to stabilize friendly 
governments were essential parts of American Cold War foreign policy. In the case of 
Europe, the implicit outflow of capital coincided positively with the European need for dollar 
liquidity during the 1950* s. This need vanished, as we have seen. The US military posture, 
however, remained essentially the same, as did the dollar drain associated with it. As in the 
British case, it is hardly possible to establish the exact impact of troop maintenance abroad 
on bilateral payments balances. The only concerted effort during the Trilateral negotiations 
of 1966/67 failed (see ch.XI).
2. US investments abroad and long-term capital outflow. As the European recovery proceeded, 
investment in the European market became very attractive for American businesses. Factors 
like low labour costs, the lowering of tariffs within the Common Market, the proximity of 
markets, etc., made this an obvious strategy for US investors.9
3. The shrinking. American, trade surplus, closely connected with re-emerging„European
* This inertia was one of the major reasons that flexible exchange rates were ruled out for such a long time; see: 
Mil ward, "The Origins of the Fixed Rate Dollar System*, in: Reisfed), International Monetary Systems in Historical 
P erspective1995, p.135-51.
* Agon, Autonomy and Interdependence, 1983, p21.
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competitiveness and output.
^  Short-term capital movements. The pegged exchange rate system made speculation against 
currencies under pressure good business without many risks. Sterling, and subsequently the 
dollar, became repeatedly the target o f speculative attacks, requiring costly rescue actions.
Table 8:
Selected US balance of payments figures, 1955-1961 ($ billion)
Liquidity Balance . Trade Balance, incl. 
government financed 
exports
Direct Investment 
Abroad
Direct Military
Expenditures
Abroad
1955 -1.24 2.90 -0.82 -2.90
1956 -0.92 4.75 -1.95 -2.95
1957 0.62 6.27 -2.44 -3.22
1958
-335 3.46 -3.43
1959
-3.65 v 1.15 -137 -3.11
1960 -3.71 4.89 -1.67 -3.09
1961 -2.43 5.57 -1.60 -3.00
Source: Survey of Current Business, October 1972; June 1975.
A rapid correction of these factors would have required revolutionary changes in US foreign 
and domestic policies, such as an ’agonizing reappraisal’ of its security policy, the 
introduction of currency controls, direct controls over American investment abroad, or curbing 
the domestic economy to keep prices down. This last option was hardly considered in the 
United States, contrary to the British case. To balance its external account Britain resorted, 
as we have seen, repeatedly to restrictive domestic policies (see ch.l). There were hardly any 
other options available apart from devaluation and large-scale borrowing abroad. The United 
States, on the other side, were able to exert enough influence to get other countries to hold 
laTge parts of their reserves in dollars and not exchange them for gold. As we shall see later, 
they were also able to induce other countries, including Britain, to a monetary policy which 
actively supported the reserve currency role of the dollar.10
10 Britain lacked this bargaining power. Everybody, except the Sterling Area countries, was free to cash in surplus 
sterling for dollar and thus add to the rampant speculation against the pound.
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Devaluation, the most logical way of adjustment for a country with a persistent deficit, was 
ruled out as long as the dollar was not seen as fundamentally overvalued. Without the 
acceptance of such a view by Washington’s major trading partners, those would follow the 
US move and neutralize it by devaluing themselves. It was also very likely that a change of 
the dollar gold parity would have ended an international monetary system which hold 
considerable advantages for the United States. It had been instrumental in building up a ’free 
world’ economically and militarily compatible with American policies, it had helped to 
finance long-term military commitments abroad without balance of payments constraints or 
domestic inflation11, and it made the United States the issuer o f the world’s principal vehicle 
and reserve currency. Further reasons against devaluation were notions of prestige and 
national pride. Until the early 1970’s US presidents saw devaluation as humiliating for the 
nation and disastrous for themselves on the domestic scene. It is not by accident that militarist 
language like ’the battle for the dollar’ or ’war against the deficits’ was used so often by the 
US government.
Thus, radical solutions were ruled out. Other, Jess grave, measures were sought. These
i
measures often implied active cooperation by other countries. US governments did not see the 
deficits as their sole responsibility. The view became prominent in Washington that American 
policies which had helped to rebuild and protect Europe were the main cause of the deficits, 
and that the beneficiaries should take over part of the burden of adjustment. This basic 
underlying conviction is fundamental for an understanding of American international monetary 
policy in the 1960s. It also partly explains the emphasis many American politicians put on 
the foreign exchange cost of their troops, though they were only a limited part of the problem.
A structural omission in the working o f the international monetary system was responsible 
for much o f the political argument between Europeans and Americans on the payments 
deficit. Nowhere was it stipulated whether surplus or deficit countries would have to take the
11 This argument was brought forward forcefully by European critics of US monetary policy.’..ihe United States 
had used its exorbitant privilege as the centre-country o f a gold-exchange system to run a perpetual balance o f 
payments deficit and to finance a distant and expensive war in Vietnam by inflationary credit creation rather than 
by a transfer o f resources from the civilians to the military by means o f ta x a tio n Strange, ‘Interpretations of a 
Decade’, in: Tsoukalis(ed), The Political Economy o f International Money, 1985, p .l l .
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necessary steps in case of a persistent imbalance.1 2 On a worldwide level there were no 
formal procedures to settle such imbalances. The conflict had to be decided by interstate 
bargaining and a basically economic problem became a highly politicized issue. Monetary 
adjustment usually has strong repercussions on the domestic economy and politics o f the 
adjusting country, and is risky for every government. It is much safer to get other countries 
to adjust. The result are various political and economic pressures leading to the kind o f 
linkages of which offset is a prime example.
The disagreements about the responsibility for adjustment found their expression in 
profoundly different views of European and US governments about the reasons for the 
monetary problems and its possible cures. This fundamental divergence is well summarized 
in an exchange of letters between J.Holtrop, president o f the Dutch central bank, and 
RBemstein, a high American IMF official.13 Both made overtly clear whom they thought 
should take the principal steps to solve the problem. Holtrop concluded his letter by stating 
that 'the solution o f the American batance ofpaym ents problem has fundamentally to be found  
in the internal economic policies o f the United States. This conclusion is not different from  
the one we have arrived at when balance o f payments troubles, after the period o f  
reconstruction was over, still harassed many European countries \  Bernstein retorted: 7 /  the 
United States continues to bear an excessive share o f the expense o f defense within Europe 
... and relieves the European countries o f meeting an adequate part o f the cost o f their own 
defense, it is inevitable that these wealthy countries will save too much...this is the central 
part o f the US payments problem  ... the US cannot solve its payments problems through its 
own financial p o lic ie s' These key positions were to be repeated over and over during the 
1960s. They formed the background o f a debate which became increasingly acrimonious.14
In the late 1950s, however, both sides agreed that they had better to find some common
11 Hoffmeyer, The international M onetary System. An Essay in Interpretation, 1992, p.70.
n  The letteis are in the Archive of the Dutch Foreign Ministry: MF/GT/891/EEG/E/AJgemeen/4: Holtrop to 
Bernstein, 26 July I960; Bernstein to Holtrop, 17 August 1960. 1 thank YAlkema for making these documents
available to me.
14 A concise summary of European-American differences in monetary matters is provided by Cleveland, The 
Atlantic Idea and its European Rivals, 1966, p.75-95.
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ground and coordinate their monetary policies to a greater extent than previously. The 
introduction of convertibility for European currencies in 1958 had vastly increased the amount 
of capital movements, and the negative American balance of payments caused speculation on 
a large scale. The Europeans first pointed out the dangers of this development. They had 
rebuilt their reserves now, yet dollars were still accumulating on their accounts. The 
temptation to transfer them back via exchange to gold was strong, but, as we have seen, a 
two-edged strategy given the dangers for the international monetary system this implied. 
There was widespread transatlantic agreement on the desirability to continue with a system 
which had served the participants well since the end of the war and whose breakup would 
have unforeseeable consequences. The only question was which action was to be taken and, 
above all, who would have to take it.
d) The Eisenhower-Administration and its Response to the Balance of Payments Problem 
It is difficult to trace the exact point at which the balance of payments began to seriously 
trouble the American administration and public. There had always been deficits during the 
1950s, apart from an exceptional 1957 when the Suez Crisis pushed raw material prices up 
and produced a small surplus.15 Shortly afterwards, the American economy slumped into a 
brief recession, characterized by low investment rates and rising unemployment. When it 
recovered, parallel to a period of stagnation in European economies, the trade balance of the 
United States was unsettled by an import boom in the US and a slowing down of exports to 
Europe. The traditionally high American trade surplus with Europe, which had balanced 
capital export and government expenditure abroad, shrank considerably. Suddenly a yawning 
balance of payments deficit emerged. At the same time, the drain on the US gold stock grew 
to record levels. The recession obviously also had led to a loss of confidence in the dollar. 
Additionally, Britain and France refilled their depleted reserves.
The combination of these temporary and the structural factors outlined above caused the high
1958-1960 deficits. The government registered the gold outflow with particular concern. In 
November 1958, Eisenhower and Anderson informed the Senate Majority Leader about
For Ihe following paragraph, sec: NA, RG 59, Lot Files: BEA, OGA, Box 5, Background Paper: US Balance 
of Payments Position, 16.11.1960.
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warning voices from abroad concerning dollar stability. Eisenhower struck the key of the later 
debate, stating that ’the stability o f our currency is an absolute necessity to our security and 
our economic development. *16 However, serious preoccupation and discussion started only 
in mid-1959. From the outset, the solution of raising the price of gold, which meant a 
devaluation of the dollar, was ruled out as contradicting basic US postwar policy.17 *Foreign 
economic policy was still much a prerogative of the State Department, and in a short paper 
of July 1959.it laidoutits..proposed course. The authors acknowledged that the present trend 
in thebalance of payments could not be allowed to continue. The sharp decline of the trade 
balance and large military expenditures abroad were identified as the fundamental 
problems.^ Rejecting explicitly restrictive measures in the domestic economy, the paper 
proposed the removal of trade restrictions of all kinds, the substitution of US foreign aid by 
European aid, and a reduction of military expenditure. The cabinet approved a program of 
action along those three lines in August 1959.19 Subsequently Washington intensified its 
efforts towards trade liberalization, in particular vis-a-vis Europe, and towards a better sharing 
of the foreign aid burden.20 *
Divergences within the administration emerged on the third issue. It had been a recurrent 
theme in European-American relations in the 1950s that Washington felt it bore a 
disproportionate share of the cost of common defence. Time and again, Eisenhower criticized 
the European reticence in taking up more of the burden: 'We should ask when the hell these 
other people are going to do their duty. We have got to get tougher with them ... These other 
NATO powers cannot go on forever riding on our coat-taib  ... A ll o f these nations seem to 
be trying to figure out how little they themselves can do and how best to leave us do the rest
16 NSA, NHP (Fred Kaplan Donation), Box 1, folder 6], 18.11.1958.
17 FRUS 1958-60, IV, US-British Meeting, 10.6.1958, p.27-28; ibid. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 133.1959, 
p.103.
"  ibid., Paper prep, by DoS: Internal. Payments Position of the US, 24.7.1959, p.115-120.
19 ibid.. Record of Actions on Items presented at Cabinet Meeting, 19 August 1959, p.53-54.
10 A US initiative at the GATT session in 1958 led to the lifting of many quotas in European-American trade. 
The so-called Dillon Round, negotiating mutual tariff reductions started only in 1961. See: Alkema, Regionalism in 
A Multilateral Framework, Ph.D., EUI 1996. For the American effort to get their allies to share the foreign aid
burden, see Kaufman, Trade and Aid, 1982.
o f the job. ’21 The gold outflow and the deficits added to this feeling. 'The President said he 
would have no objection to new measures in Berlin and Germany. He commented that, fo r  
example, it is time to pu ll out some o f our forces now located in Europe. He cited the balance 
o f payments difficulties the U.S. is experiencing at the present tim e. ,22 The foreign exchange 
cost of American forces in Germany had risen sharply throughout the 1950s, in particular 
after the termination of occupation and support cost payments. From FY 1953-1955 it had 
been $250m, in 1956 $316m, in 1957 $425m, in 1958 $545m, and in 1959 $686m; a level 
which was expected to remain stable.* 23 Compared with the liquidity deficit, it seemed as if 
troop stationing in Germany contributed to about 20% of the deficit. As we have seen in ch.l, 
when discussing the cost of British troops, it is very difficult to establish the real impact of 
troop stationing abroad on the balance of payments of the sending country. There is, however, 
little doubt that American troops contributed considerably to the accumulation of reserves by 
the Federal Republic. This factor and the growing dissatisfaction with the immobility in the 
political and military situation in Europe sparked a vivid debate within the US government, 
which centred on the question whether monetary and military developments required a 
reduction of the US military commitment in Europe. The arguments used during this debate 
will be outlined in some detail; they were to come up again and again in subsequent 
discussions within US governments.
In late 1959, during the budget discussions, a series of high-level meetings was devoted to 
the problem. The initiative seems to have originated -like the Radford plan- in the Department 
o f Defense. The Secretary of Defense, McElroy, thought that troop cuts in Europe were now 
possible and desirable for military reasons. These were first the diminished importance of 
conventional troops due to the gigantic nuclear capability the US had built up during the 
1950s, both in the strategic and .tactical range, and second Jhe_ improved mobility of combat
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32 ibid., IX, Memo of Conference with President, 16.10.59, p.70.
23 NA, RG 59, BEA, OGA, Box 14, Briefing Paper for the Anderson-Dillon mission: Support Costs, November 
1960. To give an illustration of how this foreign exchange was used: The 1959 figure (S686m) was divided up in 
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forces.24 He was supported by the Secretary of Treasury, Anderson, who argued that the 
balance of payments problem was as vital as defence matters. In his opinion, it could not be 
solved by conventional means and it urgently required action on military expenditure abroad.
Against this, Gates, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, pointed out th a t 'he did not see how we 
could balance our budget unless we completely revolutionized our military strategy'.25 His 
position was supported by the State Department: 'There seems to me to be no greater problem  
facing this Government than whether or not to warp our military doctrine end stunt our 
military establishment to meet temporary economic pressures. We face the alternative whether 
to run an uncertain risk o f some loss o f confidence in the dollar or the certain risk o f a loss 
o f confidence in Am erica's determination to  make common cause with its allies and maintain 
a rational and credible deterrent to communist aggression. I f  this happens, the standing o f  
the American dollar and a great deal more besides will inevitably be prejudiced*.2* The 
President took an intermediary position. Though he was increasingly frustrated with the fact 
that the US with its troops seemed to be stuck in Europe and deeply worried about the gold 
drain, he was also highly sensitive to any action which could unsettle NATO. At the 
beginning of November he met SACEUR Norstad, who argued strongly against force cuts in 
view of the uncertain situation regarding Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum. After once more 
denouncing the Europeans for 'making a sucker out of Uncle Sam', the President agreed in 
the end ’that we cannot take ruthless actions simply fo r  financial reasons.fV
Soon afterwards he convoked a NSC meeting in which the opponents in the debate presented 
their arguments again.21* The Director o f the Budget, Stans, pointed out that the commitment *1567
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24 T he U S. is going to have to begin withdrawing...in FY 1961...it would give us a great deal more flexibility 
to have the principal body o f our troop strength in the US. where they could be dispatched quickly to any trouble 
spoL..it seemed likely that West Germany would soon be in a position to take over the U S. role as chief defender 
o f Western Europe\  excerpt from a memcon Burdcn-McEIroy, attached to a Memo Merchant to Herter, 25.9.59, NSA, 
The Berlin Crisis, Doc.nr.1666.
15 FRUS 1958-60, V ll.l, Conversation Herter, Anderson, McElroy eud ., 24.10.59, p.488-94.
16 ibid., Memo from Acting SccState, Smith, to Herter, 29.10.1959, p.496.
17 ibid.. Memo of Conversation Norstad-Eisenhower, 4.11.1959, p,497-500.
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in Europe cost the US $2.5 billion (plus $900 million military aid) in budgetary terms, of 
which $1.2 billion were relevant for the balance of payments. He doubted whether the budget 
could stay in balance with this burden. State Department and CIA representatives, on the 
other side, warned of political destabilization in Europe in case of troop cuts. They thought 
that reductions should only be effected if there was a corresponding move by the Soviet 
Union. The President apparently had already made his mind up against reductions beforehand. 
Grudgingly, he stated that the time was not yet ripe for reductions. The final decision was 
’that there would be no significant cuts in Calendar Year 1960 in the forces committed to 
NATO for that year, unless agreed to through negotiations [with the SU; H Z].* 2* 
Eisenhower’s rather timid disarmament proposals, however, never came close to mutual force 
reductions. This was partly due to Adenauer’s resistance to any such a scheme. The idea, 
however, that mutual balanced force reductions were a solution to the problem was to surface 
again, particularly during the Johnson administration.
The outcome of the debate signified that the balance of payments problem would remain for 
the moment separated from the issue of troop levels in Europe. After all, the dollar problem 
was widely seen as temporary, manageable and even self-correcting because costs and prices 
were rising faster in Europe than in the United States. The political rationale behind the.troop 
commitment was still perceived as strong, enough to. overcome... a „short-term economic 
difficulty. Washington’s activism therefore_centred on trade liberalization and foreign aid. 
Germany was asked to establish a foreign aid program of its own.”  The Germans, relieved 
at the absence o f troop cut threats or support cost.demands, promised vigorous efforts. 
However, the results were poor. One year later, during the annual meeting of the IMF and the 
World Bank, the Germans were the targets of strong criticism directed at their failure to 
initiate a foreign aid program to correct their high surplus.31
At the same meeting, the Americans were confronted with the wide-spread anxiety in
19 ibid., p.515.
*  FRUS1958-60, IV, Anderson Memo to President, 2.1259, p.357; FRUS 1958-60, VH,1. Conversation Dillon * 
German Government, 11.1259, p.196-201.
it NYT, 27.9.1960, p5 ; Financial Times, 28.9.1960.
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international financial circles about the future of the international monetary system if the 
deficits continued. This was no surprise. Despite a remarkable recovery in the trade balance, 
another high balance of payments deficit was expected for 1960. It was clear that the first 
efforts had not yielded the expected results. The gold outflow continued with irritating 
regularity. US liabilities came perilously close to the point where they were no more covered 
by US gold reserves.
Increasingly, the American government became also aware of a possible spillover into other 
policy fields. This was true, above all, for relations with the allies who were the main 
recipients of out-flowing dollars or gold. In case of serious conflict -and de Gaulle’s actions 
since his ascendancy to power were ominous- this factor could possibly be used as a tool 
against the United States. 'M r H erter sa id  that a report, alm ost a rumour, had come to him 
that, during the conversations o f de Gaulle and Adenauer, they talked about shifting the 
currency base from  dollars to gold, in part as a means o f putting pressure on the United 
States to accede to some o f their ideas affecting NATO. The President said that i f  this were 
to happen, our immediate and necessary action would be to p u ll our forces out o f Europe and 
that this would destroy at their very heart the security arrangements in Europe.*K The 
exchange shows clearly the hidden political conflict in the balance of payments question, and 
also its emerging linkage to the context o f security policy in the alliance.
As the gold losses continued, despite the recovery in the trade balance, more drastic action 
than the export promotion program advocated by the State Department was obviously 
necessary. The options seemed limited. Restrictive action in the domestic economy was hardly 
considered, given its unpopularity in the middle o f Nixon’s election campaign against 
Kennedy and the fact that the economy had just surmounted a recession. Interest rates 
remained low for this reason, and what was decisive, they remained lower than in Europe.33 
Thus, when in autumn the budget planning began, attention focused again on US military *13
n  FRUS 1958-60, IV, Memo of Conversation, 12.8.1960, p.127.
13 From June to August 1960, the US discount rate was lowered from 4% to 3%. The Germans, Fighting with 
an booming economy, put their rate up from 4% to 5%, and thus attracted massively speculative capital. See: 
Emminger, ’Deutsche Währungspolitik im Spannungsfeld zwischen innerem und äußerem Gleichgewicht’, in: 
Deutsche Bundesbank(ed), Währung und W irtschaft in Deutschland, 1876-1975, 1976, p.502.
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commitments. This time, the feeling that the monetary problem would be of a temporary 
nature had been shattered.
Anderson informed his colleagues that 'this large outflow and accumulation by financially 
strong Western European countries and Japan was more likely to create a crisis both fo r  the 
US and the Free World than any other set o f existing circum stances.'* He accused the State 
Department and the Pentagon o f having blocked all burden-sharing initiatives by citing 
various political obstacles. According to Anderson, it was time *to negotiate on a bilateral 
basis with the European countries, and especially Germany, fo r  the payment o f the cost o f 
maintaining US forces abroad**. The President agreed on the need for firm measures, and 
an action program for further study was formulated, which included the removal of the troopfs 
dependents from Europe, support cost negotiations with Germany, force reductions, further 
trade liberalization, etc. Simultaneously, Eisenhower wrote a letter to Adenauer in which he 
pointed to the need of German action in the field. oT international monetary policy and 
announced that Anderson and Dillon would visit Bonn to pursue, corresponding 
negotiations.34 *6 37*
The alarm in the US government grew close to panic when an unforeseen event in October 
1960 rocked the foundations of the international monetary system. Within a few days a wave 
o f  speculative gold acquisitions drove the price on the London gold market from the official 
$35 an ounce up to $40.57 The danger of a run on the US gold stock was obvious. In view 
o f  the absence of sufficient gold sales by the producing countries it was up to the United 
States to furnish gold to fulfill the demand. The US authorities supplied the Bank of England
34 DDRS 92 (408), Memo of Meeting with the President, 4.10.1960.
36 FRUS 1958-60, IX, Eisenhower to Adenauer, 7 October 1960, p.692-94. Adenauer’s response ostentatiously 
welcomed the prospect of a visit. However, he urged Eisenhower not to request anything like support costa, citing
the well known argument of an impending election campaign; ibid., Adenauer to Eisenhower, 20.10.1960, p.694-696.
37 The London gold market was the place where 85% of all newly mined gold was handled, either by central
banks or by private dealers. The Bank of England had assumed respnsibility for controlling the market price. Yet, 
under the pressure in October 1960 its reserves were soon exhausted.
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with gold from its reserves to enable it to keep the price down.38
The alarming signal of the London Gold Crisis was that it showed the thin ground on which 
the international monetary system was built. The whole system rested upon the certainty that 
the United States would guarantee the exchange value of the dollar with its reserves, and 
around 1960 it became clear that the reserves in Fort Knox were not adequate to coyer the 
foreign .liabilities. The slightest hint that the United States in these circumstances would 
increase the official price of gold met with an immediate run out of dollars into gold. The 
election race in 1960 provoked such a slide of confidence centring on the intentions of 
Kennedy in case were... heL.to.be. elected. Huge amounts o f short-term capital moved to 
European accounts in anticipation of a change in monetary policies. Only after Kennedy on 
31 October pledged firmly to defend the dollar gold exchange rate, did markets slowly calm 
down. For the Eisenhower administration the London Gold Crisis was the last straw and any 
impediments against drastic action were thrown over board. *We can*t afford to let our 
monetary system break down before M r Kennedy is even sworn in ,39, Eisenhower remarked 
and added in a telephone conversation with Herter that '... when you are going into a war - 
and this is in effect a kind o f war- you take lesser objectives and put them aside.**0 
Anderson struck an equally apocalyptic note: we had not been faced by a problem as
serious as the one facing us now: M oreover, this was a unique experience; it had never 
happened to the United States before.
Hastily, the government put together an emergency program. Two weeks later, Eisenhower 
issued a directive outlining steps with respect to the US balance of payments.* 4012 It was the 
first in a long series of presidential action programs dealing with the balance of payments 
threat. Eisenhower’s directive contained no analysis of the deeper causes of the deficits. Nor
*  Strange (1976). p.76.
*  FRUS 1958-60, IV, Memo of Conference with the President, 15 .lt.I960 ; p.138.
40 Kesaris(ed), Minutes of Telephone Conversations of the Secretaries of State, 1953*61 (microfilmed). Reel 10, 
15.11.1960.
41 FRUS 1958-60, V1I/1, Memo of Discussion at the 465th NSC Meeting, 31.10.1960, p.529.
41 American Foreign Policy. Current Documents 1960, p.786-92.
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was there an attempt to evaluate its implications for future policies. The only new step, apart 
from restating well-known remedies -trade J ib  eralizalion. domestic economic stabilization, 
tying of foreign aid programs to.purchases in theJJS- was an extensive reduction in the 
number of dependents of US military personnel abroad. There were, in fact, not many actions 
by which the outgoing Eisenhower administration could show its determination to resolve the 
problem. During another tense discussion of the problem, Anderson ruled out restrictive trade 
measures as inimical to US interests and monetary remedies as setting off speculation. The 
onlyjield_where the government could act rapidly unilaterally was in the Field of military 
commitments abroad. That was the background of the dependents decision.43 Regarding 
military expenditures abroad in general, the directive identified them as a major cause but 
limited the related paragraph to the wish 'that our friends and allies accept their fu ll share 
o f the costs o f maintaining the security o f the free world. * *
e) The Anderson-Dillon mission, November 1960
That concrete action would follow was announced one day later. Anderson informed the press 
o f the US government's intention to pursue with the German government talks regarding ways 
to relieve the monetary pressure. In the aftermath of the London Gold Crisis, the announced 
Anderson-Dillon visit had changed its scope. What had originated as a proposal to discuss 
bilaterally various measures to resolve the balance of payments problem, narrowed now to an 
outright demand for funds to balance the foreign exchange cost o f US troops. The question 
whether the US delegation should demand support costs, that is straight budgetary help, or 
some kind of transaction which would offset the dollar drain was decided in favour of 
Anderson's position. ’Mr. Anderson sa id ... he would ask Adenauer fo r  $650,000,000 a year 
as payment fo r  keeping our troops on their soiL Drastic action is necessary here.*5 
Throwing over board all political arguments, Anderson pressed his position, against resistance 
in the State Department and to the surprise of most participants, including the US embassy 
in Bonn and the German government.
FRUS 1958-60, IV, Memo of Conference with the President, 9.11.1960, p.130; Kesarisfed), Telephone 
Conversations, Reel 11, telcon Anderson-Herter, 11.11.1960.
** American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1960, p.789.
4S FRUS 1958-60, IV, Memo of Conference with the President, 15.11.1960, p,138; see also: Donfried, The 
Political Economy o f Alliance: Issue Linkage in the West-German American Relationship, Ph.D.thesis, 1991, p.61-65.
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In the midst of the preparations for the visit, Kennedy won the presidential elections. This 
deprived the delegation of much of its bargaining power. Anderson and Dillon therefore tried 
to enlist the support of Kennedy for the initiative and requested a meeting with the newly 
elected President. All they achieved, however, was an explanatory meeting with one of 
Kennedy’s advisers.46 Kennedy was clearly unwilling to be committed to a step which might 
produce far-reaching political consequences.47 This reflected the judgment of the State 
Department which increasingly had moved to the sidelines of the discussion. Herter was 
present in almost none of the above-mentioned meetings on the balance of payments. It very 
soon became known that Dillon himself was less than enthusiastic about the mission.48 As 
a possible candidate for a post in Kennedy’s cabinet he was in a precarious position, anyway. 
All in all, the signs did not bode well for a successful mission.
Meanwhile, the Germans tried to prepare themselves, assuming that they would be asked 
mainly for more foreign aid49 and not for support costs. If the latter was to happen, the 
demand would be rejected outright as a revival of occupation costs.50 In a cabinet meeting 
on 15 November, the big foreign aid program was finally approved. It amounted to about one 
billion dollars of which more than a quarter would be supplied by German industry.51 This 
large capital export program has to be seen not only as an attempt to take the wind out of the 
American sails but also in the context o f Germany’s efforts to get rid of the surplus capital 
streaming into the country. Additionally, the Germans planned to accept a larger share in
JFKL, PPP, Transition Files: Task Force Reports, Box 1073, Conversation Nitze-Anderson, 16.11.1960.
47 One indication that the Kennedy people did not approve of the mission is a memo by an unidentified official 
on this subject, addressed to Vice President elect, Johnson. It complained that Anderson had become 'almost obsessed* 
with the gold outflow and that 'gold outflow, troop reductions, and NATO atomic arms plans are moves which really 
ought to await the transfer of powers'; LBJL, VPSF, Box 9. After the American delegation had returned from 
Germany, the German ambassador in Washington, Grewe, reported that Achcson had ridiculed their effort and that 
Kennedy had felt insufficiently informed; PA-AA, Büro STS, 79, Grewe to AA, tel.2447, 30 November 1960.
44 NA, RG59, DF 1960-3, 762a^/l 1-460, Leddy to Dillon transmitting an Anderson memo on the troop cost 
issue, 4.11.1960; NYT, 27.11.1960, p 3 .
44 In August, Dillon had written to Adenauer on this subject The U.Sjemba$sy was advised to tell German 
authorities that ’their firs t financial and moral obligtttion was to establish a significant longterm lending program  
see: NA, RG 5 9 ,862a.0000, 8-260, Dillon to Adenauer; 862a. 10, 8-160, Dillon to Bonn embassy, 1.8.1960.
50 BA, B 126/34104, Preparatory Meeting of Oflicials prior to US delegation visit, 7.11.1960.
BA B126/34104, Excerpt of 129th Cabinet Meeting, 15.11.1960.31
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NATO infrastructure costs and possibly the prepayment of postwar debts.
The records of the actual conversations are not yet completely available. However, detailed 
accounts exist from both sides and this permits an accurate reconstruction of the issues. At 
the outset, Anderson and Dillon met with Adenauer. According to Dillon the meeting only 
served to underline that the Chancellor did not understand the problem *at all well' and just 
kept on repeating, 'that there is only one thing that worries him, and that is the possibility 
that we might redeploy some o f our t r o o p s On this point Anderson remarked that 
Eisenhower was resolved to take any measure necessary to protect the dollar.52
After this short encounter the delegations met and the Germans presented their proposals.53 
These included the foreign aid program, the NATO infrastructure costs, and the proposal of 
a prepayment of postwar debts, provided the Americans released German assets, vested during 
World War II. There was also some talk about larger military purchases in the United States, 
and the Germans promised 100% prepayment to the already existing Treasury account, on 
which Germany transferred the payments for its military orders. As a last concession, they 
also offered to negotiate about the assumption of some U.S. military aid to Turkey and 
Greece. The Americans, however, considered the foreign aid program as self-evident and 
possibly just self-serving, and the other measures as too small. *The US Secretary o f Treasury, 
Anderson, outlined in very drastic words the US situation and its needs, and he hinted very 
outspokenly to German moral obligations in this respect.... it became clear that, in the end, 
a German budgetary contribution was expected.
In a meeting of officials, the US delegation presented the details of its proposal. It foresaw 
that Germany would pay an amount o f $600m to a fund at the US Treasury which was to be 
used for direct payments to the US and for additional purchases of military equipment to be *54
"  FRUS IV, 1958-60, p.142-43.
33 This account is based on: FRUS 1958*60, IV, Memo of Conference with the President, 28.11.1960, p.142-47; 
DDRS 87(2061), Anderson to Eisenhower, 23.11.1960; BBA, ZBR, Extract from the records of the 83.ZBR meeting; 
Emminger reports on US-German financial discussions, 1.12.1960.
54 BBA, ZBR, 83d meeting, Emminger report, 1 December 1960.
delivered to poorer NATO allies.35 State Secretary Hopf from the Federal Defence Ministry 
responded that it was impossible to add such a large amount to the German defence budget. 
He also rejected the notion that the foreign exchange losses in Germany were responsible for 
the US deficits. The Americans suggested ’that an increased contribution to the United S ta tes 
defense effort could be explained to the German public as a contribution towards Germany *s 
own defense\  At this point, the representative of the Federal Finance ministry delivered a 
Fierce rejection o f the American demands. He could ’not see what practical significance there  
could be in having a joint fund i f  all the money was to come from  German sources and i f  the  
main purpose was to distribute these funds to ease the US balance o f payments ... an y  
payment o f support costs was out o f question. Those times are gone forever. ,56
The differences were irreconcilable. Subsequent negotiations on separate items of the agenda 
brought no result. As in earlier conflicts with the British, the Germans denied the existence 
of a linkage between military commitments and foreign exchange problems. Instead, they 
pointed to the large outflow of American private capital to Europe. A welcome example w as 
the recent decision by the Ford Company to purchase the shares of its British subsidiary, thus 
transferring $358m abroad, much to the annoyance of the US government. Later, D illon 
commented angrily *that General N orstad had said it would be a long time before the G Is  
buy a Ford again.,57 The suspicion was voiced in US circles ’that they [FordJ are doing th is  
to get their m oney out o f the United States in anticipation o f real trouble here ... th e  
Europeans, who have a large experience in this kind o f thing, certainly recognize it as ju s t  
that.*58
The Germans, o f course, welcomed the additional argument, which later should become part 
of de Gaulle's repertoire against US hegemony. After some more bickering about the causes 
of the balance o f payments deficit the Americans broke off the negotiations, to the surprise 
of the Germans. Anderson, in somewhat tormented language summarized the results in a  51
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telegram to the President: *For practical purposes there is \rry Unie relief either to our 
budget or balance o f payments position that will result from our discussions...We made clear 
to the Chancellor and his associates that in view o f these circumstances and in view o f the 
key position which the U.S. dollar occupies in the international financial system we will be 
required by irresistible logic to make whatever decisions we deem appropriate both in our 
domestic and foreign policies, including both military and economic matters as are necessary 
and appropriate to our firm resolve that we will not allow the dollar to deteriorate. ,w After 
going to Bonn, Anderson and Dillon went to France, where they got a noncommittal statement 
of support for their monetary policies, and to London. The British consoled the American 
delegation with their own dismal experiences over the issue. Lloyd called the German 
proposals "chicken food* and expressed his difficulties in understanding the German 
psychology.60
Yet, it is difficult to see, even without knowing all details, how Anderson could have 
expected that the Germans would take such far-reaching steps as required by the US deficit 
when dealing with a lame-duck administration. It even seems that the Germans were informed 
beforehand that the newly elected President did not approve of the line taken during the 
talks.61 Thus, they quietly leaned back and waited for the position of the new administration. 
On top of that came heavy US press criticism of the American delegation and its clumsy 
negotiating tactics.62 When the Eisenhower administration took stock of the mission, it had 
to acknowledge that the results had been poor and that 'anything the Germans really do they 
will want to do fo r the new administration, so as to get maximum credit with them. ** 
Nevertheless, Eisenhower did not want to leave his post with such a failure and the Atlantic 
Alliance in disarray. In his last two months in office he tried to leave his mark on three major 
issues related to US-European relations: balance of payments talks, troop reductions, and the 
problem of NATO nuclear sharing. *41
59 DDRS 87/2061, Bonn to SecSute (Anderson to President), 23.11.1960.
*° NA, RG 59, Lot Files, BEA/OGA, Box 5, mcmcon Uoyd-Andenon. 25.11.1960.
41 BA, B126/34104, Embassy Washington to AA, 2111.1960.
“  See for example NYT, 24 and 25 November 1960.
"  FRUS 58-60. IV, p.144.
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Regarding the talks with the Germans, those were continued at a lower official level almost 
immediately after Anderson and Dillon went home. The demand for outright support costs 
was, due to the reaction of the Germans, quietly dropped.64 The talks concentrated on the 
German offer. Shortly after the US delegation had returned, a group of participants met to 
discuss the prospect for a huge increase in the German defence budget, which promised to 
result in much higher procurement abroad. The officials agreed that, because France and 
Britain were eager to obtain part of these orders, the main question was 'where the 
prospective business goes.'65 The Americans lost no time. From 29 November to 12 
December, Pentagon officials pursued in collaboration with the US embassy negotiations 
about military purchases in Bonn.66 The Germans remained non-committal, citing budgetary 
problems as well as possible protests by third countries and the German industry in case of 
increased procurement from US sources.67 Little progress was also made on the question of 
debt prepayment as linked to the vested German assets, on infrastructure costs, and the 
assumption of military aid.68 All these issues found a conclusion soon after Kennedy took 
over. The outgoing administration would get no concessions.69 Eisenhower and Anderson, 
in turn, spared no effort to impress upon the new President the importance of the issue.70
Discussions also continued within the administration on the issue of troop levels. The 
supporters of reductions argued in favour o f immediate reductions.71 There was much debate 
on whether the US should announce such a reduction at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial 
Meeting in December. Finally the following sentence was introduced into Herter’s statement:
On 28 November, Press Secretary Hageny said that the issue of support costs would not be taken up again 
since ’the Germans are not prepared to discuss it*; KCA I960, p.17955.
65 NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63,811.10/11-2960, Memo: German Assistance to US B/P problem, 29.11.1960.
Documentation in NA, RG 59, 811.10, Box 2286, Bonn 824, 2.121960; Bonn 825, 2121960; Bonn 848, 
6.121960; Bonn 870,8.121960; Bonn 891, 13.12t960; see also: Donfried (1991), p.83-84.
"  NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63, 811.10/12-1360, Bonn 891, 13.121960.
*  DDRS 92(1330), Paris to SccState 2508: Meeting Anderson/Dillon-Erhaid, 15.121960.
W PA-AA, Buro STS, 79, Carstens memo on German-American financial talks, 11 January 1961.
70 FRUS 58-60, IV, Anderson Memo: Meeting with Kennedy, 6.121960, p.147-51; FRUS 1961-63, IX, 
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*Some redeployment may become a necessity unless our balance o f payments can be brought 
into a more reasonable equilibrium,,72 More was not possible given Kennedy’s and the State 
Department’s opposition.
Herter’s speech also saw the emergence of another project which would, like the troop cost 
talks, long outlive the administration which initiated it: the plan of a multi-laterally manned 
NATO atomic force. The scheme was intended to give the Europeans a say in nuclear matters, 
prevent the development of national atomic capabilities, and solve the credibility dilemma of 
NATO, which lay in the question whether the United States would really go to nuclear war 
for Europe, in particular after the Soviets had demonstrated that they were able to reach US 
territory with nuclear weapons. Herter offered as a first contribution to this multilateral force 
(MLF) five submarines equipped with POLARIS missiles.73 The plan was to fulfill the 
European demand for more participation, leaving, however, the last decision to the Americans. 
This ambiguity was to plague the project, apart from the protracted practical problems, until 
its hardly glorious finish in the mid-Sixties.
When Eisenhower handed over the office to his successor he had just made some tentative 
steps concerning American monetary, problems and. Europe’s demands for equality, 
particularly in the nuclear field. Transatlantic relations in the 1960s were.to be dominatedby 
these issues. The balance of payments. was\ to. play a .  central, role J n .  the. game,. and 
consequently, so too did the troop cost problem.
The deeper cause of the problems outlined in this chapter, however, lay in the simple 
fundamental fact that the monetary system and the Atlanticsecurity system, which had been 
to a large degree two sides o f the same coin, showed increasing signs o f incompatibility. The 
! monetary system, in itself irrational as critics like Triffin and others pointed out, had
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DF 1960-63, 811.10/12-1460, Herter to Eisenhower, 14.1Z1960; ibid, 12-2360, White to Merchant, 23.12.1960.
71 For the discussion and the proposal see: FRUS 58-60, VII/1, p.611-82; a recent analysis of the MLF story is 
Haftendom, Kcrnwaffen und die Claubwurdigkeit der Allianz: Die NATO Krise 1966(67, 1994, p.107-48, with 
references to the extensive literature on the subject
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functioned well during a period o f unprecedented American commitments abroad.74 It had 
allowed this expansive policy without disrupting the domestic economy and thus leading to 
an erosion of domestic support for American foreign policies. It also had been of considerable 
advantage to America’s principal allies. Thus, the monetary system had fostered (or not 
impeded) economic growth at home and had made the financing of the Cold War possible.
This advantageous situation slowly but inexorably changed. The strains American 
commitments abroad put on the monetary system became increasingly evident. The principal 
ways out were to reform either the security system to relieve the strain on the monetary 
system (and this would have amounted to a fundamental change in Cold War policies) or the 
other way round. If both these ways were not taken, a third possibility, was to find temporary
expedients in the hope that the situation would change back to an equilibrium. This is what 
happened. The next chapter will deal with the coming about o f one of the most important of 
these expedients.
^  ■ 0  
r f c x d o
74 These US commitments abroad included not only direct military commitments, military interventions, foreign 
aid, military aid, and other material help, but also the enormous expansion o f American ’cultniral’ activities abroad.
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CHAPTER VIII
OFFSET AND MONETARY POLICY 
DURING KENNEDY’S PRESIDENCY, 196M 962
a) The International Monetary Policy of the Kennedy Administration 
Since the first accounts of Kennedy’s presidency were published it has become a 
commonplace that the President took a keen interest in monetary matters and that he 
considered the dollar-gold problem one of his most serious challenges, up to the point of 
comparing it with the nuclear threat.* 1 Contrary to the far-flung initial expectations of the 
Kennedy team, balance of payments matters became an ongoing preoccupation which turned 
up with irritating regularity on the agenda. Research has interpreted these monetary problems 
as an expression of the decline of American hegemony and Kennedy^ policy as a fight 
against this decline.2 Unfortunately, those sweeping interpretations lack serious empirical 
underpinning. A thorough historical account of how Kennedy managed his international 
monetary policy, how it evolved and changed over time, where exactly the points of debate 
lay, and what strategy towards the surplus countries was pursued, is still wanted. Such an 
endeavour is, o f course, far beyond the scope of _this_ research. 1 will try to sum up and 
supplement previous research, caution against oversimplifying arguments, and outline briefly 
the rationales behind US monetary policy towards Europe, and in particular towards Germany.
This will lead to the question of how American security policy towards Europe became 
increasingly linked to the monetary problem. One significant result of this problem was the 
first offset agreement. The genesis of this crucial agreement for German American relations 
in the 1960s will be outlined -for the first time- in detail. An analysis of the motives of the 
participants and of the significance o f the agreement concludes the chapter.
1 Schlesinger, A 1000 Days, 1964, p.654; Sorensen, Kennedy, 1965, p.405; Rostow, The Diffusion o f Power, 
1972, p.136; Roosa, The Dollar and World Liquidity, 1967, p J .
1 See, for example, Borden, 'Defending Hegemony: American Foreign Economic Policy', in: Paterson, Kennedy's
Quest fo r  Victory, 1989, p.57-85; Calico, Thejm perious Economy, 1985; Matusow, 'Kennedy, the World Economy, 
and the Decline of America*, in: Snyderfed), JFK. Person, Policy. Presidency, 1988, p .l i 1-22.
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It emerged clearly from Kennedy’s first balance of payments message to Congress, shortly 
after his inauguration, that he intended no radical departures from existing policies towards 
solving the dollar problem. After the appointment of Douglas Dillon as Secretary of Treasury 
this came as no surprise. The central passage of Kennedy’s talk went as follows: ’The United 
States official dollar price o f gold can and will be m aintained at $35 an ounce. Exckange 
controls over trade and investments will not be invoked. Our national security and economic 
assistance programs will be carried forward, ’3 The President declared himself also against 
any far-reaching, reform of.the international monetary system. The Kennedy administration 
saw the balance o f payments deficit as a manageable problem and was confident of solving 
it within a relatively short period. Policiesjequiredjwould include a more sophisticated jise 
of available monetary, instruments, further removal.o f. trade.barriers, and strong efforts at 
home to improve the competitiveness of American goods.4
Proposals from within the administration for more radical solutions, like a change in the gold 
price, capital controls, or restrictions on tourism, never prevailed.5 The Treasury Department 
clung to its leadership on monetary issues. The two main elements of its policy were a more 
vigorous domestic economic policy than Eisenhower’s had been, and increased participation 
by other industrialized powers in the management of the international monetary system. This 
second element was based on the optimistic assumption that these countries, mostly affluent 
members of the Atlantic Alliance, were actually willing to cooperate on the required large 
scale.
r \'c4 t> isty
I The idea that the European countries had an obligation to help the .United States was rooted 
’ in the thinking of the Kennedy administration as deeply as it had been in Eisenhower’s. It
1 The Balance of Payments and Gold Outflow from the US: Message of President Kennedy to the Congress, 
6.2.1961; in: DAFR 1961, pJO.
4 This approach had been suggested by a special Task Force on the balance of payments, which produced a 
comprehensive report on the problem for Kennedy in December 1960; see: JFKL, PPP, Transition Files: Task Force 
Reports, Box 1073. One of the ongoing conflicts within the administration was, whether economic policy was to be 
pursued with litUe regard to balance of payments objectives, as the CEA demanded, or whether economic policy, in 
particular short-term rates, were to be dominated by monetary .considerations, as the Treasury maintained. On these 
debates, see the forthcoming Ph.D. by^FJ.Gavin, University of Pennsylvania.
s Dillon and Roosa warned that plans for radical changes would create additional large-scale speculation as long 
as theposition of the dollar was not safe. This argument was accepted by Kennedy; see: Roosa, 1967, p 6-13; Odell, 
US International Monetary Relations, 1982, p.106-108.
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stemmed from Kennedy’s and his advisers’ conviction that the surplus countries bore an at 
least equal part of the responsibility for the crisis of the monetary system and that it had been
generous American policies which had enabled the Europeans to acquire their huge currency 
reserves. The interpretation that the US problems were a result of inadequate policies by the 
Europeans was widespread in the new government. The pre-presidential Task Force on
’Foreign Economic Policy’ stated in its report’s section on the balance of payments deficit 
that it ’resulted principally from  the failure o f other major industrialized powers to pursue 
adequate policies o f growth \ 6 The reproach of building up its economy with American help 
and then shirking its obligation to help the US in its monetary policy, was mainly directed 
at Germany. ' To some significant degree...Germany ’s ability to maintain its export volume f 
can be attributed to .liberal _U.S. policies on trade, a id  and investm ent\ Bali wrote in early ‘ 
1961, and Secretary of State Rusk echoed him: the *Germans have an obligation to make a 
contribution to the solution o f this problem without need fo r  any compensatory action on our
part*.* 1 f , r  i T '
From many of his remarks, it appears that Kennedy himself fully shared this opinion." When 
de Gaulle vetoed the British accession to the Common Market in January 1963, an event 
which blatantly exposed the weaknesses of US foreign policy towards Europe, this factor 
became a dominant theme in the ensuing discussions. Kennedy voiced his frustration in a 
series o f remarks which were typical for the German-American burden-sharing debate in the 
1960s. ‘We have been very generous to Europe and it is now  time to look out fo r ourselves, 
knowing fu ll well that the Europeans will not do anything fo r  us simply because we have in 
the past helped them. No longer dependent on the U.S. fo r economic assistance, the^European 
states are less subject to our influence. I f  the French and other European powers acquire a 
nuclear capability they would be in a position to be entirely independent and we m ight be on 
the outside looking in. We must exploit our military and political position to ensure that our
* Report. 31.12.1960, JFKL, PPP, Transition Files, Box 1073; for a similar statement: NSA, The Berlin Crises 
Collection, Doc.2054, Gregh-Nitze discussion on NATO strategy, 25.5.61.
7 JFKL, POF, Countries: Germany, Box 116a, Ball to JFK, n.d.(February 61?); NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63,811.10, 
Box 2287, Rusk to Dillon, 1.2.1961. For a similar statement see: JFKL, POF, Departments & Agencies:CEA, Box 
73, Heller to JFK: The Future of the Dollar, 15.9.1961.
1 See for example his discussion with the French Minister for Cultural Affairs, Malraux, on 11 May 1962, in: 
FRUS 1961-63, XIII, 695-701.
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economic interests are protected * Similar statements multiplied during the 1960s in media 
comments, in Congress, and, last but not least, in the U.S. government. At the highest levels, 
monetary and security problems were seen as inseparably linked.
In this matter, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom saw eye to eye. 
In his first meeting with Kennedy, Macmillan put the blame for the American and British 
payments problems on the Europeans (in particular the Germans) who had failed to reinvest 
the foreign exchange they had acquired via Anglo-American aid and military expenditure in 
Europe after the war.9 10 Both heads of government strongly emphasized the need for adequate 
compensation for their foreign exchange losses. Thus, a clea^split emerged in monetary 
policy between the European surplus countries and the deficit countries, Britain and the USA. 
This split was to some extent parallelled by divergences in security matters (nuclear and non­
nuclear members o f the Alliance) and in trade..policy (EEC and non-EEC countries). Though 
these lines of conflict were, of course, often blurred when it came down to specific issues and 
Germany found itself frequently caught in the middle, it very much dominated relations in 
the Western Alliance during the 1960s, and the different issues linked up with and reinforced 
each other.
The American activism in international monetary policy, centred on two fields:
1) the intensification of monetary cooperation between the major monetary powers by a series 
of multilateral agreements, vigorously pursued by Dillon and his Undersecretary Roosa (they 
will be dealt with only parenthetically in this thesis).
2) the reduction and sharing of the.defense and foreign aid burden, with an offset of military 
expenditure in Europe as the most important component, strongly pushed by Secretary of 
Defense McNamara. Though these policies were pursued by different ministries jm d in a 
different institutional setting, they have to be seen as a whole.
9 FRUS XIII, 1961-63, Remarks of President Kennedy to the NSC Meeting, 22.1.1963, p.486.
10 NSA, The Berlin Crisis Collection, Doc.2024: CAB 133/244: Record of a Meeting Macmillan-Kennedy, 5.4.61.
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b) Military Strategy and the Balance of Payments
Kennedy made it from the outset clear to all concerned that he assigned to military burden- 
sharing a very high importance." This derived not only from his determination to.defend 
the dollar and his conviction that America’s allies had to carryalargershare  ofJhe_defence 
burden. Changes in military strategic thinking also led to a more assertive burden-sharing 
policy. The new administration had started immediately with a revision of American military- 
strategic policy which led to a stronger emphasis on conventional forces. The strong 
inclination by the preceding administration to reappraise the military commitment in Europe 
because o f balance of payments reasons was not shared by the Kennedy administration, at 
least not during its first year. Eisenhower’s directive to curtail drastically the number of the 
dependents of the American overseas forces was renounced due to heavy criticism by the 
military and the supposedly strong impact on the morale o f the GI’s.* 12
Simultaneously, the Americans sought to educate the Europeans on their new strategic ideas. 
These, subsumed under the heading of ’Flexible Response’, expanded on ideas formulated 
during the closing stage of Eisenhower’s presidency, notably by people like Robert Bowie and 
Maxwell Taylor.13 Appalled by what they saw as an irresponsible reliance on the immediate 
use of nuclear weapons in case of an even limited conflict and based on a more balanced 
estimate of Warsaw Pact Forces, strategic planners in the Kennedy administration tried to 
switch the emphasis of military strategy away from nuclear weapons towards a better 
conventional capability in order to have an increased range of options. The situation in Berlin 
underlined this need. A corresponding commitment by the Europeans to conventional troops 
in order to make ’Flexible Response’ credible became a top priority of US security policy 
towards Europe.14 A study group, headed by Dean Acheson, summarized these ideas in a 
policy paper, and the so-called Acheson report became a policy guideline approved by
n JFKL, NSF, Meetings & Memoranda, Box 328, NSAM 22, JFK to Rusk, 20.2.61.
12 JFKL, NSF, Clifton-Kaysen Memos: Memo of Meeting JCS with the President, 27.1.61; JFKL, POF, 
Departments and Agencies: Defense, Box 77, McNamara to JFK, 1.2.1961; JFKL, OH Interview Gilpatric, p.80.
w For the Bowie Report see: FRUS 1958-60, VII,1, doc.266; Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, 1960. For the 
development of Flexible Response see: Slromseth, The Origins o f Flexible Response, 1988.
M DDRS 1995/1414, Briefing Book for Adenauer Visit: Position Paper NATO, April 1961.
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Kennedy.15 In April, Acheson went to Europe and told Adenauer (and de Gaulle) that ’the 
new administration wished to correct som e harmful impressions created toward the end of 
the old one ... American troops were not to be withdrawn from  Europe, nor would there be 
any threat to do so \ 16
However, as Acheson recalled later, he 1was never quite sure how completely [Kennedy*s] 
mind was sold on this~....the thing that continually seemed to bother the President about this 
was the continuation o f so large a body o f American troops in Europe without any plan that 
they should come home at a specific date ... Surely we do hope to bring them home, but the 
point was to bring the Europeans in such a state o f confidence and growing capabilities that 
this time would come. It would never come i f  you keep saying, "i f  you don’t do exactly what 
we want, we’ll go home”. This was the wrong way to act. I  don’t think he was ever quite with 
me on this. *17 Kennedy’s ambiguity is not surprising, given that ’Flexible Response’ with 
the inherent continuation or even augmentation o f American troop presence in Europe 
conflicted with balance of payments objectives. What made sense in military-political terms, 
did not at all coincide with perceived economic necessities, contrary to the situation in the 
1950s. One way to square the circle was to get the Europeans to assume more of the burden 
of conventional defense. Another possibility was to negotiate a financial compensation for the 
American foreign exchange losses wherever possible. To achieve this, however, the threat of 
American disengagement would be the obvious means of pressure. Such threats, on the other 
side, undermined the credibility of US military policy. There are few doubts that Kennedy 
acutely felt this dilemma.
15 FRUS 1961-63, XIII, p.285-91.
16 FRUS 1961-63, XIII, Telegram Embassy Bonn to DOS: Adenauer-Acheson conversation, 10.4.61, p.270; ibid, 
Conversation Gavin-de Gaulle, 20.4.61, p.244. This reassurance was repeated by Kennedy during Adenauer's first 
meeting with the new President, ibid., p.273.
1 7 JFKL, OH1 Acheson, p.12-13.
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c) Towards the First Offset Agreement
The Kennedy administration wasted no time to preserve the momentum of the financial talks 
which had been initiated by Anderson and Dillon. Even before inauguration, Dillon sent 
Secretary of State-Designate Rusk a memorandum urging immediate action by the new 
government.18 The offset of American foreign exchange tosses in Germany became the first 
o f many German-American disagreements during Kennedy's tenure. The German government, 
in order to get a good start with the new administration, had decided to table new proposals 
without delay. However, counting upon a more relaxed attitude of the new team, the Germans 
made almost no changes as compared to the offer they had already presented to Anderson and 
Dillon. The main points -the foreign aid program, the debt prepayment (linked to the vested 
assets question), NATO infrastructure costs, advance payments on military orders, etc.- 
remained the same. The Germans also pointed out that the program was devised for one year 
to ease a temporary strain in the US balance of payments.19
The American reaction was indignation at the impertinence of trying to sell the same offer 
twice. Kennedy, in a press conference, said that the proposals did 'not meet the problem or 
the opportunity.*20 The first high-level visit from Germany, Foreign Minister von Brentano, 
scheduled to take place in mid-February, provided him with the chance to communicate 
directly his disappointment.21 The Americans wanted to use the opportunity to impress upon 
the Germans their understanding of the balance of payments problem. The approach was 
based on the assumption ’that a general condition o f economic imbalance exists in the 
Western world which can only be rectified by continuing and concerted measures which 
members o f the Alliance should take....and which calls fo r sustained action by the Germans *31
ia FRUS 1961-63, IX, Dillon to Rusk, 13 January 1961, p.105.
”  NA, RG59, DF 1960^3, 811.10, 2-2/61, Bonn 1174 + 1175 to Secstate, 2.2.1961; see also: BPI, 10.2.1961. 
p.258.
10 KPPC, 8.2.61, p.29; for a similar critique by the embassy see: NA, RG 59, DF 1960-3,811.10/2-361, Bonn 
1186.3.2.61.
31 ’As the Chancellor is interested in power it would seem to me that /  should give Mr.Bretano f  sicƒ a sense o f 
our disappointment with their progress1; NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63,033.619-62A11, Box 77, Kennedy to Rusk, 8.2.61.
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as the major surplus country o f the W est *n  Obviously, the United States aimed at a long­
term commitment of Germany towards relieving the American balance of payments. This 
expectation derived from America’s long-term commitment to Europe’s security. Presumably, 
the Germans would resist such an approach which would have deprived them of much of their 
autonomy in monetary policy making. A fundamental conflict emerged between the American 
interest to enlist German monetary powers for the defence of the dollar and the German 
attempt to retain as much freedom of manoeuvre as possible. The outcome of the offset 
negotiations would reflect a first answer to this conflict
The von Brentano visit brought no solution to these large questions. The US government 
handed the visitor an aide-memoire which set out its basic position on the balance of 
payments problem. It stated that the deficit existed mainly because of the American 
commitment to the defense of the Free World, and that this burden as well as the foreign aid 
burden had to be shared equally among the members of the Alliance. The proposed German 
measures were deemed inadequate because they did not meet the condition of a sustained 
program.23 The aide memoire suggested a multilateral solution to the burden-sharing 
problem. W.Rostow maintained that after the von Brentano visit *Kennedy considered and 
tentatively supported a multilateral approach in the Alliance to the offset problem. *24 He 
added that concerted pressure by the Department of Defense and the Department of Treasury 
had killed that proposal. It would have taken in any case a long and protracted negotiating 
process to get all o f NATO into a comprehensive burden sharing system. The Kennedy 
administration, looking for fast solutions, was hardly prepared for such a major diplomatic 
effort. The idea was appear again from time to time; however, it never came close to 
implementation.
On some of the lesser German proposals, agreement was achieved very soon after the von 
Brentano visit. The German share of the NATO infrastructure cost was augmented to 20%.
n  JFKL, POF, Countries: Germany General, Box 117, Rusk memo for the President, 15 February 1961; PA-AA, 
Büro STS, 79, Record of Dillon - von Scherpcnberg talk, 17 February 1961.
11 BPI, 23.2.61, p.322.
24 Rostow, The Diffusion o f Power, 1972, p.236, 395.
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Table 9: Distribution of NATO Infrastructure Cost 1956-64 (in %)
1956-60 1961-64
USA 36.98 30.85
Germany 13.72 20.00
United Kingdom 9.88 10.15
France 11.87 1X00
Source: BPI, 17.2,1961, p.294. The total cost of NATO infrastructure programs was $676m a year (1957*60), 
rcsp. S733m (1961-64).
The foreign aid problem was separated from the offset discussions and referred to the OECD. 
The major reason for this was that the Americans wanted to avoid that uncertain foreign aid 
efforts would be played off against other burden sharing issues, causing lower results in both 
areas.25 The Anderson-Dillon mission had signalled the beginning of a regular German 
foreign aid program. That did not prevent the issue from becoming time and again a 
controversial topic in German-American discussions during the 1960’s. The issue of trade 
liberalization was allayed by some smaller measures of Germany and for the time being lost 
its relevance in the context of offset. However, it was clear that the US government regarded 
all these matters as relatively unimportant. The real issues were extended monetary 
cooperation and full offset of the US troops' foreign exchange cost. It is not intended here 
to reconstruct the history of German-American monetary cooperation during the 1960s in 
detail as it evolved in a multilateral (OECD, IMF, BIS) and bilateral context, involving 
governments, central banks, and other players in the monetary field. This monetary 
collaboration expanded greatly during the Kennedy years and it will blend into our story at 
various moments. I will concentrate on probably the most important component of this 
cooperation: military offset.
The main part o f the talks during 1961 was held on a lower official level than during the 
Anderson-Dillon mission. Officials of the Federal Defense Ministry (BMVg), the Federal 
Finance Ministry (BMF), the US Treasury and Defense Departments, and the US embassy in 
Bonn had met almost immediately after the mission to work out alternatives to a direct 
contribution. The large agenda was split up into several issues which were assigned to three
15 NA, RG 84, Post Files: Embassy Bonn 1959-61, Box 17,320: US Policy, DOS Grcutar Telegram, 183.1961.
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working groups. The first group included the representatives o f the BMF and dealt with the 
debt prepayment question. Contrary to the Eisenhower administration, the new government 
categorically declined to link the issue with German assets seized by the US government 
during the war, fearing that such a deal might require a long and uncertain ratification debate 
in Congress.26 The Germans were bluntly told that the new administration would take no 
action whatsoever on the problem. This was a painful defeat for the German government 
which had hoped to score a great popular success on an issue which was highly sensitive in 
Germany. Endless bilateral discussions had been going on during the 1950s.27 Finally, after 
the Dillon-Anderson mission the US seemed ready to compensate the former owners of the 
assets linking that with premature debt prepayment by the Federal Republic. The German 
government prepared already draft treaties.28 Disappointment ran high when this chance was 
lost. At that point, the Germans probably began to suspect that they had fallen in the offset 
question from the frying-pan of Eisenhower into the fire o f Kennedy. Despite the lost 
opportunity, Germany agreed, after some more discussions to prepay, as an offset measure, 
DM587m of its postwar debts, without conditions attached.29
In any case, this was a convenient way to transfer back the surplus dollars which had 
streamed to German accounts during speculative waves in 1960 and 1961. Short-term capital 
had continued to move into the country as again and again rumours of a DM revaluation 
made their way to the public. Doubtlessly, these rumours were intensified by the fierce 
struggle within the German government on the question. Adenauer and Erhard repeatedly 
clashed on the issue; industry, consumer organisations, and financial experts bombarded the 
government with recommendations for and against; even within the Bundesbank's highest 
levels opinions were divided.30 Though there is no doubt that the United States was in 
favour of a revaluation, they apparently put no direct pressure on the German government and
*  BA, NL Etzcl, vol.18, memo: prepayment of US postwar aid, 20 March 1961; NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63, 
811.10, Box 2287, Ball to Rusk, 30 January 1961; Rusk to Dillon, 1 February 1961; RG 59. Lot Files, BEA, Office 
of German Affairs, Box 12, memcon Dillon/Ball-Scherpenberg, 19 February 1961.
27 Kreikamp, Deutsches Vermögen in den Vereinigten Staaten, 1979.
a  BA, B136/2125, Referat 6: note for Cabinet meeting, 10 January 1961.
29 BPI, 13.4.61, p.657; see table 6, Appendix.
30 The best account of this conflict is: Körfer, K am pf ums Kanzleramt,1988, p.464-518.
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stayed clear of the wasps* nest. When the British urged them to press the Germans towards 
revaluation, Dillon answered that the US accorded to this question a lower priority than to 
bilateral payments negotiations.31 Only when finally, in March 1961, the DM was revalued 
from DM4.20/dollar to DM4.00/dollar, the US treasury committed a minor blunder by calling 
the revaluation a ’modest but useful step’. Nothing illustrates the nervousness of monetary 
markets during the 1960s better than the deluge of funds moving to Germany after this 
statement which seemed to hold the possibility of a further revaluation. The German 
ambassador protested personally to Kennedy.32 The markets calmed down only in mid-1961, 
after combined intervention by all major central banks. It was the pound which, once more, 
came under pressure during these weeks and was saved only by one of the many multilateral 
monetary rescue actions of the 1960s.33
The offset negotiations had continued during the monetary turmoil. After the debt prepayment 
question was settled, they concentrated on weapons procurement and sharing of military 
facilities. The Ministries of Defense assumed the responsibility for the talks which 
increasingly promised to be the only way to come anywhere close to the great aims the 
Americans envisaged. Accordingly, when Adenauer was scheduled for his first state visit in 
April 1961, the American interest had switched towards a pure bilateral military offset 
scheme. In a forceful memorandum Dillon pressed upon the President the importance of 
pursuing the issue in his talks with the Chancellor. 7 hope you w ill talk with the Chancellor 
about the importance o f prompt action by Germany to step up its military procurement in the 
United States for at least the present year. Less urgent; but also important, is our desire fo r  
a reduction in the cost o f contractual services for our m ilitary establishment fo r which we 
now pay Germany...without active Federal Republic cooperation there is no way o f bringing 
our expenditure in Germany down to a tolerable level short o f troop withdrawal which we 
do not want to contemplate. Dillon estimated the amount of prospective German orders *14
”  FRUS 1961-63, IX, US-UK bilateral talks, 15-16 December 1961, p.111-12.
”  FRUS 1961-63, XIV, p.21-5.
“  Strange (1976), p.82-89.
14 JFKL, POF, Countries: France/Germany, Box 116a, Dillon to President: Discussion with Chancellor Adenauer 
on balance of payments, 7.4.61. For the actual talks see FRUS 1961-63, IX, 13.4.61, p.114-6.
Iat about $430m/year which would bring down the foreign exchange cost of the troops 
(inflated to $650m because of the DM-revaluation) to $220m. Strauss had informed Dillon 
that only an increase to $200m was reasonable, but State Secretary van Scherpenberg during 
the von Brentano visit had quoted a figure o f $400m a year for 1961; this had met opposition 
in the German government, notably from Erhard.35
Progress in the bilateral working groups on procurement and sharing of military facilities was 
slow. The first disagreement arose not on the level of orders but on the US insistence that the 
Federal Republic was to commit itself for an extended period to a certain level of purchases. 
This was unacceptable for the Germans. The proposed level of $450m of arms orders in 1961 
-in addition to $125m already made * was dismissed in the same vein as completely 
’unrealistic/36 The Americans suspected that this intransigence was due to French and 
British competition for German orders.37 This was not a major reason, as we shall see later. 
Both sides tried, however, to keep the talks confidential. 'The FRG would be subjected to 
difficult pressure, not only from other governments, but from  German domestic industry as 
well. The sensitivity of the subject makes it even today difficult to get a consistent record 
of the talks, particularly from the German side. Many questions will remain open, probably 
until the archive of the Federal Defense Ministry at Freiburg finally opens its post-1955 
holdings to the general public.
The main objective o f the US during the talks was simple: to get a commitment to increased 
military procurement as extended and voluminous as possible. This was promoted at the 
highest levels, in particular the Secretaries of Treasury and Defense. The potential of the 
vague proposals for sharing military facilities and contractual services was unclear. It seems, 
however, that the US government soon realized that this issue could provide additional 17
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36 NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63, 762a3, Box 1903, memcon FRG offidals-US embassy officials, 163.61.
17 N A, RG 5 9 ,762a3 6 , Bonn 1487,183.61: ’British are applying extensive pressure to increase level of German 
procurement and Selwyn Lloyd wall arrive next week to discuss matter with Strauss. Federal Republic also peculiarly 
dependent on France because of basic need for training areas and French tendency to relate procurement to rights for 
facilities creates fundamental political problem.*
M ibid-. 762a3 ,  Box 1903, memcon US embassy/MAAG-BMVg, 6.6.61.
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leverage, and, in case of a satisfactory agreement, also political advantages. The Americans 
proposed, and the Germans agreed, to undertake long-range studies on a large number of 
questions, including, for example, sharing of logistic services, training facilities, reserve 
stocks, and developing standardized military equipment.39 40Detailed talks on these issues 
started in May 1961.
However, during the first seven months of 1961 the Germans dragged their feet on any 
longterm commitment towards military purchases. This might well have been an expression 
of Strauss’ continuing insistence on buying the most modern material. In a long and animated 
discussion with Kissinger in mid-1961, Strauss complained about the outdated equipment of 
the US army: ’ ...he would be willing to approve a huge increase in German procurement o f 
military items in the U.S. but was reluctant to do so when the Germans could produce better 
weapons here ... i f  the U.S. would modernize her weapons to match qualitatively the German 
weapons, then the German orders would soon erase the American balance o f payments 
problem. ,4° Apart from the slight exaggeration concerning the quality of weaponry made in 
Germany, there was a barely hidden quid pro quo. If the US was ready to sell the most recent 
developments of its weapons industry, inclination and money to buy American would increase 
immediately. Strauß still had lingering suspicions that Germany would be sold second-rate 
material, as it had happened sometimes in the 1950s. He also was conscious of German 
technological backwardness and hoped for some spill-over.41 He and his officials clearly 
realized the leverage the offset issue provided to them in two issues: equality in the 
equipment of German forces and access to advanced military technology which at that time 
was considered the spearhead of technological progress.
Furthermore, Strauß expected a clarification of the future course of American military policy
19 NA, RG 84, Bonn Embassy 1959-61, Box 25, 3223  Logistic Support, Morris to van Scherpenberg, 14.4.61; 
Van Scherpenberg to Moms, 18.4.1961.
40 NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63, 762a.5, Bx 1903, 5/1961. ApparenUy, Kennedy got hold of the conversation and 
ordered an investigation of Strauss' allegation. The charged officials expressed surprise about Strauss' remarks as the 
German army was almost exclusively equipped with U.S. weapons, see: NSA, The Berlin Crisis, Doc.2121, 
memorandum, 3.7.1961.
41 Kelleher, Germany <& the Politics o f Nuclear Weapons, 1975, p.90-91, 96-97.
155
before embarking upon a large procurement program.41 2 The strategic reorientation of the 
Kennedy administration had met with strong resistance in the Federal Republic. The Germans 
feared that increasing reliance on limited conventional response would invite Soviet 
adventurism, lead to the loss of Germany in the event o f war and make the country a nuclear 
battlefield.43 By getting a larger voice in nuclear questions, and particularly by getting access 
to the 'hardware’, Germany would acquire much more influence over the formulation of 
military policy in NATO. This would have brought the Federal Republic a big step closer 
towards pursuing a forward defence for its own territory, and thus reduced its dependence on 
other countries for this task. During the final stages of the Eisenhower administration, 
American intentions for nuclear sharing had gone very far, up to the point of considering the 
equipment of German forces with tactical nuclear weapons.44 45Kennedy, however, took a 
strong position against nuclear proliferation. Under those circumstances, acquiring nuclear 
delivery systems was the closest the Federal Republic could come towards more direct 
influence over the use of nuclear weapons on its territory. What Strauß' intentions amounted 
to was in the last consequence the use o f the strong reserve position of the Federal Republic 
to enhance its military and political influence on vital defence questions. As we shall see, 
Strauß succeeded.
The available records of the Working Group meetings give further indications of German 
objectives.43 First: the request that the US government act as purchasing agent in weapons 
procurement, because of lack of qualified German personnel for negotiating directly with US 
firms (a procedure similar to the one agreed in the MSMS agreement of October 1956; see 
ch.V). Second: the Germans emphasized the importance of a joint use of logistic facilities,
41 'Basic decision increase level o f procurement in US dependent on Strauss' acceptance o f new strategic 
viewpoints and agreement on precise balance between nuclear and conventional forces; NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63, 
033.62A11, 6-2461, Bonn 2170, 24.6.61.
°  Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas, 1985, p.154-55; 167-170. On the strategic disagreements between West 
Germany and the US in the early 1960s see: Kelleher (1975); Mahncke, Nukleare Mitwirkung. Die BRD in der 
atlantischen Allianz 1954-70, 1972; Stromseth (1988); Steinhoff/Pommerin. Strategiewechsel Bundesrepublik und 
Nuklear Strategie in der Ära Adenauer-Kennedy, 1992; Hoppe, Zwischen Teilhabe und Mitsprache, Die Nuklearfrage
in der Allianzpolitik Deutschlands 1959-66, 1993; Haftendom (1994).
44 Trachtenberg, H istory dt Strategy, 1991, p.180-91.
45 NA, RG 84, Bonn Embassy 1959-61, Box 25, Bonn 1711: Studies on Procurement, Joint Use and Contractual 
Services, inch memcon US-FRG officials (15 May), 245.61.
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training areas, airfields, barracks, etc. In these areas the German defense ministry faced 
particular difficulties. The German rearmament effort had been hampered from the beginning 
by various shortages due to the densely populated country and the occupation o f the most 
convenient training-, stationing-, and storage locations by allied forces (see ch.II). When the 
build-up accelerated in the early 1960s these problems became even more pressing. The 
unfortunate 1961 attempt by the German government to negotiate with Franco training areas 
in Spain derived from these problems. Bonn’s NATO allies were not very cooperative in this 
respect. According to Strauß *arrangements fo r depots in France was ƒsic} completely 
dependent on German procurement in France.*46 Third: The Germans insisted during the 
talks that the negotiations should be kept out of the public and that an eventual agreement 
should be concluded in a form not requiring Bundestag approval/7 A public debate on the 
issue had to be avoided at every price.
In July, the amount of proposed German orders was still far from forming a full offset.48 The 
US military stalled at the idea of having to share its facilities in Europe with another army. 
The gap between American and German expectations was large until an event happened 
which should play the decisive accelerator function for the offset talks: the erection of the 
Berlin wall in August 1961.49 50
The consequences were manifold. The Americans augmented their forces in Europe despite 
misgivings about the gold drain such an action implied. The administration soon backed away 
from the initial idea to send up to six divisions.90 After long discussions, however, it was 
decided to augment the American forces in Germany by 45.000 men, with the option for
46 NA, RG 84, Bonn Embassy 1959-61, Box 26, metncon Gilpatric-Hopf/Straufl, 24.10.1961.
47 NA, RG 84, Bonn 1959-1961, Box 25, 3223 Logistic Support, Bonn 1711,24 May 1961.
41 For the following paragraph see: NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63, 811.10/7-1561, memcon Dillon-Strauss, 15.7.61; 
RG 84, Bonn Embassy 1959-61, Box 26, Bonn 211, 29.7.1961.
49 For 8 concise analysis of the Berlin Crisis see: Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 1991, p.169-234.
50 For the discussions see: JFKL, POF, Countries: Germany general. Box 117, Memo of Meeting on Berlin, 
17.7.61; ibid., McNamara to JFK: Status o f Berlin Build-up, 7.9.1961; LBJL, VPSF, Box 4, notes on NSC meeting, 
19.7.61.
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further reinforcements if the situation required that.51 The additional gold drain was expected 
to be offset by the German government. Because of tactical reasons, the US embassy in Bonn 
advised that the exploration of this subject should start only after the ongoing offset talks 
were concluded.52 *
The wall also stirred up a feeling o f vulnerability on the part of the West Germans and 
demonstrated how much the Federal Republic depended on the Western Alliance for its 
security. The Western response, deemed as lukewarm by a large part of the German 
population, sparked renewed doubts about the Western security guarantee. In this situation, 
funds suddenly flowed abundantly for the further build-up and modernization of the 
Bundeswehr. The German defence budget was increased by about DM 3bn to DM16.6bn 
($4.15bn).s3
The US leverage in the offset talks increased considerably. The Americans decided to meet 
some of the German requests to capitalize on the situation. 'W e are approaching the strongest 
bargaining position since the negotiations began. Our negotiating leverage is increased by  
the possibility o f major deployments to assist in the defense o f Berlin and Germany, and also  
by the fact that the Department o f Defense is prepared to provide the German forces with a 
cooperative logistics system fo r which the Federal Republic has been pressing.*** This 
system included, for example, the provision o f US government procurement services, sharing 
in selected areas of common items and US war reserves, on-call support for German forces 
(tying in the Bundeswehr as a customer to the US logistical system for providing spare parts), 
and maintenance services.55 Equally important was that the Americans indicated they were 
willing to continue selling their most advanced weapon systems. They stepped up the pace
S1 US troop strength rose from 233.000 to 277.600. For details of this build-up see: NSA, The Berlin Crisis, 
Doc.1942, US Army Europe Headquarters, The Replacement and Augmentation Systems in Europe, 1945-63, ch.6, 
March 1964.
51 NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63, 811.10/9-1261, Ball to Dowling, 12.9.61; ibid., 9-2261, Bonn 700, 22.9.61.
33 Table 1, appendix.
M JFKL, POF, D&A: Treasury, Box 89, Dillon to JFK, 14 September 1961
33 NA, RG 59, DF 196<W3, 811.10/9-2161, Bonn 694, 21.9.1961; ibid, Tyler to Ball: US/FRG military offset
negotiations, 9.10.61; RG 84, Bonn Embassy 1959-61, Box 26, Bonn A-403 to DOS, 30.9.1961.
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in the negotiations.56
At an October meeting of the Procurement Working Group, the Germans informed a delighted 
US delegation that the level of procurement would rise substantially above previous 
estimates.57 *The circumstances seemed to be propitious for a comprehensive understanding. 
The negotiations moved to a higher level. Kennedy informed Adenauer that he would send 
Undersecretary of Defense, Gilpatric, for talks with the Federal Defense Ministry. He 
expected the Germans to 'work out with us arrangements to insure that U.S. military 
expenditures in Germany do not drain foreign exchange reserves from the U.S. to 
Germany.,5ft The Gilpatric trip was given very low key public treatment to avoid drawing 
attention to the wide-ranging issues discussed. The Undersecretary of Defense brought along 
with him an outline of the logistics assistance actions which the Department of Defense was 
prepared to offer to the Germans.59 He also assured Strauß that the US would continue to 
furnish the Bundeswehr with modem missile systems.60 The condition the US set for these 
offers was straightforward: a formal commitment by the Federal Republic to offset the entire 
foreign exchange cost of US troops in Germany.
Strauß certainly understood that the consequence was a far-reaching commitment to the 
United States in the military-economic field at the expense of other allies. He remarked to 
Gilpatric 'that i f  he signed the agreement as presently drafted the British ambassador would 
be in his office the following morning to demand equal treatment*.61 This, however, did not 
prevent an eventual signature. The German defence minister, however, insisted upon limiting 
the agreement to two years and he demanded renewed, preferably multilateral, negotiations
36 For example, the soon to be ousted von Brentano was -once more- confronted with the problem, this lime by 
Rusk: NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63, 811.10/8-14.61, memcon, 14.9.61; see also: ibid, 862a.l0/9-1461, Martin to Ball: 
Treasury, Defense and State Meeting on US/German Financial Negotiations, 14.9.61.
57 NA, RG 59, DF 1960^3, 762a.5/10-1261, MAAG Germany to Secstate, 13.10.61; ibid., 862a.l0, 12-2261, 
discussion Embassy-BMVg officials, 18.12.61.
* JFKL, POF: Countries: Germany general. Box 117, Kennedy to Adenauer, 16.10.1961.
59 NA, RG 84, Box 26, Bonn to DOS: Summary Statement by Gilpatric, 2.11.1961.
“  FAZ, 27 October 1961; FR, 29 October 1961.
61 ibid., memcon Gilpatric-Hopf/StrauQ, 24.10.1961.
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in case of a substantial augmentation o f US forces due to the completely unclear Berlin 
situation. After some discussion, Gilpatric accepted these conditions and a brief memorandum 
of understanding was signed on 24 October 1961. The following paragraph established the 
working principle of offset: ’It is anticipated that under the proposed cooperative logistics 
system, payments by the Federal Republic o f Germany to the United States fo r materiel and 
for research, development, procurement supply, maintenance and other logistics services, 
including the Federal Republic o f G erm any's share o f the system ’s capital and operating 
expenses, will be sufficient to insure that military transactions o f direct benefit to the U.S. 
balance o f payments are large enough to offset the transactions o f U S. forces in Germany 
o f benefit to the FRG balance o f payments, on the basis o f such forces presently stationed in 
Germany or heretofore announced fo r  movement to Germany. In the event o f further 
deployment o f U S.forces to Germany, the two governments w ill consider methods whereby 
the balance o f payments effect o f such movements can be adjusted to their mutual benefit. 162
The memorandum would be in effect for a period of two years during which the accumulated 
foreign exchange cost of US troops in Germany was estimated at about $1450m. This 
signified that procurement in the US was to make up roughly one-sixth of the German 
defence budget. Strauß supplemented the memorandum with a letter of comments. In this 
letter he set forth: 1. that a firm commitment beyond US FY 1962 was not possible, 2. the 
mentioned condition in case of an increase in US manpower, 3. the impossibility of 
concluding a similar agreement with any other country, 4. the necessity to maintain existing 
military-economic relations with other NATO countries, 5. a demand for US political support 
if the agreement was to create problems with other NATO allies.63 As it turned out soon, 
Strauß1 apprehensions were well-founded.
The immediate problem was, however, how to place the broad understanding into a more 
precise framework. This led in the following weeks to hectic discussions on financial, 62
62 For a full version of the memorandum, see: NA, RG 84, Bonn Embassy 1959-61, Box 25, Bonn to DOS, 
Treasury, Defense and White House, 24.10.1961. The German version is in an attachment of a tetter by Kennedy to 
Adenauer: JFKL, Correspondence Adenauer-Kennedy, Kennedy to Adenauer, 25.11.62, with note on German 
obligations and payments to the US pursuant to the military offset agreement. See also, FRUS 1961-63, IX, p.132-3.
“  ibid., Strauss to Gilpatric, 30.10.1961.
160
organisational and procedural details, as well as on the elements of the cooperative logistics 
system. Talks commenced on a large number o f items which the FRG would eventually 
buy.64 The financial framework posed a particular problem. The Federal Ministry o f Finance 
objected to its implementation at the last minute. The ministry had been almost completely 
excluded from the talks. Its intervention, however, came too late to change the outcome. An 
agreement was concluded based on the example of the MSMS agreement of October 1956. 
The period for order and payments targets were split. Orders to the tune of SI450m were to 
be made in US CY 1961 and 1962, the equivalent payments were to be placed in FY 1961/62 
and 1962/63 (ending June 1963). A formal exchange of letters between Strauß and Gilpatric 
recorded the details.63 The payments level was made contingent upon the working of the 
logistics agreement. Once more, the Germans requested that the letter exchange be held in 
strictest confidence in order to avoid difficulties with the UK.
Nevertheless, the ticklish problem of informing the British and the French became now 
urgent. The Federal Republic was particularly afraid that the UK, pursuing then its own offset 
talks with the BMF, without much success, would react furiously and demand equal treatment. 
Another delicate question was the need to inform the French. First, the political scope of the 
agreement was certain to displease the French government; second, the provisions of the 
logistics arrangements on war reserves and on-call support entailed the presence o f German 
materiel in France, because the bulk of US war stocks in Europe was deposited there. This, 
and the possible presence o f the German military for control and inspection purposes, was 
very likely to incense the French, who were known to display little humour on issues 
regarding their sovereignty.66 Already in August 1961, the US embassy in Paris had warned 
of difficulties because an US-German logistics agreement might undermine a French-German 
agreement, thus robbing the French of an important lever in their dealings with the Federal 
Republic. The embassy also expressed doubts about whether the Franco-American agreements 
regarding the use of French facilities by US forces and the lines of communication through *456
*  NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63, 762a.5/12-1661, MAAG to OSD(Washington), 16.11.1961.
45 NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63, 762.0221/1-3162, Bonn 1774 (Section I+1I), 31 January 1962; ibid, Bonn 1789,1 
February 1962; Bonn 17%, 2 February 1%2.
46 ibid, 762.0221/1-962, Ball to Tyler, 9 January 1%2.
France allowed the sharing of these facilities with other countries.67 *The State Department 
cautioned against entering the agreements without informing the French, even if this entailed 
the risk that the French would veto an important part of the agreements. T he core o f the 
problem is that the US Line o f Communication in France w ill under the proposed agreements 
be used to supply and store materiel fo r  FRG forces.968 Finally, rather vague information 
was conveyed, painfully avoiding the mention of the crucial payments arrangements.w It 
took the French some time to figure out the scope o f the deal.
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d) Military, Political and Monetary Aspects of the Agreement
The foregoing has been the first detailed account o f the genesis of the offset agreement. 
However, to really evaluate its significance, it is necessary to place it in the military, political 
and monetary context of overall German-American relations. In the following paragraphs 
these consequences are, for the sake of clarity, discussed separately, but it is self-evident that 
all these factors were inextricably intertwined.
The military importance of the agreement lay primarily in linking the American and German 
military efforts in Europe on many levels to a hitherto unknown extent. The immense amount 
of procurement made the Bundeswehr for a long time a mostly American equipped army. The 
Federal Republic gained access to some of the most modem weapon systems which existed, 
and to instructions on how to use them.70 The Americans guaranteed the delivery of this 
high-tech procurement which the FRG was not able and/or not allowed to produce. This was 
an important step towards the modem posture for German forces StrauB fought for so 
fervently. That the agreement gave the Germans the possibility to buy weapons capable of
67 NA, RG 84, Bonn Embassy 1959*61, Box 26, Paris 69, 5 August 1961.
“  NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63,762.0221/1-962. Tyler to Ball, 9  January 1962.
M NA. RG 59, D F 1960-63, 762a.5/2-1062, DOS to Paris/Bonn, 13 February 1962.
70 Some items already agreed upon included for example tanks ($104m), 2  PERSHING battalions (S126m), a 
NIKE and a SERGEANT missile system (S69m), etc. For a lump sum payment of $75m Germany acquired the 
remaining items on loan from the NASH lis t See also: NHP, Talking Points for Visit of Minister to the US. 13.11.61.
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delivering nuclear warheads might have been even an unwritten condition for Strauß' 
consent.71 *
Cooperation between the American and the German forces was intensified probably even 
more by the logistics arrangement. A joint State/Defense/Treasury memorandum to Erhard in 
July 1963 listed the following areas: *Co-Production o f common military equipment by 
German and US sources, re supply and maintenance support for FRG forces through VS 
military logistics systems, training o f FRG troops in US military schools, joint usage o f 
military facilities, and joint research and development projects,72. The Federal Republic thus 
gained storage space in the Hinterland and badly needed training areas, for example the huge 
Grafenwöhr area, a place well known by every German recruit for its more than average 
amount o f dust and mud, and still jointly used by US and German forces. Eventually, German 
military personnel would go in large numbers to the United States for training purposes. 
Certainly, US-German cooperation along these lines had existed before. But there are few 
doubts that these arrangements, which saw a vast extension over the next years, 
’americanized' the German forces, coming close to outright dependence. This danger was 
realized by the Germans but, at that time, accepted due to the benefits.73 Anyway, a large 
part of the procurement budget of the Bundeswehr in the next years was to be reserved for 
purchases in the US, to the detriment of other weapon producing countries and probably even 
the German industry.74
This leads directly to the political aspects of the agreement. With regard to the massive 
amount of procurement and the close cooperation of the West German and American forces, 
European armaments cooperation was pushed far into the future. The Strauß-Gilpatric 
understanding was a clear option for the US, even if that was not so obvious at the time. The 
much-debated military provisions of the Franco-German Treaty of 1963 were insignificant 
compared to the effects o f the offset agreement. It fostered a closer alignment of West
71 Kelleher (1985), p.162.
71 NA, RG 59, SF 1963, FN 12. Box 3451, DOS 147, 17 July 1963.
73 NHP, Talking Papers for Meeting with Gilpatric, 6 February 1963.
74 PA-AA, Ref.IIA7,835, Memo 117: German-French Military Cooperation, 8 January 1965.
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Germany on the United States in the monetary and security spheres at a time when serious 
doubts arose whether Germany would not gang up with de Gaulle. In this sense it was a 
direct continuation of American policy towards Germany after the war which had aimed at 
incorporating Germany economically as well as militarily into the Western Alliance as tightly 
as possible. The continuation of the offset agreement became for these reasons a top priority 
of American foreign policy (see ch.lX). There were few American-German high level 
meetings in the 1960s during which the Germans were not reminded of the essential 
importance of continuing the agreements.
For the German government the agreement was of similar political importance: it virtually 
bought itself the continuation of the security structure of the 1950s, i.e. the continuation o f  
a large US troop presence in Germany. Eisenhower's policy had cast deep doubts on the US 
commitment. At the end of 1961 the military planning of NATO still foresaw the fall back 
of its forces to the Augsburg-Weser line in case o f a war, which meant giving up half o f  
Germany.75 The Berlin Wall crisis appeared to the Germans as initiating a new intensified 
phase of the Cold War, making American protection more valuable than ever. The offset 
agreement became a means to stifle US inclinations to redeploy their forces. Later, when 
Erhard replaced Adenauer, abandoning the latter's policy to look for a closer cooperation with 
the France of de Gaulle to reduce Bonn's dependence on the US, a stable US troop level 
became essential for him to ward off his Gaullist adversaries on the domestic front.
Probably the most important consequences of the offset agreement lay in the financial field. 
By considerably augmenting the production numbers o f military items, the Pentagon was able 
to reduce unit costs for their own procurement. Its weapon industries derived a huge profit.76 
Planning figures for 1964 indicate that military exports to Germany made up roughly a third 
of all American weapon sales abroad.77
”  NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63, 762.0221/12-1161, Pans 3035: Noistad Briefing of NATO Military Committee. 
11.12.61.
*  It has not been possible to get precise information as to the US industry's influence on offset. However, it 
seems that relations between the sales agencies at the Pentagon and US industry were cordial, to say the least See: 
Medick. W affenexporte und Auswärtige Politik der US, 1976.
77 N A  RG 59, Box 3753, DEF 19-3 US, Summary of Military Sales: FY 64 Order Goals, 8 July 1963.
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Time and again the US government referred to the offset agreement as the most important 
success of its monetary policy. By counting these military sales as balance-of-payments 
relevant gains, the Kennedy administration achieved a large part of the reduction in the US 
deficit from $3.9bn in 1960 to $2.67bn in 1963. Kennedy himself made it clear that 77 should 
be understood that under present circumstances military offset agreements enjoyed a clear 
priority over increased development assistance because o f the immediate and direct benefits 
which this objective can bring to our balance o f paym ents,78. This view of the importance 
of the offset agreement was based on an overwhelming consensus between departments in 
Washington, with particularly strong proponents in Defense and Treasury. The agreement 
provided Treasury with a breathing space in which it was able to pursue its policy of 
surrounding the dollar with ’peripheral defenses’. Without the offset deal higher deficits 
would have made this strategy much more difficult to justify and the dollar gold standard 
might have come down earlier than 1971.
One might ask - and critics of the agreements did so ceaselessly- how many of these sales 
were really additional sales which would not have been made anyway. This is, of course, not 
easy to answer. Very probably, the Federal Republic would have augmented its purchases 
anyway, though probably not to the same extent. What counts, however, is that this 
augmentation was directly linked to the principle of offset, that is, balancing the foreign 
exchange cost of US troops in Germany. This was a manifestation of the Federal Republic's 
policy to support the dollar. It was used as such by the American government and perceived 
as such by other governments. As a high placed collaborator of de Gaulle recalls: 'Every time 
there was a meeting o f Europeans to coordinate their policies, the State Department 
announced, as i f  by chance, that in order to reduce the US deficit, a possible reduction o f US 
forces in Germany was under consideration. Thus, the Germans told us: "We have no chance, 
we have to support the American position”.'* 79 It would take a long time before this link 
between the defense of the dollar and the maintenance of the US commitment in Europe was 
to be dissolved.
n  NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63, 811.10/8-862, DOS Circular Telegram, 8 August 1962. Accordingly, the US made 
strong efforts to achieve similar agreements with other stationing countries. They succeeded, for example, in the case 
of Italy which agreed to purchase a SlOOm of equipment a year from the US.
79 Institut de Gaulle(ed), De Gaulle et son Siècle III, 1992, p.157.
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All in all, offset allowed the Kennedy administration to bring the two contradictory objectives 
mentioned at the outset of the chapter into accordance: the continuation of the American 
military presence in Europe to deter the Soviets and preserve American influence in European 
affairs, and the continuation of the dollar-gold system in a period when the Atlantic security 
system and the world’s monetary system became increasingly incompatible. The German 
government managed to combine a number o f advances towards the goal of military equality 
with the avoidance of large scale US reductions which would have signified a drastic change 
in the Atlantic security structure. The price was support for the dollar.
In hindsight, it is easy to see that the agreement was possible only because a set o f favourable 
circumstances coincided: the impact of Berlin; the availability of funds and the German need 
for advanced weapon systems; the US willingness to provide the advanced military material; 
the German forces’ requirement for logistic help; the incessant pressure by McNamara and 
his associates; the absence of sizeable German and European competition; the almost 
complete exclusion of the Federal Finance and Foreign Ministries from the talks. The offset 
agreement was a bargain which may have made sense only for a short period; nevertheless 
it soon became an institutionalized factor of German-American relations. Both sides showed 
very early signs of disenchantment with their part of the bargain. The question was when it 
would come unstuck.
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CHAPTER IX
THE BARGAIN SLOWLY COMES UNSTUCK:
TROOP REDUCTIONS, OFFSET, AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1962-65
a) The Handling of the Offset Agreements
The agreement whose genesis is described in the previous chapter had been formulated, with 
the exception o f the target figure, in a rather vague form. The question arises as to how the 
agreement was actually executed and how the ’Offset* was managed? This question has 
received almost no attention in the literature. However, only after describing the working of 
Offset is it possible to understand the peculiar course the history of the offset agreements took 
in the succeeding years.
The German and American ministries of defence were charged with putting the provisions of 
the Strauss-Gilpatric agreement into practice. Their officials kept the subject in their hands 
until 1966. Given the far-reaching political content of the agreement, this is important. 
Particularly conspicuous is the relative absence of the State Department and the Auswärtiges 
Amt in this context.
In the US, offset was managed by the Pentagon with some participation by the Treasury 
Department; only when problems transported the issue to a politically sensitive level, did the 
State Department belatedly try to get in anew. A team of highly motivated Pentagon officials, 
supplemented by some Treasury and embassy people, had undertaken the detailed negotiations 
with the German defence ministry. The same officials began now to travel regularly to 
Germany to discuss projects and orders. These frequent shuttle missions to Bonn by Kuss and 
Sullivan, the Pentagon and Treasury officials in charge, soon stirred up considerable irritation 
in the US embassy in Bonn which felt bypassed and warned of the absence of political 
considerations in the multi-million-dollar deals concluded between the BMVg and the 
Pentagon salesmen.1 Already in August 1962, officers in the American embassy concluded, 
somewhat resignated, that 'State is no longer trying to keep fu lly  abreast o f the machinations
McGhee Papers, 1988 add.. Box 1, Tyler to McGhee, 16 April 1964; McGhee to Tyler, 18 April 1964.I
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o f Messrs. Kuss and Sullivan. We have neither the manpower nor the money. *2
Very soon, a kind of military-industrial complex, dealing with offset, emerged in the 
Pentagon. Its existence was closely linked to the rise in German military purchases and it 
expanded its activities soon on a worldwide scale. For McNamara’s Defense Department, the 
sale of military hardware became a major source of revenue. During the Kennedy 
administration, the Pentagon initiated a professionally organized sales campaign which quickly 
multiplied American military exports. From 1961 to 1966 American military sales abroad rose 
from $630m to $1.937m.3 The Federal Republic alone took about one third of all those 
exports.4 A special sales agency, headed by Henry J. Kuss, was established in the Pentagon 
which was called, somewhat euphemistically, ’Office for International Logistics Negotiations’. 
This agency expanded their activities with the blessing of McNamara on an unprecedented 
scale, in close cooperation with the about twenty major weapon producing firms. Industry 
representatives accompanied Kuss on his sales missions to Germany.5 In Germany, the 
MAAG, counting over one-hundred employees, established day-to-day contacts with 
procurements officers in the German defence ministry.6 German military personnel was 
trained on US weapons, German supplies were processed and placed in the US supply system, 
maintenance of damaged weapons was provided, procurement services were extended, etc. - 
all, of course, against dollars.7
* NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63, 862a. 10/8-862, Box 2658, Freshman to Dowling: Your Meeting with Dillon, 8 
August 1962.
3 Armed Forces Management, January 1967, p.36. Journals like AFM and Defense Industry Bulletin, partly 
financed by the Pentagon, served as show-case for the US industry’s weapon production. They clearly show the close 
cooperation between the DOD and the major arms exporting firms. Most of these exports went via the Pentagon and 
as such they were registered as gains in the account of the Defense Department On this subject see also: Medick, 
Waffenexporte und Auswärtige Politik der Vereinigten Staaten, 1976 and Louscher, The Rise of Military Sales as 
a U.S Foreign Assistance Instrument’, in: ORBIS 20/1977, p.933-64. Only at the end of the 1960s, Congress became 
aware of the major foreign policy implications of McNamara’s sales offensive; see ch XI.
4 NA, RG 59, SF 1963, Box 3753, DEF 19-3US, Kuss Memorandum: Summary of Military Sales FY 64 Order 
Goals, 8 July 1963.
5 McGhee Papers, 1988add., Box 1, DOD/FMOD Conference in Bonn: List of Participants, 22 May 1963.
4 NA, RG59, SF 1963, Box 3760, DEF19-2 US-WGER, Bonn 3161,22 May 1963.
7 ’U.S. Foreign Sates Carry a Guarantee of Continued Logistics Support’ AFM, January 1967, p.71-72.
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Thus, the Pentagon was able to reap some revenue and, in particular, curtail the tremendous 
balance of payments impact the intensification of the Vietnam War had on its activities. The 
continuation of German orders became a core element in McNamara’s management of his 
department. His strong insistence on offset by military purchases even when the Federal 
Republic claimed to have no further need is derived from that.
Dillon and McNamara were mainly interested in a constant flow of offset funds and did not 
care very much what was sold and how this was done, as long as it did not concern sensitive 
material. Once the agreement was concluded it quickly became an institutionalised factor on 
which McNamara counted in his military-economic policy, particularly regarding the foreign 
exchange component of military expenditures, and on which Dillon relied in his efforts to 
stabilize the American balance of payments. Few thoughts were given to the longterm aspects 
of the agreements.
A similar pattern emerged in Germany. As reported, the negotiations were conducted and 
concluded by BMVg officials, apart from a last minute intervention by the Finance Ministry 
which achieved only a short delay. It seemed a deliberate policy by the German defence 
ministry to keep other ministries out of the offset process. As long as the offset funds were 
covered by the defence budget, the Finance Ministry would see no reason to take up the 
troublesome issue. Its officials had their hands full coping with British demands for offset; 
a task which they had assumed very reluctantly and after all other concerned ministries had 
declined to manage it (see ch.X).
The involvement of the Auswärtiges Am t in the offset process was also conspicuously low. 
At the end o f 1962, when Foreign Minister Schroder was questioned by Dillon about 
indications that the agreement would not be fully honoured, he displayed an almost awkward 
lack of knowledge on the subject.8 This is particularly striking if one remembers the 
important role the AA played in the support cost negotiations with the British after 1955. 
Even if we account for Schroder’s unwillingness to discuss the complicated problem at this 
level, it might well have been true that he knew very little about the details, as he claimed. *
* FRUS 1961-63, IX, conversation Schr&der-Dilton, 15.11.1962, p.157-9.
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Relations between him and Strauß were not particularly cordial. Furthermore, offset was in 
line with Schroder’s policy of close alignment to the US. His interest was that the BMVg 
took care of the issue, so that it might not interfere with the general conduct of German- 
American relations. What the AA was worrying about was the maintenance of the US troop 
level. However, it refused to accept its linkage to the level o f offset, even when it became 
increasingly obvious that this link took the form of official US government policy.9
Chancellor Adenauer also was unwilling to concern himself with such a technical matter. 
When McNamara tried to obtain Adenauer’s comments on the issue, the Chancellor just 
responded that the Pentagon chief should discuss offset with Blessing, the president of the 
Bundesbank, and with Abs, one of Adenauer’s principal advisers in monetary affairs; both o f 
them were at that time hardly experts on offset.10 In his memoirs there is no reference to the 
offset agreement.11
Thus, the Defence Ministry was left with a politically highly sensitive issue. This situation 
was not particularly harmful as long as the Defence Minister was Franz-Josef Strauß, a 
powerful figure in the cabinet and on the domestic political scene. He also was not the man 
to be susceptible to American pressure. However, his dubious role in the SPIEGEL affair put 
an unexpected stop to his career in late 1962. He was replaced by Kai-Uwe von Hassel, who 
distanced himself from the impetuous and energetic style of Strauß and had much less 
standing in the German cabinet. Von Hassel failed to initiate a change of policy on the offset 
issue which was vigorously pushed by the Americans, in particular by McNamara, every time 
he met them. It is unclear when the defence minister realized the limited rationality o f 
continuing with offset by military purchases and why he then did not put on the brakes. It 
might have been loyalty to Erhard which prompted him to adhere to the principle of offset 
until it was too late.
* PA-AA, B150/27/4, Memorandum Ref.Il(ll6): Frage eines Junktims zwischen...Truppenstationierung.^und 
Rüstungskäufen, 24 April 1964.
10 AAPD 1963, McNamara-Adenauer Talks, 31 July 1963, p.864-65.
11 With the result that the Adenauer-centred research on German-American relations until 1963 ignored the issue, 
like many fundamental economic problems, completely. See, for example, the almost complete absence of economic 
issues in Schwabe(ed), Adenauer und die USA (Rhöndorfer Gespräche, BdL14), 1994.
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When Erhard became Chancellor in 1963, the alliance with the US became his and his 
Foreign Minister’s, Schröder, all-important objective. This objective they had to defend 
against powerful critics at home. They expected the management of offset to occur in such 
a way as not to interfere with their coveted German-American relationship. Von Hassel 
himself was very Atlanticist and thus had every intention of assuring continued American 
support for the Erhard government. Dahlgrün, the Finance Minister, was no Schaffer. As a 
member of the smallest coalition party, the FDP, he developed no particular profile and was 
not the man to challenge the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister on policies they considered 
essential. As a result, nobody in the government took up the issue vigorously and initiated a 
re-negotiationing process with the Americans. This neglect was particularly blatant in the case 
of Erhard who by this very carelessness dug part o f his own political grave. Numerous high- 
level interventions by US officials should have warned him that some kind of a political time- 
bomb was ticking, or, at least, that the American side placed more importance on the 
'hardware* of mutual relations then on declarations of friendship.
Summing up, it appears that the management of offset was pursued on both sides with 
insufficient consideration to future political problems, in the interest of short-term political 
and economic objectives. Officials in the BMVg and McNamara's salesmen had considerable 
autonomy in pursuing their multi-billion dollar deals in a highly sensitive area of mutual 
relations, and of transatlantic relations in general.
Probably even more conspicuous than this was the absence of democratic control, due to the 
secrecy surrounding the agreements. Only very few members of Congress or of the Bundestag 
were aware of the deals and had a vague knowledge of what was going on. When the 
problem surfaced in 1966, most parliamentarians and the public were caught by surprise 
regarding the scope of the agreements. There had hardly been any discussion of the 
agreements in the press until signs o f trouble became overtly clear in early 1966.
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b) The second offset agreement and the institutionalization o f offset 
Shortly after the Gilpatric Strauß letter exchange of February 1962 was consummated, the 
Americans had directed their thoughts towards a successive agreement, providing for orders 
in CY 1963-64, and payments in FY 1964 and 1965. Somewhat to their surprise the 
negotiations proved short and not very complicated. The Americans, again headed by 
Gilpatric, had offered to extend their logistics cooperation to the Navy and the Air Force, 
including the U.S. mainland, which involved mainly the training of German soldiers in 
American facilities.
Additionally, the Germans sought a commitment by the US to extend the logistics cooperation 
to comprehensive wartime support. This was to assure a supply for German forces from bases 
abroad in the case of an attack which was thought to result in a substantial initial loss of 
German territory.12 Studies on this question were initiated.13 14*The US embassy saw several 
advantages in such a scheme. First, it would result in forging a stronger dependence of 
Germany on US material and shield American sales against competition from foreign or 
German weapon producers. Second, it would probably allow the US to sell some of its 
warstocks in Europe which were to be reduced anyway due to McNamara’s cost saving 
campaign. Finally, it would enhance US influence on German military policy. 'U nited States 
influence could also be exercised indirectly on significant FRG policy decisions, e.g. as 
counterweight to such remotet but nevertheless conceivable, factors as a Franco-German 
"third force" approach to European defense or any fu ture tendency o f the FRG to pursue an 
independent (be it neutralistic or adventurous) military policy vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc. ,M 
The offset agreement also served as tool to bind West Germany closer to the Atlantic 
Alliance.
NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63, Box 1276. 6U.62a/6-1262, Bonn A-1493: US/FRG Wartime Logistics Support 
Agreement, 12.6.1962.
13 McGhee Papers, 1988adcL, Boxi, MAAG to AmbassadonDOD/FMOD Conference, 22 May 1963; PA-AA, 
B 150/9, Memo of Understanding on the creation of a logistic system for wartime support, 1 August 1963.
14 NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63, Box 1276. 611,62a/6-1262, Bonn A-1493: US/FRG Wartime Logistics Support
Agreement, 12 June 1962.
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The new features were embodied in a second memorandum of understanding, signed on 14 
September 1962, again with very little public repercussions. The German side, however, 
already began to have second thoughts on the continuation o f offset. StrauB had insisted on 
inserting an additional clause which stipulated that offset payments would be made *subject 
to the availability o f funds’} 5 This proved to be a bad omen.
Already in August, reports had arrived in Washington that the German defence budget might 
be affected by growing German uneasiness about future strategic trends in NATO and about 
the country’s economic prospects.16 In October, it became clear that the Federal defence 
budget in 1963 would be much lower than both the US government and the BMVg expected, 
and lower than necessary in order to fulfill the goals agreed to in NATO defence planning. 
Adding a further blow, the BMVg specified that under these circumstances all new 
procurement orders would be stopped by January 1963 at least and payments for orders 
already made would be delayed.17 The uncertainty regarding the defence budget was part of 
a protracted political situation in Bonn.
Adenauer, against the opposition of part of his cabinet, occupied himself in achieving closer 
cooperation with the France of de Gaulle. France had always been particularly interested in 
arms cooperation and sales by its industry, and it was only prudent for the German 
government to wait with new orders until the outcome of Adenauer’s plans took concrete 
forms. Furthermore, the German Finance Ministry was insistent on limiting a further growth 
of the defence budget on which the Ministry of Defence had counted in their offset deals. 
StrauB was immobilized by the SPIEGEL affair and not able to put up a Tight for more 
money. It is quite likely that the BMVg officials who informed the Americans of the problem, 
painted an exaggerated negative picture to get the US government to exert pressure on 
Adenauer and the Finance ministry.18
11 McGhee Papers, 1988 add., Box 2, Memorandum of Understanding, 14 September 1962.
“  NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63, Box 2658. 762aJ/8-2362, Bonn 556, 23.8.1962; ibid, Bonn 597, 28.8.1962.
17 NA, RG 59, DF 1960-63, Box 1903, 762aJ/l 1-3062, Bonn A-1193. 30 November 1962.
» ibid.
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If this was the reasoning, it worked perfectly well. The Americans reacted fast and vigorously. 
The embassy in Bonn urged an approach to Adenauer by the President himself during the 
Chancellor’s forthcoming visit in November.19 Dillon and McNamara fully concurred with 
this idea. They pointed out that the German decision to delay the payment of $225m, which 
were expected to arrive before the end o f 1962, would swell the US payments deficit by this 
very amount. Both advised Kennedy to hit Adenauer strongly on this point.20 The President 
did not need much persuasion. Alluding to the Cuba Crisis, he told the Chancellor: ’Since our 
difficulties in October we had had to draw on our dollar resources even more and had since 
then heard the disquieting rumor that fo r  budgetary reasons the Federal Republic was 
expecting not to fu lfill this agreem ent... This would have a very bad psychological effect. ’2I 2
One day later, a strong-worded memorandum covered the points more specifically. As the 
United States was maintaining its full force in Europe, it felt it should *have the right to 
expect Germany, in turn, to do its fu ll share.,22 Therefore, the US requested an augmentation 
of the German defence budget. Another memorandum, ten days later, listed up German 
obligations under the offset agreement and warned o f ’disastrous consequences* in case 
payments would be deferred as announced.23
Apparently, this broadside convinced Adenauer and provided enough ammunition to overcome 
the resistance of the Finance Minister. Two weeks later, the Chancellor informed Kennedy 
that the projected defence budget would be augmented by an additional DM 1.1 bn ($275m) 
and that the StrauB-Gilpatric agreement would be fully honoured. He added that German 
defence expenditures now had reached their upper limit.24 The US government expressed its 
satisfaction with the steps taken. However, the peace did not last very long. With his famous 
press conference on 14 January 1963, de Gaulle effectively rocked the boat of Kennedy’s
n ibid., 11 -862, Box 1903, Bonn 1299: mcmcon Schiffers-Morris, 8 November 1962; 862a.10/11-1062, Box 
2658, Schiffcrs-Sullivan talks, 10 November 1962.
20 ibid.. Box 2658, 862a.l0/11-1362, Dillon/McNamara to Kenndy, 9.11.1962.
11 FRUS 1961-63, XV, Adenauer-Kennedy talks, 14 November 1962, p.435-6.
22 ibid., Memorandum Kennedy to Adenauer, 15.11.1962, p.444-3.
23 Kennedy-Adenauer Correspondence, compiled in the JFK Library, Boston: Kennedy to Adenauer, 25.11.1962.
24 ibid., Adenauer to Kennedy, 12.12.1962.
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European policy. The solemn signing of a Franco-German Treaty of friendship and 
cooperation only one week later appeared to the Americans like an act of utter provocation 
by Adenauer.
The Kennedy administration, in the follow-up, undertook a reappraisal of its European policy.
I will later analyse the effects o f this reappraisal on the issue of troop levels in Europe (see 
paragraph c). On the continuation o f offset, the crisis of trust in German-American relations 
had no direct impact. Initially, the US was deeply worried about a possible nuclear deal 
between France and Germany, and in addition a diversion of German military procurement 
to French sources. The Germans hastened to reassure the Americans on these points.25
Internally, however, the Germans were extremely sceptical as to whether they would be able 
to fulfill the agreement. French pressure was only one aspect in these apprehensions. Not only 
the difficult budgetary situation, but also the uncertainty regarding the future of NATO policy 
and Franco-German cooperation in the wake of the treaty, as well as the danger of increasing 
dependence from American sources were some of the reasons.26 Therefore, the BMVg 
declined stubbornly to commit itself to more than $1000m of payments during the term of the 
second agreement, using the safeguard clause in agreement.
The Americans, on the other hand, tried to extract from the Germans an unambiguous, loop­
hole-free commitment to full offset payments. The Treasury and Defense departments were 
particularly active. In mid-1962, the continuation of offset became, in the absence of other 
major successes against the balance of payments deficit, the highest priority in the Treasury. 
Dillon noted that a large part of the improvement in the balance of payments had been due 
to offset.27 With presidential approval, military offset agreements took uncontested 
precedence over previously equally valued efforts by the US to convince its allies to share
0  NHP, note on von Hassel-GHpatric talks, 13.2.1963; BA, NL. Blankenborn 152/1, Bonn Orcular Telegram re 
von Hassel-Gilpatric talks, 20.2.1963.
26 NHP, Brief for von Hassel re Conversation with Gilpatric, 6.2.1963; NA, RG 59, SF 63, DEF19 WGER, Bonn 
2176, 22.2.1963.
27 FRUS 1961-63, IX  Dillon to Kennedy, 14.11.62, p.155.
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the foreign aid burden.28 The Americans undertook initiatives to conclude military offset 
agreements with numerous other countries, including France, Italy, and Japan.29
Foremost in the considerations behind this policy was, of course, the balance of payments 
objective. On the occasion of the President’s trip to Bonn and Rome, Dillon urged the 
emphasizing of the importance of military offset agreements, ’which contribute so 
significantly to meeting our balance o f paym ents goals and which constitute from  the balance 
o f payments point o f view our top priority financial objectives in these countries. ,3° In the 
absence of other major breakthroughs in the fight against the deficit and in the absence of a 
political decision for large-scale reforms in the international monetary system, the offset 
mechanism had taken on the role of a palliative for coping with a fundamental monetary 
imbalance.
The sale of military hardware was considered, apart from these monetary reasons as 
advantageous from a business point o f view and also with regard to political objectives. 
Elaborating on the desirability of American-German co-production of a new tank, the US 
embassy in Bonn wrote that the 'the co-production technique ... offers [the] only realistic 
method fo r [the] future not only to get our share [of] German armaments orders but abo , 
and more importantly, to keep [the] Fedferal] Repfublic] closely tied to U.S. in conventional 
weapons.**1 A similar argument was used by Dillon: ’...we should move promptly to make 
sure that European countries place orders now fo r U.S. manufactured equipment, rather than 
make plans to meet their needs from  their own production or from  other foreign sources. ,32 *10
*  NA. RG 59. DF 1960-63, 862a.l0, 8-862, Box 2658, Freshman to Dowling, 8.8.1962.
*  France refused to buy more US weapons as long as the Americans refused to sell nuclear technology. Italy 
agreed on 19 September 1962 to buy a yearly SlOOm of military equipment in the US; however, this was coupled 
with US credits to Italy. See; JFKL, POF, Departments&Agencies: Treasury, Box 90, Dillon to JFK, 9 October 1962. 
In connection with the Vietnam War, numerous Asian countries also assumed offset obligations; see: LBJL, NSF, 
NSC Histories: The 1968 Balance of Payments Program, doc.9e. Military Account, 25 December 1968.
10 NA, RG 59, SF 1963, Box 3455, FN 12 WGER, Dillon to Ball, 31.5.1963.
11 NA, RG 59, SF 1963, Box 3769, DEF12 Armaments, Bonn 2817, 20.4.1963.
”  JFKL, POF. D&A: Treasury, Box 90. Dillon to President, 13.5.1963; see also: NA, RG 59, SF 1963, Box 
3753, DEF 19-3US, Kuss: Summary of Military Sales FY 64 Order Goals, 8.7.1963.
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In 1962-65, the Germans continued to buy heavily in the United States, due to the reasons 
cited in ch.VIII and also because of increasing US pressure. Among the largest items were 
again modem missile systems like PERSHING or SERGEANT. This led to a certain 
uneasiness in the State Department about the spread of these weapons. I f  the Chancellor (or 
von Hasset) suggests that Germany could meet its offset obligations by purchasing more 
Pershing missiles beyond the four battalions now contemplated, it would be advisable not to 
make any commitment but simply to agree to consider the request in the light o f other Allied 
strategic interests [le . a continued conventional build-up/. ,J1 In the end, those considerations 
were overcome by the need to meet the foreign exchange cost of the troops, estimated at 
about $ 1350m in FY 1963-1965.* 34
Despite the purchase of such expensive tools, the Germans lagged consistently behind 
schedule with their offset payments.3’ They refused to commit themselves to more than $lbn 
of offset in the two years covered by the second agreement.36 In July 1963, the US sent a 
long memorandum to the German government listing the advantages of the cooperative 
logistics system and requesting a firm commitment to a payment target of $ 1300m37. The 
same point was made by McNamara to Adenauer when the two met on 31 July. Von Hassel, 
who was present, said that because of increasing domestic production, Germany had to limit 
purchases abroad. He mentioned that the US had abandoned a scheme already agreed upon 
in April which would have allowed Germany to make up the gap by investment in US 
treasury bonds. McNamara denied that such an agreement had existed and threatened that, in 
case the offset target was not fulfilled, the US would have to reconsider its troop 
commitment. At that point, Adenauer cut the quarrel short by refering this subject to
DDRS 1979, 305B, Presidents European Trip, June 1963: Scope Paper Germany, 14.6.1963; see also: , 
McGhee Papers, 1988add, Box 1, Gilpatric to von Hassel, 8.5.1963.
34 NA, RG59, SF 1963, DEF13 US-WGER, Tyler to Rusk: Sale of Pershings/Sergeants to the FRG, 21.5.1963.
35 N A  RG 59. Box 3451, FN12US. Bonn 5, 1 July 1963.
36 N A  RG 59, SF 63, FN 12US, Box 3451, Bonn 374. 27.7.1963; see also: McGhee (1989), p.75-6.
37 N A  RG 59, SF 1963, FN12US, State/Treasury/Defense message, 16.7.1963.
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discussions of financial experts.38
Nevertheless, McNamara’s veiled threat was taken very seriously by the German government. 
Apart from budgetary considerations and the apprehension regarding one-sided dependence, 
the German reluctance to commit themselves to a fixed level of payments was fed by 
disturbing signs emanating from Washington. Increasing rumours threw doubt on the 
continuity of the US troop presence. In fact, the years 1962/63 saw a major debate within the 
American government regarding the future of its troop commitment to European defence.
c) The Troop Reduction Debate in the Kennedy Administration
The StrauB-Gilpatric agreement did not stop discussions in the US government about the 
adequate level of American forces in Europe. This had many reasons. Doubts about the 
continuation of offset were nurtured by delays in German payments. The balance of payments 
remained highly in deficit. After the erection of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Crisis, fears 
of direct Soviet aggressive acts subsided. A gradual acceptance of the Status Quo and the 
pursuit of some kind of detente in Europe became open objectives of US foreign policy. 
Apprehensions of irresponsible acts by the Germans diminished as the Federal Republic 
became politically, economically, and militarily increasingly accepted and stronger linked to 
the West. All those trends, which touched upon the rationales which once had led to the 
stationing o f US troops (see ch.I and VI) surfaced in the troop reduction debate o f 1962/63, 
whose outcome was to be of great importance to European-American relations in general and 
the offset story in particular.
As soon as the Berlin crisis subsided, the ratio behind the Acheson report lost logical force 
and the day-to-day concern of the balance of payments came to carry more and more weight.
“  AAPD 1963, McNamara-Adcnaucr Talks, 31.7.1963, p.864-65; see also: McGhee Papers, 1988ad&, Box 1, 
Bonn to Department of State on Adenauer-McNamaia Talks, 2.8.1963. During the same meeting, McNamara came 
up with a proposal that the Germans should acquire US logistic facilities in France which the Americans were about 
to close. A corresponding memorandum was signed on 1 August (NA, RG 39, SF 1963, Box .3766, DEF13 US- 
WGER, Bonn 971,14.9.1963). This set the stage for a major German-French row. The French explained that ’since 
Franco-US LOC [Line o f Communicationsƒ arrangements are on completely different basis from Franco-German 
arrangements (German used facilities being under French command) France did not see how US facilities could be 
transferred to Germans (ibi<L, Paris 1337, 19.9.1963).
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It has been already mentioned, that Kennedy himself was deeply sceptical about the wisdom 
of keeping so many troops in Europe. His frustration had mounted when reports showed that 
the ambitious goal of eliminating the balance of payments deficit at the end of 1963 would 
not be accomplished. Attacks against the Europeans which were not ready to increase their 
conventional force level multiplied, most bluntly perhaps during a tense discussion with the 
French Minister for Cultural Affairs, André Malraux, on 11 May 1962. An ill-tempered 
Kennedy repeated several times that the US would be happy to leave Europe if that was what 
the Europeans wanted. 7 /  it is desired that we should cease to cany the load in Europe, 
nothing would be better from  our point o f view - it has now cost us about $1300.000.000 to 
maintain our forces in Europe and the savings on these forces would just about meet our 
balance o f payments defic it... We fee l like a man carrying a 200-pound sack o f potatoes, and 
other people not carrying a similar load, at least in potatoes, keep telling us how to carry our 
burden. 09
The expression of such sentiments by the President encouraged those sections in the 
administration which saw the forces in Europe as a wasting asset. They had their champions 
in McNamara and Dillon. Opposed to reductions was the State Department (although Rusk 
was somewhat ambiguous), which still saw the European theatre as of paramount importance 
to US foreign policy objectives and therefore accorded to the 7th army a political importance 
which went much further than military and financial considerations. The consequence of this 
conflict was a long drawn-out controversy in the administration.
Very rapidly after the Berlin Wall had been erected and US troops had been augmented by 
about 40.000 men, the DOD tabled first plans to bring the costly reenforcement back. The 
army and the State Department thought this much too early and weighed in successfully 
against such precipitate action.40 No reductions were effected in early 1962, but the planning 
in the Defense Department went ahead - not only regarding the reenforcement but also the
*  FRUS 1961-63, XIII, p.695-701.
* ’While the messages received here do not expressly slate so it is believed that gold drain from  the US was 
central among considerations behind the orders to USAREUR’ USAREUR to Dowling, 11.1.1962, McGhee Papers, 
1988 add., Box 1. See also: JFKL, NSF, Depts & Agencies: DOD, Box 275, Taylor to President, 9.12.1961; FRUS 
1961-63, XIV, telcon Rusk-Kohler, 15.1.1962, p.760; FRUS 1961-63, XIII, Rusk to McNamara, 20.1.1962. p.356-7.
179
regular forces. Nobody in the administration took the President’s orders to reduce the foreign 
exchange component in the expenses of their departments more seriously than McNamara. In 
mid-July, he had compiled an impressive list of saving measures, called Revised Project 8, 
which were to reduce the balance of payments impact of defence expenditures by about 
$lbn.* 41 McNamara considered in his project large-scale reductions in the regular 7th army, 
at a magnitude of about 44.000 men in a long-term perspective. He made no secret of his 
opinion that he considered the bulk o f these forces as unnecessary expense. Based on new 
assessments of the Soviet threat which set Warsaw Pact military capabilities much lower than 
previously estimated,42 he thought large reductions possible with regard to the military 
situation and, anyhow, necessary from a balance of payments point of view.
The Department of State reacted alarmed. In its view the Berlin crisis was not yet over and 
advance consultation with the allies was necessary even before reducing the Berlin roundout 
forces.43 However, one factor was undeniable: gold losses in the first half of 1962 reached 
alarming degrees.44 Faced with this predicament the State Department was fighting a 
continuous rearguard campaign in the troop level issue. During 1962, as long as the studies 
on Project List Vin went on. State managed to fend off DOD and Treasury pressure for large- 
scale reductions. In the meantime, the Americans continued with their concerted effort to get 
the Europeans to build up their conventional forces. Much has been written on other places 
about the basic disagreement on strategy between the US and Germany in these years.43 
Whereas the Americans pointed to the necessity of avoiding immediate recurral to nuclear 
warfare the Germans talked about the inferiority of their forces which had no tactical nuclear 
weapons at their disposal.44 Behind the German arguments were further considerations.
41 Total annual defence ouUays entering the American balance of payments were about S3bn/year In 1961; JFKL, 
NSF. Mectings&Memoranda, NSAM 171. Box 337. Revised Project Eight, 10 July 1962.
41 Enthoven/Smith, How much a  enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-69. 1971.
43 NA. RG 59, D F 1960-63.740.56311/5-1762. Fessenden to Johnson. 17.5.1962; FRUS 1961-63. X m . Johnson 
to Nitze, 23.5.1962, p.394-5.
44 FRUS 1961-63, IX, Report by Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments to President, 27.7.1962.
43 see ch.Vm . fn.43.
44 The disagreement is well summarized in an exchange between Adenauer and Kennedy on 14 November 1962; 
see: FRUS 1961-3, Xm. p.452-3.
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Firstly, the nuclear dilemma of the Federal Republic which had to insist on forward defence 
and an immediate use of all available weapons to deter any attack on its territory. Any doubts 
about the American willingness to use all its firepower for the defence of Germany limited 
the credibility of deterrence and impinged directly on the German security. For this reason, 
the Germans tried in the late 1950s and 1960s consistently to get a stronger voice in the 
planning for the use of nuclear weapons.47 Secondly, once again, economic reasons played 
an important role. Accordingly, Strauss informed Adenauer that the conventional program the 
US wished was financially impossible and strategically undesirable.48 A fundamental 
dilemma of German foreign policy throughout the 1960s appears in this context. Having 
renounced the possession of nuclear weapons, the Federal Republic was effectively unable to 
live up to its own Cold War rethorics by conventional means. As long as it did not change 
its rigid stance in the East West conflict and achieved some kind of accommodation with the 
Eastern bloc, it would remain necessarily dependent on the US and its troops. It would be 
unable to get rid of its dependence by conventional means, and even if it effected a large 
buildup, the danger of American withdrawals mounted. This created the political and military 
necessity to assure the American troop presence by all means, including offset.
Whereas in 1962, Kennedy, despite McNamara’s efforts, shied away from provoking a crisis 
with Europe over troop reductions, his thinking changed strongly in 1963. The major event 
responsible for this change might have been the mentioned crisis in German-American 
relations provoked by the Franco-German treaty of January 1963. However, already some 
weeks before the General’s press conference, the President had clearly indicated his 
impatience with European defence efforts. In a discussion with the military leadership in 
December 1962, the President, referring to the gold outflow and the limited military 
rationality of forward-basing so many troops, questioned strongly the necessity of the US *4
47 Whether German politicians actually strove for ownership of nuclear arms is still debated; see: Ahonen, 
’FJ.Strauss and the German Nuclear Question, 1956-62’, in: Journal of Strategic Studies 18/1995, p.25-41. For an 
argument which explains the Berlin crisis convincingly with Soviet fear of German nuclear ambitions see: 
Trachtenberg, T h e  Berlin Crists', in: Trachtenberg (1991), p.170-73.
44 NHP, Strauss to Adenauer, 21.12.1962; for the strategic dilemma and economic reasoning, see: NHP, Talking 
Paper for Meeting with the President, 18.11.1961; ibid., Results of Talks between AA and BMVg in Munstereifel, 
June 1962; BA, NL Carstens, 620, Draft protocoil on BMVg - AA colloquium, February 1963..
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effort.49 McNamara immediately promised a plan to withdraw 50-70.000 men from Europe. 
The President’s frustration was heightened by de Gaulle’s veto over the UK entry to the EC 
and the signing of the Franco-German treaty in January 1963. All this came on top of an 
already manifest unease in the administration about the handling of the Skybolt affair with 
the British.50 Altogether, these events blatantly exposed the contradictions and conflicts 
governing the relations in the Western Alliance.
Kennedy’s reaction was impetuous. He requested a sweeping reappraisal of US policy towards 
Europe, including the American troop presence, based on a ’cold, hard’ attitude in order to 
preserve US interests. *As soon as the French have a nuclear capability, the President 
continued, we have much less to offer Europe and the Europeans may conclude that 
continuing their ties with us will create a risk that we will drag them into a war in which they 
do not wish to be involved. I f  we are not vital to Germany, then our NATO strategy makes 
no sense. The President said that we must not perm it a situation to develop in which we 
would have to seek economic favors from  Europe. H e thought we should think now about how  
we can use our existing position to p u t pressure on the Europeans i f  the situation so demands 
... He thought we should be prepared to reduce quickly, i f  we so decided, our military forces 
in Germany.tSl
Bad news from the monetary front were strongly on the President’s mind during these 15
DDRS 1995/1787, memcon JFK. McNamara, JCS, 27 December 1962.
30 In mid-1962, McNamara had cancelled, to the shock of the British government, the further development o f 
the Skybolt rocket, due to technical deficiencies. This rocket had been promised to the British as delivery system and 
was essential for maintaining an independent British deterrent. When Macmillan shortly afterwards met Kennedy in 
Nassau, he categorically asked the Americans to provide a substitute. Despite heavy misgivings -the Kennedy 
administration pursued a policy of non-proliferation and would have liked to see a phase-out of the independent 
British nuclear force-, Kennedy acceeded to the British demands. Later on, Kennedy felt that Macmillan had pushed 
him into the comer and even LBJ was still haunted by the fear that the British Prime Minister, Wilson, would 'do  
the Macmillan* on him. Opponents of the concessions to Britain thought that de Gaulle might take the implicit snub 
badly and retaliate with an assault on Britain's application for EEC membership. This actually happened, though other 
reasons played a more important role in de Gaulle's veto. For the very interesting Kennedy-Macmillan talks, see 
FRUS 1961-63, X lll, p.1088-1115. Kennedy afterwards commissioned a long study on the mistakes made in the 
Skybolt-affair (JFKL, NSF, Meetings &  Memoranda, Box 322, Neustadt Report to the President: Skybolt and Nassau,
15 November 1963). It was later transformed into a book by the author (Neustadt R^ Alliance Politics, 1970). An 
excellent study on the issue is Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship, 1994. On the British EEC 
application and related aspects, see the articles in Grifflths/Ward(ed), Courting the Common Market, 1996.
51 FRUS 1961-63, XIII, Summary record o f NSC Executive Committee Meeting 38 (pt.II), 25.1.1963, p.488-89. 
See also his remarks to the NSC, ibid., 22.1.1963, p.484-87.
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remarks. The situation at the beginning of 1963 seemed bleak. Treasury expected further 
substantial gold losses during the succeeding months and reaching the revered goal of a 
balance of payments equilibrium seemed highly unlikely before I965.32 French policy with 
regard to its huge dollar reserves was incalculable. De Gaulle might cash in his dollar reserves 
at any time and thus provoked a major currency crisis. Kennedy felt that the American 
monetary weakness provided the Europeans with much o f their leverage against the US and 
he ordered Treasury to assess the relative monetary strengths of France and the US.53 54*
In the weeks after the Franco-German treaty the Americans undertook a vigorous effort to get 
the Federal Republic to an unambiguous declaration of adherence to the principles of the 
Atlantic Alliance and US-American postwar relations.34 The Americans succeeded with the 
famous Bundestag resolution, accompanying the ratification of the Franco-German treaty. A 
carrot in form of a renewed US initiative concerning the MLF was extended to the German 
government. Overshadowed by these diplomatic ramifications, the question of the future of 
the US troop commitment in Europe remained open. The issue showed up consistently on the 
agenda during the discussions of these weeks and formed one of the questions Kennedy put 
before the NSC Executive Committee which was to coordinate the reappraisal.33 During the 
discussion, the principal differences emerged. Whereas Dillon urged a reduction arguing with 
the balance of payments impact. Rusk remarked 'that we are in Europe not because the 
Europeans want us there but because we believe our presence there is essential to the defense 
o f the U S .'56
This was a basic point, and on this point Kennedy, supported by McNamara and Dillon, had 
serious doubts. To them, the US troop presence in Europe increasingly represented more a 
favour extended to the Europeans than a policy dictated by US interests, particularly from a
53 FRL'S 1961-63, IX, Kaysen to Kennedy, 21.1.1963, p.43-44; Dillon to Kennedy, 16.1.1963, p.159-60.
M JFKL, POF, D&A: Treasury, Box 90, JFK to Treasury, 19.1.1963; for Dillons answer, stressing the need to 
get the non-French countries to a cooperative policy regarding their dollar reserves, see ¡bid., Dillon to President, 24 
January 1963.
54 Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Staatsmann, 1991, p.810-26.
”  FRUS 1961-63, XIII, p.156-7.
M ibid., p. 161.
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monetary perspective. Typical of this is the letter Kennedy wrote to Adenauer the day after 
this discussion. He mentioned the * $45bn and 16 years of American economic and military 
assistance’ which had brought nothing but hositility, and warned of a new isolationism in the 
United States.57 There was a considerable amount of self-deception in these statements which 
were to become so common during the 1960’s. The Europeans, for the most part, saw US 
postwar policy not just as dictated by altruism but also by what one might call 
euphemistically enlightened self interest. If the continued presence of the US troops was 
consistently being presented as a favour and a burden for the US it was clear that the hard- 
nosed Macchiavellians Adenauer and de Gaulle were easily able to put the sincerity of the 
commitment in doubt
The President was not convinced by the State Department claim as to the continuing 
importance of having troops in Europe. He raised his doubts about the stalemate situation in 
Europe soon after the January debacle in a meeting with the JCS. Kennedy urged the military 
to come up with plans ’as to how much we can reduce our forces in Europe in the next 12  
months*. He denounced the insufficient defence efforts of the allies, cited the reduced military 
threat in Europe (calling it ’about the eigth on the list of trouble spots’), and proclaimed it 
as ’absolutely essential for us to protect our monetary position...Eventually we will have to  
confront them [the Europeans] with the fa c t that either they must pay or we will have to cu t 
back*?* His remarks summarized the arguments of the reduction proponents: the unlikeliness 
of a crisis in Europe, based on an implicit recognition of the status quo (which was at 
variance with the German reunification postulate); the vulnerability of the dollar, interpreted 
as a sign of political weakness o f the United States; the frustration regarding the 
unwillingness o f the Europeans to accept American strategic views and to live up to an 
equitable sharing of the defence burden. Similar concerns were summarized in a memorandum 
by McGeorge Bundy of March 1963. ’One might conclude from  a general perusal o f these 
papers [ ie . the results o f the reappraisal o f American policy towards Europe; HZ] that the  
twenty year involvement o f U S. forces in Europe may well be extended another twenty years 
or even more. In  spite o f US. difficulties with the political, social and economic problems o f
ib id ., Kennedy to  Adenauer, 1.2.1963, p .164-65.
*  FRUS 1961-63, XIII, Memorandum for the Record, 28.2.1963, p.516-18.
184
Western Europe, its crushing burden o f expenditures on armaments, and the potentially 
destructive erosion o f the U .S monetary position, little consideration is ever given to ways o f 
reducing the impact or effects o f these issues’59. Bundy conceded, however, that reductions 
without compensatory moves by the Soviet Union were dangerous, and that thorough advance 
consultation with the allies was necessary.
The State Department complemented those counter-arguments with a long list of its own 
against reductions. Reductions might heighten the present uncertainty in NATO regarding 
future military strategy, they might signify the abandonment of 'flexible response', play into 
de Gaulle’s hands, weaken American political influence in Europe and particularly in 
Germany, and, finally, according to the DOS, the balance of payments gain would be 
relatively small compared to other corrective measures.60 An additional reason for avoiding 
precipitate moves in early 1963 was the forthcoming Kennedy visit to Germany in June.61
This point carried the day and Kennedy was careful not to commit himself to any specific 
action during his visit, which was a spectacular success.62 Kennedy also avoided a clear 
statement on foreign military expenditure during his second balance of payment message to 
Congress in July 1963.63 He emphasized particularly the need to improve the 
competitiveness of American trade and proposed an 'Interest Equalization Tax' to increase 
the cost of borrowing in the United States for foreigners.
The emphatic reaffirmation of German-American friendship during Kennedy's trip did not 
stop the planning for reductions in the DOD. It continued along several tracks. There was first 
the slow reduction of the Berlin reenforcement (from a peak level of 273.377 in June 1962, *4012
”  LBJL, VPSF, Box 4, Burris to LBJ: McBundy re European Policy, 13.3.63.
40 NA, RG 39, SF 1963, DEF 6 US/NATO, Johnson to Rusk: Political Effects of Troop Withdrawals from 
Europe, 173.1963; Bruce to Rusk, 213.1963; FRUS 1961-63, IX, Rusk to McNamara, 7.6.1963, p.66.67.
41 NA, RG 59, SF 1963, US 6-8NATO, Box 3749, Johnson to Rusk, 93.1963.
42 See his speeches in the Paulskirchc/Frankfurt, 23.6.63, and in Naples, 2.7.1963, in: DAFR 1963, p.203-211; 
AAPD 1963, Kennedy-Adenauer talk, 24.6.1963, p.670. The President, however, warned Adenauer that recent events 
in Europe had evoked doubts in the US as to the wisdom of keeping the troops there; ibid.
«> PP Kenndy:1963, p374-84.
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the troop strength in Germany fell to 241.222 in September 196364), second the cut-down 
in non-combat troops, and finally, highly sensitive, plans to reduce a considerable portion o f 
combat troops over the long range. Those plans had received a new boost when in the first 
half of 1963 the administration began to review its previous balance of payments policies. In 
April, Kennedy had a long meeting with his principal advisers to discuss new ways of solving 
the balance of payments problem.65 Asked about possible actions by Defense, McNamara 
replied that he expected a net adverse balance o f $1.6-1.7bn a year in the military account 
over the next years, provided the offset agreement is continued at the present rate. McNamara 
doubted this and thought the only way for large savings was by effecting troop reductions, 
mainly by thinning out units.66 Asked by the President about the deficit in the military 
account he stated that the *only way to improve our position was to reduce troop  
deployments...this can be done without reducing our effective military strength. *67
Following this meeting, Kennedy charged the Secretary of Defense with presenting a program 
in July which would achieve foreign exchange savings o f $300-400m in the Defence 
account.68 *The proposals McNamara presented in July were coordinated with the State 
Department and contained only minor reductions in Europe.64 However, as soon as the m ajor 
part of McNamara's proposals was approved, the President requested the next program. T h is 
time savings without actual reductions in effectives were no more possible.70 In September, 
the new program was on the President’s desk. In the European theatre, it proposed the  
removal of about 50% of l)S combat aircraft (according to the plans made possible by a  
greatly increased missile force), the reduction of the army by 30.000 to about 205.000 m en,
64 NS A, The Berlin Crisis, Doc 1924, The Replacement and Augmentation Systems in Europe, March 1964, p .63 .
*  FRUS 1961-63, IX, Memo for the Record: Meeting with the President, April 18, 24 April 1963, p.51-62.
46 ibid., p.60.
67 ibid.
“  ibid.. Memo Kennedy to Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments, 20.4.63, p.62.
w ibid, McNamara to Kennedy, 16.7.1963, p.68-73.
70 NA, RG 59, SF 1963, DEF6-8US/NATO, Box 3749, Schaetzel to Kitchen. 24.7.1963; ibid.. DEF6 US, Box 
3747, Popper to Schaetzel, 19.9.1963; ibid., FN12US, Dept.of State to Harriman, 19.7.1963.
as well as other streamlining measures.71 The plans were to be implemented until FY 1966 
and would produce estimated foreign exchange savings of $339m. Owing to the increased 
mobility of US forces, the Pentagon expected no significant weakening of US military 
effectiveness.
The State Department protested strongly and eloquently against such far-reaching cuts, 
arguing that they ’would be the gravest sort o f mistake, fraught with adverse political and 
psychological consequences, perhaps out o f all proportion to the intrinsic military 
significance, but, nevertheless, carrying a real danger o f jeopardizing our entire existing 
national security posture. '72 These measures would evoke fears of US disengagement from 
Europe, upset NATO, reduce significantly the military capabilities of NATO, and lead to 
political turmoil. The State Department recommended that studies in other balance of 
payments related fields with much larger saving potentials should be urgently pushed forward. 
The strong counter-attack proved successful. Kennedy accepted the State Department’s 
arguments and effected only limited reductions, particularly in Britain and France. Germany 
was spared. Presumably, the offset agreement together with loud German protest against 
minor reductions in summer 1963 played the central role in this decision.73 The President 
accompanied his decision, however, with the wish that a political base should be established 
from where they could proceed towards implementation o f the steps not accepted.74 75
This result was formulated as policy guidance in a National Security Action Memorandum 
(NSAM 270).73 Rusk was charged with publicly announcing the government’s intention to 
effect at the moment no combat force reductions in the European theatre. At the end of 
October, the Secretary of State traveled to Europe and visited Germany. In a programmatic 
speech at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt, he outlined the government’s position on troops in
1 8 6
71 FRUS 1961*63, IX, p.94-96.
71 FRUS 1961-63, IX, Rusk to Kennedy, 18.9.1963; this memo was based on NA, RG 59, SF 1963, DEF 1US. 
Box 3746, Johnson to Rusk, 16.9.1963. See also: ibid.. Kitchen to Rusk, 19.9.1963.
n FRUS 1961-63, IX, Dillon to LBJ, 2 December 1963.
74 FRUS 1961-63, IX, Bundy Memorandum for the Record, 23.9.1963, p.97-98.
75 ibid., NSAM 270, 29.10.1963, p.98-100.
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Europe in a phrase which should from then on become the official line on the subject for the 
succeeding years: *We have six divisions in Germany. We intend to maintain these divisions 
here as long as there is need fo r  them  -and under present circumstances there is no doubt 
that they will continue to be needed.76 The same statement was repeated by Kennedy in a 
press conference a few days later. The President reaffirmed that apart from some streamlining 
of non-combat personnel, the US would keep its six divisions in Europe 'as long as they are 
required.’77 No specific definition o f this ’need’ was given, and, likewise, no specific 
conditions were attached to the pledge. The discussion within the government had, however, 
stopped just short of linking the pledge directly with the continuation of offset. It was only 
a very small step towards the establishment of such a link as official policy; a majority in the 
US government probably already adhered to this view. Large-scale plans to reduce the troops 
in Europe were blocked for the following years; the 'streamlining', however, continued. At 
some moment during 1965, the official line changed: 'six’ was supplemented by 'five '.78
d) The Offset/Troop-Level Link becomes Official Policy
It came as a surprise to the Americans when, in summer 1963, on the occasion of a 600 men 
thinout in the Berlin garrison, the German government protested at the highest level. 
Adenauer personally intervened with Rusk. He argued that during the present negotiations on 
the nuclear testban treaty those reductions seemed a compliment for Khrushchev.79 The 
negotiations had renewed Adenauer’s suspicions about an impending deal between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. He was particularly vexed about a possible inclusion of East 
Germany as a contracting party.80 This might have constituted an implicit recognition of the 
East German state and thus undermined the 'Hallstein doctrine', a center piece of German 
foreign policy which held that West Germany alone represented the whole of Germany. 
Adenauer thought any detente moves potentially dangerous as they all moved towards some
76 DAFR 1963, Adress by Secretary of State Rusk in the Paulskiiche, Frankfurt, 27.10.1963, p.220.
77 ibid., p.222-3.
71 PSSD, reel XIII, p.781.
79 AAPD 1963, Rusk-Adenauer Conversation, 10.8.1963, p.973-75; ibid.; Knappstein to Carstens, 9.8.1963, 
p.965-67.
K> Schwarz (1991), p.846-51.
188
recognition of the Status Quo. For the US government, however, the Cuban crisis had marked 
the climax of the Cold War and any new conflict on European issues would have been 
extremely inconvenient due to the increasing American involvement in Vietnam.
When the German Foreign Minister Schröder visited Washington in September, Kennedy tried 
to reassure the Germans and indicated that the US had decided against troop cuts at the 
present moment. Schröder repeatedly stated that the German government was not against any 
reductions as long as there was consultation well in advance and time to prepare the public 
opinion.81 The President agreed with Schröder on this point. It may, however, well be that 
both men had a different idea of consultation. Schröder would have hardly accepted the 
definition of ’consultation’ outlined in NSAM 270: ’Possible redeployments o f US forces 
under consideration within the government should not be discussed publicly nor with our 
allies until a decision has been made and a politico-military plan fo r action approved. 
Following these steps, we should consult as appropriate with our allies before any public 
announcement is made, and then proceed with our intended actions. Wherever possible, action 
o f low visibility should be taken without public announcement. **
Whatever reassurance the Germans had taken from the Kennedy-Schröder talk, it was badly 
shaken by a series of official and unofficial public statements in the US soon afterwards. 
First, Eisenhower gave a widely reported interview where he recommended drawing down 
forces in Europe to one d iv is io n T h e n , on 19 October, Gilpatric delivered a speech which 
seemed to indicate reductions in connection with military exercise BIG LIFT in which the US 
trained the moving of large forces from the US to Europe and back. 'By employing such a 
multi-base capability the U.S. should be able to make useful reductions in its heavy overseas 
military expenditures without diminishing its effective m ilitary strength or its capacity to apply 
that strength swiftly in support o f its world-wide policy commitments.,M These remarks were 
accompanied by similar statements from Senators and other leading personalities, producing *
FRUS 1961-63, IX, Kennedy-Schroeder Conversation, p.86-87.
*  FRUS 1961-63, IX, NSAM 270, p.99.
Williams (1985), p.137-38.
AAPD 1963, p.1365, fn.3.M
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headlines in German newspapers.85
The timing of these announcements was particularly unfortunate from a German point o f 
view. The remarks occurred in the first weeks of Erhard’s chancellorship. The former 
Economics Minister had assumed the post only after long and bitter resistance by Adenauer 
who had humiliated his rival consistently.86 Erhard’s arrival was linked with a distinct 
reorientation of German foreign policy towards repairing the damaged relationship with the 
United States and taking a more independent stance towards de Gaulle. Discontent with 
Adenauer’s one-sided inclination towards France had been a major factor in increasing inner- 
party criticism directed against the aging Chancellor. However, Adenauer was not so easily 
put off. He kept the chairmanship of the CDU, and thus retained a major voice in German 
politics. Together with other heavy-weights, like Franz-Josef Strauß, he made no secret about 
his dislike for the ’atlanticist’ orientation of his successor’s foreign policy. Domestic debates 
on foreign policy were for the following years to be shaped mainly by this conflict between 
’Atlanticists’ and ’Gaullists'. News of impending US troop reductions therefore undercut the 
new Chancellor’s policy which was founded upon the steadfastness of the US commitment 
in Europe.87 They looked like a vote o f no-confidence for the new government and 
reenforced the arguments of de Gaulle and his supporters in Germany. The US troop presence 
had always been a major domestic issue in Germany; now it became directly linked with the 
fate of the Chancellor.
Erhard and Schroder immediately voiced their concern about the statements of Eisenhower 
and Gilpatric to the American ambassador, McGhee.88 The Germans repeated their 
apprehensions to Rusk on his visit in October. The Secretary of State showed them the draft 
of his Frankfurt speech and repeated the assurances o f the ambassador, not without saying that
** For example: FR, 21.10.1963, ’Gilpatric Announces Troop Cut* .
*  Körfer, Kam pf ums Kanzleramt, 1988.
91 This point was brought to the President’s  attention by McGhee; see: McGhee-Kennedy conversation, 19 
September 1963, McGhee Papers, 1988 add.. Box 1.
"  AAPD 1963, Erhard-McGhee Conversation, 22.10.1963; Schroeder-McGhee, 22.10.63, p.1359-71.
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the Federal Republic should take a broader look at the worldwide responsibilities of the 
US.89 90In his meeting with Defence Minister von Hassel, the Secretary o f State stated that 
the US position was influenced by two aspects. *(1) /ƒ NATO does not meet its force goals - 
and most member countries have not- how can we explain it to our people and justify our 
continuing to meet our goals? (2) The offset. I f  our gold flow  is not brought under control 
the question could become an issue in next year*s elections. The continuation o f Germany *s 
payments under the offset agreement is vital in this respect. *° There was hardly any doubt 
left what the condition for the continued US troop presence was. The German government did 
not fee) reassured by Rusk's speech. Talks with other countries affected by reductions 
reaffirmed their apprehensions.91 The assassination of Kennedy in November 1963 evoked 
new uncertainty concerning the future course of American foreign policy. It therefore became 
a major objective of Erhard to obtain a commitment of the new President to the assurances 
Rusk had given in his Frankfurt speech.
Lyndon B. Johnson sought to follow the policies of his predecessor. However, on the troop 
level issue the situation was still in flux. Despite the public assurances, the planning for 
further reductions had continued. Kennedy himself seemed eager to continue with the 
reappraisal.92 He had given orders to develop plans for implementing the elements of the 
McNamara proposals which had not been approved in October.93 However, firm decisions 
were still pending.94 This was the situation when Erhard went to Washington, shortly after 
the inauguration of Johnson as successor of Kennedy.
m ibid., Erhard-Rusk. 25.10.1963; Schröder-Rusk, 26.10.1963, p.1384-97.
90 McGhee Papers, 1988 add. Box 1, Memorandum on von Hassel Rusk talks, 25.10.1963.
91 The Japanese Foreign Minister, Ohira, reported US plans for deep cuts in US forces in Japan, and the British 
Labour Deputy, Brown, claimed during a conversation with Schröder that Kennedy in person had given him the 
impression that the US would withdraw soon. See: AAPD 1963, Ohira-Schröder, 7/8.11.1963, p.1421-22; Carstens- 
Brown, 27.11.1963, p.1507-09.
w JFKL, OHI R.G.Gilpatric, p.83-84.
"  DDRS 1992/3513, Background Paper for Erhard Visit: US Force Levels in Europe. 19.11.1963; NA, RG 59, 
SF 63, Box 3749, DEF6-8US/NATO, Johnson to Rusk, 21.10.63.
* McGhee Papers. 1988ad&, Box 1, MAAG to Ambassador, 18.12.1963.
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Dillon had furnished the new president with several memoranda for the meeting emphasizing 
the importance of the balance of payments problem. He termed the deficit and the gold drain 
the most serious present threat to American political and military leadership. According to 
Dillon, it had been caused in large part by military spending overseas and he felt the Germans 
should be made to realize their crucial role in this matter. * lf Germany wants the United 
States to continue its commitments in support o f the Alliance, Germany must be as helpful as 
possible in correcting pressures on our balance o f payments. m  He urged the President to 
press for lower German interest rates, for a continuation o f the policy of not exchanging 
dollars to gold, and, above all, for a firm offset commitment. 7n view o f our recent public 
assurances o f our intention to maintain the present level o f our combat forces in Germany 
"as long as they are required", it would seem appropriate and important to obtain Erhard's 
assurance that the FRG will continue to fu lly  offset U.S. dollar expenditures in Germany both 
in new orders and in actual payments fo r  "as long as may be required". It would seem to me 
that failure o f the FRG...to fully offset our defense expenditures in Germany would be as clear 
evidence as we could have that the current level o f U.S. forces in Germany was no longer 
required. '96
Johnson followed this advice though he did not explicitly link offset with the troop level. In 
his talks with Erhard, however, he repeatedly underlined the importance he attached to the 
continuation of offset.97 During a car trip on the grounds of the Johnson Ranch with the 
President personally behind the wheel, he pointed to the mounting criticism in his country 
because US troops remained now in Europe for such a long time despite modem airlift 
capabilities and the unfair division of burdens. Erhard insisted on the absolute necessity of 
maintaining existing troop levels and underlined this with the remark that in his opinion the 
GI’s felt very happy in Germany. Johnson quipped that he was sure they would feel even
** LBJL, NSF, Country file: Germany, Box 190, Dillon to LBJ, 13.12.1963; see also: ibid., Dillon to President: 
Late Report on Germany and our Payments Deficit, 20.12.1963; DDRS 1980/435A, Dillon to President, 18.12.1963.
*  LBJL, NSF, Country File: Germany, Box 190, Dillon to President: German Offset Agreement, 13.12.1963; 
see also: DDRS 1995/199, Bator to Bromley Smith ouUining the President’s  position on offset, 6.5.1964: '/.The U S  
prefers the status quo. 2. The status quo, however, has two components: offset purchases in the previoust agreed 
amounts and force levels. 3 J f the Germans unilaterally alter the status quo by not living up to their offset 
commitments, we shall certainly be forced to reconsider the question o f force levels'.
91 For the talks on 28/29 December, see: AAPD 1963, p.1672-1713; specifically p.1673-74, 1696,
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better at home.98 *The communique of the meeting contained a repetition of Rusk’s assurance 
in Frankfurt as well as a principal commitment of Erhard to the continuation o f offset."
The meeting made clear that pressure in the US on the' issue of troop levels would continue. 
The only change was one of emphasis: whereas Kennedy was haunted by the fear of gold 
losses, Johnson was more receptive to congressional criticism. The most important factor in 
the communique was the offset-troop level link which was implicit in it. With the onset of 
the Johnson administration, this became official policy for a majority in the US government. 
During the months to come, the Americans sought to put Erhard's principal promise into an 
agreed payments scheme for the 1962 agreement as well as to prepare the ground for a new 
agreement. There would be several opportunities to get the new policy across.
In April 1964, McNamara sent a draft memorandum for a new agreement covering the years 
1965/66. He intended to sign this memorandum on his visit to Germany in May. The German 
officials felt unease at the prospect of formalizing their Chancellor's promise of December 
1963.100 The Finance and the Economics Ministries expressed doubts whether the defence 
budgets of the succeeding years would be high enough to continue the practice of offset by 
military procurement. State Secretary Hopf from the BMVg agreed with these doubts, citing 
additionally the pressure from domestic armaments industries and increasing European co­
production. However, as AA and Chancellory officials explained, the political importance of 
continuing with the agreement had priority over these concerns. There were no illusions about 
the American insistence on a continuation of offset, though the Germans hoped they would 
be able to avoid a direct link between troop levels and offset.101 A formula pointing to the 
uncertainty of future military procurement levels was to be inserted to any new memorandum 
of understanding.102 103
“  ibid_, Erhard-Johnson Conversation in Stonewall/Texas, 28.12.1963, p.1699-170!.
"  EA 19/1963. p.D33-34.
100 AAPD 1964, Interdepartmental Meeting of German Ministries, 4.3.1964, p.504-06; BA, B 136/3133, memo 
for cabinet meeting, 5.5.1964.
>0> PA-AA, B150/27/4, Memorandum Ref.II(II6): Frage eines Junktims zwi$chen...Tnippenstaiioniening...und
Rüstungskäufen, 24 April 1964.
103 AAPD 1964, Interdepartmental Meeting, 4 May 1964, p.504-06.
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In May 1964, McNamara arrived in Bonn with two major objectives: to consummate the third 
offset agreement and to urge the Federal Government to come forward with tangible help in 
Vietnam. Erhard was non-commital as regards Vietnam. He added that it would be 
problematic to continue offset on previous levels due to budgetary problems and the 
increasing competition from German domestic industry for arms orders.103 McNamara 
remarked that Germany would do better to  manufacture for its exports than shifting to the 
production of military equipment. He concluded the exchange emphasizing the US *just 
cannot continue to maintain [its] forces in Germany without fu ll offset payments. ,UM In his 
conversation with von Hassel the Secretary of Defense was even more outspoken: *He wished 
to make clear that he was making no threats, but it would be absolutely impossible for the 
United States to accept the gold drain caused by the U.S. forces in Germany, if  Germany did 
not assist through continuation o f the O ffset Agreement* J 05 Von Hassel responded only 
’yes,yes’ and reminded McNamara that the German cabinet would not like such a link. The 
Secretary agreed that the link should not be made public, but 'privately there must be an 
association\m
This was the bluntest reminder of the offset-troop link the German government had ever 
received and thereafter that the German government could have had no illusions regarding the 
condition for the maintenance of the US troop level. Whether this threat was decisive for the 
signing of a further memorandum of understanding on the same day is difficult to determine, 
given the scarcity o f German documents. The Erhard government, in any case, accepted the 
commitment in order to preserve its overriding foreign policy priority: undisturbed relations 
with the United States. That this was an uncertain bet on the future was clear to all informed 
and there were many signs of misgivings within the government, not least in the 
memorandum itself which has been published in parts recently.107 The yearly rate of 
payments for 1965/66 was fixed at $1.35bn. The protocol contained a proviso that the
IQS
McGhee (1989), p.143-45; McGhee Papers, Bonn 1514: Offset Agreement, 11.5.1964. 
ibid.
DDRS 1995/3179, McNamara • von Hassel Talk, 11 May 1964. 
ibid.
AAPD, 1964, p.125. fiuZ
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contracting parties were aware of the difficulties regarding fulfilment of offset by military 
payments. This would only be possible if a corresponding need for weapons existed for the 
German forces and if satisfying this need from US sources made economic sense. In case a 
full military offset was not possible» negotiations should take place to determine other 
methods of offset.108 This wording is open to quite a degree of interpretation. Thereafter, 
the US left no doubts regarding its insistence on full military offset. However, it would seem 
that the Germans rightly felt that they were not obliged to meet this goal under all 
circumstances. We will refer back to this when dealing with the big crisis of offset in autumn 
1966 (see ch.Xl, fn.4).
The US administration tried to get the commitment reaffirmed on the occasion of Erhard’s 
visit in June 1964. Only the State Department still put up some resistance against the rapid 
erosion of the rationales which had once led the US government to station more than 300.000 
men in Europe. In a memorandum for the President, McGeorge Bundy expressed the new 
logic bluntly: 7  m yself agree with Dillon and McNamara, who argue that we should closely 
link the offset agreements and our ability to maintain troop levels. The Secretary o f State -o r  
his advisers-- say that this linkage would be "short-sighted and untrue". I  doubt i f  he is right, 
since our troop levels in Germany are justified, finally, more by the psychological needs o f 
the Germans than by strategic necessity. I f  the Germans will not pay for psychological 
comfort, why should we?’im When the President mentioned the problem in his talk with 
Erhard and expressed his expectation for full offset, Erhard reassured the President in this 
point.110 Again he emphasized the preeminence of the German-American alliance in all his 
considerations. He had few choices left between an unbending Cold War policy, punctuated 
by a few timid steps of Ostpolitik, and an equally unflinching repudiation of Gaullist policies.
Internally, however, the German government was increasingly preoccupied. Very soon it 
became all too obvious that Erhard’s promise was far from easy to fulfil. It was clear that a
LB JL, Country F ile : G erm any, Box 191, 11 June 1964.
AAPD 1964, Conversation Johnson-Erhard, 12 June 1964, p.656-659.
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new offset pattern would require an initiative at the highest level.* 111 This did not happen, 
neither in 1964 nor in 1965.
e) Offset and German Defence Budget, 1965
During 1965, German payments were falling more and more behind the schedule. When the 
Americans received first reports about the lag in meeting the offset-commitment, they 
interpreted it as the recurrence of problems with previous agreements which in the end, 
despite many complaints by the Germans, had always been fulfilled. This was a mistaken 
assumption. It was precisely the fulfillment of the previous agreement which had heavily 
mortgaged the 1965/67 offset. To meet the payment goal of the second memorandum of 
understanding in time, the German defence ministry had advanced huge payments to the US 
Treasury account destined for purchases of weapons. Much o f these advanced payments were 
on orders which would be delivered much later, and even on orders not yet placed.112 The 
BMVg thus had reinitiated the policy o f advance payments on armaments orders which had 
been so common in the 1950s. The problem was that this time a major build-up phase was 
nowhere in sight. Both military and economic reasons meditated against a further increase in 
the Bundeswehr equipment. The American embassy was advised of these problems during 
several briefings by BMVg officials. According to them, the German forces had reached their 
’consolidation phase* after the rapid build-up during the Berlin Wall crisis.113 They were 
fully equipped with modern material, up to the point that they lacked trained personnel to use 
their weapons as well as storage sites to protect them. Numerous indications show that the 
saturation point might have been reached already in 1963/64 when Germany, on a large scale, 
began to give away military surplus material. Countries ’benefitting* were Israel, Greece,
ibid., AA memorandum, 28 December 1964, p.1565-7.
111 McGhee Papers, 1988 add., Box 1, Bonn A-341: Review of Recent Trends and Future Prospects of the
German Defense Program and the Offset Agreement, 30 August 1965.
115 ibid.; see also: ibid., Blaser to McGhee: Outlook for the Offset Agreement as revealed by the Attitude of the 
Germans during Mr.Kuss* visit, 8 October 1965.
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Turkey as well as numerous developing countries.114
Another structural problem accompanying the ’consolidation* of the German forces was the 
rapid increase in operating costs, such as wages, social benefits, repair of equipment, etc. This 
was intensified by strong competition for manpower by the German industry in a labour 
market which was close to full employment, leading to a general rise in German wages during 
these years. Consequently, the share of funds earmarked for procurement declined in case of 
a stagnating defence budget.
According to the BMVg officials, it was also the unclear military strategic situation in the 
Alliance which suggested the discontinuation of the immense procurement program of the 
early 1960s. The debate evoked by the new strategic ideas of the Kennedy administration was 
still unresolved. The intricate discussion about future NATO strategy almost paralysed NATO 
military planning; the French completetely refused to go along, and the British pursued their 
own agenda, largely dictated by economic objectives. The MLF was in a state o f agony since 
the end of 1964, and only the German government still stood firmly behind the idea. Force 
planning exercises for the late 1960s were of course volatile and superficiel in this situation, 
and nobody knew exactly on which kind of forces and on how many the NATO alliance 
would agree in the end.115 This was not the ideal situation for continuing with major 
investment in new weapons systems. Nor did the trend towards detente with the Eastern bloc 
add incentives to invest in new arms. The absence of a crisis situation in Europe made neither 
rapid agreement on strategic concepts nor heightened military preparations seem very likely.
Even if the circumstances described above had been more conducive towards a continuation 
of offset, the German government would still have faced another major problem: where to get 
the money from to pay for new purchases. The years 1965/66 saw the Erhard goverment 
desperately struggling to balance its budget. During the election year 1965 the government *1
114 The old M48 tanks, for example, were transferred via Italy to Israel, based on an understanding between 
Erhard and LDJ; see: DDRS 95/924, Department of State to Bonn embassy, 18 June 1964; AAPD 1964, Memo 
Ministerialdirektor DrSachs, 22 December 1964, p.1559; AAPD 1965, Memo Carstens: Appendix IV: Conversation 
Schroder, von Hassel, Carstens, 29 July 1963, p .l l . Thiel, Dollar-Dominanz, Lastenteilung und Amerikanische 
Truppenpräsenz in Europa. 1979, p.46.
111 Haftendom, Kernwaffen und die Glaubwürdigkeit der Allianz. D ie NATO-Krise von 1966/67, 1994.
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had greatly expanded social programs for veterans, families, fanners and elderly people; it h ad  
lowered taxes, and introduced a broad array of subventions amounting to over DM 6 b n ." 6 
Already before the elections the Finance Minister warned Erhard of the imminent unsettling 
of the budget and the government tried to put on some breaks.117 The elections in O ctober 
1965 were a big triumph for Erhard. The investment had paid off; however, the bill w as  
presented immediately. Required by the constitution to present a balanced budget, th e  
government had to cut back government programs on all levels and to go back on some o f  
the election promises. The damage for Erhard was considerable. Even in its reduced form, th e  
budget still rested on the assumption o f greatly increased tax revenues in 1966. The defence 
budget had been particularly affected by the cutbacks. It stagnated at DM17.5bn (in  
comparison: 1962, DM14.9bn; 1963, DM 18.3bn; 1964, 19.1bn; 1965, DM17.3bn).118 
Because of the inevitable rise o f fixed costs this particularly curtailed the available funds fo r  
procurement.
From mid-1965 onwards, almost no new orders and payments were made. The A m erican 
government realised that intervention on the highest level was needed. Erhard’s visit in  
December 1965 presented the obvious opportunity. State disagreed again with Treasury an d  
Defense as to how strongly offset was to be linked to troop levels; all agreed, however, th a t 
the President should press the Chancellor strongly to fulfill the agreement.119 According to  
McGhee, Johnson spared no effort. ’Towering’ over the Chancellor, ’gesticulating and  
speaking in a strong strident voice’, he lectured Erhard like a school boy.120 The President 
was incensed at the lack of German support in the Vietnam theatre. On top of that, they 
would not even honour their offset commitments.121 Johnson said that the quarterly balance
114 SP IEG EL 43/1966, 17.10.1966; Hildebrand, Von Erhard zur Grossen ¡Coalition, 1983, p.123-126.
,,T ibid., p.135.
118 McGhee Papers, 1988 add, Box 1, memcon Dahlgrun-McChee, 9 November 1965; Btaser to McGhee,
8 October 1965. This figures should not be confounded with the actual expenditure detailed in table 1, App.I.
1,9 DDRS 1995/200, Position Paper on Offset for Erhard visit, 15 December 1965.
120 McGhee, Present at the Creation, 1988, p.183-5; see also: McGhee Papers, 1988 add, Box 1, memcon Erhard- 
LBJ, III of III, 20 December 1965; McGhee to Leddy, 13 January 1966.
111 AAPD 1965, Erhard-Johnson conversation, 20 December 1965, p.1938-42.
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of payments figures would soon be published and demanded an immediate lumpsum payment 
of $100m. Erhard emphasized his own difficulties and promised to do what he could. In their 
last meeting, after the communique had already been formulated, the President came back 
again on these points. He 'asked the Chancellor if he understood correctly that the FRG 
would honour the (offset) agreement. The Chancellor nodded agreement’.122 * The 
communique stated that the offset 'agreements were o f great value to both governments and 
should be fu lly  executed and continued. 'm  This rather unenthusiastic approval of Erhard's 
was interpreted by the Americans as a new fixed commitment.
This raises the question as to why the German government did not try to renegotiate the 
agreement instead of committing itself to new payments which it knew it would hardly be 
able to make. Certainly, the Germans were up for heavy weather if they approached the US 
with such proposals but it would seem an alternative preferable to the certain risk of a major 
embarrassment when the cards had to be put on the table. The scarcity of German sources 
allows only hypothetical answers to this question. Preparatory efforts for renegotiations were 
apparently made. Already by the end of 1964, the AA  planned to approach the BMVg, 
formally responsible for offset, with such an initiative. However, the project was repeatedly 
delayed and nothing happened.124 A major reason for this was probably the prospect of a 
major row with the Americans during the election year 1965. Erhard would not open this 
Pandora box. After his triumph in October, he might have entertained some hopes that he 
could get some concessions without a major crisis; the treatment during his December visit 
in Washington dispersed those quickly. Instead of taking an initiative, the German government 
hoped that the situation might resolve itself by muddling through. However, it could hardly 
foresee that during the year of 1966 a series of unforeseen circumstances would propel offset 
to a central place in German-American relations and in the domestic discussion of both 
countries.
133 McGhee Papéis, 1988 add.. Box 1, memcon LBJ-Erhaid, 21.12.1965.
133 PP Johnson 1965, pUI, p.1165-7.
134 AAPD 1964, note Ministerialdirektor Sachs, 28.12.1964, p .1565-67, esp. fn.13.
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CHAPTER X
THE CULMINATION OF TH E BURDEN-SHARING CONFLICT: CHANCELLOR 
ERHARD*s VISIT TO  WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 1966
a) The McNamara - Von Hassel Meeting, May 1966
This chapter resumes all the threads laid out in the previous ones in order to give a 
comprehensive picture of the crisis in which many of these developments culminated. During 
Chancellor Erhard’s visit to Washington in September 1966, and the months that preceded it, 
all the problems inherent in the offset conflict emerged to the surface, interrelating and re­
enforcing each other, resulting in a postwar low in German-American and German-British 
relations.1
Most German experts concerned with the execution of the offset agreements became quickly 
aware that a continuation of full offset by purchases o f weapons after 1967 was practically 
impossible. It also became apparent that the targets agreed upon in the von Hassel-McNamara 
protocol of 1964 would be reached -if at alt- only by counting non-military purchases or other 
substitutes. During a cabinet meeting in March 1966, the Ministers of Defence and Finance 
as well as the Bundesbank, which began to take part in the deliberations concerning offset, 
noted furthermore that without a supplementary budget later in the year it would be 
impossible to honour the agreement.2 The ministers foresaw a prospective gap of about 
$700m in orders at the end of 1966 and of $1130m in payments in June 1967. The decision 
to proceed with a supplementary budget, however, was postponed because it would have 
required difficult compromises among the parties (CDU/CSU/FDP) of the strained coalition 
government in Bonn. It was decided to sound out first the Americans as to their acceptance 
of alternatives to arms purchases.
1 German-British Offset, which during the early 1960$ had been marginalized compared with the scope of the 
US-FRG agreements, plays an important role in this context. A short account of German-British offset, 1960-66, will 
be inserted as necessary background.
1 Military Diary von Hassel, entry of 25 March 1966; B A  B136/3135, Excerpt from the 20lh Cabinet Meeting,
25 March 1966; Oslerheld, Aussenpolitik unter Bundeskanzler Erhard, 1992, p304.
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On 14 May, von Hassel and McNamara met in Washington. The German Defence Minister 
disclosed publicly that he expected a payment gap of $600m in 1967 when the term of the 
agreement ended, and that the German government wanted to abolish the strict formula of 
offset by military orders. Von Hassel’s appeal failed. McNamara retorted that in this case the 
U.S. would reduce its forces in proportion to the payment gap/1 *These statements provoked 
a strong public reaction, and angry comments in Germany.4 The spokesman of the German 
government denied the existence of any linkage between troop levels and offset payments.5 
Erhard complained to Secretary o f State Rusk that announcements such as McNamara’s were 
highly embarrassing for his government.6 On the otherhand, however, von Hassel reasserted 
once more in public that the German government had every intention of fulfilling the offset 
agreement.7 *Subsequently, the Americans tried tocalm the debate and denied any plan to 
withdraw any significant number of troops from Europe.*
After the row, the public increasingly took note of the problem and speculations regarding 
troop-levels and offset continued all through summer 1966. Offset which until then had played 
only a marginal role in public debates suddenly became a big issue. The press and parliaments 
in both countries regularly brought the matter up. This came at a moment when both the 
offset and the troop level problem were approaching a critical point where top-level 
intervention and difficult compromises would be required to get out of the deadlock. The 
circumstances for such an effort turned out to be extremely unfavourable. A series of 
domestic and international developments exacerbated the prospects for a smooth solution and 
seriously limited the bargaining space o f both the German and the American governments (not
1 'The Secretary stated further that he must point out, as he has in the past, that unless a Jut! offset agreement 
is attained with the Federal Republic, the U S. would be required to reduce its forces to the level o f the offset goats'
LBJU NSF, NSC Histones: Trilaterals, Box 51, Background Paper: US/German Military OfTset Relationship, 
November 1966; see also: NHP, von Hassel note on talks with McNamara and Acheson, 15 May 1966; SZ, 16 May
1966; FAZ, 16 May 1966; NYT, 6 June 1966, p.40; Raj, American M ilitary in Europe, 1983, p.220-23.
4 Grabbe, Unionsparteien, Sozialdemokratie und Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, 1945-66. 1983, p.531.
5 FAZ, 17 May 1966.
‘ McGhee Papers, 1988 add.. Box 2, Rusk-Erhard conversation, 9 June 1966.
1 Von Hassel in parliament, 1 July 1966, in: VdB, 5th period. 54.sess., p.2609-2613.
* Press Conference Johnson, McNamara, Rusk, 11 June 1966, in: PSSD, pt 3, reel IV, 0007; Press Conference
Rusk, 27 May, in: DOS Bulletin, 13 June 1966.
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to speak of the British). These developments exposed all the contradictions inherent in the 
traditional offset approach. The issue became a focus for the multi-faceted crisis of the 
Western Alliance in the mid-1960s, combining political, economic, and military aspects.
In this chapter, I will first outline the developments in the international field which made the 
offset problem so difficult to solve (the NATO crisis, Vietnam, the British offset picture, 
developments in the monetary field). Then 1 will analyze the increasing domestic pressure 
which built up against the German and American governments. Finally, Erhard’s abortive and 
fatal attempt to renegotiate the offset agreement during his September 1966 visit in 
Washington will be described in detail. The chapter aims to place the offset conflict in a 
variety of contexts in order to give a comprehensive picture of the issues involved in the 
offset problem during the 1960s.
b) NATO Crisis and International Monetary Problems in the Mid-Sixties 
McNamara’s public troop reduction threat came at a particularly inconvenient moment for the 
Erhard-govemment. In March, the withdrawal of 30000 combat personnel from the 7th army, 
the American forces in Germany, had become known. The German government had not been 
consulted, and the news that those forces would be substituted to the last man by recruits 
failed to reassure the Germans. Actually, a thinning-out process had been going on for quite 
some time. The State Department had told its missions abroad to remain silent on the issue 
and to 'avoid to extent possible further categoric statements on the maintenance o f present 
composition and number o f our forces\* However, the changes could not go unnoticed, 
particularly as the reductions concerned mainly highly trained personnel.10 The logical 
conclusion to which most observers came was that the moves had something to do with
* FRUS 1964-68, XIII, DOS to US Mission it NATO, 9 December 1965. For the German reaction: NHP, 
Talking Paper for Meeting with General Wheeler, 9 April 1966; Röhl, Neue Ziele im Atlantischen Bündnis, in: 
Kaiser/Mende(eds), Die Internationale Politik 1965/69. 1974, p.322-323; Haftendom, Kernwaffen und die 
Glaubwürdigkeit der Allianz, 1994, p.227-28.
10 DDRS 1995/2652, Cleveland to Rusk and McNamara. 19 May 1966.
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Vietnam. With increasing irritation, the US government denied those charges." Persistent 
questioning in Senate Hearings, however, evoked a comment by McNamara that the 
reductions would ’probably not* have been effected without Vietnam.12
Such contradictions hardly calmed down the suspicions on part of the German government. 
The substantial thinning out -in both quality and quantity- became the subject of extensive 
discussion in the media. Particularly galling for the German government was that, against 
their promises, the Americans had not consulted Erhard. Only after repeated requests they 
disclosed details o f the operation. Internally, the German government resigned itself from then 
on to the unavoidability of large-scale reductions in the near future.13 Due to its beleaguered 
position in foreign policy issues in the domestic debate, however, it felt unable to abandon 
a stance which had been a dogma of German policy since 1955. Those critics who saw the 
US on their way towards a concentration on Asia and an accommodation with Soviet Russia 
in the European theatre would have taken US reductions as a confirmation of their analysis. 
The Erhard government therefore tried to postpone the inevitable withdrawal as long as 
possible, and to avoid offset becoming the excuse for the Americans.
The unquestionable weakening of American combat power in Germany was aggravated by 
another event which rocked the foundations of NATO: the French withdrawal from the 
military organisation of NATO, and de Gaulle’s announcement that all foreign forces and 
installations would have to leave French territory by 1 April 1967.14 The events and the
11 See McNamara's reaction at a press conference on 2 March 1966: 'Let me answer your question. Where are 
you hum?* Questioner.'From Germany.’ McN.:’It is absolutely not true and you are the First that ought to know it. 
1 am sick and tired of having implications made that we have drawn down the forces in Western Europe when we 
haven't. The 7th Aimy...will not be affected...by our operations in South East Asia', in: PSSD, XIV, p.1396.
12 ibid., Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 20 April 1966, p.2127.
15 'In the long run, US troop reductions will be inevitable. It is, however, essential to maintain during the 
negotiations with the U.S.A. that troop reductions should take place only when the strategic, operational, and military- 
political preconditions are more favourable than at the moment’; NHP, Talking Papers for Chancellor-Minister talks 
in Washington, 20 September 1966; Personal Diary von Hassel, Entries of 23 July and 3 August 1966.
14 For pertinent documentation, see: FRUS 1964-68, XIU; EA 21/1966, D22S-240.
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political-military consequences of this move have been discussed extensively elsewhere.15 
I will concentrate on the impact o f de Gaulle’s move on the offset conflict.
The United States had long been expecting a French action. Earlier on, it started with 
contingency planning in case its troops had to leave French territory.16 This allowed for a 
relatively calm reaction, memorably summarized by Johnson with the words: ’If a man asks 
you to leave his house, you don’t argue; you take your hat and go.’17 *Walking out had even 
some advantages: a part of the 75000 US personnel in France was redeployed inconspicuously 
to the US.1H Air force units were relocated to UK bases and helped the British to some 
additional foreign exchange earnings.19 These economic ’gains*, however, were offset by the 
interruption of the US logistics system concentrated in France and the removal of the NATO 
headquarters, both of which involved heavy expenses. Estimated at between $t75-$275m, this 
cost was a major element of the US government’s discussions on the consequences of the 
French move.20 The Germ an-American payments balance also was affected. Certain military 
installations, such as the US army headquarters, were moved to Germany, and provision and 
supplies had to be re-routed to German and Benelux ports.21 The Bundesbank estimated that 
this reorganization would increase the US forces’ foreign exchange need from 
DM5.4bn($1.35bn) envisaged in the offset agreement to DM6.3bn($1.575bn). This precipitate 
rise in the cost, which was exacerbated by pay and wage rises, obliterated all savings the 
Pentagon had achieved in the last years. Naturally, this lessened the American willingness to 
compromise on offset.
,5 Haftendom (1994), p.209-227; Harrison M., The Reluctant Ally, 1981; Costigiiola. France and the United 
States. The Cold Alliance since World War 11, 1992; Gardner, in: Paxton, De Gaulle and the United States. A 
Centennial Reappraisal, 1994, p.257-278; Institut de Gaulle(ed), De Gaulle et son Siecle, vol.4, 1992; 
VaTsse/M£landri/Bozo(eds), La France et VOTAN 1949-96, 1996.
16 LBJL, NSF: Memos to the President: McG.Bundy, Box 3, Bohlen to Rusk, 4 May 1965; Bator Papers, Box 
3, Memo for the President: de Gaulle and NATO, 3 March 1966.
11 Johnson, The Vantage Point, 1971, p305.
11 18.000 military personnel and 21000 dependents were reduced. Prospective foreign exchange savings were 
estimated at about $1 lOm/year, FRUS 1964-68, XIII, Talking Paper prepared by Dept, of Defense, July 1968, p.729.
’* LBJL, NSF, Bator Papers, Box 3, Fowler to President: Sterling Crisis, 18 July 1966.
"  FRUS 1964-68, XIII, Summary Notes of 566th NSC Meeting, 13 December 1966.
71 Ruhi, in: Kaiser/Mende etjl.(eds), D ie Internationale Politik 1968/69, 1974, p.323-325.
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De Gaulle’s move had not only financial and logistic consequences, it also cast grave doubts 
upon the continuing rationality of the Western security structure. Because NATO troops 
stationed along the ’Iron Curtain’ had lost their hinterland, the military sense of their mission 
was put into question. The reaction in the United States and Great Britain was that the already 
undermined political and military rationale of conventional troop maintenance was further 
damaged. In West Germany, the effect was the reverse: the dependence on conventional 
protection offered by the Anglo-Saxons grew. The status o f the French forces in Germany 
(about 71000 men), which were withdrawn from SACEUR command from 1 July on, was in 
a limbo until the end of 1966. Initially the German reaction, mainly advocated by Foreign 
Minister Schroder, was to insist on a clear NATO commitment for these troops, particularly 
in war-time operations. The French refused, and, in the end, a more conciliatory attitude was 
pursued by Erhard, tacitly supported by the Americans.22 This was a major political defeat 
for Schroder, who was to play a rather passive role in the final months of the Erhard- 
government.23 In all, the French action deepened the feeling o f insecurity on side of the 
Germans and like many of de Gaulle’s policies, served to underline German dependence on 
US protection. On the other hand, it heightened American frustration with the situation in 
Europe. It was a major point for those who argued that Europe did not only not need, but 
actually did not want a direct commitment from the US any more.24
The main reason for the growth of this sentiment was, however, the escalation o f the war in 
Vietnam. During 1965 American military involvement in South East Asia multiplied. The war 
absorbed public attention increasingly, and dominated all activities of the government. Europe 
became a distant theatre with no major crisis expected.25 This had a deep influence on US 12*
12 Ample documentation on this issue and the whole France-NATO crisis is in FRUS 1964-68, XIII. For a 
German view, see: NHP, Talking Papers Tor Chancellor/Minister visit to Washington, September 1966: Status of
Negotiations regarding Cooperation of French Forces with NATO.
11 Grabbe (1983), p.528-29.
24 Williams, The Senate and U.S. Troops in Europe, 1985, p.140-141.
25 For the impact of the Vietnam War on US-European relations: Knapp, Vietnam ab Belastung des Verhältnisses 
zwbchen den Vereinigten Staaten und ihren Verbündeten, in: Carstens/Mende(eds), Die internationale Politik 1966/67,
1971, p.70-73; Grosser, The Western Alliance, 1980, p.237-43. The recent study of Arenth, Johnson, Vietnam und 
der Westen, 1994, -descriptive, tiresomcly repetitive, and full of confounded platitudes,- is useful only in so far as
it shows how not to write diplomatic history.
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policy towards Europe. The progressive thin-out of US forces in Europe has been already 
mentioned. A parallel development was the precipitate fall in the quality of the troops.26 
Vietnam also played a major role in American efforts to formulate a detente policy towards 
the Soviet Union, summed up in Johnson’s bridge-building speech in October 1966.27 
Speculation about a reorientation o f American policy towards the Pacific became a preferred 
issue of political commentators on both sides of the Atlantic. As the struggle in Asia 
intensified, the US government became increasingly interested in some sort of accommodation 
with the Soviet Union in Europe, whereas Bonn still dinged to the reunification postulate, 
opposing most steps by the Americans to reduce tensions in Europe.
The American willingness to support the German viewpoint was not increased by the 
European response to the new core problem of the American containment strategy, the 
Vietnam War. In the US, frustration about Europe’s lukewarm response towards the American 
effort in Vietnam ran high. Angry memoranda by the American government did nothing to 
change this stance, and a perception of European ingratitude permeated comments in the 
government, Congress, and the press.2* Why should the United States continue to make 
sacrifices for the defence of Europe, if the Europeans would not lend a helping hand to their 
partners in an emergency?
Vietnam also had a heavy impact on the US balance of payments; in what manner and to 
what extent exactly is a question still to be answered by economic historians. Some basic 
observations, however, can be made. The rise of the foreign exchange cost directly related to 
the escalation is impressive: from 1964 to 1967, outlays in South East Asia rose from $847m 
to $2318m.29 Parts of this loss was offset by various agreements similar to the ones 
concluded in Europe. Nonetheless, the burden remained immense. The Administrative History
36 There was a serious lack of officers and specialists. Criminal incidents abounded, drug use and racial conflicts 
became major problems. See: Nelson, A History o f US. Forces in Germany, 1987, p.83-84.
17 PP Johnson 1966, p.1125-30; Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe, 1989, p.90.
16 For an aide-memoire to the FRG requesting a whole list of possible German aid projects for South Vietnam, 
see: McGhee Papers, 1988 add.. Box 1, 6 July 1964. 19
19 Shepter/Campbell, US Defense Expenditure Abroad, in: SCB 12/1969, p.44. Countries with the biggest 
increases between 1964-67 were Vietnam (S64m to S564m); Japan ($321 m to S538m); Thailand ($34m to $286m); 
Korea ($91 m to S237m). The liquidity deficit in 1967 was $4.89bn.
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of the Treasury during the Johnson-Administration summed up: ’There was tacit recognition 
during 1966 that the efforts to achieve equilibrium in our balance o f payments would not be 
successful as long as the hostilities in Vietnam continued on such a large scale*.30 This 
statement also takes into account indirect effects of the war. The rapid rise of government 
spending in defence, supplemented by the effects o f the parallel 'Great Society' program, led 
to an economic expansion which, in the absence of tax rises, put increasing pressure on 
prices. The trade balance was unsettled by the related augmentation of domestic demand.31 
These developments produced increasing apprehensions in the Department of Treasury that 
the balance of payments might have got out of control. Estimates of the year-end deficit went 
to about $2bn, despite 'cosmetic* operations to the tune of $1.5bn.32 Additionally, there was 
the incalculable risk of a run on Sterling. All this came on top of heavy gold losses, 
particularly in 1965.
The main reason for this was another de Gaulle challenge. During a press conference in 
February 1965 the General denounced the dollar-gold system as an instrument o f American 
hegemony, enabling the United States to buy up with cheap money foreign industries.13 
Therefore, he urged all dollar holding countries to present their dollars at the US Treasury so 
as to undermine the dollar-gold standard. In the first quarter o f 1965, the US Treasury lost 
$3.244bn of gold ($1.928bn of it to France), from April to June another $1.198bn (French 
quota: $0.592bn).M The only reason why the United States were able to withstand the 
challenge was that all major gold-holding countries reacted with disapproval to de Gaulle's
“  LBJL, Administrative History Treasury, vol.l, pt.II, chJX: Balance of payments.
31 Solomon, The International Monetary System, 1945*76, 1977, p.100-102; on the economic policy of the 
Johnson-administration: Kettl and Kaufman, in: Divine R.A., The Johnson Years, VoUI, 1987, p.54-109.
M The 'cosmetic* operations consisted mainly in switches by Foreign Central Banks from liquid dollar holdings 
to longer-term securities; LBJL, NSF, Memos to the President: W.Rostow, Box 9, Bator to President: Balance of 
Payments, 6 July 1966. It was enough to prolong 12-month bonds to 13 months to make them disappear from the 
statistics of liquid liabilities, which formed part of the liquidity balance (the overall measure for the US balance of 
payments until the late 196(b); Gilbert, Quest fo r  World Monetary Order, 1980, p.140.
”  De Gaulle, Discours et Messages, 1962-65,1969 , p.330-34. For de Gaulle's attack on the gold standard, see: 
Calleo, ’De Gaulle and the Monetary System: The Golden Rule*, in: Paxton/Wahl(eds), De Gaulle and the United 
States, 1994, p.239-255; Institut de Gaulle(ed), D e Gaulle et son Siècle, VoLIII: Moderniser la France, 1992; 
Bordo/Simard/White, ’France and the Bretton Woods International Monetary System, 1960-68’, in: Reined), 
International Monetary Systems in H istorical Perspective, 1995, p.153-80.
M Odell, (1982), p.119. At the end of 1964, US gold reserves stood at S15.47bn.
suggestion. If they had followed the example, the monetary system would have collapsed. Its 
preservation, however, was still in the interest of most countries, not least because the 
decisive countries were almost all linked in a security partnership with the US. This was 
especially the case of the Federal Republic, which due to its large reserves played a pivotal 
role.35 To refrain from gold conversions was not particularly difficult for the Germans at that 
time. From 1963 to 1965 they had balance of payments deficits which they financed by 
reducing their dollar reserves.36
The US government immediately issued a new statement after the de Gaulle challenge 
committing itself unswervingly to the $35/ounce ratio. This stiffied internal voices for parity 
changes.37 However, the new Treasury Secretary, Fowler, knew that determination and 
piecemeal measures a la Dillon/Roosa would not do anymore. The US therefore took the lead 
in proposing a new reserve unit, initiating years of discussions with the Europeans, which 
eventually led to the establishment of the so-called Special Drawing Rights.34 The 
complicated negotiating process was continuously disturbed by the developments outlined 
above. It was clear that the dollar-gold system was on the brink. The accumulation of these 
dangerous signals made the short-term balance of payments the prevalent consideration of US 
officials in dealing with the issues posed by Erhard's visit in September.
Both in the monetary and the security field, the situation reached a critical point in 1966. The 
fundamental bases of the transatlantic relations thus entered into a crisis at the same time
2 0 7
1S De Gaulle elaborated on his main argument, namely that the reserve role of the dollar liberated the United 
States from monetary discipline and allowed US firms to buy up foreign industries with cheap credit, already in 
January 1965 at the occasion of Erhard's visit in Paris. He did not inform his visitor of the spectacular step he was 
to take only two weeks later; AAPD 1965, Conversation Erhard-De Gaulle, 20 January 1965, p.130. The German 
government immediately disassociated itself from the move. It expressed, however, to the Americans similar concerns 
about the high level o f US investment abroad which forced Germany to balance the monetary consequences by way 
of Offset; AAPD 1965, Erhard-McGhee conversation, 8 February 1965; p.270-73; Knappstein to Schröder on talk 
with the President, 9 February 1965, p-282.
36 The Bundesbank President, Blessing, informed Erhard that following de Gaulle's example, as some economists 
had proposed, made no economic sense under these circumstances. He assured Erhard that the Bundesbank had ways 
of convening foreign exchange surpasses to gold without drawing directly on US reserves; sec: BA, B l36/3322, 
Blessing to Erhard, 22 February 1965. See also Appendix 1, table 1.
17 Gilbert (1983), p.136-37.
14 The most comprehensive analysis of the creation of SDRs remains Cohen, international Monetary Refrom, 
1964-69, 1970.
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when the offset practice was running into almost insurmountable practical difficulties, in the 
German-American as well as in the Anglo-German context.
c) British Offset During the 1960s
The final spark which forced the US to tackle the mass of problems which had accumulated 
in Europe in 1966, was a crisis in Anglo-German offset dealings. Compared with the amounts 
of money and the serious implications for Western financial and security policy involved in 
US-German offset, the parallely pursued British-German offset was but a sideshow • a very 
noisy one, however. The British took the issue as serious as they had done during the 
1950s.34 A great many of complicated questions were raised during the negotiations and a 
complete detailed account would go beyond the scope of this thesis. I will give a brief survey 
of story and issues, concentrating on the aspects which are important to the main argument 
of the thesis.
We left the British-German offset quarrel at the end of 1958 when, after tiresome 
complications, an agreement was reached covering the three years until March 1961 (see 
ch.IV). This had removed the issue for some time from the mutual agenda. The basic causes 
for the conflict, however, had not disappeared. The British government still regarded their 
continental commitment with ambiguity and the pound remained weak, betraying the illusions 
HMG might have entertained during a period of calm in the foreign exchange markets. In 
1960 it seemed as if the British currency had finally reached a stable level. The British 
government was able to pay back large parts of the debts it had amassed during and after the 
Suez-Crisis.
This was warmly welcomed by the Americans as they struggled with their emerging and 
persistent payments problem. One result o f their efforts drew particular attention in London:
*  Historical research has been less impressed by its importance. British-German offset in the 1960s is a virtually 
uncultivated field, despite the abundance of material available in German and British archives. Whightman (1988) 
gives a brief, coherent account, p38-40. Further details in Schmidt, D ie Labour-Regierung, die BundesrepubUk und 
Europe, 1964-67, in: Schmidt (1989), p.253-314, Mendershausen (1968), and Haftendom (1994), p.227-241.
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the Anderson-Dillon mission. As their three-year agreement was about to expire, the British 
were afraid -not without reason- to be left out in the cold by a massive German-American 
deal.40 More importantly, the London gold crisis in October 1960 and the speculation 
following the revaluation of the German DM in March 1961 vividly demonstrated the 
continuing weakness of Sterling. A new agreement seemed therefore imperative, particularly 
because the government ruled out the possibility of further troop cuts. First, the Berlin Crisis 
was still in full swing, second, the BAOR was already under strength drawing increasing 
criticism from NATO authorities, and third, a reduction ’could not fa il to wreck such hopes 
as exist for a settlement o f our European problems and it must bedevil our relations with the 
new American administration from  the start.Ml These remarks hinted at Kennedy’s requests 
on the British to live up to their conventional troop commitments to NATO, and at the need 
to get German political support regarding the British EEC-membership application of July 
1961.
However, the British were not prepared to absorb the foreign exchange burden of their troops 
just for the sake of these political gains. In March 1961, Selwyn Lloyd, now Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, arrived in Bonn for a new round of talks.41 *3 As during the Anderson-Dillon 
visit, the Germans resisted any attempt to renew direct payments. The British accepted that 
the support-cost concept was out o f date. The negotiations took a similar turn as the preceding 
US-German ones. The German side promised to step up arms purchases in the UK (to about 
DM280m a year), to assume more foreign aid, to prematurely repay their remaining postwar 
debt, and to leave a £25m sum, which was the remainder of German prepayments on arms 
orders, in the Bank of England.44 Satisfaction with this unbinding promise did not last very
40 '...if we let the Americans get away with a deal in which our more real and pressing needs are overlooked, 
it will be a fa ta l blow ', Macmillan to Treasury, 14 November 1960, PRO, PREM 3773.
41 ibid.. Report by Treasury Officials on Mutual Defence Costs, 5 December 1960. Kennedy informed Macmillan 
immediately of the new liS emphasis on conventional troops which he expected the UK to follow. See: NSA, The 
Berlin Crisis, Doc.2024, Macmillan-Kennedy Meeting, 5 April 1961.
41 FRUS 1961-63, XIII, Kennedy to Macmillan, 16 February 1962, p.1059-61; PRO, PREM 11/4217, Home to
Macmillan, 14 February 1962; ibid., Meeting at Admiralty House, 12 March 1962.
43 PRO, CAB 129/105, Anglo-German talks, 23 March 1961.
KCA 1961, 18002A.
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long. In July 1961, Britain invoked the NATO resolution o f 1957 which requested NATO to  
investigate and propose solutions for countries in payments difficulties due to troop stationing 
abroad.45 The NATO experts supported the British case and the Germans agreed to open 
formal negotiations. These were clearly prejudiced by the parallel Germ an* American talks 
which were in their final phase. The StrauB-Gilpatric agreement in October 1961 put the 
British and the French in an even more disadvantageous situation on the German arms market 
than before. Soon it became clear that the Germans would not formalize the promises given 
to Lloyd in March. They also refused to offset the whole British troop cost, contrary to the 
agreement with the Americans.46
In the end, the British accepted less than full offset * a result which owed much to the 
political considerations outlined above.47 They also agreed, first, to count 'civilian purchases' 
as offset and, second, to consider the assumption of British foreign aid obligations by the 
German government as offset measure.46 Both provisions caused endless quarrels between 
officials from the Federal Ministry o f Finance and the British Treasury on the kinds o f  
projects to be credited against the German obligation.
The agreement was signed in March 1962/’ It covered April 1962 through March 1964. The 
sum of DM1200m ($300m) was split up in military purchases(DM920m), civilian 
purchases(DM180m), and DMIOOm for foreign aid projects. Difficulties in reaching these 
targets soon arose. The Germans viewed British goods as uncompetitive.50 British weapons 
were considered as second rate quality, not fit for the kind of military operations German
45 NA, RG 84, Bonn Embassy 1959-61, Box 16, Airgram A-l 1: UK Statement at NATO Council Meeting, 27 
July 1961; KCA 1961, 18443.
*  This put the Americans in an uneasy position which should last for many years. On the one side, they wanted 
the British to keep their troops in full strength and the pound strong, and supported the British offset efforts, on the 
other side, they were not ready to share part of the German weapons market.
47 A folder with extensive documentation on the negotiations is in: BBA, A270/13168; an account by British 
officials is PRO, FO 371/172175, Stationing Costs of British Forces in Germany: Report by Officials, autumn 1963.
*  'Civilian purchases' meant orders of civilian equipment above normal levels by official German agencies; 
purchases of goods for the foreign aid projects Germany financed were to be placed in England.
44 HMSO, Cmnd.1766 (1962).
30 BA, B136/3133, memorandum for cabinet meeting, 29 September 1961.
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planners foresaw, and generally disadvantaged because of the British reluctance to agree to 
common research projects.31 In April 1963, German orders had reached a level of only about 
DM400m. Further prospects were bleak, and the British government officially stated its 
disbelief in the German capability to see through their promise.32 The overall political 
situation in which the agreement operated had also changed for worse. The EEC application 
had been checked by the General, and the Americans seemed to have second thoughts on the 
wisdom of a further conventional build-up. The British Defence White Paper of 1962 clearly 
demonstrated the doubts o f the Conservative government about its European commitment.33 
Although the British Cabinet Defence Committee once more decided to avoid troop reductions 
in Germany, it was obvious that the firmness of this resolve hinged on the status of 
sterling.54
The lingering hostility towards Germany in financial matters remained strong, as a hand­
written note of Macmillan on a memorandum regarding a Schroder-Lord Home discussion 
illustrates: 7/ is a very depressing story. The Germans have no sense o f guilt and 
shame...there is nothing about the financial agreement, on which they are in default. What 
about the huge commitment to buy American? Every time they mention Eastern Germany, we 
ought to remind them o f the intolerable financial situation.,55 This comment on the troop 
cost problem, shortly before Macmillan left office, struck once more the emotional tone which 
had pervaded so much of the conflict in the preceding years. The trace of hostile remarks left 
by the Prime Minister in connection with this problem shows some characteristics of his 
policy towards Germany: a sense of frustration at the inexorable falling behind of Britain's 
economy; an unwillingness to cooperate with the former enemy which had so rapidly been
31 Interview of the author with Minister von Hassel, 17 August 1994. BA, B 136/6894, BMV to Erhard: 
Technological cooperation with Britain in the Military Field, 18 May 1966. British sales consisted as during the 1950s 
mostly of minor items, like tank guns and spare parts; see: NA, RG59, SF 1963, FN15WGER, Box 3455, Bonn A- 
2535: UK-RG Offset Agreements, 5 June 1963. Not only regarding quality but also in the professional manner of 
selling the British had nothing to equal the Americans.
11 BA, B136/3133, AA to Chancellor's Office: Cabinet Memorandum, 25 May 1963.
51 Darby, British Defence Policy East o f Suez, 1947-68, 1973, p.7.23-27.
54 PRO, PREM 11/4726, Thomeycroft to Macmillan, 24 April 1963.
31 PRO, PREM 11/4259, Macmillan to Lord Home, 21 August 1963.
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rehabilitated; a strong insistence on the symbols of British power, nuclear weapons and the 
reserve role of sterling; the annoyance about being stuck in Europe with troops whose military 
importance seemed doubtful, of whom Germany benefited economically, and whose political 
importance Macmillan saw mainly in relations to the US, but not to the Federal Republic. 
Thus, support costs and offset acquired a disproportionate place in determining the state o f 
Anglo-German relations. Macmillan’s position on the support cost question lacked flexibility 
which was characteristic of the whole British approach to Germany during those years. This 
approach reflected the state o f the debate in the British press and parliament.56 Few steps 
were taken by the Macmillan government to get out of this cul-de-sac in mutual relations. 
After all, Britain did not have much to offer as compensation if it was not ready to support 
the rigid German position in the East-West conflict.
The 1962-64 agreement was fulfilled by the Germans despite British apprehensions. This was 
probably due to a change to leaders who were more cooperative than the Macmillan-Adenauer 
duo. Erhafd and Alec Douglas-Home both assumed office in October 1963. The snag of the 
offset success was that it had only been possible by large prepayments on prospective military 
and civilian orders (the civilian part of the agreement had turned out an almost complete 
flop). The next agreement was heavily mortgaged.
Negotiations commenced in late 1963.57 The German government wanted to abolish the 
foreign aid and the ’civilian* component which had. drawn increasing criticism from the 
German industry. Furthermore, it wanted to reduce the military order targets.58 The 
negotiations were concluded in a quite cooperative mood in April 1964, due to the relative 
calm in monetary markets and the absence of troop reduction threats. The Germans, originally 
proposing a two-year level of DM500m($125m) for military orders, agreed in the end that 
they would try to offset the whole estimated £84m($235m) foreign exchange cost ’as far as
36 Watt, Britain looks to Germany, London 1965, p.130-45.
17 The Federal Ministry of Finance bad waged and lost a fight in the cabinet to get rid of its responsibility for 
the talks. PRO, FO 371/172174, Roberts to Reilly, 10 September 1963; Melville to Reilly, 20 September 1963; Bonn 
embassy to FO, 8  October 1963; PA-AA, Ref I11A5, 384, Dahlgriin to Westrick, 24 January 1964. 38
38 A A PD 1964, Erhard/Douglas-Home talks, 15 January 1964, p.62-63; Memorandum Lahr (State Secretary, AA), 
3 January 1964, p.8-9.
possible’, counting also civilian purchases.59 The British accepted that no fixed target should 
be set; a crucial difference to the American-German agreement of May 1964. They had early 
on resigned themselves to getting less than the US. An unspecified commitment was thought 
to be more acceptable to the public than a specified level far short of the actual cost.60 A 
mutual working group was established which was to meet regularly to identify projects and 
review the progress made.
Shortly after the agreement was signed, general elections were held in Britain resulting in a 
Labour-victory. The new government under Harold Wilson had hardly settled down when a 
new violent currency crisis rocked the boat. The election campaign had been accompanied by 
speculation caused by the political uncertainty and rumours of a prospective £800m payments 
deficit in 1964. During November, an unprecedented run on British reserves ensued. Within 
two days, the new government had made its mind up and decided firmly against 
devaluation.61
The reasons were mainly political: apprehensions that Labour, after it had devalued the pound 
in 1949, would retain the stigma of a devaluation party, the moral commitment to the 
Commonwealth and other dollar holders, and the belief that it were structural weaknesses in 
the British economy which caused the pressure on the pound and which could be corrected 
by measures to improve the competitiveness of British goods. Diagnosis and reactions were 
strikingly similar to Kennedy’s response to the US payments deficit some years earlier. Like 
the Democratic president, the Labour Prime Minister was elected on a very small margin and 
shied away from showing supposed ’weakness* in monetary policy, laying the emphasis of 
his action on strengthening the domestic economy. Devaluation acquired a status of ’the 
unmentionable’. An effective ban against even discussing the issue stiffled the debate within
** For the agreement: HMSO. Cmnd.2434 (1964). For the negotiations: BA, B136/3133, Memorandum for 
Cabinet Meeting, 9 March 1964; Dahlgrun to Erhard, 23 March 1964; Dahlgrun to Erhard, 15 May 1964; AAPD 
1964, Memorandum Carstens, 29 April 1964, p.495-96; Cars tens to Dahlgriia. 6 July 1964, p.796-97; Memorandum 
Lahr (AA), 24 July 1964, p.877-78.
“  PRO, CAB 128/38, CM 64(39X conci.. 17 July 1964; CM 64(41), 23 July 1964; CAB 129/118, CP(64)155, 
Memo by Chief Secretary to Treasury, Boyd-Carpenter, 22 July 1964.
61 Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970,1971, p.5-7. Browning, The Treasury A  Economic Policy 1964-85, 
1986, p.5; Woodward, Labour's Economic Performance, in: Coopey/Fielding/Tiratsoo(eds), The Wilson Governments, 
1964-70,1993, p.82-3.
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the government, and even the British press, then more patriotic than nowadays, shied back 
from speculation.62
On 16 November, Wilson declared emphatically: *If anyone, at home or abroad, doubts the  
firmness o f the government's resolve and acts upon these doubts let them be prepared to pay  
the price.163 No speculator felt deterred, and the government was forced to various restrictive 
measures, such as a 15% surcharge on imports, which ignited both EEC and EFTA countries 
and violated GATT rules. A belated rise in the interest rate did not help either and only 
annoyed the US, which had had solemn promises to the contrary.64 The sterling crisis o f  
November 1964 was overcome only by a hastily organized international credit of $3bn, later 
supplemented by a $lbn drawing from the IMF.65 It showed the British dilemma clearly: 
either they had to take measures which irritated their major allies or they had to accept their 
’help* or ’recommendations’, and take vigorous actions in the domestic economy which often 
were among the conditions for help.
The Federal Republic played a central role in the international rescue effort o f December 
1964. In this context, the Germans were urged by some Americans, like Ball and Acheson, 
to use their monetary leverage to get the British to full-heartedly support the MLF.661 have 
found no direct proof that the Germans followed this advice. The Americans felt fewer 
inhibitions. For them, either devaluation or a large reduction in Britain's overseas defence 
expenditure was unacceptable as it was thought to have unforeseeable repercussions on the 
dollar position or on the Western and Pacific security-structure. They, therefore, felt a strong 
temptation to use their good services in preserving the sterling value in order to get British 
assurances on these points.
U G. Brow a, in  My Way, 1971, p.114; Caimcross/Eichengreen, Sterling in Decline, 1983, p.166-67; Browning 
(1986), p J .
w Quoted from Caimcross/Eichengreen (1983), p.169.
44 The step forced the US to do likewise, and LBJ did not hide his irritation on the occasion of Wilson's first 
visit; FRUS 1964-68, XÏI1, McG.Bundy Memo on LBJ-Wilson conversation, 7 December 1964, p ,l37-39.
15 A vivid description of the international rescue action by one of the participants is provided by Coombs, The 
Arena o f International Finance, 1976, p.110-23. 46
46 AAPD 1964, Schroder to Erhard, 26 November 1964, p.1404-05.
2 1 5
Taking stock after the storm on the markets had passed, the Labour government, like its 
predecessors, took British overseas expenditure under closer scrutiny. Probably even less than 
Macmillan, Wilson had a clear idea as to what purpose the Rhine Army should still serve. 
The offset agreement he had inherited he considered insufficient. Already the first meeting 
of the mixed working group for the implementation o f the offset agreement, in December 
1964, had shown the new government’s discontent with the achievement of their predecessors. 
The British noted the absence of any significant German requests for British civilian or 
military goods, and did not hide their disappointment.67 *
One specific project acquired particular importance in this context. London pressed for a 
positive decision of the German Lufthansa to purchase the BAC 1-11 aircraft for its fleet, an 
order of probably over $50m. The UK representatives put on the record that a 'rejection 
would be regarded as an indication that the offset agreement meant little to the German 
side.'** The Lufthansa order was deemed essential for the success of the aircraft on the 
European market where not a single order had been accrued until then.69 During his first 
meeting with Erhard, Wilson strongly pressed the case citing the disappointing German 
performance under the offset agreement.70 Once more, the British had to compete against 
an American producer, Boeing. The US ambassador in Bonn intervened on the highest 
political levels to support the American aircraft - a further instance for the contradictory 
nature of US policy towards British financial problems.71 In the end, it was the alleged 
technical superiority of the US aircraft which was decisive for the Lufthansa managers, 
despite an intervention o f Erhard on behalf of the British firm.72 Her Majesty's government 
was not amused.
67 BA, B126/34106, Record of Meeting of Joint Committee in London, 8 December 1964; B136/3133, German 
embassy London to AA, 8 December 1964.
“  ibid.
w PRO, F0371/183099, FO Brief for Bonn talks 1/1965: Offset Agreement.
10 PRO, FO 371/183042, Record of PM-Erhard discussion, 30 January 1965; also in: AAPD 1965, p.224.
71 Osterheld (1992), p.125-26; BA, B 136/3133, Federal Ministry of Transport to AA, 14 December 1964.
73 BA, B 136/3133, Dahlgrün to Chancellor’s office, 25 February 1965; Erhard to Abs, 4 March 1965.
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When Wilson visited Bonn in March 1965, he told Erhard that he was 'profoundly  
disappointed, surprised and shocked* by the Lufthansa decision and that he regarded th e  
whole offset agreement as ’dirty work* which had to be renegotiated.73 In a letter soon  
afterwards the Prime Minister warned the German government of any ’misunderstanding 
between us on the importance o f this question fo r  the fu ture development o f good A nglo- 
German relations*. He added that the British had taken the firm decision that while * naturally  
they wish to play their full part in the common defence o f the West, they can no longer accep t 
the very large share which they have to bear o f the foreign exchange burden o f m aintaining 
British forces in Germany at its present level o f £90 m illion a year.*14
With this letter the acrimony which had marked British-German offset dealings in th e  
Macmillan era had returned. The troop cost issue proved to be no less disruptive for Anglo- 
German relations than under the Conservative government. This is also reflected in Wilson’s  
letter to the American President, in which he reviewed the proceedings of his meeting w ith  
Erhard. The Prime Minister displayed no intention to make any constructive move towards 
ameliorating and intensifying British relations with West Germany, despite the opportunity 
the anglophile Erhard government represented. He assumed that the Federal Republic w ould 
continue its support for the pound in the international markets and that it would also o ffse t 
the foreign exchange cost of British troops: *We had some very tough sessions on the o ffse t 
agreement but since you have yourselves virtually equipped the German armed forces th ere  
does not seem much for us in that line...W e left the Germans in no doubt that i f  we did n o t 
get satisfaction on this part, we should be forced to agonizing re-appraisals \ 75
The frustration resulting from the feeling of growing financial dependency on an ally  
(particularly obvious during the late-1964 attack on Sterling) which, on the other hand, w as 
protected by a British security commitment reached new peaks. The Chief Secretary o f  
Treasury, Diamond, mentioned this frankly during the offset re-negotiations in Bonn: *In 
order that Britain should never again need to seek emergency assistance from its Allies, th e  71
71 PRO, FO 371/183046, Record of Wilson-Erhard discussion, 8 March 1965, 8am.
74 BA, B l36/3133, Wilson to Erhard, 31 May 1965; Federal Ministry of Finance: Cabinet Paper, 11 June 1965.
75 FRUS 1964-68, XIII, 11 March 1965, p.190-91.
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British government needed to reorganise its affairs, and, in particular, Us expenditure across 
the exchanges. In many respects British policies were directed and redirected by the balance 
o f payments problem; it lay behind every Cabinet decision concerning economic affairs and 
defence, and the Government would never feel free to carry out its policies....until it had 
solved its foreign exchange d i f f i c u l t ie s British FO officials became increasingly 
preoccupied with the emotional state of government thinking on Germany. Citing a top-level 
discussion in Chequers, Undersecretary of State Gore-Booth, wrote to his Minister, Michael 
Stewart: *One may have what emotions and sentiments one likes about Germans - fair 
enough. But we cannot conducL.Joreign policy like this.*77 The Foreign Office tried in the 
successive months to exert a calming influence on the PM and the Chancellor of Exchequer 
without much success.
The German government could hardly refuse to re-open the negotiations, due to its failure to 
come anywhere near its promises to Douglas-Home. At a time when French-German relations 
were at a low ebb, an open row with Britain would have been doubly inconvenient. The talks 
started immediately after Wilson's visit to Bonn. In June, Diamond, and the German Finance 
Minster, Dahlgriin, agreed to extend the existing agreement by one year and to set fixed 
targets for all three years now covered.7* A German advance payment of DM464m, 
additional to the DM336m worth of orders placed until then, brought the level for the first 
two years up to DM800m. For the third year, the Germans undertook to offset DM 
600m($150m). With this agreement the German government took up two heavy commitments: 
first, to equal the advance payment, borrowed from the Bundesbank, by orders until March 
1966 or otherwise to repay it out of the Federal budget; second, to identify orders of 
DM600m in 1966/67.
At the end of 1965, when budgetary problems became apparent, the situation became critical. 
German officials were desperately seeking suitable projects to fulfil the promised amounts. 
A Bundesbank memorandum on one of the meetings of the British-German commission
*  PRO. FO 371/183101. Record or Dahigriin-Diamond Meeting. 28 June 1965. 
77 PRO. FO 371/183044, Gore-Booth to Stewart. 15 June 1965.
*  HMSO, Cntnd 2731 (1965); BPI 112/900, 1 July 1965.
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recommended that, before they were forced to pay a fonds perdu, the German m inistries 
should equip their car park with Rolls Royce limousines.79 The German Finance M inister 
urged his colleague from Defence to step up military orders; otherwise the government w ould  
have to repay the advanced funds from the Federal budget which was already stretched to its 
limits.“1
The British meanwhile had other problems. The German prepayment had almost immediately 
been spent during the next currency crisis in Summer 1965.81 Again, the British turned to  
the US for multilateral help, only to hear that strings were attached to such help. M cGeorge 
Bundy wrote to the President in July 1965 that the *British are constantly trying to m ake  
narrow bargains on money while they cut back their wider political and m ilita ry  
responsibilities. We want to make it very sure that the British get it into their heads tha t it 
makes no sense for us to rescue the pound in a situation in which there is no British fla g  in  
Vietnam, and a threatened British thin-out in both East o f Suez and in Germany T h is  
shows the scope of the intense discussion regarding the nature of those strings which w as 
going on in Washington. Treasury demanded a guarantee against devaluation o f S terling, 
McNamara urged for an increased British commitment in South East Asia, and the S ta te  
Department wanted a forthcoming policy towards Germany, including a stable B A O R  
level.*13 1 have no record of the decisive bilateral discussions, but the rescue operation to o k  
• place successfully, and presumably the Americans put it to the British on all those points,
*  BBA, A270/13168, memorandum department A21, 25 October 1965.
“  BA, B136/3134, Dahlgrun to von Hassel, 20 October 1965.
Crossman, Crossman Diaries, vol.l, 1975, p.290.
C LBJL, NSF, Memos to the President: McG.Bundy, Box 4, 28 July 1965.
°  Numerous documents in the LBJ Library relate to this discussion, for ex.. Ball Papers, Box 1, telcon B ator- 
Ball, 27 July 1965; telcon Bundy-Ball, 29 July 1965; NSF, Memos to the President: Bundy, Box 4, McG.Bundy to  
President: Sterling Devaluation, 28 July 1965; NSF, Country File: UK, Box 215, Ball on Pound Crisis, 6 A ugust 
1965; Fowler Papers, Box 4, Ackley to President, 9 August 1965. DDRS 1978/211A  Bator to Bundy: The U K  
Problem or *Thinking about the Unthinkable*, 29 July 1965. The British were deeply irritated by these requests. T o  
quote from a letter of Wilson to Stewart, 23 March 1965: 'Should the President try to link this question [V ietnam ; 
HZ} with support fo r  the pound I would regard this as most unfortunate..Jf the financial weakness...is to  be used a s  
a means o f forcing us to accept unpalatable policies or developments regardless o f our thoughts this w ilt raise very  
wide questions indeed about Anglo-American relationships; quoted from: Ziegler P„ Wilson. The Authorised L ife, 
London 1993, p.222-23. For a first assessment o f British-American financial diplomacy in this period, see: Kunz, in: 
Kunz(ed), The Diplomacy o f the Crucial Decade, 1994, p.80-114.
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refraining only from asking for direct military support in Vietnam. In any case, the Labour 
government was surprisingly cautious regarding the European commitment. The US position 
was certainly one reason for the absence of serious reductions in overseas defence 
expenditures in Wilson’s austerity program of August 1965.®4 One further reason might have 
been that just before the 1965 Sterling crisis broke loose, the Wilson government managed 
to renegotiate the previous offset agreement, and it would have been difficult to justify 
reductions at this stage.
The restraint lasted until the beginning of 1966. In February, London published a White Paper 
which mentioned the possibility of troop cuts because the foreign exchange cost of the BAOR 
was only insufficiently covered by the offset agreement.85 Negotiations in early 1966 on the 
implementation of the agreement had become increasingly rough, with the British uttering 
dark threats and the Germans manoeuvring round the issue.86 With a vigorous effort, 
including subsidies to German firms to induce them to place orders in Britain, the Germans 
reached the 1964/66 target.87 Sighs of relief were premature. During Erhard’s last state visit 
in London, Wilson and his Chancellor of Exchequer, Jim Callaghan, demanded full offset for 
1966/67 instead of 80% as agreed in 1965. This meant transferring an additional DM 
500m($125m) to the British Treasury. Erhard, deeply in budgetary trouble, refused."8 
Subsequent talks between Callaghan and Dahlgnin brought no results.89
The sterling crisis which erupted in mid*1966 added urgency to the British case. Speculation 
reached new record levels. Including the losses in these months, total British foreign exchange 
losses in the currency battle had reached a shattering $4bn of owned and borrowed reserves
84 Caimcross/Eichengreen (1983), p.178.
85 HMSO, Cmnd.2901 (1966).
86 BA, B136/3134, memorandum on BMF-Treasury Talks, 7 February 1966; attachment to BMF Cabinet Memo, 
25 February 1966; B126/34106, BMF memorandum: Offset UK, 29 March 1966.
87 BA, B136/3134, Memorandum on British Offset, 11 May 1966; PA-AA, I1A7,835, AA note: Meeting of the 
Mixed Anglo-German Commission on Offset, 6 April 1966. The German industry protested against such methods; 
BA, B 136/3134, Berg (President of BDI) to Erhard, 17 May 1966.
88 BA, B136/3134, de la Croix to Dahlgrun, 7 June 1966; Osterheld (1992X p.318-19.
*  BA, B136/3134, Dahlgriin-Callaghan talks, 30 June 1966.
since the 1964 elections.90 Though even ministers now recommended devaluation, W ilso n  
decided to hold the line once more.91 A huge program of deflationary measures (the s o -  
called July program) was hastily pulled together, including a JtlOOm cut in o v erseas  
expenditure, a freeze in wages and prices and deflation of domestic demand by v a rio u s  
measures designed to check consumption.92 In his statement in the Commons on 20 J u ly ,  
Wilson announced that expenditure on the BAOR 'would be cut so that total foreign exch a n g e  
costs were at a level covered by offset and other paym ents.m  Callaghan was asked to g o  
immediately to Bonn to ask the German government to bring up payments up to the full le v e l 
of the British foreign exchange cost -to no avail. The Germans told the British flatly that n o  
budgetary funds were available to fulfil their requests.94 Departing, the Chancellor o f th e  
Exchequer made public that London would now start with preparations to reduce its tro o p s . 
The British government invoked the NATO and WEU procedures for a revision of its N A T O  
commitment.93 This move, which together with de Gaulle's actions and the G erm an- 
American problems seemed to forebode the end of the traditional structure of NATO, fin a lly  
pushed the US government to take the initiative in trying to disentangle the mess.
d) Domestic Constraints in Washington and Bonn
Whereas in Britain the troop cost issue always had led to acid comments in parliament a n d  
press concerning German stinginess, it had only rarely been a matter of public debate in th e  
German-American context. The far-reaching consequences of the offset agreements w e re  
hardly discussed. These 'fortunate* circumstances changed during 1966. The Johnson 
administration saw itself confronted with a serious motion by Congress members to reduce  
the American commitment in Europe. One main argument in this debate was insufficient 
burden-sharing by the Europeans. In the background hovered the nascent struggle betw een 
Congress and the Executive in the shadow of the Vietnam quagmire, in which critics o f
"  Yeager (1976), p.458.
”  George Brown, (1971), p.114-115.
”  Wilson (1971), p.258-59.
”  ibid., p.259.
M BBA, A270/13168, Interdepartmental Meeting, 27 June 1966.
w Haftendom (1994), p.232-33.
220
221
Johnson’s policy emphasized the over-commitment of the United States not only in Asia, but 
also in Europe.96
Ever since the Great Debate in 1951 over the decision to send ground troops on a large scale 
to the European Cold War theatre, there had been voices in Congress criticising the lasting 
commitment of the United States in Europe. However, only in 1966 this sentiment took an 
organized form. What made it doubly inconvenient for the administration was that the 
initiative originated from the party of the President. In July, the Democratic Majority Policy 
Committee had expressed its concern about the ’excessive and unchanging* deployment of 
troops in Europe.97 Shortly afterwards, a group o f eminent Senators introduced a Sense of 
Senate resolution which, after its main sponsor, the Democratic Majority leader Mike 
Mansfield, came to be called the Mansfield resolution.90 Mansfield did not force his 
resolution to a vote, but the government had received a warning of what was to come.
Already in early 1967 the resolution was re-introduced and the issue of troops in Europe 
became a major subject of debate between the administration and Congress until the mid- 
1970s. The Mansfield resolution was not only ’scare tactics*99 to get the Germans to be 
forthcoming for offset. Certainly it was of help in this sense and McNamara might have even 
welcomed it because it gave him further arguments. The White House, however, perceived 
the move, quite correctly, as an attempt by Senate to regain lost influence in foreign policy 
formulation. As a result o f the Vietnam escalation, Congress had become increasingly restive 
about its limited influence on foreign policy formulation. The balance of payments, the 
pressure of military expenditure, prospects of détente, and the prosperity of Europe made the 
US troops there an obvious target, as long as the majority dared not to challenge Johnson’s 
Vietnam policy directly. The administration tried to keep the situation under control and to 
preserve its freedom on such a vital foreign policy question. Offset became a weapon in this
*  The most comprehensive treatment of this debate is Williams (1985). See also: Thiel (1978), p.157-171.
97 LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 51, Trilaterals Background Paper (DoS/EUR): Mansfield 
Resolution, 17 November 1966.
"  Congressional Records, Senate, 31 August 1966, p.20554.
99 As Nelson (1987), p.82, suggests. Williams (1985) shows the much broader background, p.145.
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controversy. In order to defeat the Mansfield initiative the government needed a presentable 
offset agreement.
The conflict in Germany aimed not only at the Chancellor’s authority regarding the 
formulation of German foreign policy, it also became directly linked with Erhard’s political 
future. Offset was only a side issue in the mid-1960s’ acrimonious political controversies in 
the Federal Republic. In the end, however, it became an important element in Erhard’s fall 
from power.
It had been predictable from the start that Erhard would not have an easy life as Chancellor. 
Main rivals, like ex-chancellor Adenauer, who was still leader of the Christian Democrats 
(CDU), the main party forming the government, and Strauß, the chef of the Bavarian 
counterpart o f the CDU, the CSU, remained aloof from the government and kept enough 
power to exert a strong influence. This was particularly dangerous for Erhard, as a deep rift 
on foreign'policy issues went right through the governing parties ever since the last years o f  
Adenauer’s chancellorship. This rift separated the so-called ’Gaullists' from ’Atlanticists*. T he 
former were pleading for a policy of closer alignment to France, more European independence 
from the US, and resistance against American inclinations to pursue a cautious detente 
policy.100 Strauß, for example, strongly emphasized in a letter to Erhard the supposed 
unreliability of US policy, the consequent danger of being dependent on the American nuclear 
guarantee, and the necessity to create an independent European deterrent.101
The Gaullists stepped up their pressure on Erhard when German-French relations deteriorated 
and Erhard’s government stumbled over numerous other issues. The ’Atlanticists* -Erhard, 
Foreign Minister Schröder, and von Hassel led this group- emphasized the paramount 
importance of US-German relations.102 The debate was intensified, and partly created by
100 The most important protagonists of this ’group* (characterized more by their common opposition to Erhard 
than by the similarity o f their political concepts) were former Chancellor Adenauer, former Defense Minister Strauß, 
the CSU representative Freiherr zu Guttenberg, and the President of the Federal Parliament, Gerstenmaier. For a 
detailed portrayal o f these men and their ideas, see: Grabbe (1983), p.469-489; Lailenberger, Ludwig Erhard. D er 
Nationalökonom als Politiker, 1986, p.168-181.
101 BA» NL 397, von Guttenberg, 187/1, Strauß to Erhard, 10 November 1965.
,<0 The Social democrats also were mostly ’Atl an ticist \  See: Grabbe (1983), p.540-88.
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domestic rivalries. It can only be understood in this context. Most leading politicians saw 
Erhard as a Chancellor in transition, and regarded his Foreign Minister Schroder as a main 
rival in the struggle for succession. Foreign policy became a main battlefield. During 1966, 
Erhard was increasingly challenged by his opponents. Adenauer continued to publicly criticise 
Erhard’s and Schroder’s policy towards de Gaulle.101 Strauß questioned one of the 
paradigms of German foreign policy, the insistence on a stable level of allied troops on 
German soil. In an interview with ’US News Sc World Report’, he argued for a stronger 
European component in Western defence which then would allow the withdrawal of one or 
two US divisions.104 These remarks were promptly cited by McNamara during 
Congressional hearings as evidence for the European capacity to do more for defence, and for 
the willingness to accept limited US troop reductions.105
As a consequence of the ceaseless pressure, Erhard felt compelled to emphasize the 
importance of German-American relations in a much stricter way than he would have 
probably done in the absence of this domestic opposition. A more independent course towards 
the US would have confirmed his opponents. Unfortunately for Erhard, American policy did 
not provide much support. He had to take several snubs, all resulting from the questioning 
of traditional policies towards Europe which was going on in Washington. The arguably most 
severe blow was the quiet but inexorable dismissal of the MLF by the Johnson administration. 
Erhard and Schröder had placed their credits on the scheme which should secure the Germans 
some kind of Mitspracherecht (right to say) in the nuclear affairs of the Alliance. Critics like 
Strauß and, looming in the background, de Gaulle saw it as just another device by the 
Americans to perpetuate their nuclear hegemony.10* In 1965/66, the project disappeared
101 Göllncr, Politisch-historische Beiträge zu Ludwig Erhard's Kanzlerschaft und Sturz, phil D iu., 1986, p.120* 
25.
104 Time to Slait US Pull'back in Europe: Interview with FJ.Slrauß, in: US News & World Report, 18 April 
1966. See also: Strauß, Entwurf fü r Europa, Stuttgart 1966, p.19 (According to Strauß it wasn't necessary for the 
Germans, 'to go hysterical every time an American battalion is withdrawn from Europe*).
105 To McNamara, the interview demonstrated that the Europeans were capable of increasing their defence outlays 
and that the US ’must assume the responsibility for persuading them to do so*; PSSD. XIV, 2207, Hearing before 
Senate Committee on Appropriations: Foreign Assistance, 89th cong., 2nd sess, 30 April 1966.
>0t On the MLF see: Hoppe, Zwischen Teilhabe und Mitsprache. Die Nuklearfrage in der AUianzpolitik 
Deutschlands 1959-1966, 1993; Kelleher, Germany and the Politics o f Nuclear Weapons, 1975; Mahnke. Nukleare 
Mitwirkung: D ie Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der atlantischen Allianz, 1954-1970, 1972; Steinbniner, The
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more and more from the agenda, and the only government to still try to keep it alive was 
Bonn. Erhard also felt undercut because the Americans pursued their cautious détente policy 
without consulting the German government.107 Conflicts on troop levels and offset came on 
top of this.
What made the offset issue, in particular, so dangerous for Erhard was that it was connected 
with the problems his adversaries cited over and over again: the eroding credibility o f  
American policy towards Europe, Erhard's weak leadership qualities, and, finally, the quarrel 
about the 1966 and 1967 Federal budgets.
Erhard silenced his critics temporarily by an impressive victory in the 1965 federal elections. 
However, in order to placate and covet as many interest groups as possible, the government 
had greatly expanded public expenditure prior to the elections. About DM 6bn were spent in 
this effort.108 The electoral pledges threatened to unsettle the 1966 budget. Some of them 
had to be revoked almost immediately after the elections. Despite the cuts, government 
expenditures were running too high and a supplementary budget became necessary to honour 
the government’s offset commitment. The presentation of this appropriation (to the tune o f  
one billion DM) to parliament was, however, delayed until it was too late.109 A parallel 
problem was that a balanced budget for 1967 seemed only possible in case of the increased 
tax revenues or new tough spending cuts which were politically very difficult to sell. At that 
time, a balanced budget was seen as a central task of the government in public opinion;110 
the Federal Republic had never practised deficit spending. To the contrary, it rather 
accumulated surpluses, like the Juliusturm.
Cybernetic Theory o f Decision, 1974.
107 Hanrieder (1989), p.170-94.
m  Hildebrand, Von Erhard zur Grossen ¡Coalition 1963-68, 1984, p.135; Mersey, Die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, 1987, p.86-91; Roeper, D ie D-Mark, 1979, p.145-47.
m  In June, von Hassel urged his colleague from Finance, Dahlgriin, to bring the supplementary budget finally 
on the way; otherwise, the offset agreement was unrealizable. Dahlgriin responded that because of the critical situation 
of the 1967 budget a supplement for 1966 had to await the passing of the former, tn the end, both budgets were 
approved only after Erhard’s fall. See: BA, B 136/3231, von Hassel to Dahlgriin, 20 June 1966; Dahlgriin to von 
Hassel, 22 June 1966.
1,0 Fels, 1966/67: Anatomic einer Rezession, 1988, p.10.
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The expansion of government expenditures in 1964/65 fueled a rapidly expanding economy. 
Prices began to rise perceptibly, endangering the main postulate of German economic policy, 
the stability o f the currency. Consequently, the Bundesbank put on the brakes and pursued 
an increasingly restrictive credit policy, successful in so far as it decisively slowed down 
economic activity.111 Problems such as low investment rates and a contraction of demand 
came together to produce angst of a major recession in the offing. Though modest in its 
economic effects, the recession had a strong impact on public perception as it was the first 
economic slow-down since the early 1950s.111
An early effect of the slowdown (which was actually to take hold from mid-1966 on) was that 
the tax revenues the government counted upon were much lower than hoped for. Erhard was 
forced into a difficult dilemma. All during 1966 the government struggled to fight the 
recession while at the same time trying to reduce government expenditure. Erhard’s authority 
seriously waned in his own domain, economic policy, and all he could still draw on was his 
role during the ’Wirtschaftswunder*. During the election campaign for the Land Nordrhein- 
Westfalen, widely seen as a test for Erhard’s government, the Chancellor lost his temper and 
attacked a crowd of protesting steel- and mine workers: 'And before t  g o t'd  tike to tell you 
louts that you would have perished in your nappies without me and my policy."1' The 
election result on 10 July 1966 was a resounding victory for the Social Democrats. This blow 
made Erhard’s domestic position almost untenable. His fate became dependent on a solution 
of the budgetary crisis and, as mentioned above, on a more convincing foreign policy. On 
both issues, offset had a strong impact.
111 From January 1965 to May 1966, the Bank raised the discount rate from 5% to 5%. It repeatedly took the 
unusual step of criticising the government publicly for its anti-cydical spending policy. See the speeches by 
Bundesbank President Blessing 'Central Bank Policy Today*, 8 December 1964, and in Maine, 24 February 1966; 
in: Blessing, Im Kampfum Gates Geld, 1966, p.185-203,275-287. See also: Schlesinger/BOckelmann, in: Holbik fed). 
Monetary Policy in Twelve Industrial Countries, 1973, p.191-195; RAper (1979). p.149-153.
ni It is probably more correct to speak of a slow-down of growth than of a recession. TV figures are not very 
impressive. The GDP sank by 0.1%, unemployment rose to 2.1% in 1967, and investment stagnated. Nevertheless, 
the political effect was powerful. First, because certain branches (like mining and steel producing) w ere  strongly 
affected, and second because of a shaky political dimate which tended to produce a Rood of alarmed statements, 
leading to a feeling of crisis which was intensified by the government's inability to get a grips on hi budget problems; 
see: Giersch/Paque/Schmieding, The Fading Miracle, 1992, p i  42*45; KJeflmsnn.ZwrtSiMren, evteSatuuL Deutsche 
Geschichie 1955-70, 1988, p.193-199; Feb (1988).
IIS SPIEGEL, 43/1966, pSQ.
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e) US Decision-Making prior to Erhard’s Visit
With the German government slowly sinking into the budget imbroglio, American 
apprehensions about the continuation o f offset grew rapidly. However, they did not take 
alarming hints from Bonn regarding the current agreement too seriously. Every agreement had 
seen a critical phase, yet, in the end, funds had arrived (though the last agreement, as we have 
seen, was only fulfilled by huge prepayments on future orders). On 5 July, Erhard wrote a  
letter to Johnson in which he urged for different means of offset ’than the purchase o f  
weapons and military equipment atone. In my view, which I  hope, is shared by you, this s e t 
o f problems should, however, not be linked with the question o f the future presence o f U .S. 
troops in Germany. This would be a ll to easily give rise to an approach that would not d o  
justice to the friendship between our two countries...tlH The letter sparked a vivid debate 
in the US government about the future of offset and, increasingly, also about the future of the  
commitment in Europe. The front-lines were the same as they had been during the troop 
reduction debate in 1962/63. For a strict weapons military offset approach and, in case o f  
non-compliance by the FRG, a corresponding reduction of US troops were McNamara’s  
Pentagon, the Treasury Department under Henry Fowler, and, in the background, parts o f  
Congress. A shrinking but still influential group in the State Department, the White House, 
and the ambassador in Bonn, McGhee, defended the traditional orientation of American policy 
towards Europe and did not want to see it endangered by a rigid offset policy. President 
Johnson and Rusk navigated somewhere in the middle until they were forced to take 
positions.115
The loudest voice in this debate, and the one held to be the most decisive by all the literature 
on the Erhard visit, was certainly the one of Robert Strange McNamara116 who, due to h is
114 DDRS 1994/181, Erhard to Johnson, 5 July 1966.
1,5 An unsurpassed account of American decision-making prior to the Erhard-visit is Trcverton’s analysis (1978). 
p.100-24. The very descriptive account by Schertz, D ie Deutschlandpolitik Kennedy's and Johnson's, 1992, confines 
itself to translating almost literally the major documents from the LBJ Library. The following paragraphs try to  
expand Treverton*s analysis by taking a closer look at the structural political and monetary problems involved.
116 See for example his remarks on offset during a press conference on 6 June 1966: 'This agreement was 
renewed under the instructions o f President Johnson, confirmed by Chancellor Erhard, signed by M inister von HasseL 
We fitly  expect it to be m e t' (PSSD, p tJ , reel XIV, p.12), and, just prior to Erhard's visit, on IS September: 
’Question: Do you want to renew the offset agreement? McN.: Oh, o f course, we do! Q.: For military equipment?
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rigid insistence on a continuation of offset by military purchases, subsequently earned himself 
the title of a 'tireless arms merchant with shockingly high-pressure sales techniques' .U1 
McNamara’s position on offset is usually characterized by such titles and he is portrayed as 
the main culprit in the deterioration of US-German relations; the roots and motives behind 
his policy are rarely adequately analysed.
In the following paragraphs I will try to present a more elaborate picture than the usual 
slogans suggest although the documentary record is still incomplete. It has been suggested that 
McNamara’s stance was only a tactical position, pursued to preserve the American bargaining 
leverage before the inevitable re-negotiation and diversification of offset would 
commence.118 It is true that McNamara showed strong doubts as to the possibility of 
continuing offset by weapon purchases, at the latest in early 1966."9 However, he had a real 
and deep interest in prolonging the military offset scheme as long as possible.
It has been noted before that soon after the first offset agreement had been signed a powerful 
coalition which benefitted from the agreement had formed in the US government. This 
coalition included State Department members searching for arguments to preserve an 
undiminished US presence in Europe, monetary authorities which needed offset to keep the 
payments deficits under control, and, finally and most insistent, a kind of military-industrial 
complex which developed out of the enormous sales activities of the Pentagon during the 
1960s with West Germany as the main market(see ch.IX). This military sales effort had 
become the major source of income for the Pentagon. Government-mediated sales were 
counted on the income side of the Pentagon balances though the benefits went mostly to the 
about twenty major weapon exporting enterprises. The sales were credited as positive item 
in the traditionally negative military payments balance which was the target o f particularly
McN.: Yes,..there is no question that they have a requirement for more military equipment * (PSSD, p t3 , reel XVI11, 
p.819-39).
111 The phrase, repeated in most accounts of the events, had been coined originally by Theo Sommer in his article 
'Bonn Changes Course*, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1967, p.477-491.
"* Raj (1983), p.222-23.
1
’Realistically the FRG cannot continue indefinitely to provide a fu ll offset McNamara during a discussion 
with the UK Foreign and Defence Ministers. 27 January 1966, in: FRUS 1964-68, XIII, p.304.
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energetic efforts by McNamara. At times of growing congressional unease regarding the huge 
defence budget, swollen with Vietnam related expenditures, it became increasingly important 
to have a guaranteed income and a counterweight to the growth of military expenditure 
entering the balance of payments. The higher production numbers associated with a successful 
selling of material abroad also made the Pentagon's own orders cheaper due to the lower cost 
of producing a bigger output. A sudden reduction of foreign military sales would have 
unsettled all the savings which had been achieved by McNamara's vigorous managerial 
programs since the first days of the Kennedy-administration.
McNamara's main concern in the mid-1960s was the conduct of the Vietnam War and the 
justification of this war at home. This conflicted with the allocation of resources for the 
European theatre. Offset was vital to balance these contradicting objectives, particularly 
regarding the payments component of expenditures in Europe. Diversifying offset to other 
means, such as German investment in Treasury bonds as Erhard had suggested, did not make 
much difference from an overall balance of payments perspective; it would, however, make 
a huge difference for McNamara who with one stroke would loose about $700m a year, if not 
in budgetary, than at least in foreign exchange terms.
Those were the reasons why McNamara publicly was so outspoken in his insistence on a 
continuing need for weapon purchases for the German forces. He left no doubt on this matter 
during Congressional Hearings, when pressed by Senators who demanded a reduction in US 
forces in Europe120, and during his conversations with German representatives. Within the 
government he fought until the very last for a continuation of the old offset approach. In a 
straightforward memorandum to the President, prepared for the Erhard visit, he repeated his 
conviction that the Federal Republic's military posture was deficient, that it still had huge 
requirements for military hardware, and that German statements to the contrary were 'clearly 
untrue.*121 He emphasized that the US could not accept any different method for offset, and 
that it could not accept the balance-of-payments drain if the Germans stopped their orders. 
He recommended for this case a troop reduction of about 50.000 men, and the dual-basing
110 The Atlantic Alliance: Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Government 
Operations, 89th Congress, 2nd sess., 21 June 1966, in: PSSD, p tJ , reel XV, p.215.
111 LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box SO, 19 September 1966.
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(alternately in the US and in Europe) of about half the US Air Force in Germany.122 
Underlying his memorandum was the speculation that if he kept the pressure on the Germans 
high enough they might in the end agree to American troop reductions (and StrauB remarks 
had given him some encouragement).123 This was the only scenario which would make him 
renege on a full offset.
The considerable risks o f such a policy of brinkmanship did not go unnoticed: a prolonged 
deterioration of German-American relations, a further blow to the already shaky NATO 
cohesion, an almost certain loss of US prestige in Europe, and a weakening of the military 
posture in Europe. Those were the main arguments used by a group of advisers in the US 
administration who became increasingly preoccupied with the state o f European-American 
relations in the shadow of the Vietnam War. Among them were, for example, W.Rostow 
(Johnson's security adviser), F.Bator, (the Deputy Assistant of National Security Affairs in 
the White House, very close to the President, and, because he organised all meetings and 
screened and commented all memos before the President, a central figure in offset 
deliberations), and a State Department group, led by George Ball. A deepening conflict had 
emerged between a more European minded traditional group, which had dominated US 
foreign policy after the War, and others who saw America's future for the good and bad in 
the Pacific.124 The 'Europeanists* argued for the over-riding priority o f keeping the 
traditional structure of the Alliance intact despite such pressures as the balance of payments, 
Vietnam, East-West detente, and domestic criticism. The decisive voice in determining the 
American position towards Erhard, however, turned out to be neither McNamara nor the State 
Department, but the Treasury (see para.g).
The first move in the hot phase of the quarrel on offset within the Johnson-administration was
123 ibid. In his conversation with the British McNamara saw the solution in 'first, a modification o f our force 
structure, and second, a substantial increase in the FHG financial and force contribution \  27 January 1966, in: FRUS 
1964-68, XIII, p304.
,2J FRUS 1964-69, XIII, Briefing Memo Bator to LBJ, 23 August 1966, p.454-455.
114 See for example the heated dispute between McCloy, who accused the Johnson administration of having no 
European policy at all, and Harriman, who argued that no movements in Europe were possible without getting the 
Germans ’in a stew’ and located the future in China, not in Europe (Library of Congress, Manuscript Collection, 
Harriman Papers, Box 486, note on a conversation with McCloy, 22 January 1966).
* • * ' * - * » «
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the plan of a multilateral payments union, destined to avoid the bilateralism o f the US- 
German offset relationship and proposed once more by Rostow.125 However, McNamara and 
Fowler put up strong resistance against this idea and warned of the very protracted bargaining 
which would be necessary, particularly at a time when NATO was already in disarray.126 
This killed the project quickly.
The main conflict emerged on the issue o f how to respond to Erhard’s 5 July letter which had 
asked for a diversification of the offset approach. The situation was complicated by the 
simultaneous public declaration of the British government that it intended to reduce its troops 
on the European continent. The hard-liners in the American government wanted to send an 
immediate response to Erhard demanding full military offset for the period after June 1967 
(tacitly hoping that this would make significant troop reductions possible either by a German 
refusal to continue offset or by forcing them to give up their insistence on an undiminished 
American presence).127 Ball, Bator, Rostow, McGhee, and others, however, were determined 
to ’not let Bob wreck this thing’ with unforeseeable consequences for the US position in 
Europe.12*’ They therefore tried to delay the answer to Erhard.12*
When in early August, however, the US embassy in Bonn reported that the German cabinet 
was about to finalize its budget for 1967 with heavy cuts into defence in the air, McNamara 
urged for an immediate and tough response. Once more, his opponents argued against the 
dangers of this approach which in all likelihood would not force Erhard to revise his spending 
program: 'It would be a very poor trade fo r us to take serious risks with the stability o f 
German and alliance politics, and hence with our security position in Europe, in order to 
make marginal gains on our balance o f payments. 1,30 They recommended that the President
DDRS 1994/63, Bator to LBJ, 9 June 1966; Rostow, The Diffusion o f Power, 1972, p395-96; Treveiton 
(1978), p.114-118.
LBJL, Ball Papers, Box 4, telcon Bator-Ball, 17 June 1966; telcon Bator-Ball, 20 June 1966. 
m  FRUS 1964-68. XIII, Bator to LBJ. 23 August 1966, p.453-55. 
m  LBJL. Ball Papers, Box 4, telcon Ball-McGhee, 23 July 1966.
Treverton (1978), p.118.
,w FRUS 1964-68, XIII, Bator to LBJ, 11 August 1966, p.446.
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postpone the reply to Erhard once more and bring together all principals before a firm 
position was to be decided.
Johnson agreed.131 That gave the proponents of a compromise line two more weeks to 
elaborate a proposal which would deal with both the German and the British problem, and 
at the same time would not put further strain on European-American relations. The result was 
a plan to get all three concerned nations together and try to trilaterally work out a mutually 
acceptable financial offset framework.132 During such discussions it would also be possible 
to talk comprehensively about the actual threat in Europe, about the necessary force-levels, 
and probably also about the troublesome nuclear problem. An immediate British cut which 
would encourage the Mansfield-group in Congress could be postponed. If no solution was 
found, troop cuts could be legitimately founded on the insolubility of the problem. During the 
decisive meeting on 24 August the President endorsed the Trilaterals' proposal.133
The idea had been floated by the State Department at least since mid-1965, originally as a 
response to expected actions by de Gaulle;134 however, only in the emergency situation of 
autumn 1966 Alliance problems became so intricate that the necessary political impetus was 
created to get the US government moving towards a major diplomatic exercise. In order to 
start immediately, the United States planned to join the Anglo-German commission which at 
that moment dealt with the British offset issue and to try to explore alternatives to military 
offset.133
LBJL, Dali Papers, Box 4, telcon Bator-Ball, 13 August 1966.
132 LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 50, Leddy to Secretary Rusk: UK Financial Problem with BAOR. 
23 August 1966.
133 LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 50, Bator Notes on 23 August Meeting.
134 FRUS. 1964-68 XIII, Leddy to Ball, 23 September 1965, p.244-47. The British had been already approached 
with the idea; see: PRO, FO 371/183103, FO Brief for Stewart visit to Washington, 29 September 1965; Excerpt 
Stewart letter to Lord Hood, 20 September 1965; For the discussion within the US-administration: FRUS XIII, 1964- 
68, Memcon Bundy, McNamara, Ball, JCS, et.al., 8 October 1965, p.253-57. 135
135 FRUS 1964-68, XIII, Bator to LBJ. 23 August 1966, p.454.
Letters were sent to Erhard and Wilson inviting them to participate in trilateral talks136. The 
letter to Erhard proposed immediate trilateral discussions on the future offset modus and 
related themes; there was no give in regarding the current offset. 7 know that you and I  a re  
agreed that the current offset agreement will be fu lly  m et and provided fo r  in your new  
budget and legislative program.’131 Erhard, in his reply, suggested only the delaying of the 
Trilaterals until after his visit in September.138 Due to the complicated preparations for such 
a large undertaking, this delay occurred anyway. Still, the Americans displayed considerable 
activity, trying to prevent the participating governments from moves which would prejudice 
the exercise. LBJ wrote twice to Wilson so that the British Prime Minister would not com m it 
himself irreversibly to reductions in the BAOR.139 At the same time, the government tried 
to hold the line in the domestic scene where the Mansfield resolution was introduced on 31 
August. However, a further blow was to disturb the smooth proceeding o f the plan: the 
realization that the current agreement was not going to be fulfilled. This proved to be the 
most serious factor in the mass of problems accumulated prior to Erhard's visit.
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f) German Troubles
The Germans for some time had pondered as to how to put the cards on the table. The 
question involved not only changing the rules of future offset140, but also whether there w as 
any money at all available for offset and -in particular- whether the current agreement could 
be fulfilled. After the government had realized already in March that offset targets could be 
reached only with a supplementary budget for 1966, it had put off this idea because o f  
internal divisions on the 1967 budget, particularly between the Christian Democrats and the
m  FRUS 1964-68, XIII, LBJ to Wilson, 26 August 1966, p.457. Wilson, in his not yet declassified response, 
apparently requested preceding bilateral talks with the US. This was denied by the US government. See: ibid, Johnson 
to Wilson, 1 September 1966, p.460-61.
1,7 LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 50, LBJ to Erhard, 25.8.1966.
m  FRUS 1964-68, XIII, Erhard to Johnson, 7 September 1966, p.464-65.
m  FRUS 1964-68, XIII, LBJ to Wilson, 26 August 1966; 31 August 1966; DDRS 1985/1006, Rusk to Ball in 
London, 7 September 1966.
140 In July, the US offset negotiating team, headed by fiuss, was told in Bonn that ’superior levels’ had given 
order not to proceed with the negotiations on the old terms; McGhee Papers, 1988add., Box 2, 23 July 1966.
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Free Democrats. The former pleaded for tax increases whereas the Liberals insisted upon cuts 
in government spending.141 From mid-66 on the government struggled to present a more or 
less balanced budget for 1967. All proposals submitted by the ministries were vigorously cut. 
This affected, in particular, the Defence Ministry. It had planned for a budget of DM19.8bn 
and ended up with DM18.5bn.142 In a Cabinet Meeting, von Hassel stated that *with such 
a budgetary situation the offset agreement could be neither fulfilled with orders nor -even 
approximately- with paym ents.M43 In a letter to Erhard on 12 September, he specified that 
payments would probably only reach $267m at the end of 1966 (target March 1967: $1392m). 
Orders made up to this date would heavily mortgage future budgets, so that future offset 
agreements were to stay within a limit of $350m military and civilian orders, including a 
complete moratorium on orders in 1967.144 Von Hassel also added that the interests of 
German defence industries could no longer be neglected.
This reflected mounting criticism in the public regarding the agreements. After the von Hassel 
visit to Washington in May, the Bundestag had for the first time taken up offset. Von Hassel 
had to deny the allegation that unecessary material had been purchased. Helmut Schmidt from 
the Social Democrats criticised the political and economic consequences of the agreements.
*For reasons o f security and alliance policy we can't perm it oursleves to purchase all the 
heavy material we import from  abroad exclusively from  the United States. It ju st won*t do. 
I  would like that we buy and commonly develop parts o f  this equipment in France, whenever 
this is possiblef so that relations to France in this area would not suffer from  the gigantic 
volume o f payments we owe to America. tl4S
A further factor in increasing criticism in the military offset deals was that the quality of the 
US material came to be increasingly questioned due to a series of crashes by the Luftwaffe’s 1
11 SPIEGEL 45/1966, p.31.
MI Military Diary von Hassel, 26 August 1966.
M1 ibid.. Entry 4 August 1966 on Cabinet Meeting the day before.
144 ibid., von Hassel to Erhard, 12 September 1966.
145 Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestags, 5.Periode, 44.Sitzung, 26 May 1966, p.2142. Schmidt’s critical 
remarks were shared even by members of the governing parties, ibid., p.2144-45.
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principal aircraft, the Starfighter. Von Hassel had to face embarrassing questions in the 
Bundestag as to the wisdom of buying American.146 To obtain further authority for funds 
to fulfill the offset agreement was impossible under these circumstances.
Various ideas were floated as to how avoid a breach of the agreement and an open row with 
the Americans. Negotiations were, independently of offset, already under way on a premature 
repayment of the last tranche ($214m) of German postwar debts to the United States. The 
Federal Ministry of Finance wanted such a procedure to be counted as offset. However, the 
US Treasury refused.147 Another idea, pushed by Erhard, was the possibility of increased 
cooperation in space technology which might make some investment in US technology 
possible. However, the expected sums were much too low to have great significance, and the 
Americans also raised doubts as to the 'additionality* of this investment because in their 
opinion it would have been made anyway.148 With the same argument they refused to 
consider ’civil* purchases, like aircraft for the Lufthansa. The only escape route seemed offset 
by financial measures, like German investment in mid- or long-term US treasury securities, 
thus transferring the accumulated dollars back. In pursuing this alternative the Erhard 
government was confronted with two formidable obstacles: the first was that it was unclear 
whether the Americans would agree, and the second was the Bundesbank which would have 
to advance the money because of the sad state of the government's budget. However, by law 
the Bundesbank was prohibited to extend credit in order to finance government programs; and 
the Central Bank Council considered the government's request to be such a case. Only major 
concessions by the Americans would save Erhard from the budgetary trouble which threatened 
to bring down his government.
VdB, 5th period, 33d sess., 24 March 1966, p.1510-17.
147 LBJL, Fowler Papers, Box 51-52, memo: Present Status of German Debt Prepayment Question, 19 July 1966. 
,4a McGhee Papers, 1988 add.. Box 2, Blaser to McGhee, 16 July 1966.
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g) The Erhard-Visit
On 9 September, the US ambassador was informed that the German government felt unable 
to fulfill its current offset obligations.149 This was a very bad surprise. The money had been 
already earmarked for various purposes, particularly in the Defense and Treasury 
Departments. ’The importance...of the past FRG offset receipts b  indicated by the fact that 
the offset receipts o f about $700 million in F Y 1965 were equal to about one-half o f the total 
Defense Department global military receipts....The U.S. balance o f payments deficit for CY 
1965 was $1.3 billion on the over-all balance, liquidity basb. We rely heavily on those 
receipts in our total balance o f payments program, and our CY 1966 and 1967 estimates are 
based on FRG honouring its commitments. ’15° These considerations were decisive for the 
US response to Erhard, despite continued warnings by the adherents of a softer line against 
an uncompromising US stance.151 Fowler and McNamara, both saw their policies in serious 
danger and urged the President to get Erhard to fulfil the present agreement. McNamara 
requested authority to commence with troop cuts, if the Germans would not stand up to their 
promises.152
On the order commitment and on future offset, various compromises were considered. 
However, on the essential point, the US administration decided to remain hard: the payments 
had to come across the exchanges as planned. The agreed paper for the President 
recommended a tough line regarding the fulfilment of. the offset obligation by any means, 
even if it included investments in Treasury Papers; this clearly reflected the concerns of the
w  Treverton (1978), p.120.
150 LBJL, Papers of H.Fowler, Box 69, Treasury Background Paper. Trilateral talks (U.S7Gcrman Military Offset 
Relationship), 24 October 1966.
131 The arguments were summed up by the American Ambassador in Bonn, G.McGhec. He sent a long cable to 
Washington on the possible consequences of a hard American response, the points of which he later repeated in a 
memorandum for the President He listed up the danger that Erhard fell with die U.S. appearing as culprit; a decisive 
weakening o f NATO; the end of Flexible Response; a decisive military weakening of US forces in Europe; a political 
victory for the Soviet Bloc; a blow to US-European relations and a corresponding loss in the American ability to 
influence events there; a possible reorientation of German security policy. See: LBJL, NSF, Country File: Germany, 
Box 193, Bonn 3361: The Offset and American Troop Levels in Germany, 20 September 1966; McGhee Papers, 1988 
add., Box 2, Memo for the President: Your Meeting with Chancellor Erhard, 22 September 1966.
131 LBJL, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 50, McNamara to President, 19 September 1966.
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Treasury department. The order period was to be stretched out, with Fowler and McNamara 
insisting on eventual military orders and the Bator/Ball group pledging for substitution by 
other means133. The essential consideration was the balance of payments. Fowler stated 
categorically that he 'con’/ take a nickel*s loss in the balance o f payments this year. ,/w The 
last instruction, the President received prior to the meeting reflected this: the President was 
advised to insist upon full payments and on an immediate start of the Trilaterals.153
These instructions showed clearly how much the US government now relied on a continuation 
of offset payments despite an awareness of its character as a temporary expedient. Even if we 
take into account that the US government suspected that Erhard was bound to fall in any case, 
the decision to bluntly refuse his request was a risky one which might have poisoned mutual 
relations for some time to come - as subsequent events demonstrated. The contradicting aims 
of an expansive Cold War policy, including Vietnam, the continuation of the dollar-gold 
standard, and the refusal to take drastic action in the domestic economy were to an important 
degree hold together by the creation of offset. The US government found itself trapped. In 
one way or the other, it would have to compromise its policy, either by reducing its Cold War 
commitments, by diluting the monetary system, or by restrictive measures in the domestic 
economy. For the moment, however, there was still hope that Erhard would come up in some 
miraculous way with additional funds.
Just prior to his departure for Washington, Erhard's domestic problems took a dramatic turn 
for the worse. The coalition government agonized over the budget imbroglio. Statements that 
the Chancellor should offer his resignation multiplied. The attacks were not only pointed 
against the Chancellor, but also against his advisers. Foreign Minister Schroder and Finance 
Minister Dahlgriin had since long been harshly criticized for their policies. Two of von 
Hassel’s chiefs o f staff left office in protest on the issue o f union representation in the armed 
forces. Both vehemently criticized the Minister.136 On 21 September 1966 von Hassel
111 LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 50, Bator to President: Erhard-Vi sit, 25 September 1966.
134 LBJL, Ball Papers, Box 1, telcon Rostow-Ball, 26 September 1966.
135 LBJL, NSF, Country File: Germany, Box 193, Rostow to President, 11am, 26 September 1966.
** Hildebrand (1984), p2 1 1-215.
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survived by a small margin a vote of non-confidence in the Bundestag. The disorganized 
working of the government also made the Head of the Chancellor’s Office, Erhard’s closest 
collaborator Westrick, a target of incessant attacks. In early September he resigned. It turned 
out to be extremely difficult to find a successor. Nobody wanted to enter the sinking ship.
Erhard had been advised prior to the visit that it was better not to go into such an uncertain 
mission under those disadvantageous circumstances, but he had brushed this advice away. He 
had also refused American attempts through lower official channels to discuss the problems 
beforehand.157 On the main issue, the Germans had received no positive signs. On 23 
September, during a NATO meeting, von Hassel had briefly spoken to McNamara. The 
Secretary of Defence told him that the US government would probably be flexible regarding 
future offset, however, there would be no give in regarding the current offset.15®
When the state visit drew nearer, Erhard saw no alternative left but to ask his friend, the 
President, to extend the current offset, to change the rules for further agreements, to avoid 
immediate US troop cuts, and to reaffirm the American support for the MLF.159 Out of fear 
of being presented with an united US-UK front on the issue, Erhard also wanted to achieve 
a postponement of the trilateral exercise until after his US visit.1®0 A diplomatic success on 
these issues together with an impressive reaffirmation of German-American friendship might 
have given him some breathing space on the domestic scene. However, on the main problem, 
the offset agreement, no conclusive alternative plans existed. Efforts to convince the 
Bundesbank to advance a short-term credit continued until the very last minute - and 
failed.161
’ Treverton (1978), p.144; Osterhcld (1992), p350; McGhee Papers, 1988 add.. Box 2, General Klein on
Erhard's present mood, 13 September 1966.
,M Military Diary von Hassel, entry of 23 September 1966.
159 Much has been made out of Erhard’s alleged naivity and a quote o f him '1 love MrJohnson, and MrJohnson 
loves me* appears in almost all accounts of the events. If all the sources cited for this quote are correct, Erhard must 
have made this comment on quite a number of occasions.
,M LES, Talking Points for Washington, 26/27 September 1966; NHP, Ref.tIA7 Chancellor’s Visit in 
Washington: Problems of European Defence, 17 September 1966.
IM SZ. 29 September 1966; SPIEGEL, 3 October 1966.
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The reception in Washington was not very auspicious. Only Ball, who had left the 
government service already, welcomed the German delegation in which, strangely enough, the 
Finance Minister was not present; probably a reflection of the state of the coalition, as 
Dahlgriin was an FDP member. The first rounds o f talks took place in the State Department. 
Erhard pledged for prior bilateral consultations concerning the proposed trilateral exercise. 
Regarding offset he explained that the Federal Republic would not be able to fulfil the current 
agreement, and needed a stretch-out o f the target as well as a diversification and decrease in 
future offset payments.162 His interlocutors responded that this problem would have to be 
dealt with in the face to face talk with the President the following day.
During this famous meeting, Erhard repeated his points citing the cooperative attitude of his 
government in the whole field of bilateral issues.163 He also hinted that in case h is 
government fell, the succeeding one might be less cooperative. Johnson did not take up any 
of Erhard's proposals. He expressed deep disappointment at the fact that his German friends 
had broken their word and had put him in an extremely difficult position. He suggested tha t 
experts on both sides should start to work on the problem. There was no indication of any 
give-in on Erhard’s basic pledge, a payments stretch out in the current agreement. It w as  
obvious that the Chancellor’s hopes had failed. When both joined their waiting delegations, 
Erhard, according to McGhee, looked ’utterly dejected.*164 The German delegation which 
had not formulated a consistent position for the emergency that Erhard’s pledge might fail 
worked feverishly to present an acceptable alternative. The only solution to fill the enormous 
order and payments gap163 was US acceptance o f large-scale German investment in Treasury 
papers and of premature repayment o f the remaining German postwar debts ($214m) as offset.
The Bundesbank acquired a central role in the deliberations. Bundesbank President Blessing
ibid., 26 September 1966; Osterheld (1992), p.350-53.
IU The complete text has been published recently in the FRUS, 1964-68, XIII, p.471-77.
,M McGhee (1989), p.193; Osterheld (1992), pJ54 ; LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 50, memcon 
President/advisers - Chancellor/advisers, 12:30, 26 September 1966.
145 Estimated Orders shortfall on 31 December 1966: S567m; payments shortfall on 30 June 1967: $892m. Both 
of these figures were only reached by counting some questionable items. See: LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, 
Box 51, Minute o f US-FRG discussion, 27 September 1966.
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was in Washington for the Annual IMF Meeting; however, in consultations with the German 
delegation, he put hard conditions on any help which would come close to Bundesbank 
lending to the Federal Government. In case the Bundesbank should agree to convert its short* 
term reserves to mid-term US treasuries, thus depriving itself of flexibility in a potentially 
unstable monetary environment, he demanded a supplementary budget for 1966 of DM 1 
billion and an augmentation of the 1967 Defence budget by another billion.166 Those funds 
would allow the Federal government to gradually acquire the bonds from the Central Bank, 
and to repay the funds for the debt prepayment mentioned above. The snag was that this offer 
was contingent upon approval by the Bundesbank board, and budget augmentations had to be 
approved by parliament. The German delegation informed the Americans that they would not 
be able to present more than suggestions for Ailing the $892m payments gap.167 These went 
as follows: $428m transfer of short-term Bundesbank funds to Treasury bonds which would 
count as positive items in the US Balance of payments; $214m prepayment of postwar debts; 
$250m funds coming from an augmented defence budget.168 Regarding future agreements 
the Germans proposed a level of $350m/year on a five year base.
McNamara and Fowler rejected this last point out of hand as a question which had to be dealt 
with at the Trilaterals. Regarding the proposed purchase of Treasury bonds, Fowler demanded 
that those were non-negotiable, non-convertible, with a term of 6-8 years and later on to be 
settled by arms purchases.169 This would make them a kind of pre-payment on future 
military orders, preserving the military offset scheme. The Americans compromised on 
counting the debt prepayment and on a stretch out of the order period. The main consideration 
for them was getting the payments across exchanges one way or the other. On this base, both 
delegations tried to formulate a face-saving communique. The result was the longest of all 
postwar German-American communiques.170 It stated that the Federal Republic would ’do
Military Diary von Hassel, 25 September 1966.
167 LBJL, Ball Papers, Box 4, telcon Carstens-Ball, 26 September 1966.
Military Diary von Hassel, entry of 27 September, LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 51, Minute 
of US-FRG discussion, 27 September 1966.
1W ibid.
170 EA 21(1966), p.D522-25.
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its best* to meet the current agreement, but would not be able to continue offset at the same 
level. The Federal Republic also agreed to an immediate start of the trilateral exercise. The 
MLF was not mentioned anymore.171
The long-winded communique could hardly veil the fact that the German delegation had not 
reached its objectives of getting relief from its offset obligation. Soon, harsh criticism centred 
on various aspects of the trip. Not only the press172, but also parliament173 and voices 
from Erhard’s own party joined ranks.174 During Erhard’s absence several conspiratorial 
meetings had taken place, but Erhard’s rivals could not agree on a successor. Meanwhile, the 
budgetary chaos took on ever more disastrous forms. Shortly after Erhard returned, new 
estimates put tax revenues even lower than already expected. The budget which was finally 
prepared was ruled out by the Bundesrat (Council of the Lander) as unconstitutional because 
important obligations like offset were not even mentioned, let alone covered by funds. The 
alternatives now were either cuts in government programs (which the CDU/CSU resisted) o r 
tax rises (which the FDP abhorred). In October, the Free Democrats left the government when 
the cabinet decided for tax rises. Erhard tried to cling to his chair with a minority 
government. On 8 November a majority in the parliament asked him to pose the 
Vertrauensfrage (vote of confidence).175 The CDU had to act. One day later, the party 
elected the Minister President o f the Land Baden-Württemberg, Kiesinger, as Erhard's 
successor. Kiesinger immediately got together with the Social Democrats to form a Grand 
Coalition. On 1 December, the Kiesinger government was elected by the Bundestag w ith 
Brandt as Foreign Minister, Strauss as Finance Minister, and Schroder pushed to the Defence
171 Hoppe (1994), p357-58.
172 For example: SPIEGEL 41/1966, p.26-28; The Frankfurter Rundschau of 29 September 1966 spoke o f  •  
thinly veiled fiasco on all counts.
171 For the debate see: VdB, 5th period, 60th session, 5 October 1966, p.2939-2970. Speakers of the opposition 
(H.Schmidt; H.Wehner) mentioned the absence of the Finance Minister, the secretiveness sunoundiog the 
commitments, and the committing o f enormous funds on the base of insufficient budgets. FDP speakers joined this 
chorus, stating that present budgetary estimates were void in view of the offset commitment. Universally the absence 
of a clause of best efforts was strongly criticized.
174 Straufi found fault with the absence of a clause of best efforts and the naive one-sided reliance on US policy; 
SPIEGEL 42/1966, p J l .
m  For the agony of the Erhard government, see: Göllner (1986), p.140-49; Laitenberger (1986), p.211-217; 
Mintzel. Geschichte der CSU, 1977, p.380-91; Hildebrand (1984), p.217-231.
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Ministry.
The question as to how much the fatal visit to Washington contributed to Erhard’s fall and 
whether the US government deliberately took this possibility into account is open to 
speculation. It is true that the US were fully aware o f Erhard's problems and probably saw 
him as a lame duck anyway. Any concessions would have been tactically unwise as Erhard's 
future was so uncertain. The problem was the danger that the Americans appeared the culprits 
which would have damaged German-American relations considerably. However, as we have 
seen, the US government also felt under very strong pressure not to compromise. The US 
didn’t escape all the blame176, but the prevailing opinion was that Erhard's fate was sealed 
anyway and that the visit was just the last straw.
The indirect impact of the offset problem was decisive for Erhard's fall. The exact role of 
offset commitments in the budget problem is, due to the scarcity of available sources, not 
answerable; it seems, however, that it was the biggest problem.177
These questions, however, are only of secondary importance to the main argument. The 
central purpose of this chapter has been to show the multi-faceted nature of domestic and 
international, economic and political, structural and temporary factors which shaped events 
and decisions on a complicated issue like offset. In the instance of the Erhard visit a melange 
of longterm factors (balance of payments problems, British economic crisis, de Gaulle's 
challenge, détente, crisis of German foreign policy, Vietnam) was exacerbated by the impact 
of short-term developments like the Sterling crisis in July 1966, German budgetary problems, 
the sudden motion in the US congress, and the dim prospects for the 1966 US balance of 
payments. Offset had been a kind of glue keeping together all those disparate elements. It had 
become institutionalised in a rather rigid form, particularly in Washington. When its further 
implementation became impossible, an immobilized German government was not able to 
change the modus and escape from the commitment
IH Sommer, in his influential Foreign Affaire article, April 1967, wrote that *it was American insensitivity which 
brought Erhard down’, p.483. In the same vain: Morgan, The US and West Germany 1945-73, 1974, p.146-48.
177 SZ, 27 October 1966; 29 October 1966.
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The most important function of offset became temporarily unfeasible: to provide a protective 
shield for the currencies under pressure, pound and dollar, and to guarantee the continuity o f 
military protection by the Alliance, symbolized by the troop commitments. The issue in the 
Trilateral negotiations was whether another form o f ’glue' could be found or whether either 
Anglo-American monetary policies or German security policies had to be revised profoundly. 
These revisions would have signified the abandonment of longstanding fundamentals of either 
foreign policy. It is no surprise that the negotiations tuned out to be everything but smooth.
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CHAPTER X!
THE TRILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 1966/67
a) Fulfilling the McNamara-Von Hassel Agreement
On 11 October 1966, President Johnson announced that the governments of the Federal 
Republic, the United Kingdom, and the United States were about to 'undertake a searching 
reappraisal o f the threat to security and -taking into account changes in military technology 
and mobility- o f the forces required to maintain adequate deterrence and defense in Central 
Europe. The reappraisal will also deal with: equitable sharing o f defense and other 
comparable burdens, the impact o f troop-deployments and force levels on the balance o f 
payments o f the US and the UK, the effect on the German economic and budgetary situation 
o f measures designed to ameliorate balance o f payments problem s'.* 1 will deal with the first 
part of this program, the reappraisal of NATO strategy, and with the diplomatic process of 
the ensuing negotiations in the Alliance only parenthetically. Previous research has 
emphasized the importance of the Triiaterals as a first step towards the restructuring and 
reconsolidating of NATO in the late 1960*s, paving the way for the Harmel Report at the end 
of 1967.2
However, the most significant aspect of the trilateral negotiations were the financial ones and 
their consequences. The public German statement not to convert its accumulated dollars to 
gold has been termed 'the most important postwar step in insulating the United States from  
external pressure on its reserves',5 The questions as to how this different kind of offset came 
into being and which factors led up to it have been barely analyzed. 1 will look at the genesis, 
consequences, and actual significance of the unprecedented commitment by the German
1 Statement by President Johnson on the forthcoming talks between Washington, London, and Bonn, in: PP 
Johnson (1966), II, p.1139.
1 The best analysis of the Triiaterals is in Haftendom, Kernwaffen und die Glaubwürdigkeit der Allianz: Die 
NATO-Krise von 1966167, 1994. Furthermore: Whightman, in: Rivista di Sioria Economics 5/1988, p.26-75; 
Duckwitz, Truppenstationierung und Devisenausgleich, in: Aussenpolitik 8/1967, p.471-75; Treverton, The Dollar- 
Drain and American Forces in Germany, 1978. Sc hertz. Die Deutschlandpolitik Kennedy’s und Johnson’s, 1992, 
devotes a lengthy chapter to the Triiaterals p.379-405) which is nothing but a chronologically arranged transcription 
of some documents in the LBJL.
* Bergsten, The Dilemmas o f the Dollar, 1973, p31.
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government not to convert dollars to gold. The impact o f the Trilaterals on the continuity o f  
Anglo-American troop levels in Germany will be assessed. Once more, the way the monetary 
problems of the Western World intersected with the management of mutual security w ill 
receive particular attention. Much more material needs to be declassified before a 
comprehensive analysis can be given. This thesis will make a start though some documents 
consulted cannot be referred to as they still fall under the thirty years rule.
Before any serious negotiations about the future of Atlantic burden-sharing and fo rce  
structures could start, the three participating governments had to solve several immediate 
problems. The most pressing of these was a legacy of the unfortunate Erhard-visit, nam ely 
the problem of the 1965/67 agreement. The issue of how this agreement was to be honoured 
was -by German-American agreement- to be treated separately from the trilateral exercise. 
Upon his return, Erhard faced the enormous challenge of obtaining the necessary funds fo r  
fulfilling the German offset obligation on which Johnson had insisted so strongly. T h is  
obligation was the biggest element in the budgetary gap which would cause the break-up o f  
the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition and seal the end of Erhard's chancellorship. Erhard complained 
bitterly to McCloy, the US Chief Negotiator at the Trilaterals, about Johnson's refusal to g ra n t 
him an extension of the commitment. He accused his Defence Minister of carelessness w h en  
concluding the May 1964 agreement with McNamara.4 However, it had been the Chancellor’s  
own imprudence which had prevented the exemption clause of the agreement from becoming 
effective. At the point in his personal meetings with Johnson and McNamara when he shou ld  
have insisted strongly on a mutual revision of the agreement's provision he had b een  
vacillating and irresolute.
4 LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 50, Bonn 4833, 21 October 1966. Prior to the Erhard visit, th e  
Germans and the Americans had disagreements on the interpretation o f the McNamara-Von Hassel protocol. T h e  
Germans thought that the safeguard-clause, on which Straufi had insisted as part of the 1962 agreement, was s till 
valid. The Americans denied that such a condition existed. The German version of the protocol is ambiguous. T h e  
Strauss safeguard clause made the offset commitment 'subject to the availability of funds', whereas the 1964 
agreement coupled it to a German need for new weapons and to the economic competitiveness of the US 'goods*. 
(See: McGhee Papers, 1988 add.. Box 2; AAPD, 1964, p.526, fn.2). This is why McNamara in his public statements 
emphasized the insufficient equipment of the Bundeswehr as well as the competitiveness of US weaponry. Erhard 
had committed himself several times to fully executing the agreement without reservations, most conspicuously in  
the communique of the December 1965 meeting with Johnson. Probably for this reason, the Germans did not attem pt 
to argue about the safeguard clause during the talks in September 1966. A stronger German government could w ell 
have insisted upon another interpretation.
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Now in a hopeless political situation, the Chancellor was unable to offer more than vague 
suggestions. The only chance seemed to be help from the Bundesbank with which, according 
to Erhard, his government had ’a lively debate* going on.3 However, the Bank remained 
adamant in its refusal to help Erhard. The Bank’s Council (ZBR) informed the government 
that confidence in the German currency would be impaired if the Bundesbank was dragged 
into closing budgetary gaps. The Bundesbank was unwilling to tie up a huge amount o f liquid 
funds in longterm Treasury bonds o f a foreign country and such loose a good deal of 
flexibility in its monetary policy. The bankers argued furthermore that such an investment 
would be tantamount to the extension of a credit to the Federal Government which was illegal 
according to Bundesbank law.6
The Bank was ready to offer substantial help only if two conditions were fulfilled: first, the 
parliamentary approval of the supplementary Federal budget for 1966 the Bank had demanded 
since months and, second, increased defence appropriations for 1967 so that the Central Bank 
could be reimbursed if it gave the requested emergency help. The Bundesbank President, 
Blessing, confirmed this later to the US ambassador, McGhee: *Ble$sing had no desire to 
move to help Erhard until he took the necessary steps to help himself by an increase in the 
budget... Bles sing would not advance funds until he was assured o f later repayments through 
the military budget\ 7 Erhard’s government, however, could not force the Bundesbank to 
moderate its conditions, nor could it push an augmented budget with corresponding tax 
increases through a hostile parliament. The politically explosive idea to invest some of the 
reserves of German social security funds in US Treasury bonds had to be abandoned as soon 
as the first rumours became public.8 The impression that German pensioners paid for the 
government’s offset obligation would have been difficult to avoid. The only concession 
Erhard achieved was that the Bundesbank advanced funds for the prepayment of postwar
5 ibid.
6 BA, B136/3327, Records of 224. and 225. ZBR Meeting. 6/20. October 1966; BBA, B330/10245, TOngeler 
(Bundesbank) to Carstens, 28 October 1966.
7 LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 51, Bonn 6967: Meeting with Bundesbank President Blessing 9 
December 1966.
* McGhee Papers, 1988 add., Box 2, Memo: Basic Considerations in a Solution of the Current and Future 
German Offset Problems, 15 October 1966; SZ, 19.1072.11.1966.
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debts, as it had done previously in 1961.9
The whole episode is the culmination o f an increasingly assertive Bundesbank policy towards 
Erhard’s government in 1965/66. The Bank had stated repeatedly its disapproval of the 
government’s anti-cyclical spending policy (see ch.X, fn.110). Confronted with a weak 
Chancellor, it was able to withstand pressure by the government to relax its restrictive 
monetary policy. In the final phase o f Erhard’s chancellorship, the Bank was not ready to 
extend significant concessions. First, because its conditions were not fulfilled, and second, 
because it expected, like almost all observers, soon a new government. As we shall see later, 
the Bundesbank became and remained an important player in a question which previously had 
been the exclusive domain of the government: the financial management of the Western 
Alliance. Until then, the Bundesbank's policies regarding the defence of the dollar had been - 
on the surface- separated from the government’s efforts to neutralize the US troop cost. The 
events of 1966/67 made the continuation of this rather artificial separation impossible. The 
crisis of the monetary system and of the security system were not separable any more - not 
even on the surface.
Kiesinger’s ’Grand Coalition*, in power from 1 December 1966 on, decided to honour 
Erhard’s financial pledges. Its huge majority in parliament enabled it to prepare a 
supplementary budget for 1966 and effect spending cuts for 1967 without the furious 
opposition Erhard had encountered.10 Combatting the recession was the first priority for the 
new government, represented in this field by the colourful couple of Economics Minister 
Schiller and Finance Minister Strauß. Schiller and Strauß took officially recourse to Keynesian 
policy and deficit spending for the first time in the Federal Republic’s existence.11 This made 
the honouring of the von Hassel-McNamara agreement possible. Government bonds w ere 
placed on the market by the Bundesbank which yielded enough income to pay $250m to the
9 BA, B 136/3135, Memorandum for Chancellor: ZBR Meeting, 6  October 1966; Blessing to Westrick, 10 
October 1966.
10 Hildebrand (1983). p.283-301.
11 Giersch/Paqud/Schmieding, The Fading M iracle, 1992, p.146-48; Abelshauser, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der BRD, 
1945-80, 1983, p.106-116.
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to the US at the end of the year and another $125m in 1967.12 These funds were placed at 
the disposal of the government and were to be repaid out of later defence budgets. The 
settlement of postwar debts, which as a gesture of goodwill by the US had not to be matched 
by military orders later on, covered another $192m. That left $325m of the gap as established 
during the Erhard visit ($892m). By mortgaging future defence budgets with further advance 
payments on prospective military purchases, the Federal Republic was able to transfer this 
sum in the first half of 1967.13 With its budgetary policy the new government had fulfilled 
the Bundesbank*s requests; however, that was to turn soon into a Pyrrhic victory for the 
bankers.
In June 1967, the level of German advance funds on future military orders from the US had 
risen to almost $1 billion. The German government announced that it would not be able to 
place any new orders in 1967 which, of course, greatly reduced the options for any new 
agreements.14 The advance payments, however, were of great value for the American 
monetary position. In 1966, the liquidity deficit would have amounted to about $2.6bn instead 
of the official $2.15bn (which was only a slight deterioration compared to 1965). The 
payments also were the major element in the ’special transactions’ which kept the deficit in 
the first half of 1967 to $1 billion rather than to $2.7bn in the absence of these 
transactions.13
b) The British Problem Again
Parallel to these efforts, work on a new offset mechanism continued. The actual trilateral 
negotiations got off to a very slow start. The prime reason was the German government crisis 
which precluded firm decisions until January. The British, who had joined the exercise very 
unenthusiastically, posed another substantial difficulty. They had continued to pursue their 
bilateral offset talks with the Erhard-govemment even after they had already agreed to the 1*
11 Bundeshaushaltsplan 1967 and Nachtragshaushalt 1966; SZ, 28 December 1966.
u DDRS 1992/3537, Background Paper for Brandi Visit: Current US/FRG Offset, 6  February 1967; McGhee
Papers, 1988 add.. Box 1, Bonn 15302. Kiesinger Visit: Military Offset, 27 June 1967.
M BP1 21, 28 February 1967, Probleme der Devisenhilfe für die USA und Großbritannien, p.171.
>s The figure also includes the SSOOm purchase of US Treasury bonds by the Bundesbank which was a result
of the Trilaterals; LBJL, Fowler Papers, Box 49-50, Meeting in the President’s Office, 10 August 1967.
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Trilaterals. A gap of DM 500m had remained between the German offer and the British 
request of DM 850m when, in the end of October 1966, the talks were suspended.16 This 
was the moment the British government had waited for to start finally with troop reductions. 
Time was pressing, because the measures should take effect before the new budget in April 
1967 was put together. A comprehensive review of strategic and military questions was 
considered a ’luxury* in this respect, and UK representatives told the Americans openly that 
they were only interested in the financial aspect o f the Trilaterals.17 There was to be no 
illusion that for the British the commitment to Sterling and to budgetary exigencies had 
absolute priority over any NATO strategic doctrines or cordial relations with Germany. The 
situation on the currency markets was so tight that the government saw no margin left for 
compromising on the troop cost problem.
On the other side, London still seemed to be unprepared for the practical and political 
problems a large withdrawal would cause. First, there was the old problem of where to house 
the returning troops.18 Furthermore, the ’special relationship* once more demanded restraint. 
After the Erhard visit, Johnson had urged London in strong terms to refrain from actions 
which would undoubtedly prejudice the Trilateral exercise.19 Reductions in Europe, therefore, 
required careful advance preparation with the Americans to limit the effect of possible adverse 
reactions in Washington. A third obstacle in the way of reductions was the new bid for EEC 
membership the British government planned at the end of 1966, placing the UK again in the 
dilemmas of the late 1950s-early 1960s(see ch.IV). These reasons appeared to have convinced 
Wilson that if he went ahead with reductions straight away he would find himself between 
all stools. The snag of a delay, however, was that the Labour government had publicly already 
committed itself to a rigorous position which would have made a renunciation of cuts look 
like backing down because of pressure from abroad.
“  SZ, 18.10; 20.10.1966.
17 DDRS 1993/323, Memorandum of Brown-Rusk Conversation, 14 October 1966; LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: 
Trilaterals, Box S I, Leddy to Rusk, 8  November 1966; Box SO: Memorandum o f  Healey-McNamara Conversation, 
14 December 1966.
u Crossman, Diaries o f a Cabinet M inister, Vol.II, 1976, p.145. Disbanding them would have meant a risky 
quarrel with the Americans and with Britain's NATO partners. It would also have made the balance of payments 
argument seem to be just a pretext for saving budget money.
19 FRUS 1964-68, XIII, LBJ to Wilson, 6  October 1966, p.477-78.
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Therefore, Wilson needed some compensation to solve the dilemma. The Americans came to 
the same conclusion. They made an offer which Johnson outlined as follows: ’Would it help 
if I placed in the United Kingdom in the near future 535 million in orders beyond those 
already agreed to? I think I could do so on assurance from you that you will stay with us and
the Germans in completing this fundamental review..... . making no change in your troop and
supply dispositions there until after the completion of the review...This procurement would 
supplement the accruals of dollars to you associated with the recent shift of our forces and 
installations to Britain from the Continent’.20 The background of this offer was the American 
fear that if the British started to reduce, they would set in motion a wave which might well 
have led to irresistible pressure in the US to follow suit. This would have rendered the 
Trilaterals absurd before they even started. Accepting the offer, the British announced a delay 
in any final decision for 6 months, at the end of which they would call on NATO and WEU 
to set the reduction process in motion.21 This delay also had the great advantage of giving 
the German and the US governments valuable time to consider thoroughly the issues which 
emerged during the negotiations already under way.
The representatives chosen by the governments for the talks were John J.McCloy on the 
American side, Carstens from the AA on the German side (after the government change 
replaced by Duckwitz), and G.Thomson from the Foreign Office for the British. The choices 
signalled important institutional changes. McCloy, former High Commissioner in Germany, 
was a strong supporter of ’Atlanticist* policy in the US government. In his person, the State 
Department acquired an important ally in the struggle against the seemingly inevitable 
reduction of the US commitment in Europe.22 In Germany, the appointment of Carstens 
signalled that the AA had now taken on the principal responsibility for offset, and that it was 
removed from the Finance and Defence ministry track. This assured that the broader 
objectives of German foreign policy would cany more weight than they had in the offset
20 FRUS 1964-68, XIII, Johnson to Wilson, IS November 1966, p.492; on the genesis of the American offer 
Treverton (1978), p.123-24.
21 FRUS 1964-68, XIII, London 4234: E.Rostow talks in London, 22 November 1966, p.499; LBJL, NSF, NSC 
Histories: Trilaterals, Box 30, memcon Healey-McNamara, 14 December 1966.
22 Treverton (1978), p.124.
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negotiations of the 1960s.23
The first meetings of the negotiators were devoted to setting an agenda for the talks. The rest 
of the remaining 14 NATO countries -after the French walk-out- had to be convinced that 
they were not going to be faced by fait accomplis and that they would be fully consulted by 
the three big members.24 For this reason the General Secretary of NATO, Brosio, 
participated in the talks. Three working groups were formed which were to look at the 
interrelated issues of Warsaw Pact military capabilities, NATO capabilities, and the balance 
of payments effects of troop stationing. This last group had the task to establish the real net 
foreign exchange drains and gains resulting from the troops presence in Germany.25 In the 
first two groups, tentative agreement was soon achieved leading to a series of further talks 
on NATO strategy which lay beyond the scope o f this research.26
c) The American Debate on the Trilaterals
More crucial than the deliberations of these working groups were the debates in the 
participating governments themselves. Unfortunately, a sufficient archival base is only  
available for the American government as yet. 1 will have to concentrate therefore mainly o n  
American decision making.
The US government was divided on an old question which for the first time was strongly 
influenced by public disputes: the troop reduction debate, or in other words whether to  
continue its traditional European policy or to give priority to the pressing political and  
financial exigencies of the moment. The Mansfield-resolution and the end of the previous 
offset mechanism introduced important new elements into the debate. After the disaster o f  
Erhard's visit, McNamara felt that he now, finally, would be able to effect a large reduction 
of US forces in Europe. As we have seen, this was motivated not only by Vietnam, as m ost
23 On British decision-making during the Trilaterals there is only the scarcest evidence derived from som e 
memoirs until the PRO opens the pertinent files under the 30-years rule.
M LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 51, Paris 6006: McCloy Briefing for NATO representatives, 2 2  
October 1966.
23 ibid., Terms of Reference for Working Group on Balance of Payments, 19 November 1966.
16 On this subject, see the literature cited in fn.2.
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contemporary observers suspected, but even more by McNamara’s now six year old effort to 
achieve a modern and economically rational posture for US forces abroad.27 Immediately 
after the Erhard visit he circulated a memorandum on ’NATO strategy, Force Levels and 
Balance of Payments’ in which he argued for a reduction of US forces in Europe by 50.000 
men and the dual-basing of almost all the US airforce deployed in Europe.28 Clearly, the US 
government would not be able to participate meaningfully in the Trilaterals if it had not taken 
a basic decision on the fundamental issues posed by the McNamara memorandum. This time, 
the adherents of a stable troop level were to have a much more difficult stance because of the 
multiple pressures and the powerful military, economic, and now even electoral arguments 
for reductions in Europe. The discussion was to drag on for months.
The first voice against McNamara’s proposals was raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which 
asserted that there was no military rationale justifying them.29 McCloy also voiced his strong 
disapproval of McNamara’s plans. In a lengthy report for the President on the basic issues 
of the Trilaterals he emphasized above all the ’historical* argument of the US forces as 
pacifiers of Europe which had prevented the outbreak of another war in Europe. He diagnosed 
NATO as being on the brink of falling apart. This development would be decisively 
accelerated by American and British troop withdrawals.30 However, both the JCS and 
McCloy realized that the circumstances made some reductions almost unavoidable and 
included in their memoranda recommendations on the least damaging ways of effecting them. 
Their interventions had the effect of delaying the immediate decision McNamara sought. 
Another basic intention behind McCloy’s arguments, namely to sever the link between troop 
levels and money by forcing first a purely political and military decision on troop levels,
11 A summary of DOD measures to reduce foreign exchange losses during McNamara's tenure is in: LBJL, 
H.Fowler Papers, Box 1, Statement Summarizing Actions by the DOD....FY 1961-67. Attempts to convince US 
personnel abroad of the gravity of the balance of payments problem look sometimes quite unconventional forms. In 
1966, for example, the GPs were subjected to a film, titled 'Gold and You’, which described actions every army 
member could take to help alleviate the dollar drain.
a  The memorandum, dated 4 October, is not yet open to research. Its contents can be deducted from the JCS 
response to it: LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 51, JCS to McNamara, 27 October 1966.
19 Cf. the memorandum mentioned in the previous footnote.
30 LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 50, McCloy report: Political Effects of NATO Troop Reductions; 
Military Effects of US Force Changes in Europe, 21 November 1966.
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failed.31 The credo of the majority in the US government remained as it had been for years: 
'the final decision on US forces w ill inevitably depend in part on how much money M cCloy 
can get out o f the Germans '.32
Time was pressing. The British government became increasingly restive about the delay and  
news from Germany bode ill. In the beginning of February, it became public that the Federal 
Republic intended to put a virtual stop on offset for both the US and the UK for some tim e 
to come.33 The British government immediately reacted with renewed preparations fo r 
withdrawals. If the Americans wanted to avoid the undoing of their initiative, and the risk o f  
severe damage to both the security and the monetary system, they had to present a position 
which made the basic intentions of the US clear. Would they try to preserve the traditional 
structure of the Alliance or would they rather take the lead in initiating far-reaching changes? 
McCloy pressed for a position which assured the allies that the United States saw the  
preservation o f the Alliance as its overriding goal. This implied a positive statement on the  
future presence of American military forces in Europe. A presidential decision was required.
The opposing sides in the US government summed up their arguments in a series o f  
memoranda. Invoking balance-of-payments savings and the eroded military rationale of th e  
troops, the civilian leadership of the Pentagon recommended the withdrawal of two out of f iv e  
division and o f the major part of the American tactical airforce, that is six out of nine a ir  
wings in Europe. They were to remain allocated to the European theatre and periodically b e  
brought there for training purposes by way of a rotational scheme. The State Department, th e  
JCS and McCloy brought up a familiar range of counter-arguments: -the relocations w ou ld  
save only relatively small amounts o f foreign exchange; -they would undercut the Flexible 
Response strategy; -they would lead to corresponding European reductions; -they w ould  
encourage Soviet pressure on Europe; -they would result in declining American influence o v e r  
Europe; -they would destabilize Western Europe and NATO; -they would increase the danger 12*
11 Treverton (1978). p.143.
12 LBJL, NSF, Memos to the President: W. Rostow, Box 11, Rostow to President, 23 November 1966.
M BPI 20, 24 Febniary 1967, Strauß speech at DIHT, 15 February, p.64.
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of German nationalism: -they would impair gravely American combat effectiveness in 
Europe.34 The State Department therefore advocated a reduction/rotation of only one division 
and three air wings; McCloy was against any reduction.
Several meetings were held with the President on the troop level question, in which Johnson 
made his opposition, in principle, to cuts clear. He pointed, however, to the insufficient 
defence efforts of the UK and the Federal Republic, and, in particular, to domestic pressures. 
In mid-January, Mansfield had re-introduced his Sense of Senate resolution calling for large- 
scale reductions as a reaction to the slow progress of the talks in NATO.33 The President 
met with the Congressional leadership to sound out the strength of the Mansfield group.36 
Faced with the arguments of the Senators, Johnson was reluctant to take a definite position 
in the decisive meeting, although he indicated again that he preferred to remove as few men 
as possible. When, during the meeting prior to his departure to Europe, McCloy complained 
about the vague guidelines, LBJ explained his position in a monologue coloured by graphic 
hill county metaphors.37 What emerged, apart from the President’s asides about ’stinginess* 
as part of the German national character, about ways to deal with the ’babies* on the Hill, and 
about his indignation at being lectured in public by allies38, was not very much to McCloy’s 
satisfaction: he should go to Europe and find out what the Europeans were ready to do. Only 
then would the President take a decision on the troop-level issue.
McCloy was provided with three basic principles for conducting the negotiations: *~ Force 
levels should be determined through agreement among the A llies on the basis o f only security 14
14 LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: TrilateraJs, Box SO, McQoy to E.Rostow, 9 February 1967; McCloy to President: 
Force Levels in Europe, 23 February 1967; Ibid., Box 51, JCS to Secretary of Defense: Military Redeployments from 
Europe, 2 February 1967; R os tow, Bowie, Leddy, Kitchen to Rusk: OSD Proposals for Reducing US Forces in 
Europe, 30 January 1967.
M Williams, The Senate and US Troops in Europe, 1985, p.148-53.
* LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 50, Record of President’s Meeting with the Congressional 
Leadership, 27 February 1967.
,7 ibid., Box 50, Memo of President’s Conversations with McQoy, 1 March 1967.
x  In February 1967, Kiesinger had given a speech, in which he had used the phrase 'atomic complicity* 
describing US-Russian negotiations on a Non-Proliferation Treaty. This had infuriated Johnson and poisoned the 
relations between the two men for a long time. See: Hildebrand (1983), p JlO .
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considerations, broadly construed; — Germany should decide what levels o f procurement in  
the U.S. and Britain it wishes to undertake in order to bring its military forces up to the  
appropriate strength levels; ~  Simultaneously, the A llies should deal with the remaining 
balance o f payments consequences o f allied troops stationed in Germany by cooperation in  
its management o f monetary reserves. 09
These guidelines were probably not as precise as McCloy had wished; they embodied, 
however, important preliminary positions on several issues. The first principle indicated that 
the allies would have a voice in the decision about troop levels. Therefore, it would be 
politically very difficult to reduce by as much as McNamara envisaged. That only ’security 
considerations* were to decide future force levels was, however, -even ’broadly construed 
wishful thinking. The second principle put an end to 100% military offset. The new German 
government had clearly stated its opposition to any new fixed commitments of this kind. 
Public criticism had been so outspoken in Germany that a continuation o f the US sales 
operations on the previous scale was ruled out. Even in the United States, apprehensions 
emerged. McNamara had to defend the operations o f his sales division against mounting 
criticism in Congress.40
The third principle pointed to the direction into which the solution of future offset agreements 
would move: towards the field of monetary cooperation between the United States and the 
Federal Republic. In a cover memo to the President for one o f the meetings on the troop level 
question, Bator had outlined two further issues which Johnson should keep in mind before 
making a decision: 'how the troop decision will affect German cooperation on money; and, 
most crucially, your judgment about the feedback on politics at home'.41. On the latter issue 
the President was particularly sensitive and needed no reminder, faced as he was by an 
increasingly rebellious Congress and elections drawing nearer. Bator predicted that if NATO 
would go down this would give the Republicans and Johnson’s Democratic rivals (among
*  FRUS 1964-68, XIII, President to McCloy, 1 March 1967, p.536-37.
40 See for example the remarks by Congressman Ellender and Senator Fulbright accusing McNamara of arming 
the whole world indiscriminately; PSSD, reel XV, House Committee on Armed Services, January 1967, pJ2; US 90th 
cong.. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2  March 1967, p.137-140.
41 LBJL, Bator Papers, Box 4, Memo for the President: US Position in Trilateral Negotiations, 23 February 1967.
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them Robert Kennedy) a valuable issue.*2
These apprehension were probably foremost in the President’s mind when he hesitated to 
accede to McNamara’s proposals. The problem was how to sell this restraint to Congress. To 
escape the dilemma between the danger of becoming the President who had greatly weakened 
NATO and the prospect of an uproar over no cuts at all, Bator recommended a monetary deal 
with the Germans which could shield the President from domestic criticism, if he decided to 
keep the reductions to a minimum. 'There is no hope fo r any sort o f new 100% military offset 
deal with the Germans. However, we may be able to get them to agree to financial steps 
which would be fa r more valuable. Specifically: —that they will not use their dollars, old or 
new; to buy gold, —that they will join us in pushing the other Europeans, ex-France, to Qgree 
to the same sort o f rules; —to support us against France in negotiations on longer-range 
monetary reform; —to neutralize the military imbalance by buying and holding securities 
which would count against our balance o f payments deficit I f  we can also get the Italians, 
Dutch and the Belgians, as well as the U.K., Canada, Japan, to play by such rules, we will 
have negotiated the world onto a dollar standard. It will mean recognition o f the fact that, 
for the time being, the U.S. must necessarily play banker o f the world and that the continuing 
threat to convert to gold is simply unacceptable. *3
This was a sweeping proposal, combining openly the large security and money issues which 
had previously formed the background of the offset story. If implemented, it would be 
unavoidable that the final decision regarding troop levels in Europe, with all its implications 
for Alliance policy and the European security structure, would depend on a basic agreement 
between the Federal Republic and the United States regarding the continuation of the dollar- 
gold system. The previously informal agreement between the Americans and the Germans 
regarding the structure of the Alliance and international monetary relations would be placed 
on a new level, a clear quid-pro-quo which would allow both sides to pursue -with the clear- 41
41 ibid. In a conversation with the President one week later, W.Rostow drew the same connection between 
monetary concessions by Germany and congressional acceptance of a continued stable troop level in Europe: 7 / we 
get a good money bargain with the Germans, which will realty help stabilize the monetary situation and provide 
protection for the dollar, then perhaps we can turn the situation around in Congress* (LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: 
Trilaterals, Box 50, Memorandum for the Record, 2 March 1967).
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cut support of the other- essential foreign policies which were crucial for the shape o f  
international politics during the 1960s. The US would support a security structure in Europe 
the rationality o f which it had serious doubts. The Federal Republic would help stabilize an 
international monetary structure which it thought to be increasingly irrational. How had this 
far-reaching idea germinated?
d) The Blessing-Letter and its Implications
Towards the end of 1966, it appeared that the offset talks in the framework of the Trilaterals 
would lead nowhere. The trilateral studies on war capability and strategy which had been 
concluded relatively fast played an increasingly secondary role compared to the pressing 
financial questions. One of the ambiguous goals of the Trilaterals had been to establish new 
ways for dealing with the troop's foreign exchange cost. The first necessary step seemed to  
consist in establishing a commonly accepted measure for net drains and gains.
The Federal Republic hitherto had accepted the figures supplied by the United States and 
Great Britain. It claimed, however, that its true gains were considerably less because o f the 
numerous side-effects of troop expenditures. The Working Group on balance o f payments in 
the framework o f the Trilateral negotiations was to review comprehensively this question.44 
The result of the exercise made it clear that to arrive at precise figures was impossible as long 
as there was no agreement on economic methods and on the extent of the side-effects o f  
military spending. How the German reserve position would have looked without foreign 
troops on its soil was ultimately incalculable. The Americans, for example, arrived at a  
considerably higher figure for German net balance of payment gains than the Germans: 
$630m as opposed to $350m.4S Even on the easier question of actual foreign exchange 
conversions a considerable gap remained. For 1966, the English and the Americans estimated
44 LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 51, Treasury Paper: Net Balance of Payments Costs in the 
Military Accounts, 28 October 1966; Terms of Reference for the Working Group on Military Balance of Payments, 
19 November 1966.
45 ibid.. Box 50, Attachment to McCloy report: Balance of Payments Issues, 21 November 1966; Duckwitz, in: 
Aussenpolitik 8/1967, p.473.
their conversions at $950m, the Germans arrived at a figure of 5825m.46 The differences 
were irreconcilable. At the end of December, on German initiative, the task of reaching a 
common position was declared insoluble. The old practice of the stationing countries 
providing estimates was re-established and the negotiations turned to the old problem of 
finding a compromise despite those differences and incertainties.
The United States estimate for troop costs in 1967-1969 was $850-900m a year.41 The 
relatively simple objective was to have this sum covered by offset to the maximum possible 
extent. First priority still was accorded to military sales; however, hardly more than the 
$350m promised by Erhard were expected, and the large prepayments made to fulfil the 
1965/67 offset left no space for new orders in 1967/68. A second possibility was civilian 
purchases, like space equipment, foreign aid projects, etc; the Germans because of their bad 
experience with the British and recalling the strong protests of the German industry were very 
reluctant in this field. More promising was the third option: German investment in US bond 
issues. Negotiations on such transactions were pursued between the Bundesbank and the US 
Treasury.48 This would have been an extension of the various German investments in US 
issues to support the American balance of payments. A final idea emerged slowly and it was 
to prove decisive for US/German offset in 1967/68: the idea of a formal no-gold-conversion 
pledge by Germany, putting an end to speculations that the Federal Republic might follow the 
example of General de Gaulle. Such a pledge would ’crown* German monetary cooperation 
with the US on the whole range of issues posed by monetary problems of the 1960s. This was 
the core of the proposal Bator had outlined to the President.
The idea suggested itself to US planners since Kennedy’s times. A standstill-agreement on 
gold-conversion between Europe and the United States had been debated in 1962. Dillon and 
Roosa, however, thought that this would be an unnecessarily alarming signal and that the
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that is required for offsets in terms of long-term bonds'; LBJL, NSF, Memos to the President:W.Rostow, Box 11, 
Ros tow to President, 23 November 1966.
258
dollar problem could be brought under control by less drastic measures.49 During 
deliberations in the State Department on how to continue offset after the Erhard visit the 
proposal had been considered anew.50 The Germans were immediately informed that such 
a pledge would be of great help to the United States and probably useful with regard to offset. 
These first tentative approaches remained vague because the Bundesbank refused to consider 
a commitment with such potentially enormous consequences. In late 1966, there was still hope 
for different solutions to the offset muddle. However, it became soon clear that a hardware 
solution was out of the question and that other measures were inadequate to bridge the 
conflicting positions.
The major problem was that Germany had no acceptable suggestions to offer. One of the 
common points of the coalition partners in the German government had been to avoid 
Erhard’s mistake of getting locked into an agreement which would become a constraint and 
liability in both foreign and domestic policy.51 Finance Minister StrauB, in particular, was 
against any material concessions to the US and the UK. First, the mortgaging of future 
budgets caused by the previous agreement curtailed funds for any purchases. Second, he and 
many others thought that military orders should be diverted towards the German industry and 
towards France.52 *This would have been a step towards escaping the embrace of the US 
government in military matters. After the Erhard visit, resentment about assertive American 
policies had not been limited to the Gaullists any more. The simple question was whether the 
American security guarantee was still worth sacrifices. The discussion on future offset in the 
Kiesinger Government became inevitably embedded in a larger conflict about the future 
course of German foreign policy.
It had been one of the central objectives of the Kiesinger government to reach a new
49 FRUS 1961-63, IX, Heller to Kennedy, 9  August 1962; Kennedy to Dillon and Ball, 24 August 1962, p.138- 
141; Wightman (1988), p.54-55.
50 LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 31, Knowlton to M cQoy: Treasury Paper on Future German 
Offset Agreements, 8 November 1966.
51 Haftendom (1994), p.263.
S1 BA, B 136/3135, Memoranda for the Chancellor, 13/28 December 1966; Memo for Cabinet Meeting, 28
December 1966.
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understanding with France after the nose-dive relations had taken during Erhard’s tenure. The 
new government rapidly achieved an agreement with France on a question which had 
poisoned relations during the last months of Erhard’s chancellorship: the status o f French 
troops in Europe.53 Technological cooperation was intensified. The Federal Republic made 
an effort to achieve a common EEC position for the ongoing negotiations on the creation of 
new reserve assets for the monetary system. This effort was closely linked to the European 
pressure for a reform of voting procedures in the IMF, which had until then given only the 
US a veto capacity whereas the Six even united had not enough votes to veto measures.54 
This attempt at Franco-German rapprochement coincided with a phase of unprecedented 
mistrust in German-American relations during the 1960s, sparked off by the rude treatment 
Erhard had received in Washington, by US overtures to the East, and, above all, by the 
proposed Non-Proliferation Treaty which to many Germans seemed like a device to 
discriminate against Germany indefinitely.55
It soon became obvious, however, that France and Germany, too, still had deep divergences, 
whether it was on European policy, on French policy towards the East, or on security policy. 
De Gaulle had not much to offer Bonn and much of his policy remained gestures leading 
nowhere.56 There was no way around the Americans, at least as long as the reunification 
goal remained the center piece of German foreign policy and pitted Germany in hostile 
opposition to the Warsaw Pact. Every opening of German policy would ultimately depend on 
American backing. The first tentatives of ’Ostpolitik' by Brandt needed a credible 
’Westpolitik’. These constraints underlined the necessity to put a stop to the rapid decline of 
NATO which would be certainly speeded up by large-scale reductions of US troops. The 
alliance with the United States remained vital for the Federal Republic and the US troop 
presence as a major symbol of this alliance, too. The Kiesinger government, like its
For the text of the agreement: BP1161/1966, p.1304. For details on the negotiations: Willis, France, Germany, 
and the New Europe, 1945-67, 1968, pJ53-6; Osterheld (1992), p.309-26; Haftendorn (1994), p.222-27.
54 KCA 1967. p.22691.
55 For a typical reaction to the NPT by German Conservatives, see: Grewe, Rückblenden 1976-51,1979, p.689- 
702. For an assessment of the German response: Haftendorn (1994), p.160-66; Häckcl, Die Bundesrepublik und der 
Atomwaffensperrvertrag, Bonn 1989; Kuentzel, Bonn und die Bombe, 1993.
56 Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe, 1988, p.267-68; Willis (1968), pJ59-65.
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predecessors, could not escape the necessity to address seriously the troop cost problem on 
which the US government placed such an importance.
The government itself, however, under the restraint of a very tight budgetary situation, had 
only very few resources for a solution at its disposal. The defence budget, the source o f  
previous offset payments, underwent deep cuts. The further amassing of public debts to serve 
US offset demands was, after Erhard’s experience, politically unfeasible. The only practical 
way out seemed to lay in the American proposals - which, however, signified to shovel the 
burden on the Bundesbank*s shoulders. Thus, in a temporary alliance with the Americans, the 
government asked the Bundesbank to be more forthcoming in its talks with US officials, both 
on the issue of investment in US Treasury bonds and on general monetary cooperation.37 The 
’Grand Coalition’ had already reasserted its leadership in macroeconomic policies. In 
December 1966, it had put publicly pressure on the Bundesbank to lower its interest rates. 
This actually happened in January 1967. Now, the government requested the Bundesbank to  
compromise its monetary principles in order to provide support for basic security policy 
objectives the government judged more fundamental. Though hardly any archival evidence 
is available it is very likely that the government and the Bundesbank had a hard argument 
over this question in which the government finally prevailed.
In both the German and the US government, the non-conversion pledge had transformed from 
a technical proposal to the major hope for solving the offset impasse. As in the German case, 
US policy in this respect can only be understood in the context of the general monetary and 
political circumstances in early 1967. The formation of the Kiesinger government had been 
accompanied by much speculation in the US about the course of future German foreign 
policy, -a similar situation to the one after the signing of the Franco-German treaty in 1963. 
Prominent politicians who were seen as exponents of a 'Gaullist’ line, such as Strauß and von 
Guttenberg had assumed high posts. Doubts about German policy also extended to monetary 
policy. As already mentioned, 1967 was the decisive year for the American effort to create 
a new form of liquidity, Special Drawing Rights, which should relieve the pressure on the
Haftendorn (1994), p.266; Don fried (1991), p.128-29; Treverton (1978), p.91.
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dollar. French and American conceptions were diametrically opposed.58 In early 1967, 
leading American commercial banks voiced open doubts about the future of the dollar-gold 
exchange guarantee. A lively public debate followed, reenforced by hints of Fowler that the 
US might take drastic steps if foreign Central Banks would not behave cooperatively.59 The 
pressure put on the American balance of payments by the Vietnam War and the government's 
expansive domestic spending programs have already been mentioned in ch.X. As deficits were 
getting out of control, hidden only by dubious statistical tricks, and as Washington embarked 
on a major initiative in monetary diplomacy, formal support of the new German government 
for US monetary policy would be doubly important: A parallel consideration was the 
Kennedy-round of trade talks which approached its final phase and of which the Americans 
expected a positive impact on their external balance.“  The US needed German support on 
this issue, too. These were essential interests and a confrontational German policy would have 
posed a very serious challenge to these policies.
As we have seen, these considerations were clearly spelled out during the US debate on the 
troop-level question. The argument of the necessity of German cooperation was to prove 
decisive. The military and political arguments of McNamara in favour of troop reductions had 
to stand back. If the troops could serve once more in the interest of important economic 
objectives, in particular to shore up the monetary system, the Treasury department would 
become an incidental ally of the State Department on the issue of troop levels in Europe. 
Thus, the non-conversion pledge became a way out of the difficult dilemma which the end 
of the previous offset mechanism had created.
The talks between the Bundesbank and the US Treasury had, after the slow start, accelerated 
in early February. The German government kept itself out of the actual negotiations to 
disperse the impression of government infringement on the Bundesbank's authority over 
monetary policy. Agreement was found quite rapidly on the question of German investment
“  Cohen S., international Monetary Reform, 1964-69, 1970.
59 Cohen (1970). p. 123; Strange, international Monetary Relations, 1976, p.245.
40 On the Kennedy Round: Shonfield(ed), international Economic Relations o f the Western World, v o il: Politics 
o f Trade, 1976; Zcilcr, American Trade & Power in the 1960s, 1992.
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in US Treasury bonds. The Bundesbank representatives declared themselves ready to acquire 
$400-500m of mid-term bonds during US FY 1968. In fact» this was an extension of the 
book-keeping investments in Treasury Papers which had served in the years before to limit 
the extent of American deficits. The difference was the longer term of four years. The 
Bundesbank declared it ’extremely important» because o f the Bundesbank law» that the 
transaction be cast in such form so as to not to appear that the Bank was directly or indirectly 
financing the government...’61. Another condition of the Germans was that the Bundesbank 
would be allowed to redeem the bonds prematurely if German reserves fell below a critical 
level.62 An implicit problem was that this ’loan* supposed an amelioration of US deficits at 
the time the bonds were due.
The transaction was explicitly connected to the trilateral exercise. The Germans demanded 
that the bond purchases were counted as covering the troop cost not offset by military orders. 
The US Treasury accepted this conditions. Anyhow» its interest concentrated on a further 
request: a hardening of the German non-conversion policy in such a way that it could be used 
in public discussion» either by a letter or by a public declaration of the Bundesbank and 
German government.63 I have found only very scarce documentation on the further course 
of the negotiations between the Treasury and the Bank» as well as between the German 
government and the Bank» and within the Bank itself. Such material certainly would be a first 
level source for clarifying the Bundesbank’s international monetary policy» its relations to the 
government, and the important events in international monetary policy during the late 1960s. 
A detailed account of the negotiations is therefore impossible as yet and I will limit myself 
to results and consequences.
On 30 March, Blessing sent the famous letter. It started with the somewhat euphemistic 
statement that the US ’occasionally* had expressed concern over the impact of its troop dollar 
losses on its balance of payments. Blessing then stated his view that these costs were only
61 LBJL» Fowler Papers, Box 39, Draft Letter Deming (Undersecretary of Treasury) to Tungeler (Bundesbank 
director), 18 February 1967.
62 This actually happened after the DM revaluation of 1969 when Germany lost a large volume of its reserves.
61 VI large part o f our difficulties relate to  the public understanding as to the Bundesbank’s policies, and we 
would like ~in fact, we need— public recognition o f this policy;  cf. fn-58.
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one aspect in a much more complicated picture and pointed out that German reserves had not 
risen significantly over the past several years. However, he continued, the Bundesbank had 
for years refrained from conversions of dollars into gold and -the decisive phrase in the letter- 
the United States may be assured that abo in the future the Bundesbank intends to 
continue thb  policy and to play its fu ll part in contributing to international monetary 
cooperation\ M
Interestingly, Blessing later regretted the letter. In a 1971 interview he remarked that he 
should have been *more rigorous towards the US. We simply should have converted the 
dollars we accumulated rigorously to gold until they were driven to despair1.65 That 
statement certainly has to be put in the context of the tumultuous events on monetary markets 
from 1968 on. It indicates, however, that serious misgivings existed in responsible German 
circles before signing the letter. It is true that the letter only confirmed a policy which had 
been followed for years. Such a policy was, however, open to reversal at any time. There are 
strong indications that the German government discussed the option of joining de Gaulle in 
asking the US for a raise in the price of gold.66
The disadvantages of signing a pledge of non-conversion were obvious from the German point 
of view. It would foster an increasing link of the DM with the Dollar because of a progressive 
accumulation of dollar reserves. In 1966, the share of dollars in German reserves had 
increased greatly (see Appendix I, table 1). These reserves would be slashed in the event of 
a dollar-devaluation. Germany, therefore, would have a strong incentive to support every 
action which helped avoid this. With the Blessing-letter, the Bundesbank deprived itself of 
an important part of its monetary autonomy. A foreign country acquired an increasing 
influence over the value of Germany's reserves. Some years later, when the Nixon 
administration adopted its policy of 'benign neglect’ towards payments deficits and flooded 
the market with dollars, the Federal Republic as a main recipient was stilt bound by the
** LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box SO, Blessing to Martin (President of the Federal Reserve), 30 
March 1967.
45 Brawand, Wohin stateri die deutsche Wirtschafi?, 1971, p.61.
44 In early 1965, for example, the former Bundesbank President Vocke suggested this to Erhard; see: BA, B 
136/3322, Blessing to Erhard, 25 February 1965.
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pledge.67
Probably even more important than these economic aspects were the political arguments 
against the letter. First, Germany would loose the possibility to exert, like France, pressure 
on the United States via monetary policy; second, with the pledge Bonn hampered the chance 
to pursue a common and independent European monetary policy.68 It is not without irony 
that at the same time when the German government was looking for a rapprochement with 
France, it effectively lined up with Washington in the vital field of monetary policy. This 
recalls the Strauß-Gilpatric-agreement which had condemned the military sections of the later 
Franco-German treaty to ineffectiveness.
These counter-arguments did not carry enough weight. The political objectives -outlined 
above-proved decisive once more : the deal assured the continuation of a large American 
troop presence, symbolizing the American adherence to the basic principles of German foreign 
policy. In this interest the Bundesbank had to forfeit part of its autonomy, pressed by a strong 
German government and the dominant monetary power, the United States.
Why did the Bundesbank concede to the pressure? Unfortunately, a definite answer will have 
to await the opening of the pertinent files in the Bundesbankarchiv. However, as this question 
goes right to the center of the argument in this thesis, some tentative arguments might be 
advanced. Research has been divided on the issue. Treverton and Donfried69 assert that the 
Bundesbank would have continued its policy of non-conversion anyway and that the move 
was made to accumulate goodwill for the future. Contrary to these arguments, Volger70 
argues that in the absence of the pledge the Bundesbank would probably have followed de 
Gaulle’s policy. Wightman makes a valid point when he says that the Blessing letter was 
signed because the Bundesbank would not want to see the dollar gold system go down on its 
account (although his assertion that it was signed independently from the Trilaterals is
"  Hoffmeyer (1993), p.89.
“  BA, B 136/3135, Memorandum for Chancellor: Trilateral Talks in Bonn, 28 November 1966. 
69 Treverton (1978), p.86; Donfried (1991), p.129.
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astonishing).71 However, whether this interest was strong enough to make acceptable such 
a serious limitation on the Bank’s autonomy during a highly volatile international situation 
is very doubtful to me. Without political pressure from both the German and the American 
governments it is doubtful that the Bank would have agreed to a written statement. The 
Blessing letter was a case of the government asserting its primacy over the formation of 
German monetary policy in the interest of furthering essential foreign policy goals. The 
monetary leverage the strong DM provided was used to pursue political objectives.
The Blessing letter was the codification of the major factor behind all the offset agreements 
and monetary measures taken by German financial authorities to bolster the dollar: the effort 
to neutralise the huge amount of freely navigating dollars which threatened the American gold 
stock. Thus, an interpretation of the Blessing-letter cannot be limited to the letter itself and 
to its connection to the Trilaterals: it has to be embedded in the whole story recounted in the 
previous chapters. A central thesis has been that the monetary support of Germany for the US 
rested to a good part upon the former’s dependence in security matters. Certainly, German 
cooperation depended not solely on the German interest to keep a guaranteed US troop 
presence.72
First, the international monetary system had served the Federal Republic well during most of 
its existence, inflationary pressure was low at almost all times during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Even if we allow for the special measures with which the Federal Republic had to neutralize 
the accumulating dollars, the Bundesbank and the Federal Government would rather incur the 
disadvantages of some of these measures then assume responsibility for the breakdown of the 
system.73 The consequences of such a breakdown were unforeseeable. Maybe it might have 
resulted in better protection against imported inflation, but a likely result might also have 
been the revaluation of the DM forced by speculative pressure. The dollar gold standard had 
given governments and Central Banks for a long time unprecedented control over currency
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markets, but the rising uncontrolled money flows in the 1960s, particularly the Eurodollar 
market seemed to erode this control. It was natural that governments and Central Banks would 
collaborate to avoid loosing increasingly control over the use of monetary instruments.
The price, however, German monetary authorities had to pay for the continuation of the 
system grew continuously during the 1960s. In the earlier years, the government bore a huge 
part of the burden by committing itself to offset agreements with all the intended and 
unintended consequences pointed out in the previous chapters. Parallel to this, the Central 
Bank took a constructive part in the various monetary reform proposals advanced during the 
1960s, partly in collaboration with the government, partly independent from it. Various o ther 
steps belong to this list. The 1961 revaluation was an important move to stabilize the situation 
after the gold crisis, although it probably owed more to the inherent undervaluation of the DM  
after the parities realignment of 1949 than to the flaws o f  the dollar gold system. Another 
case in question is German support for the Pound. This certainly constituted a big  
inconvenience for Germany as it had grave doubts about the wisdom of British monetary 
policy and must have felt like throwing money in a bottomless hole. Nonetheless, the Federal 
Republic was always in the forefront of the rescue actions and this has its roots in its 
common interest with the US to stabilize the system. This interest also has a strong 
connection with the stabilization o f Germany’s security relationships.
In the mid-1960s, the German government’s part in preserving the dollar-gold system - 
military offset- became an increasing burden on its policies (and budget) until it was no more 
possible to continue with it. As the US showed no intention of abandoning the system the 
burden of dealing with the imbalance would fall not only on the budget of the government 
but also on German monetary policy. Investment in US Treasury bonds and the Blessing letter 
were the expressions of this fact. That the Federal Republic despite the increasing risks o f  
supporting the dollar gold system pursued this policy, even when it infringed on its monetary 
autonomy, cannot be explained by economic reasons alone. From the evidence discussed over 
the previous pages, the conclusion is inescapable that the security relationship with the US 
was a - and probably the - major factor in this German support for American monetary 
policy.
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It is difficult to assess the consequences of the Blessing letter without a detailed analysis of 
the developments in the monetary system after it had been signed. The US government had 
hoped that the pledge by the Federal Republic to refrain from conversions of dollars into gold 
would go far freeing the US finally from the balance of payments constraints which had 
bothered Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson so much since 1958. I f  we succeed ... we will 
no longer need to worry about reasonable balance o f payments deficits ... This arrangement 
... will permit us to live with moderate deficits indefinitely. ,74 These far-fetched hopes 
foundered on the impossibility of ’moderate’ deficits in the next years. Already one year later, 
the US had to suspend the dollar-gold convertibility for the private market. Regarding the 
official market, however, the Blessing letter was the first step away from the dollar-gold 
standard. It is doubtful whether the letter prolonged the dollar-gold standard significantly.73 
However, this was not foreseeable in 1967, and the US would have hardly accepted it as an 
offset measure if it had considered the step insignificant.
e) Results of the Trilateral Talks
With the conclusion of the talks between the US Treasury and the Bundesbank it seemed as 
if the biggest obstacle to success in the Trilaterals was surmounted. However, further 
problems awaited resolution, in particular the British offset. At the end of January 1967, the 
State Secretary of the AA, Schütz, informed the British during a visit in London of the 
German cabinet’s thinking that no offset money would be available for the British in 1967/68. 
This seemed a retreat from the German position in the bilateral negotiations of 1966 when 
the Germans had offered S87.5m (DM 350m). The British reaction was immediate: such a 
position would inevitably lead to a withdrawal of large parts of the BAOR.76 When the 
Germans retreated and tabled the October proposal anew, the British still thought the offer 
absolutely insufficient. The trilateral negotiations arrived at their lowest point.
LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box SO, Bator to President: Your Meeting with McCloy, 8 March
1967.
w It might have even had the paradoxical effect of impairing confidence in the dollar, as Hoffmeyer suspects: 
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268
The Americans immediately communicated their disapproval in case the German cabinet made 
its final decision before consulting its allies.77 The Germans reassured them that they would 
continue to participate in the talks; however, they saw themselves faced with a very serious 
financial situation.78 A controversial debate had been going on in the Grand Coalition 
practically since its start about how to tackle the British offset problem with regard to the 
budgetary bottlenecks and the mortgaging of future defence budgets by the 1965/67 
agreement. The main resistance to new obligations came from Finance Minister Strauß.79 He 
thought that the British would reduce their troops anyway and that it was senseless to take 
on new commitments.
McCloy, returning in March to Europe after his consultations with the President, tried to get 
the adversaries to compromise. At the first meeting o f the negotiators he expressed the grave 
concerns of the US government about the unproductive attitude taken by the other participants 
which explained to the poor results obtained until then.80 Soon afterwards, McCloy saw 
Wilson and Kiesinger to impress upon them the seriousness of the situation. The long 
conversation with the Chancellor was a tour-de-force on the critical aspects of mutual 
relations.
Much of the conversation was taken up by McCloy informing the Chancellor o f Johnson’s 
annoyance about the recent public denunciation o f the American non-proliferation policy by 
Kiesinger. The Chancellor tried to explain his government's problems with the envisaged 
treaty.81 Switching to the Trilaterals, McCloy stated that British and American troop levels 
were strongly linked and that the US was likely to follow suit in case of deep cuts in British 
forces. Kiesinger retorted that British statements suggested that they would reduce regardless 
of any German offer and that the British government did not have a record of showing much
77 McGhee Papers, 1988 add.. Box 1, Bonn 8678, 26 January 1967.
19 ibid., Bonn 8683: Cabinet Decision on Offset, 26 January 1967; Bonn 8747: McGhee Meeting with Brandt, 
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19 FAZ, 4 Febniary 1967.
*  LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 50, London 7112/7113: Trilateral talks, 3 March 1967.
*' FRUS 1964-68, XIII, Rostow to President: Kiesinger-McCloy Meeting, 6 March 1967.
269
concern for German foreign policy interests. The budgetary situation was critical and the UK 
had hardly enough useful military or civilian goods on offer to achieve sufficient offset 
value.82 However, Kiesinger promised an attempt to raise the German offer. Towards the end 
of the discussion, McCIoy asked how Germany would react to the reduction of one US 
division. Kiesinger merely replied that it was an ’interesting suggestion’.
This was the first time a German Chancellor had abandoned the dogma of a stable US troop 
level which had been upheld since the Radford-episode. Already in 1966, troop reductions had 
been regarded as unavoidable by the German government. However, only Kiesinger felt that 
the international and domestic situation permit him to accede to the American request, and 
only if the redeployment was of a limited nature. Finally, McCIoy warned the Chancellor of 
the unfortunate impression which would be created in the US if the Federal Republic, as had 
been reported, were to switch its military procurement towards France. Kiesinger replied -not 
entirely correctly - that this was not seriously contemplated.®3
In a discussion the following day with Foreign Minister Brandt, McCIoy went over much the 
same ground. He was, however, clearly told that there were few chances to get more for the 
UK than the amounts suggested in October 1966.M Back in Washington, McCIoy informed 
the President that the major remaining problem for a successful conclusion of the trilateral 
negotiations was the gap between the German offer and British expectations. The US 
government considered whether it would be feasible to pick up part of the bill. Both 
McNamara and Fowler were against picking up any of. the gap; the latter was still embittered 
that his push for a decisive reduction had failed once more.83 However, after some hectic 
work on possible alternatives, Johnson told McCIoy that he 'would not see NATO go down 
over $40m \ (which was the size o f the gap). He instructed McCIoy to conclude the talk on
c  ibid., p.S41.
"  ibid., p.547.
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the basis of limited reductions86, and to try to get as much out of the Germans before the  
US would put in its own money.87 In the meantime, the British had indicated that they 
would possibly settle for less than 100% offset, that is £60m ($168m), and would limit th e ir 
withdrawals to one brigade in this case.88 All depended now on the German willingness to  
raise their offer. LBJ wrote a letter to Kiesinger urging upon him once more the importance 
of keeping the British forces on the continent.89
The German decision was made during a very heated cabinet meeting on 15 March. Against 
Strauss’ bitter resistance, Kiesinger forced through an increase of the German offer to  
DM400-450m ($100-112m), split equally between military and civilian material.90 T he 
British, under pressure from Washington, decided to count the US help from December and  
the gains from the relocation of US forces from France to Britain as part of the offset, an d  
thus reduced the gap to about $20m. This was a sum the US felt able to pay as a price fo r  
the rapid conclusion of the talks: it promised to procure a corresponding amount of military 
material in the UK.91
After this breakthrough, the only problem remaining was whether the Germans would 
formally accept the American plan to redeploy 35000 men from the 7th army and over 50%  
of its tactical aircraft. Having evaluated the US proposals, the Germans expressed strong 
concern with the huge cut in air forces. They thought it a heavy impairment o f NATO strike 
capacity and the start of a denuclearization of Europe.92 Shortly after Johnson's meeting w ith
For the US: reduction/rotation of one division and three air wings; for the UK: one brigade.
17 LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 50, Record of President's Meeting with McCloy, 9 March 1967.
“  ibid.. Brown to Rusk, 9 March 1967.
*  In this letter, he also requested German cooperation in reserve creation for the monetary system. FRUS 1964- 
68. XIII, 11 March 1967, p.546-49.
10 LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 50, Bonn 10754, 15 March 1967.
*' FRUS 1964-68, XIII, Memcon McCloy-Rostow, 15 March 1967, p.549-50; LBJL. NSF, NSC Histories: 
Trilaterals, Box 50, Bator to President: Trilaterals Status Report, 17 March 1967: Aide-Memoire US Government to  
HMG, 21 March 1967.
n  ibid., Memorandum received from German embassy, 21 April 1967; US Government memo to German 
embassy, 22 April 1967; McGhee Papers, 1988 add.. Box 1, McGhee to LBJ: Suggested Talking Points w ith 
Kiesinger, 25 April 1967; Box 2, Bonn 12415, Discussion with Carstens, 18 April 1967; DDRS 1985/1021, Bonn
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Kiesinger on the occasion of Adenauer’s funeral» the McCloy-State Department faction won 
another victory over McNamara: LBJ decided to cut only 96 aircraft instead of the 144 
planned. Again the argument, that this would make the Germans more forthcoming on 
international money and the Kennedy round, carried the day.93 This settled the last open 
issue and at the end of April a series o f Agreed Minutes was signed recording the results of 
the Trilaterals.94 Regarding troop levels this meant reductions of 5000 men and 2 squadrons 
of aircraft in the case of the British, and 35.000 men and 96 of 216 aircraft in the case of the 
US. One third o f the US forces to be redeployed would always remain in Germany on a 
rotational base. This costly rotation system was soon abandoned. What counted, in the end, 
was that the continuity of the large-scale presence of American and British soldiers in the 
Federal Republic was for the moment secured.
Once more, in a series of closely fought compromises, all sides were able to save their basic 
positions. The British government had assured that their troop commitment in Europe would 
place no strains on the embattled position of their currency. They had achieved a small 
reduction to silence their critics at home. The Americans had been able to present a 
satisfactory solution to Congress, they had managed to avert the danger of a break-down of 
NATO, and had set the Alliance on the way towards a new strategic assessment. Most 
importantly, however, they had with one single big stroke achieved unparalleled cooperation 
by the strongest monetary surplus country, the Federal Republic. The latter had safeguarded 
the traditional security structure and the allies’ adherence to forward defence. They had 
assured the security guarantee of their powerful military allies symbolized by their troop 
maintenance. The Atlantic Alliance, the essential framework for German foreign policy, had 
been preserved.
In hindsight, one is struck by a certain irony inherent in this hard fought result. Most of the 
basic positions which it was to shore up would be swept anyway by inexorable developments.
12730: M cCoy to Rusk, 24 April 1967.
w LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 30, Bator to President, 27 April 1967; Rusk to M cCoy, 27 April
1967.
94 FRUS 1964-68, XIII. p.562-69.
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Sterling would go down in the whirlpool of a new monetary crisis towards the end of the 
year. In November 1967, it was devalued by 14%.95 Pressure on the American currency 
augmented despite German support. The devaluation of Sterling had directed the attention o f  
the markets to the other reserve currency. In early 1968 a new record run on American gold  
reserves started.96 At the end, the American government was forced to abandon the dollar 
gold convertibility for the free market. In a way, this was the end of the dollar gold system 
because most Central Banks had already been negotiated on a dollar standard.
The Federal Republic undertook a major revision o f its policy towards the East which became 
known as Ostpolitik. As a result, the strict dogma against allied troop reductions in Germany 
was dissolved and Bonn achieved new flexibility in its foreign policy.
f) Outlook
These events did not mean the end o f offset. Already at the end of 1967, negotiations for new  
agreements commenced.97 These agreements, continuing until the mid-1970s, were s till 
heavily contested.98 However, a decisive change in their character took place, at least in th e  
American-German context. The Mansfield Resolution in August 1966 was the first shot in a  
prolonged, intensive debate in the United States about the necessity and purpose of its troops 
in Europe, and, in the end, about the US engagement in Europe in general.99 Offset had a n  
important place in this debate. The Nixon and Ford administrations were forced, tike LBJ, to  
demonstrate to Congress that the American troop engagement was, at least regarding th e
** Odell (1982), p.173-8.
*  LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: The Gold Crisis, Box S3, narrative.
91 DDRS 95/2139, Read memorandum for Rostow: US-FRG Military Cost Neutralization Talks, 7 May 1968.
*  On those agreements see: Baumann, 'Devise nans gleich und Sicherheit', in: WEHRKUNDE, Vol.17/1968, 
p.245-251; Boeck/Krägenau, ’ Devise na us gleich und Burden-Sharing', in: WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST, 51/1971, p.91-94; 
Medick, 'Burden-Sharing als deutsch-amerikanisches Problem’, in: Knapp(ed), Die Deutsch-Amerikanischen 
Beziehungen nach 1945,1975, p.188-228; Thiel, Dollar-Dominanz* Lastenteilung und Amerikanische Truppenpräsenz 
in Europa, 1979; Thiel, 'Dollarkrise und Bündnispolitik', in: EUROPA-ARCHIV 28/1973, p.373-381.
99 For this important debate in the US, see: Newhouse J.(ed), US Troops in Europe. Issues, Costs, and Choices^ 
1971; Williams (1985); Yochelson, 'The American Mititaiy Presence in Germany. Current Debate in the US*, in : 
ORBIS 15(1971), p.784-807.
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monetary problem, no burden on the US. The Offset agreements of 1967 and 1968, consisting 
mainly in purchases of Treasury bonds by the Bundesbank100, were not at all helpful in 
calming the heated debate and Mansfield styled them 'the phoniest deal I have ever seen ... 
not sharing cost but making a profitable in v e s tm e n tThe Nixon/Kissinger administration, 
however, accorded to the Atlantic Alliance a much more important place than Johnson. They 
were determined to resist the calls for troop reductions and succeeded in the end despite some 
extremely close votes in Congress. Paradoxically, it was Leonid Brezhnev who provided the 
most valuable help in this effort by agreeing to open negotiations on Mutual Balanced Force 
Reductions (MBFR). This would have made unilateral reductions by the US a gift to the 
Soviets and Congress was hesitant to go this far. Within the logic of ’double containment’, 
Brezhnev’s intervention made even some sense.
The traditional offset approach was finally made completely obsolete by the breakdown of 
the dollar gold system in 1971-73 and the US policy of ’benign neglect’ towards the 
accumulating dollar reserves in Europe.102 The monetary movements during the turmoil in 
the markets were so large that offset measures were not sufficient to stem the tide. The 
unilateral actions by the US government during the currency crises convinced the Europeans 
of the necessity of an independent policy and they undertook an abortive effort to create a 
European Monetary System; their possibilities remained, however, limited.
The Federal government was increasingly unwilling to accede to pressures from the US for 
burden sharing and take on unnecessary burdens only to avoid troop reductions. Helmut 
Schmidt, then Defence Minister, declared in 1970 in the United States: T do not belong to 
the people who start to wince i f  only the Pentagon redeploys a kitchen brigade from  the 
officers' mess in Heidelberg. And /  am the first to admit that essential changes in the 
international situation may justify a revision o f the numbers o f troops needed in Europe. 
There is no dogma that the US troops have to remain once and for ever in the present
See Appendix It.
,m NYT, 19 August 1968. p.9.
102 Cohen B., ’A Bargain Comes Unstuck. The Revolution in Atlantic Economic Relations’, in: Hanrieder(ed), 
The United Stales and Western Europe, 1974, p.406-37.
strength in Europe.,|03 Later, Schmidt termed offset *a camouflage fo r occupation costs, 
which was certainly long outdated\ 104 He used the first opportunity to bury the old offset 
scheme formally. In the summer of 1976 the US government declared itself ready to take such 
a step. It published a common declaration with the Federal Government: *Given the recently 
introduced changes in the international monetary area, specifically flexible exchange rates, 
as well as the notably improved strength o f the dollar and a more acceptable United S ta tes  
balance-of-payments position, the President and the Chancellor consider that the traditional 
offset arrangements approach has lost its relevance*.105
Speech to the Council of Foreign Relations, New York, 8 April 1970, in: BPI 49/11 April 1970, p.466. 
Schmidt H., Menschen und Machte, 1987, p.176.
Keesing AdG 1976, 20373F.
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CONCLUSIONS
Allied troop maintenance in Germany gave rise to a series of problems which underlined the 
interrelation of security and monetary issues in British-German and American-German 
relations. NATO had given security questions a strongly interdependent character. This was 
paralleled by increasing interdependence in the international monetary policies of roughly the 
same countries. Not only the direct evidence of the support cost and offset negotiations but 
also related factors like, for example, the positive influence of foreign troop stationing on the 
German balance of payments (ch.I), the financial consequences of German rearmament (ch.II), 
the allied use of these troops to relieve their payment's balance from serious pressure, or the 
use of the arms trade to balance payments disequilibria, have been cited in this thesis.
The Atlantic security system and international monetary system were two sides of the same 
coin. Changes in one sphere invariably influenced the other. Expansive American security 
policies after the war, whether those were troop commitments abroad, foreign aid, or political 
pressure in the interest of shaping the Alliance, played an essential part in putting the dollar- 
gold system into existence. These policies were only possible in a system which protected the 
US economy from the disruptive effects of its balance of payments deficits. The European 
side of the bargain was military protection and an international environment conducive to 
economic reconstruction and growth. Countries like the Federal Republic, which saw the 
provision of security by the US as essential, would adapt to the monetary system and actively 
support i t  Britain, being less dependent was pursuing a more independent policy, though at 
a high cost
The most fundamental underlying structural change analysed in this thesis has been the slowly 
widening incompatibility of the Atlantic security structure and the international monetary 
system. This became increasingly evident during the 1960s whereas in the 1950s these two 
spheres complemented each other by and large and formed the foundation for transatlantic 
economic and political relations. The monetary system was no more able to cope with burdens 
imposed by expensive American policies abroad, many of which, like troop stationing in 
Germany, had been answers to specific political problems in the 1950s. The tensions deriving
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from fundamental economic changes and, later on, from changes in the Cold War 
environment manifested themselves in the crises of the monetary system. The straw that broke 
the camel's back was probably the burden imposed by the Vietnam War. These changes were 
reflected in the financial problems connected with British and American troop deployments 
in Germany which form the empirical base of the thesis.
The first part of the study concentrated on the British-German conflict, placing it in a variety 
of contexts. The support cost question has only a limited importance if it is seen apart from 
these contexts. The problem of the foreign exchange cost of British troops in Germany has 
to be set in particular in relation to British sterling policy. This policy, emphasizing the role 
of Sterling as the second reserve currency, was placed under heavy strain by fundamental 
British political choices, most notably the maintenance of the remains of Britain's imperial 
past and the attempt to hold on to an independent military posture. In order to fit into the 
Atlantic system as it evolved during the early 1950s, the British would have had to abandon 
the reserve currency role of Sterling, accept a European role, and bring its defence policies 
into line with those of the rest of NATO. Those were the more or less secret hopes of 
American policy-makers. However, the UK was not willing for such a sweeping 
transformation of its traditional policies. It tried to allievate the pressures on its policies by 
reforming features of the Atlantic security system, particularly those related to the defence 
of Europe.
This collided with German interests. The Federal Republic saw in the specific security 
structure which emerged in 1955. that is conventional forward defence under the protection 
of the American nuclear umbrella, the best guarantee of its survival as long as it was not able 
to defend itself autonomously. British policies to reform the structure thus invariably met 
German resistance.
The conflict about troop costs shows this clearly. It derived not primarily from a financial 
problem but from the fundamental ambiguity in British policy about the rationales of its 
security commitment in Europe. British governments never developed a consistent policy 
towards their troop commitment and the perceived imperatives of the Sterling policy provided 
a lasting incentive to withdraw from the commitment, as evidenced in the debate on the
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British White Paper 1957 (ch.III) or, later, during the Trilateral Negotiations o f 1966/67. The 
British monetary argument was strongly interrelated with an emphasis on a cheaper nuclear 
deterrence, a general belief in the economic counter-productivity o f high military expenditure, 
and perceptions of declining East-West tensions.
However, the British efforts to retreat from the WEU commitment failed. Somewhat 
paradoxically, they failed largely because of the political importance the troops had acquired 
despite the British dislike of the commitment. The BAOR had become an essential element 
of the Atlantic security structure. Whether it was pressure from the partner in the 'special 
relationship*, problems of accomodating to European integration (ch.IV), political advantages 
regarding monetary cooperation or problems like the armaments trade (ch.V), on all those 
issues the credibility of the British troop commitment had a strong bearing. Those political 
rationales in favour of a continuation of the troop commitment proved to be extremely 
persistent. In 1967, Sterling was devalued while British troops remained in Germany in 
roughly the same strength until the 1990s. British politicians and the British public in general 
portrayed their troop commitment continuously as a burden and nuisance. This deprived the 
UK of any chance to make a positive use of the troop commitment to reap political or 
substantial economic benefits (ch.IV). The support costs, in any case, had not at all the 
intended effect of stabilizing the British currency.
Troop costs remained an issue in Anglo-German relations until the mid-1970s. The decisive 
part of the German government perceived British policy after 1955 as a continuing series of 
challenges to some of its basic foreign policy principles. The troop reductions debate and the 
British disarmament proposals were interpreted in this way. This was also true for the creation 
o f EFTA. More economic cooperation without a corresponding political commitment was of 
little value for the Federal Republic which was painfully aware of the contrast between 
economic power and limited political influence. This awareness was sharpened by support 
cost conflicts. The major potential leverage of Britain -collaboration in security matters and 
East-West policy- whithered away during these conflicts and other instances in which the 
British displayed their unwillingness to cooperate with the Federal Republic politically, 
economically, and militarily.
Consequently, the Germans were very reluctant to meet the British on European policy or on 
financial matters (ch.IV). They could have done so easily and the increasing strength of the 
German currency provided the Federal Republic with an important lever. Unfortunately, a 
political history of German monetary policy in the late 1950s and the 1960s, which scrutinizes 
the importance o f this instrument more comprehensively, is still lacking and my analysis can 
cover only a few aspects. German monetary power worked often by default rather than 
through a direct use of the financial instrument Bonn (and Frankfurt) collaborated with their 
allies to a higher or lower degree, in a way closely related to political objectives. 
Collaboration with the US thus remained very strong throughout the period under research, 
whereas collaboration with the UK was pursued reluctantly, with many qualifications, and 
often more related to Germ an-American relations than to any objectives in the British-German 
context
Germany’s confrontational policy towards Britain over the support cost issue was made 
possible because the US commitment seemed more or less guaranteed after the Radford plan 
was blocked (and because France provided an alternative to Britain on the regional level). 
However, the relative certainty regarding the American commitment was to wane rapidly in 
the following years, when the US balance of payments plunged into deficit and forced the 
Americans to take a close look at the cost of their security commitments (ch.VH). The 
American response to this predicament, however, was neither a radical reform of their 
monetary policy nor a reappraisal of their security policy. Expedients were sought which 
would offer relatively painless possibilities of perpetuating both the security and the monetary 
systems.
An important part o f the solution were the offset agreements. The first offset agreement was 
not - as most o f the literature suggests in an ex post facto rationalization • the simple result 
of an assertive American use of its security leverage. The agreement was an elaborate 
compromise combining vital interests o f both sides and the Federal Republic obtained 
important concessions (ch.Vm). Only when offset became an institutionalized factor, did 
tensions grow over the years and an increasing gap emerged between American and German 
objectives.
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Offset was an important palliative in place of radical reforms either in the international 
monetary system or in American economic and security policies. It was necessary because a 
decisive breakthrough of the American government in its battle against the balance of 
payments deficit was a long time in coming and because the surplus countries got increasingly 
restive about the dollar glut (particularly France which directly challenged the US).
The receipts from military sales in the framework of the agreements became a vital factor for 
the military payments balance (chJX). Together with the Dillon/Roosa policy of ’peripheral* 
defences for the dollar, offset allowed the US to cany on their expansive domestic and 
military policies and to preserve at the same time the dollar-gold system. Furthermore, the 
offset system served to justify the continuation of an essentially unchanged American security 
commitment in Europe, first against critics within the administration and, after 1966, 
increasingly against Congressional initiatives.
At this point, the interests of the Germans and pans of the American government converged. 
Essential security concerns and important domestic political objectives made a stable troop 
level a central interest of the Adenauer and Erhard governments. With offset payments, that 
is in effect by using German monetary power, they succeeded in perpetuating this status 
despite the powerful counter-current emanating from new strategic ideas, financial constraints, 
Vietnam, détente, etc. In the first years, the offset agreements also provided the Federal 
Republic with important military benefits such as access to advanced military equipment and 
crucial logistic support for the Bundeswehr (ch.VIIl).
The benefits of the offset agreements, however, were increasingly overshadowed by serious 
political and financial disadvantages. Offset became a straightjacket for German foreign policy 
in so far as it impeded military and political cooperation with other countries, particularly 
France, and fostered increasing dependence on the US. The financial burden connected with 
offset limited funds for other government programs, contributing thus to a serious budgetary 
crisis in 1965-67 (ch.X). Constraints also became increasingly visible in the conduct of 
German monetary policy.
However, after the disastrous Erhard visit in September 1966, the Federal Republic saw itself
myimwwmm
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confronted once more with the choice of allowing the erosion of the traditional security 
structure in which its foreign policy was embedded or to bind itself even more strongly to an 
international monetary regime it considered increasingly irrational. Once more, security 
considerations and alliance policy proved overriding concerns. The Blessing letter, even if it 
signified no great change of monetary policy (it robbed the FRG, however, of the option to 
initiate such a change) and even if it was insufficient to preserve the dollar-gold system, 
symbolised the bargain once more: monetary support for security in the framework of the 
Adamic Alliance (ch.XI). However, the turmoil in the monetary markets of the late 1960s 
soon swept these desperate stopgaps away.
The results of the thesis also have shown clearly that German foreign policy in the postwar 
period cannot be understood if solely seen with the approach of traditional diplomatic history 
separating economic and security (or alliance) policies. A perspective linking those two 
spheres has to be included in accounts of Bonn's external policy much more systematically 
than hitherto. Offset provides only one aspect, though an unusually illuminating one.
At the end, one feels strongly that much more needs to be done to place the results of this 
research in a comprehensive framework. Many questions remained unanswered or open to 
revision. An archive-based political history of international monetary relations in the 1960s, 
and of respective policies by essential countries, is the first big gap that comes to my mind. 
The economics o f defence and security policy have not received enough consideration and 
are essential for understanding many security issues of the 1950s and 1960s on which 
innumerable pages have already been written. Only then can the question of the intricate 
relationship between the economy of the Western World and Cold War security policy during 
the first three postwar decades be adequately answered.
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APPENDIX 1:
Table 1: Basic Figures on German Reserve Position and Federal Budget (Defence), 1950-1969 
Table 2: Selected American and British Balance of Payments Figures, 1954-68 
Table 3: Allied Troop Levels in Germany, 1954-68
Table 4: Estimated Foreign Exchange Cost of Allied Troops in Germany as Stated by the 
Sending Countries, 1955-69
Table 5: Military Transactions in the German Balance of Payments, 1952-1964 
Table 6: Bundeswehr expenditure for Material, Maintenance, R&D, 1956-67 
Table 7: Pre-Payment of German Postwar Debts
APPENDIX II:
Support Cost and Offset Agreements between Germany and the Sending Countries USA, 
United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Canada, 1955-1969
note: Figures in the Appendices are cited in the currency in which they appear in the source 
text, if not otherwise indicated. Exchange rates of dollars, pounds, and marks in the 1950s and 
1960s were as follows:
Dollar - DM: September 1949 - March 1961: 1$ = DM 4.20;
March 1961 - October 1969: 1$ = DM 4.00; 
from October 1969: 1$ = DM 3.66
Sterling - Dollar: September 1949: 1£ = $2.80;
from November 1967: 1£ = $2.40.
Sterling - DM: September 1949 - March 1961: 1£ = DM 11.76;
March 1961 - November 1967: 1£ = DM 11.20;
November 1967 - October 1969: 1£ = DM 9.60
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APPENDIX I:
Table 1:
Basic Figures on G erm an Reserve Position and Federal Budget, 
1950-1968 (in billion DM)
German
Currency
Reserves
Gold
Reserves
Doliar-
Reserves
Federal 
Budget - 
Expenditure
German
Defence
Expenditure
1950 0.80 0.63 14.7 4.6
1951 1.91 0.12 1.42 20.9 7.9
1952 3.11 0.59 2.08 23.1 7.9
1953 5.67 1.37 3.54 27.9 7.4
1954 8.77 2.63 5.44 28.2 8.0
1955 10.48 3.86 5.76 29.7 6.1
1956 14.76 6.27 7.30 33.3 7.3
1957 17.58 10.67 6.12 36.3 1 5
1958 20.09 11.09 7.41 40.4 8.8
1959 20.17 11.08 7.26 42.7 9.4
1960 29.59 12.48 14.98 33.1 8.2
1961 28.72 14.65 10.89 52.3 12.9
1962 27.86 14.71 10.79 57.9 17.2
1963 29.52 15.37 11.67 58.8 19.5
1964 28.83 16.99 7.71 65.5 18.8
1965 27.32 17.64 5.17 69.1 19.3
1966 30.72 17.17 8.31 72.5 19.7
1967 30.21 16.91 8.51 80.6 21.6
1968 34.89 18.16 8.56 80.7 18.7
Sources:
col.1-3: (year end figures): Deutsche Bundesbank (ed)t 40 Jahre Deutsche Mark. Monetäre 
Statistiken 1948-87, 1988, p.346.
col 4-5: (until 1959: years from 1 April - 30 March; 1960: 1 April - 31 December; 1961- 
68: calendar years) Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Finanzbericht 1969, p.446-449.
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Table 2:
Selected Am erican and British Balance of Payments Figures, 1954*68
This table is to give some illustration of one of the major developments influencing the events described in the thesis: 
the strain on the American and British monetary po&itio. It can not substitute a commented, comprehensive picture 
of the US and UK balance of payments.
----------UNITED STATES ($ million)-------------  -----BRfTAIN
Liquidity
Balance
Net
Military
Expend­
iture
Total
Reserves
Assets
Gold
Reserves
Current
Balance
d m )
Balance for
Official
Financing
(£ m)
1 T i  
UK | 
Official 
Reserves } 
(Î  m)
1954 -1541
-2460 22978 21793 ♦117 ♦126 2762
1955 -1242 -2701 22797 21753 •155 -229 2120
1956 -0923 -2788 23666 22058 ♦208 •159 2133
1957 +0621 -2841 24832 22857 +233 ♦  13 2273
1958 -3348 -3135 22540 20582 +360 ♦290 3069
1959 -3648 -2805 21504 19507 ♦172 ♦18 2736
1960 -3677 -2753 19359 17804 -228 ♦325 3231
1961 -2252 -2596 18753 16947 ♦47 -339 3318
1962 -2854 •2448 17220 16057 ♦155 ♦192 2806
1963 -2713 -2304 16843 15596 ♦125 -58 2658
1964 -2696 -2133 16672 15471 -362 *695 2315
1965 -2478 -2122 15450 13806 -43 -353 3004
1966 -2151 -2935 14882 13235 ♦113 -547 3100
1967 -4683 -3228 14830 12065 •289 ■671 2694
1968 -1611 -3143 15710 10692 -273 •1410 2421
Sources:
US Figures: column 1: 1954-59: Gross Liquidity Balance; 1960-68: Net Liquidity Balance;
source: Survey of Current Business 10/1972,6/1975, p.26-27,
column 2: Direct Expenditures minus Military Sales; Economic Report of the President 1975, p .350 
column 3/4: Economic Report of the President 1975, p-356.
UK Figures: note: British balance of payments accounts have undergone substantial revisions since the time they
were published first Contemporary figures cited in the text therefore do not coincide with the 
figures in this table which are useful to indicate genera) longterm trends, 
column 5: The Current Balance combines the visible and invisible trade balance, 
column 6: Total sum (current balance ♦  capital transfers ♦net investment and other capital 
transactions + balancing item) that has to be met by (or contributes to) official financing. 
1967/68 figures include special losses due to the devaluation in 1967. High minuses indicate yean 
with strong pressure on Sterling, 
column 7: gold + foreign exchange
source: CSO, Economic Trends. Annual Supplement, 1981, pJ24, 144.
284
Allied Troop Levels in Germany 1954-68 (in Thousands)
T A B L E  3
Year
United States Great Britain 
(BAOR + RAF)
1954 251.5 82.0 (+ 26)
1955 247.6 80.0 (+ 26)
1956 250.3 80.0 (+ 25)
1957 235.2 77.0 (+ 25)
1958 227.8 63.5 (+15.5)
1959 229.7 56.0 (+15.5)
1960 226.5 56.0 (+ 15.5)
1961 232.9 51.0 (+ 8.7)
1962 277.6' 51.0 (+ 8.7)
1963 251.6 51.0 (+ 8 .7 )
1964 263.0 51.3 (+ 8.7)
1965 262.3 51.0 (+ 8.7)
1966 236.7 53.3 (+ 8.5)
1967 215.0 52.0 (+ 8.5)
1968 210.0 52.0 (+ 8.5)
Sources: US 1954-63: NSA, The Berlin Crisis, Doc.1924: USAREUR Report:
The Replacement and Augmentation Systems in Europe (1945-63), March 1964. 
after 63: Nelson, A History o f US military forces in West Germany, 1987, p.8l. 
Mahncke, Amerikaner in Deutschland, 1992, p.138-39.
UK: 1954-63: own compilation on the base of source material in the PRO; 
1963-68: KCA, various years.
1 DDRS 1993/754, Presidents Talking Points for Erhard Visit, 26.12.63 state following figures: 1961 pre- 
Berlin crises 242.000; post-Berlin crises 273000; Dec 1963: 242000
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TABLE 4:
Local Foreign Exchange Cost of American and British Troops in Germany
note: Estimating the local DM cost of Allied troops in Germany was a very complicated task, 
and figures differ considerably from source to source, particularly in the British case. The 
table gives the figures brought forward publicly by the stationing countries. These often do 
not coincide with figures cited in archival sources. Prior to 1955 the local DM costs were 
almost entirely covered by German payments. UK figures below are net figures, excluding 
German payments after 1955. From the US figures, 1955-57, German payments are deducted.
UK forces 
(£ million)
US forces 
($ million)
1955 69 291
1956 64 345
1957 63 479
1958 57 660
1959 51 664
1960 59 649
1961 60 636
1962 68 749
1963 73 691
1964 84 694
1965 84 714
1966 82 770
1967 90 837
1968 94 877
Sources:
UK: 1955-56: PRO, CAB 134/1209, Treasury Note on Organisational and Administrative
Economics, 5 June 1956
1957-63: PRO, FO 371/172175, Stationing Costs of British Forces in Germany: Report 
by Officials, autumn 1963.
1964-68: Keesings Contemporary Archives, various years
1959- 68: Freedman, ’Britains Contribution to NATO*, in: IA 54,1978
US: 1955-59: Mendershausen, Troop Stationing in Germany. Value and Cost, 1968, p.63.
1960- 68: Survey of Current Business, December 1969, p,44.
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T A B L E  5:
Military Transactions in the G erm an Balance of Paym ents, 1952-64
(million DM)
Receipts------------------------------- ---------Expenses-
total
receipts
thereof: 
receipts 
from foreign 
military 
agencies
thereof: 
receipts 
from US 
agencies
thereof:
Arms
Exports
Prepayments 
on Military 
Orders
Arms
Imports
1952 814 814 800 - -
1953 1110 1110 1077 - -
1954 999 999 956 - -
1955 1192 1192 1112 - -
1956 1673 1673 1516 236 4
1957 2519 2519 2130 1741 346
1958 3598 3598 2843 -285 1650
1959 3956 3956 2981 1429 1330
1960 4100 4100 3064 1109 1497
1961 3824 3824 2708 211 1584
1962 4300 4300 3119 - 248 2508
1963 4955 4289 2960 655 -273 4398
1964 4715 4220 2857 439 832 2895
Source: Bundes bank* Archiv B 330/10245, Vermerk: Militärische Transaktionen mit dem Ausland, 25.8.65
note: Receipts do not show the actual amount of foreign exchange needed by the stationing countries in given yean. 
They represent conversions by the stationing countries at German banks. Occupation costs and support costs, that is 
marks used directly by the troops, lowered the total amount of conversions, contrary to ofTset payments. In the years 
after 1955, the stationing countries used turn-over occupation funds, which had not been used during the occupation 
period.
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Foreign and Domestic Bundeswehr Expenditures for M ateriel, Maintenance, and  R&D, 
1956-67 ($ million)
TABLE 6:
Year Domestic US UK France Italy Others Total
1956 339 126 13 18 496
1957 265 301 26 22 6 95 714
1958 530 276 9 32 2 18 867
1959 427 390 28 77 28 91 1042
1960 504 147 17 74 18 173 933
1961 865 226 18 60 38 112 1320
1962 1250 367 50 82 40 177 1966
1963 1278 568 95 134 35 219 2328
1964 1198 530 19 172 51 167 2137
1965 1097 430 23 130 22 120 1823
1966 1162 156 39 106 22 66 1551
1967 1476 222 37 123 13 82 1953
Source: Mendershausen, Troop Stationing in Germany: Value and Cost, 1968, p.132.
note: Once more, the most plausible figures had to be choosen among several widely 
diverging sources. The figures of Mendershausen correspond best to the dispersed data in 
archival documents.
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TABLE 7
Prepaym ent o f German Postw ar Debts
The London Debt Agreement, February 1953, had settled the amount West Germany had to 
repay of prewar debts and reimbursable postwar aid. Due to the positive development o f its 
external account and in connection with payments offsetting the foreign exchange cost o f 
allied troops in Germany, Germany managed to repay these debts earlier than scheduled.
USA(Sm) UK (in £m) France(Sm)
Postwar Aid STEG-Agreement
original debt 1000 200.4 150 11.84
payments on 
schedule until 1961
62.63 183.9 60 4.736
prepayments 1959 150 - 22.5 1.776
status March 1961 78737 163 6 7 3 5328
prepayment 
March/April 1961
587 - 67.5 5328
payments on 
schedule
- 5.9
- -
Status end 1962 20037 10.6
December 1966 - -
-
-
Source: Bundesbankarchiv, B330/10245, Note on German Postwar Debts, 15 January 1963.
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APPENDIX II
Support Cost and Offset Agreem ents between Germany and the Stationing Countries, 
1955-1970
before 1955: 
occupation costs
April 1952 - April 1955 DM 600m/month
1955-56 NATO Finance Convention, Art.IV, amended by Schedule III to the Protocol 
on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the FRG, 23.10.1954
Term: 5.5.1955 - 4.5.1956
Content: Prolongation of German occupation costs:
$762m {DM 3200m) a year
British share: $140m 
US share: S350m
Sources: FRUS 1952-54, V/2, p.1342-43;
HMSO, cmnd,9304(54).
BRITAIN: UNITED STATES: OTHERS:
Support
Cost 29.6.1956 7.6.1956 29.6.1956:
Agreement
Term: 55.1956-31357 Term: 5.656-5557
France (DM278m)
1956-1957
Content: Provisions:
6.7.1956:
Denmark (DM2.275m)
DM 400m support costs; 
declaration of intention by the
DM 650m support costs
10.7.1956
German government to buy Reference: Netherlands(DM0.773m)
British weapons in Britain up 
to $524m/year
KCA 1956, p.15288
20.7.1956
Belgium(DM118m)
Reference: Canada (DM6585m)
HMSO, Cmnd 9802(1956)
Reference: KCA 1956, 
p.15288
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BRITAIN UNITED STATES OTHERS
7.6.1957 7.6.1957 7.6.1957
term: 1.4.1957-31.3.58 term: 6.5.57-5.5.58
Support Cost 
Negotiations content: Content:
Support Costs to
1957-1958 - support costs: DM 588m
- deposit of £75m by the
DM 325m support costs France: DM 225m
BdL at the Bank of England further: US reserves Belgium: DM 59m
to be used for settlement of itself the right to request
outstanding German postwar a supplementary Denmark: DM 1.2m
debt contribution during 1957
- enlargement of the German 
account for arms purchases Reference: BGBL II,
NL: DM 0.4m
at the BoE to £30m 
- intention of Fed*govt. to buy 
a "considerable" amount of 
weapons in the UK
1959, p.41(Wn
Reference:
Reference: BGBL II, 17, 1959,
HMSO, Cmnd 256 (57) 
BGBL, 1959,11, p.414-17.
p.419-431.
BRITAIN UNITED STATES OTHERS
3.10.1958 24 3 .1959
Support Cost 
Negotiations Term: 1.4.1958-3U.196I Term: unspecified
FRANCE
1957-1958
Content:
17.9.1959
- UK declaration to keep 55.000 Content: prepayment Term: unspecified
men in Germany during 1958 and of postwar debts:
45.000 until 1961 SI 50m Content: prepayment of
• support costs: postwar debt (1962-64
DM 141.2m/year in 1958-1960 Reference: instalments): $1,776
- interest free deposit of £50m by (not identified in
German government at the Bank published form) Reference;
of England to be used for BA, B 136/3132, see US
payments of arms orders in Britain Kabinettsvorlage AA,
• advance repayment of postwar 
debts (1962-64 instalments):
£22.5 m
10 March 1959.
Reference: BGBLJ959. II, 545- 
548; HMSO, CmntL588(1958)
Offset Agreements during the 1960s
United States Britain
24.10.1961
term: 1.7.1961-30.6.1963
content: military purchases (S 1425m; DM 5700m) 
reference: AAPD 1963, p.864, fnJ7
6.6.1962
term: 1.4.1962-313.1964
content: Germany makes purchases (mainly arms) to 
the tune of £54m (DM600m) in the UK 
Reference: HMSO, Cmnd.1766 (1962); 
Bundesanzeiger, 8.6.1962
14.9.1962
term: 1.7.1963-30.6.1965 
content: military purchases (S1400m; DM5600m) 
reference: not published; McGhee papers, 1988add, 
Box 2
27.7.1964
term: 1.4.1964-313.1966 
content: undertaking by German government to 
offset British costs ’as fully as possible' 
Reference: BPI, 28.7.1964; HMSO, Cmnd 2434 
(1964)
11.5.1964
term: 1.7.1965-30.6.1967 
content: military purchases ($1.35bn); advance 
payments on military procurement (DM 3.14bn); 
reference: AAPD 1964, p.526,fn.2
20.7.1965
term: 1.4.1965-313.1967
content: renegotiation of previous agreement;
- immediate non-returnable payment of £42m on 
contracts already placed or foreseen
• financing of additional British exports: £45m
- offset for the year 66/67 (£54m) 
reference: BPI 125/1965, p.1009; HMSO, 
Cmnd.2731 (1965)
28.4.1967
term: 1.7.1967-30.6.1968
content: Germany buys mid-term US treasury bonds 
(DM2bn); formal statement by Bundesbank to refrain 
from exchanging dollars to gold 
reference: DOS Bulletin, 22.5.1967; BP1,
47/6.5.1967.
5.5.1967
term: 1.4.1967-303.1968 
content: German purchases of £18m(DM200m) of 
military equipment and £22.5m(DM250m) of civilian 
equipment; £9m (DM 100m) made by private 
German firms
reference: HMSO, Cmnd.3293 (1967)
10.6.1968
term: 1.7.1968-30.6.1969 
content; Offset $785m
(SlOOrn military equipment; SSOOrn Bundesbank 
investment in mid-term Treasury bonds; Lufthansa 
buys Boeing aircraft for $60m) 
reference: BP1 74, 15.6.1968, p.627; DOS Bulletin, 
7/1968, p.14
283.1968
term: 1.4.1968-313.1969 
content: offset of £54m(DM510m)
(£22m defence purchases; £21 m civilian purchases 
by public authorities; £103m civil private purchases) 
- Bundesbank invests about £21m(DM200m) in 
British medium term government bonds 
reference: KCA 1968, 22618;
9.7.1969
term: 1.7.1969-30.6.1971 
content: military procurement (DM 3.2bn) 
renunciation of interest rewards (DM 130m); 
civilian purchases (DM 500m) 
long-term financial transactions (DM 2.25bn) 
thereof: 10-year loan by Federal Government of 
DMlbn; Germany buys claims of the EX1M bank 
and from the Marshall-Plan (DM 475m); debt pre­
payment (DM 175m); direct investment of the FRG 
in the US (DM 600m)
reference: BPI 92, 11.7.1969, p.792; DOS Bulletin, 
4.8.1969, p.92.
22.7.1969
term:1.4.1969-313.1971 
offset: £106m
(£47m defence.purchases; £36m civilian purchases; 
£33m government promoted private civil purchases, 
loan to UK government of DM500m (£52m) at 33%  
interest, repayable after 10 years 
reference: KCA 1969, p.23753-4.
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